MOSCOW'S RESPONSE TO THE DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001400530001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 26, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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I I
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
26 March 1984
MOSCOW'S RESPONSE TO THE DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
Summary
Recent Soviet commentary reflects strong concern that
Pretoria's agreements with Angola and Mozambique threaten to
weaken the USSR's position in these key southern African states
and undermine its efforts to support SWAPO and the ANC. Moscow's
attention has focused much more on Angola than on Mozambique
because the Soviets have a greater investment of resources and
presti e in uand- and a greater ability to affect developments
there.
There has been no visible sign of Soviet pressure on Angola
since the cease-fire with South Africa was signed in February.
This suggests that Moscow, while probably uncertain over Luanda's
ultimate aims, recognizes the utility of the cease-fire to shore
up the MPLA's worsening military position as well as Angola's
This paper was prepared byl the Foreign Policy Issues Branch, Policy
Analysis Divison, Office of Soviet Analysis in response to a request from Frank
Wisner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. It was coordinated
with the Office of African and Latin American Affairs and the National Intelligence
Officers for Africa and the USSR. Comments and queries may, be directed to the
Acting Chief, Policy Analysis Division
SOV M 84-10048CX
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continuing need for Soviet and Cuban military assistance.
Moreover, the Soviets probably view any radical moves as premature
given their belief th South ' a is not willing to relinquish
its hold on Namibia. at~ 7
The Soviets will use their influence in Luanda to try to
obstruct any new moves which would jeopardize their position in
Angola. In the past, they have hinted at their willingness to
replace Angolan President dos Santos, if he failed,to protect
Soviet interests. If the Soviets believed Luanda was moving
toward a Namibia package that included a Cuban troop withdrawal,
they would bring pressure to bear and Derhaus even try to promote
a coup by the MPLA hardliners.
Given the risks and uncertainties inherent in a coup and MPLA
determination to resolve the Namibia question, however, we believe
that the Soviets would ultimately accede to Luanda's wishes.
Moscow would continue to work behind the scenes to maintain the
influence of MPLA hardliners, sustain suspicions of United States
and South Africa, and help the MPLA to carry on the struggle
against Pretoria in other ways.
Soviet Interests in Southern Africa
1. Since the mid-1970s, the USSR has sought to gain an
important regional role by strengthening the power base of the
socialist-oriented regimes in Angola and Mozambique, cultivating
black African support for Moscow's position on broader
international issues, and supporting insurgents who seek to
overthrow the white minority regimes in South Africa and
Namibia. Angola is the key to these objectives because it
provides the USSR with the access to influence the region's
national liberation movements and the ootential to exploit
instability in neighboring Zaire.
Moscow's Response to the Recent Agreements
2. Soviet commentary has focused on the Angolan-South
African cease-fire along the Namibian border. No mention was
made of the nonaggression pact between Mozambique and South
Africa until the day it was signed. An authoritative Pravda
article on 5 March urged "extreme vigilance" upon the front ine
states in their dealings with the US and emphasized that peace in
the region could not be achieved without eliminating the white
minority regime in Pretoria.
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Angol a
3.
amps ng designed to raise ou is about US motives for brokering
the talks between Angola and South Africa and Pretoria's motives
in agreeing to the cease-fire. TASS and Izvestiya have repeated
allegations that the United States and South Africa are engaged
in a duplicitous game intended to alleviate the burden that
military operations are imposing on Pretoria and to provide
Washin n with an election year foreign policy "success."
4. Despite Moscow's uneasiness, there is little evidence
of a strong Soviet effort to stop the Angolan-South African
dialogue. While castigating Washington and Pretoria, Soviet
media have not condemned the Angolan-South African itself.
5. The Soviets may feel there currently is little reason
to dash the talks with South Africa. The recently concluded
cease-fire and South African withdrawal from southern Angola have
diminished the security threat to the MPLA government--Moscow's
most important regional client; indeed, the worsening military
situation prompted the Soviets to send record levels of arms in
1983. If the cease-fire holds, moreover, the Angolans and Cubans
could focus all of their energies toward the UNITA insurgency.
The Soviets may have misgivings about temporarily leaving SWAPO
in the lurch, but preserving the regime in Luanda is a more
important short-term priority.
6. The Soviet reaction to the Angolan-South African
dialogue notwithstanding, Moscow's overall position on Namibia
remains unchanged. The Soviets continue to call for a unilateral
withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia and
implementation of UN 435. They also continue to criticize any
formula which links Namibia to the Cuban troop presence in
Angola, stating that the Angolans and Cubans can consider the
issue of a troop withdrawal only after Namibia is independent and
the security threat to Angola is eliminated. Havana and Luanda
reaffirmed their opposition to the linkage formula duri
President dos Santos's recent visit to Cuba. F 7
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oscow as mounted a press
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Mozambique
7. In contrast to the publicity accorded the Angolan
cease-fire, Moscow only belatedly acknowledged the security
accord between Mozambique and South Africa. We believe the delay
reflects Soviet displeasure with Machel.
8. Machel's rapprochement with Pretoria clearly undercuts
Soviet interests and prestige; it tarnishes Maputo's
revolutionary credentials and opens up new opportunities for
Western inroads in Mozambique. More importantly from Moscow's
perspective, it diminishes the already limited capabilities of
the African National Congress and thus obstructs the USSR's long-
term objective to undermine the white minority regime in
Pretoria.
9. The Soviets evidently tried to dissuade Machel from his
rapprochement with Pretoria, reportedly alternating the threat of
oil cutbacks with offers of free oil in an effort to do so.
Moscow, however, never has been willing to make aid commitments
commensurate with Maputo's economic needs. The issue of economic
aid has loo been a source of friction in Soviet-Mozambican
relations.
10. The Soviets nonetheless have acquiesced in Machel's
policy shift, at least partly because they have less at stake in
Mozambique as compared to Angola. Soviet prestige, for example,
is not linked to the survival of the Machel regime, whereas it
was a Soviet and Cuban intervention that brought to power--and
sustained--the MPLA in Angola. Moreover, the Soviets would have
difficulty obstructing Machel in any event because they do not
have the degree of access and influence they enjoy in Luanda
11. Nonetheless, Moscow clearly has not written off
Mozambique. President Machel was accorded high-level attention at
the Andropov funeral in mid-February; the Pravda account of his
meetings with Politburo member Tikhonov and Deputy Foreign
Minister Il'ichev noted that prospects for further development of
bilateral relations were favorable.
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Soviet Prospects and Options
12. Given the deep-seated nature of regional tensions, the
UNITA threat, and Moscow's belief that South Africa remains
unwilling to relinquish Namibia, the Soviets probably view the
current talks as unlikely to lead to a Cuban withdrawal from
Angola. Recent public statements by pro-Soviet MPLA hardliners
Lucio Lara and Paulo Jorge suggest that some in Luanda see the 25X1
current cease-fire and South African withdrawal as an end in
itself and that no decision has been reached on any steps beyond
a cease-fire. We believe Moscow may share this assessment. lul
14. Nonetheless, Machel's about-face in Mozambique probably
has heightened Moscow's sensitivity to the possibility that
developments in Luanda could also evolve in a way damaging to
Soviet interests. Should the Soviets become suspicious about
dos Santos's ultimate aims in dealing with Pretoria, they are
likely to exert direct pressure on him as they have done several
times in the past,
15. The Soviets would react more strongly if the cease-fire
was the first step toward a Namibia settlement that included a
phased-withdrawal of the Cubans. With the Cuban combat troops
gone, the Soviets would lose much of their leverage in Luanda.
It is true that if IJNITA were actually cut off from its South
African supply lines and the MPLA concentrated its military
efforts solely on IJNITA, Angola would continue to be dependent on
the USSR for additional military support. Moscow, however, would
hardly be sanguine about such a strategy given Luanda's inability
to defeat UNITA in the past, when it had up to 30,000 Cubans to
bolster its cause.
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16. In the event dos Santos assembled a coalition which was
prepared to move on the US Namibia package and reconcile with
UNITA, the Soviets could:
-- Use disinformation and propaganda and active measures to
exploit Angolan fears that Pretoria and the US are
colluding to force a UNITA-MPLA coalition government (or
even worse, a UNITA seizure of power) in Luanda.*
-- Press SWAPO to step up its activities inside Namibia in
hopes of turning Pretoria sour on a Namibia settlement.
-- Encourage or promote a coup in Luanda, in hopes that a
successful power-grab by pro-Soviet hardliners would
result in a?more confrontational approach toward South
Africa and the SWAPO issue.
Disinformation might succeed, given the historical suspicion and
distrust between Pretoria and its Black African neighbors. On
the other hand, it would probably be ineffective if both Luanda
and Pretoria were determined to reach a settlement. The Namibian
insurgents would welcome additional Soviet arms support to step
up their activities; Moscow, however, would have difficulty
supplying SWAPO. without its traditional Angolan conduit. Even if
a pro-Soviet coup succeeded, it might further split the party and
weaken the military, with the attendant effect of strengthening
the position of Savimbi and his UNITA insurgents.
17. These options, however, fail to take Angola beyond the
basic dilemmas that prompted it to respond to South African
overtures in the first place. If the USSR succeeded in
destroying the recent gains, South Africa could resume its
pressure on Luanda by re-entering southern Angola and stepping up
aid to UNITA, which, in turn, would create a security crisis much
like the one which prompted Moscow to send record levels of arms
to Luanda in 1983. Moscow may be prepared to up the military
ante--as it warned the South Africans last November--in part
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because Luanda's oil earnings have minimized Soviet and Cuban
financial costs in Angola. The Soviets are unlikely, however, to
pick up the economic assistance burdens as the Angolan economy
becomes a total shambles.
18. We believe that if the Angolans resolve their internal
debate on Namibia and decide to proceed with the US package
settlement--even one which led to a reconciliation with UNITA--
the Soviets would try to dissuade them, but would ultimately bow
to Luanda's wishes. The Soviets presumably would seek strong
assurances that Luanda would retain its leftist political
orientation and its close bilateral ties to the USSR. In that
case, Moscow would continue its military assistance relationship
to maintain a stake in Angola.
19. Moscow probably would seek to put a positive face on
such a settlement, noting Luanda's continued leftist orientation,
US recognition of the MPLA (albeit in a coalition with UNITA),
and the honorable intentions of the Cubans, claiming that they
had eliminated the South African security threat and then left
when requested to do so. Moscow might go so far as to claim that
the Namibia settlement represented a victory for the Cubans and
the MPLA. While continuing to cultivate Luanda, the Soviets
would turn their attention to independent Namibia--presuming a
SWAPO electoral win--in pursuit of new opportunities for
influence and penetration.
20. There is some slight evidence that the Soviets may be
positioning themselves for such an.eventuality In December, for
example, officials from the Africa Institute and the Foreign
Ministry told a visiting US academic that a military solution was
not possible in Angola and that peace could only succeed with the
formation of a coalition--though both officials had doubts about
Savimbi's role in such a scenario. Increasing candor in the
Soviet press about Angola's precarious economic condition
seemingly suggests that Moscow recognizes that the MPLA may take
some dramatic steps to resolve an increasingly untenable
position.
21. In comparison to Angola, Moscow's future options in
Mozambique are much more limited as a result of Machel's dramatic
about-face in his dealings with South Africa. Still, the
friendly reception accorded Machel during his February trip to
Moscow reflects the USSR's desire to maintain a role and presence
in Mozambique. We believe the Soviets will try to sustain the
military assistance relationship--as they have in Tanzania and
Guinea--despite the recent setback to their interests. It is
unlikely, however, that they will make new economic assistance
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commitments while Machel continues to accommodate Pretoria.
Moscow, for example, has shown little sympathy for Mozambique's
plight during the current drought; in contrast, the Soviets have
highlighted recent food aid commitments to the Sandinista regime
in Managua.
Containing the Problem
22. Elsewhere in southern Africa, Moscow-will try to foment
and exploit new tensions to undermine South African diplomacy and
to sustain the long-term struggle against white minority rule in
Pretoria. Toward this end, the Soviets will try to channel
additional assistance to SWAPO and the ANC wherever possible.
Moscow, for example, could try to use its diplomatic presence in
Botswana to facilitate efforts to support the ANC.
Impact of Soviet Moves on the Soviet-Cuban Relationship
24. We believe Havana would ultimately bend to Moscow's
wishes on the Angolan situation, whether it be to send additional
combat troops or to disengage from Angola entirely. Although
tensions and differences could emerge if, for example, Castro
felt the USSR had sold out in Angola or used the Cuban troop
issue as a pawn in the bigger game of US-Soviet relations, the
Soviet-Cuban relationship would remain largely unchanged because
Havana's economic and military dependence upon the Soviet Union
is so great.
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SUBJECT: Moscow's Response to the Diplomatic Challenge in
Southern Africa
SOVA/PA/F/I I(26 March 1984)
Distribution:
Copy No.
1 - SOVA/PA/F
5 - SOVA/PA/F Subject file
10 - DDI 7E47 HQS
11 - NI0/USSR-EE 7E62 HQS
12-13 - NIO/AFRICA 7E62 HQS
14-18 - OCPAS/IDCD/CB 7G07 H QS
19 - ALA/AFRICA 3F25 HQS
20 - ALA/AFRICA 3F25 HQS
21 - ALA/CUBA HQS
22 - D/SOVA
23 - DD/SOVA
24-25 - AC/SOVA/PAD
26 - C/CSD
27 - C/CS/C
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SUBJECT: Moscow's Response to the Diplomatic Challenge in
Southern Africa
Distribution:
Copy No.
2 - Mr. Frank Wisner
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs
Bureau of African Affairs
6234 Dept. of State
3-4 - Mr. Robert Cabelly
Bureau of African Affairs
6234 Dept. of State
6 - Mr. Fred Wettering
NSC
Room 368 EOB
7 - Ms. Karen Puschel
INR/SEE
6510 Dept. of State
8 - Mr. Leonardo Neher
INR/AA/S
Room 4635 Dept. of State
9 - Ms. Joan Seaworth
INR/AA/S
Room 4635 Dept. of State
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