AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001302470001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 26, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

sanitized copy Approved tor Kelease 2U11/U4/U4 : UTA-KUF- b I UU2ti/KUU1:3U24/UUU1-b
Directorate of -SecF6t-
Intelligence
Afghanistan Situation Report
79-81- IMC/CB
SL
NESA M 84-10321
SOVA M 84-10225
26 December 1984
copy 79
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302470001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302470001-6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302470001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302470001-6
THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN: FIVE YEARS LATER 1
Neither the USSR nor the resistance has gained a decisive edge in the
fighting. The insurgents are fiercely determined to oust the foreign
invader fran their homeland and cannand the support of almost the
entire Afghan population. But the Soviets almost certainly believe
they will ultimately force the Afghans into the Soviet empire.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office
Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis.
26 December 1984
NESA M 84-10321
SOVA M 84-10225
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302470001-6
 Bukhar
G
z8
JSheberghi eALKH Wharf-8
JOWZJAN~
?~ , ~ ~emengiid
Now hag{bcHer~o
Gh afdeyz.`~
PAKTIA
HAZazfif
T1,(~ _
Zareh
Sharai
i PAKTIKA
~ashkar Ga
HELM
_and i
OyebMt
[ITI
"Sandemanl
y
amen a = ;. A, f
PAKISTAN
Afghanistan
International boundary
Province boundary
* National capital
Province capital
Railroad
Road
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302470001-6
as_
Boundary tnpredantaeon Is
26 December 1984
NESA M 84-10321
SOVA M 84-10225
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302470001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302470001-6
Five years into the war in Afghanistan, neither the USSR nor the resist-
ance has gained a decisive edge in the fighting, and both sides appear
determined to continue the struggle. The insurgents, stronger now than at any
time since the invasion, are fiercely determined to oust the foreign invader
frwn their homeland and command the support of almost the entire Afghan popu-
lation. But the stakes are high for the Soviets, and they almost certainly
believe they will ultimately subdue the resistance.
The Developing Insurgency
Since the invasion, the fighting has gradually spread to all areas of the
country. Guerrilla attacks against military supply convoys, outposts, and
installations during 1978 and 1979 in central Afghanistan and in the provinces
along the Pakistan border had threatened the Communist government and probably
prompted the Soviet invasion. The Soviets easily gained the upper hand in the
cities, but the insurgency spread to the northern and western provinces. We
estimate that now the insurgents hold complete sway in at least two-thirds of
26 December 1984
NESA M 84-10321
SOVA M 84-10225
The insurgents, who in the beginning were little more than ragtag bands
fighting with antiquated weapons under traditional leaders, have gradually
become more sophisticated and effective. New leaders like Panjsher commander
Masood in Kapisa Province, Zabiullah Khan in Balkh Province, and Abdul Haq in
Kabol Province are improving guerrilla tactics and organization and beginning
the country and are active to some degree in the rest.
to fashion new political structures in their home areas.
In our judgment, the number of insurgents is growing.
we estimate the number of full- and part-time insur-
gents to be at least 150,000, up from an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 in
January 1980. Despite selected Soviet reprisals against villages suspected of
harboring resistance fighters, support for the insurgents among Afghans
remains high. Most travelers from Afghanistan report that insurgent morale is
also high despite five years of war. These travelers say that many more
Afghans want weapons.
The intensity of the war-as in all guerrilla struggles-varies in
different areas and at different times of the year. Some commanders-such as
Masood or those close to supplies in Pakistan-maintain fairly constant
pressure on government outposts and cleverly attack convoys. Others, because
of a lack of nerve, ammunition, or weapons, only occasionally challenge the
Communists. Some Afghans simply wait for their enemies to make the first
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302470001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302470001-6
On the whole, insurgent capabilities have improved markedly, especially
in the past two years.
- The number of attacks on cities has increased significantly. Rocket
barrages on Kabul are more frequent, and security in Herat and
Qandahar remains tenuous. The resistance has also been able to
disrupt the Afghan economy with attacks on power and
supply/distribution systems.
- Resistance capability to counter Soviet and Afghan airpower has
improved. We estimate that the Soviet and Afghan Air Forces have lost
over 500 aircraft in combat since the invasion with losses increasing
little by little in the last two years. This year the insurgents for
the first time brought down a Soviet IL-76 transport.
- Many insurgents appear to be making better use of heavy weapons,
mines, and nontraditional tactics.
Insurgent Limitations
The resistance remains far from a coherent national movement. It is
still in large measure a spontaneous rebellion of a large number of ethnic
groups, villages, and tribes. Traditional rivalries among tribes, clans, and
religious factions, together with personal hatreds, still cause bloody
fighting and in many areas prevent much military coordination.
The resistance also is hampered by weak political leadership. The
absence of an organization able to speak for the resistance as a whole limits
its efforts to influence international opinion, to have a direct voice in
negotiations on an Afghan settlement, to ensure continued diplomatic and
material support, and to coordinate military efforts.
Although the insurgents are better supplied than in the past, many groups
still lack sufficient arms and ammunition, especially to deal with Soviet
airpower. Many insurgents are virtually untrained and have little knowledge
of explosives or modern weapons. The ability to adapt to Soviet strategies
and vulnerabilities derives much more from combat experience of individual
groups than any knowledge of guerrilla doctrine.
The Soviet Military Effort
The Soviets have successfully achieved their goal of sustaining the
Babrak regime, but they have been unable to inflict more than temporary set-
backs on the resistance or to substantially reduce insurgent pressures. The
Soviets' unimpressive showing against the insurgents has resulted in part from
an apparent effort to minimize costs and casualties. The number of Soviet
troops has grown slowly since the invasion from 85,000 to 110,000. We
estimate casualties have reached 25,000 and direct military costs are running
26 December 1984
NESA M 84-10321
SOVA M 84-10225
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302470001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302470001-6
at some $3 billion a year. The Soviets and Af hans have lost sane 660
aircraft in combat and in accidents. F 7
An unimaginative and often, rigid counterinsurgency strategy has contrib-
uted to the Soviets' lack of success in thwarting the insurgents. The Soviets
generally have relied on stereotyped search and destroy operations, that often
allow the insurgents to escape-before initial assaults.
The Afghan military, inept to begin with, has shown no significant
improvement. Desertions and casualties aggravate manpower problems caused by
insufficient conscription. We estimate that 30,000 men desert each year from
the 50,000-man force. Shortages of equipment, low equipment readiness rates,
and the inability of many soldiers to use available equipment exacerbate tht
Afghan Army's problems.
:Nor is Moscow having success in, resolving the split in the Afghan ruling
party. factionalism-rooted in social and
ethnic differences-has resulted in assassinations, armed clashes, collabora-
tion with insurgents, and diversion of government leaders from the tasks of
formulating and implementing government policy.
Soviet Frustrations
frustration over the lack
of progress in Afghanistan is high among middle level Soviet officials.
Actions the Soviet leadership took in 1984 to improve the effectiveness of the
Soviet military in Afghanistan and step up pressure on Pakistan indicate that
Good evidence suggests that the war has unfavorably affected attitudes
and behavior of Soviet citizens. It has led more citizens to dodge military
service, introduced Soviet youths to new forms of drug abuse, fed long-
standing ethnic tensions, increased working-class resentment of intelligentsia
privileges, provided new opportunities for corruption, and intensified popular
the leadership shares these concerns to some extent.
cynicism about regime propaganda.
. Soviet actions in Afghanistan have reinforced international perceptions
of Soviet aggressiveness; prompted additional Western, Chinese, and Japanese
defense efforts; made Third World nations suspicious of Soviet intentions; and
hampered Soviet efforts to exploit the Nonaligned Movement
26 December 1984
NESA M 84-10321
SOVA M 84-10225
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302470001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302470001-6
How the Soviets View the Situation
Moscow has been slow in coming to grips with the real nature of the
problem. This is partly because of overly optimistic progress reports from
Kabul and partly from a reluctance to admit that the majority of the Afghans
do not want a Marxist revolution. Officials in charge of implementing Soviet
policy in Afghanistan still allege slow progress is being made and that within
another year or two the resistance will be essentially under control.
Despite the frustrations and difficulties in fighting a resilient and
elusive foe in Afghanistan, there is no indication that the Soviets see their
situation as desperate or that Soviet resolve is flagging.
the leadership at the outset did not anticipate that pacifying
The US Embassy and Western journalists based in the USSR report that the
majority of the elite and the man in the street in Moscow appear to accept the
leadership's security rationale for Soviet involvement and view the war as a
Afghanistan would be a long-term proposition.
The Soviets clearly find the international political costs acceptable.
The :international community imposed unprecedented economic and political
sanctions on the USSR because of the invasion, but after five years, nearly
all of the countries that cooled relations with Moscow have resumed normal
necessary evil.
political and economic contacts.
The Soviets almost certainly believe-that any
move to withdraw without securing the Marxist regime would substantially
weaken their international posture and encourage the West to step up its
pressure on Soviet interests around the globe. Victory in Afghanistan, on the
other hand, would add substantially to the USSR's image as an effective super-
power that had succeeded in a power grab against a neighboring state. And the
Soviets would have enhanced military capability to intimidate other regional
states.
Outlook
We think Soviet confidence about getting the resistance under control is
unwarranted and that the USSR will need to maintain sizable forces in
Afghanistan for years to come. In the near term, the Soviets will probably
continue their economy of force strategy, doing no more than necessary to keep
abreast of improvements in insurgent capabilities and stepping up pressure on
Pakistan through further cross-border attacks. Moscow probably anticipates
that improved insurgent effectiveness will impact only slowly and unevenly on
Soviet forces and that even with better arms and training, the insurgents will
be unable to inflict a major defeat on Soviet forces.
26 December 1984
NESA M 84-10321
SOYA M 84-10225
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302470001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302470001-6
Further augmentations in Soviet forces are likely. We believe there will
be no more than 5,000 to 10,000 additional troops in the coming year.
Reinforcements of 20,000 to 40,000 troops are possible, however, if Moscow
moves decisively to neutralize recent gains by the resistance. Modest
increases in air and ground force capability are also likely. Tactical
adjustments, such as more aggressive use of Soviet troops and greater reliance
on small-unit actions, are likely, but they will be constrained by Moscow's
desire to hold casualties to a minimum and by Soviet officers' lack of
flexibility and initiative.
In our judgment, the insurgents will improve their effectiveness through
better training and weaponry. Despite social, political, and ethnic
differences, the insurgents are likely to improve interregional military
cooperation gradually. Political unity, however, is likely to remain
elusive. They will remain unable to engage the Soviets head-on in positional
Prospects for a political settlement on Afghanistan will remain dim as
long as both sides are confident that time is on their side. We believe
Moscow will continue to use the UN talks on Afghanistan to counter
international criticism and probe for concessions by Islamabad.
26 December 1984
NESA M 84-10321
SOVA M 84-10225
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302470001-6
 Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302470001-6
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302470001-6