(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001302360001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 27, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
GO)
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
27 November 1984
Saudi Reaction to Growing Moderate Coalition
Summary
Saudi Arabia favors the strengthening and coalescing of
moderate Arab forces, but its support for a moderate
alliance would be low-key and tempered by Syrian
intimidation. If such a coalition actively promoted a major
peace initiative rejected by Syria, we believe Riyadh would
serve as the link between moderate and radical players and
urge both sides to compromise. Saudi Arabia would not
publicly associate itself with the initiative, however, and
its ability or willingness to influence events would be
limited.
The Scene
The re-establishment of relations between Jordan and Egypt, the
meeting of the Palestine National Council despite Syrian objections, and
recent moderation in Iraqi foreign policies fuel speculation that a
moderate Arab coalition is emerging. An alliance of these states and
Arafat's forces could remain amorphous and cooperate only on overlapping
regional interests, or could develop into an activist coalition that pushes
or backs a regional peace initiative. In either case, the question of
Saudi involvement and support will be crucial.
This paper was prepared by the Persian
Gulf Division, Office of Near astern and South Asian Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf
Division, NESA,
NESA M 84-10305
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Riyadh's Role
Saudi Arabia would view favorably the strengthening of moderate forces
in the region and the weakening of Syrian influence. Riyadh, in our view,
fits in comfortably with the amorphous group of Arab moderates that already
share the following goals:
-- A commitment to support Iraq in its war with Iran.
-- Support for the moderate camp of the PLO, currently led by Arafat.
-- A steady reintegration of Egypt into the Arab mainstream and Arab
organizations. The Saudis are not out frond his issue, however,
in the absence of Arab League consensus.
-If this tacit, moderate alliance continues to move quietly on these
issues, we believe Riyadh will play a positive, but backstage, role. If
such a coalition grows closer and takes a higher public profile, however,
Riyadh probably will calculate that its security interests are better
served and protected by maintaining its distance from the group, at least
in public.
Syrian opposition to a cohesive, moderate coalition would be the
principal impediment to Riyadh's open participation. The Saudis probably
would calculate that they would be the most vulnerable member of the
coalition to the heavy-handed pressure tactics of the Syrians and other
radicals. Crown Prince Abdallah stated to the US ambassador in Riyadh last
week that Syria must be made a part of any peace effort. The Saudis
probably fear that an active moderate coalition would prompt Syria to apply
direct pressure on Riyadh, cause trouble in Lebanon, and increase its
cooperation with Tehran and the Soviet Union.
The Saudis also would be concerned that their financial assets might
be the object of manipulation by other members of such a coalition.
Already cautious about doling out aid to their Arab allies because of lower
oil revenues, the Saudis would expect members of the alliance to rely on
Riyadh for the financial wherewithal to achieve political objectives.
There are other aspects of an Egyptian-Jordanian-Iraqi axis that would
cause apprehension in Riyadh. The Saudis do not favor the formation of
formal regional alliances because the mercurial nature of Middle East
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politics can quickly turn allies into enemies. Riyadh sees itself
surrounded by regional superpowers--Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Iran--and
protects its interests by working to ensure that an effective counterweight
exists to any one or combination of these states. If an Egyptian-
Jordanian-Iraqi axis should form, Riyadh might even try to strengthen Syria
in order to balance the Middle East equation.
Implications for the US
The United States could expect the Saudis to quietly encourage the
moderates to proceed cautiously with a peace initiative, subtly argue the
moderate case to the Syrians, urge both sides to compromise, and serve as
the link between moderate and radical players. Saudi Arabia might also
offer financial inducements to the radicals for a moderation of their
positions but would not be willing to "punish" radicals by threatening a
cutoff of aid.
Saudi Arabia realizes that it would be subject to criticism in the
United States for its unwillingness to join a moderate front, and that this
could be used destructively by opponents of advanced US weapons sales to
Riyadh. Because they pay cash for major weapons, however, the Saudis do
not feel obliged to link political issues with weapons sales. Although the
Saudis try to limit potential negative fallout from their foreign policy
positions, Riyadh would not, in our view, be willing to substantially alter
on any important regional issue in exchange for more F-15s.
The Saudis, however, could take steps to enhance their image in the
United States, perhaps by publicly reiterating their commitment to a
peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, providing high profile
financial assistance to the IMF or countries allied with the United States,
nr irscoring their efforts to stem Soviet encroachment in the region.
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SUBJECT: Saudi Reaction to Growing Moderate Coalition
Distr ibut ion:
Copy 1 - Robert Pelletreau, State
1 - James A. Placke, State
1 - Arnold L. Raphel, State
1 - DDI
1 - NI0/NESA
1 - C/NID
1 - C/ PDB
1 - C/ PE S
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/NESA
2 - NESA/PPS
6 - NESA/PG
DDI/NESA/PG/P I (27 Nov 84)
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