AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001302350001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 27, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Afghanistan Situation Report
Top Secret
NESA M 84-10304CX
SOYA M 84-10204CX
27 November 1984
Cony 1 1
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27 November 1984
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A recent upsurge of emigration by educated Kabulis is caused by
regime pressure to join the ruling party. 0
most Afghan
leaders and insurgents fight to free their villages and local
areas of foreign troops, and join a larger fundamentalist or
moderate exile group to get weapons and supplies. Religious
ideology plays a subordinate role in most groups. The
fundamentalists have the largest following because they receive
more external aid, are better or 7d, and are fighting more
effectively than the moderates.
27 November 1984
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This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
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According to US Embassy reports, a recent upsurge in .
emigration of educated Kabulis has resulted, from regime. pressure
to join the ruling party or lose their jobs. The UNDP reported
difficulty finding suitable replacements for white-collar staff
members who had fled. Afghan employees of other embassies and
successful Afghan businessmen were also among those, who had left
Kabul or were planning to leave for Pakistan and India.
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Most educated Afghans fled the country after the Communist
takeover in 1978. The few who remained probably have cooperated
with the regime only to maintain their livelihoods. Their exodus
is likely to increase the inefficiency of the bureaucracy and, if
the Communists continue to have problems developing cadre, slow
the growth of Communist control. F1
-- Insurgent forces in Kabul fired 24 rockets in 45 minutes
during the middle of the night of 25 November, according to US
Embassy reports. The attack, one of the most intense since the
Soviet invasion, occurred in the face of recent Soviet efforts to
upgrade Kabul's security.
27 November 1984
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FUNDAMENTALISTS AND MODERATES IN THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE
Why Afghans Fight
Interviews with Afghan leaders and insurgents in Pakistan indicate
that many insurgents are motivated primarily by a desire to free their
villages and valleys of foreign troops. Others are fighting for
national freedom and independence. Belief in Islam drives a smaller
number, and some fight because war offers booty or plunder.
The interviews also indicate that the majority of guerrillas belong
to small, self-contained units that do not often require outside
support. Some insurgents, however, join a larger political
organization usually one of the six main exile groups headquartered in
Peshawar.
Potential guerrilla fighters sometimes approach these groups as
individuals, but more often they come in small bands organized along
traditional kinship or tribal lines. In the traditionally structured
Afghan society, most insurgents follow their village, tribal, or ethnic
leaders, who decide which group their men will join.
There are a number of advantages to association with a larger exile
organization:
-- These groups offer materials, mostly arms, that are not
available from other sources, especially antitank and
antiaircraft weapons. The interviews indicated that there are
many more men ready to fight than can be armed and that the
resistance organizations can accommodate only a fraction of the
potential insurgents.
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-- The main insurgent groups in Pakistan offer an organizational
structure. They can offer tactical leadership and training as
well as networks of communications in the field to help
coordinate guerrilla activity.
-- Some resistance organizations in Pakistan offer an ideological
base that is important to some of the guerrillas. F-1
The Fundamentalists
The fundamentalists have the largest following. The interviews
indicate that they are generally younger, better organized, much better
financed, and benefit from their connections to the Muslim Brotherhood.
Fundamentalist leaders generally come from the urban middle and lower
classes of Kabul; many were students or facult at Kabul University.
They are suspicious of both East and West.
The fundamentalists seek to reorder Afghan society on Islamic
principles. The extremists among them favor an Iranian-style government
and society in Afghanistan. Others are less doctrinaire, open to
compromise, and, like the moderates, acknowledge the need for
coexistence with the USSR and have ties with Afghan exiles in the West.
The fundamentalists' appeal is based on more than 'religious fervor.
-- They are better connected with fundamentalist groups in
Pakistan and -throughout the Islamic world, especially the Gulf.
These groups funnel resources to the fundamentalists in
preference to the moderates. Guerrilla leaders looking for
resources to fight in Afghanistan are naturally drawn to those
with the most to offer.
-- The fundamentalists have a better and more established
organization than the moderates, having left Afghanistan to begin
'fighting in 1973-74. ' Most moderates left Afghanistan in 1978.
-- The fundamentalists now have the upper hand in much of the
fighting, and many guerrilla commanders want to be on the side of
the winner.
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Burhanuddin Rabbani of the Jamiat-i-lslami, unlike the, leaders of the
other groups, is non-Pushtun, and tends to attract other non-Pushtuns to,
his organization. Non-Pushtuns make up more than half the Afghan
population. Many Westerners and Afghans also see Rabbani as more
reasonable than the other fundamentalist leaders, who are often
intransigent and bellicose, especially Gulbuddin. Yunus Khalis attracts
followers because he is a traditional religious leader, and because he is
the only exile leader who actually' fights in Afghanistan with his men.
The moderates, like the fundamentalists, cover a wide political
spectrum, but on the whole are more religiously tolerant, acknowledge
the need for compromise with the USSR, and maintain good connections
with the former landowners and ruling classes, as well-as with Afghan
exile communities in the West. Unlike the fundamentalists, most
moderates would . be satisfied with restoration of the traditional
monarchical system of government that existed in the 1 960s; they favor
the return of former King Zahir Shah. The moderate leaders were part of
the former ruling elite in Afghanistan and have become the. center of the
resistance movement for those who were part of that social scene.
Moderate supporters include former government ministers, other - .
officials, and school teachers. Because the ruling elite was rooted in
a tribal-based system, the moderates have better ties to tribal leaders
still in Afghanistan.
The relative disorganization of the moderates is both a liability and
an asset. They have overlapping command structures that seem to
frustrate rather than facilitate decisionmaking. They favor friends and
relatives for leadership positions rather than effective leaders. They
make no effort to coordinate their fighting in Afghanistan, and the
leaders themselves seem more concerned with their religious standing
than with running effective guerrilla operations. Many potential
followers undoubtedly become exasperated with the chaos.
On the other hand, many of the guerrilla bands who come to Peshawar
from Afghanistan would prefer to join an organization that imposes few,
if any, restrictions. This is especially true of bands from rural areas
where guerrilla activities are already organized around kin, tribal, or
village structures. Such bands are interested primarily in obtaining
27 November 1984
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arms. The moderates' access to arms is less than that of the
mentalists, but they also can provide equipment and ammunition.
Based on the interviews, we believe the fundamentalists' influence
and strength among insurgents will grow while the influence of the
moderates will continue to decline. However, the moderates will remain
an important influence, particularly in the eastern provinces, because
of their tribal connections and support from West European Afghan
exiles.
-- The fundamentalists are part of an international Islamic
revitalization that is gaining increased followings throughout
the Middle East, especially among the young.
-- The fundamentalists are vigorous and bold and have great
appeal among Afghan youth in the refugee camps.
-- The moderates represent to the new generation the old elite
that failed to lead the country and thus opened the door to
Communism.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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