INDIA: THE SIKH CHALLENGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001302310001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 6, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302310001-3
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Summary
Sikh discontent is the most serious domestic
problem facing new Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. His
decisions on the problem in the next few months will
have a major impact not only on law and order
nationwide and internal security in Punjab state--the
Sikh homeland--but also on his electoral prospects and
the course of New Delhi's relations with Islamabad.
Rising Sikh-Hindu violence, the campaign against the
ctovernment by extremist Sikhs, and growing public
criticism compelled his mother to place Punjab state
under Army control in June. Her death at the han~3s of
her Sikh bodyguards reflected the outrage among even
moderate Sikhs over the Army's assault on Sikh temples
that had been used by extremists as both sanctuaries
and arsenals.
Hindu reprisals against Sikhs outside Punjab for
Indira Gandhi's assassination have increased the
likelihood of still more Sikh dissidence, seaaratism,
and perhaps terrorism--despite the national
government's massive counterinsurgency campaign in
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of 25X1
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was coor inated with
Directorate of Operation.- Information as of 5 November 1984 was
used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be addressed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA ~ 25X1
25X1
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302310001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302310001-3
Punjab. The likely influx of refugees from neighboring
states probably also will exacerbate Hindu-Sikh tension
in the state.
To forestall renewed violence, Rajiv is likely to
retain emergency security measures and the Army in
Punjab for at least the next few months, even though
the scope of its involvement there goes against the
Army's apolitical grain. In the longer term, he will
have to risk losing support among northern Hindus by
trying to conciliate moderate Sikhs with an acceptable
political settlement if he is to avoid being identified
with his mother's pro-Hindu reputation. Otherwise, he
may have to keep the reluctant Army in indefinite
control of Punjab.
Rajiv has as yet not adopted his mother's pattern
of seeking foreign as well as domestic scapegoats for
the prolonged strife--and the resultant strains in New
Delhi's relations with the United States and
Pakistan. His reaction to the Moscow's disinformation
campaign implicating Washington and Islamabad will
shape his administration's ties with all three
countries. He will in addition have to contend with
Islamabad's fears that New Delhi has used the
disturbances in Punjab as an excuse to deploy military
forces there unrelated to the Army's internal security
mission--a concern that we share.
In recent years, rising sectarian tension throughout India
has posed a growing challenge to New Delhi, but the intensity of
regional and religious concerns among Sikhs in a key border state
will make their discontent Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's most
difficult domestic problem. The Sikhs--a minority in India but a
majority in Punjab--have long sought to stave off political,
religious, and social assimilation by the growing Hindu
population in the state. Since 1981, moderate Sikh leaders
associated with the Akali Dal Party have directed their efforts
at trying to secure greater regional autonomy for Punjab state,
their homeland, and special religious concessions for their
coreligionists there. Their demands, however, were ignored
because the government wanted to avoid making special religious
or political concessions to the Sikhs that would set off a chain
of similar demands from other regional and religious leaders
around the country.
Radical religious revivalists, however, outflanked the
moderates--and are likely to increase their sway among Sikhs
still more in the wake of the recent Hindu attacks on Sikhs. In
our view New Delhi's repeated delays of promised negotiations
helped discredit moderates who favored a negotiated settlement
and fueled the rise of extremists. The extremists have built
their following among young Sikhs on an anti-government, anti-
Hindu stance and are associated also with the movement for a
separate Sikh nation. The new religious dimension of the Sikh
-2-
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302310001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302310001-3
agitation in our view has polarized mar.v Sikhs agains*_ the
"Hindu" national government and dimmed prospects for a political
resolution of regional demands.
India's 15 million Sikhs--about 2 percent of the national
population--are disciples of their ten "gurus" (teachers),
beginning in the fifteenth century with founder Guru Nanak and
ending with Gobind Singh, who died in 1708. Nanak preached an
austere monotheism that discarded the fatalism, caste system, and
worship of idols associated with Hinduism, as well as the
intolerance and fanaticism of the then-dominant Muslim ruling
class.
Nanak's successors shaped his foll.owina into a social and
religious community with its own institutions and conventions,
including commitment to the wearing of hair and beard unshorn.
Unlike Indian Muslims and Christians, the Sikhs are not treated
as a separate religious community in the Indian constitution.
Most Sikhs have maintained close ties with the majority Hindus,
including frequent intermarriage, but relations between the two
religious groups have been severely strained by the recent
Military Crackdown: Asserting National Authority, Cutting
Po itica Losses
Indira Gandhi's decision to send in the Army against Sikh
militants in Punjab last May was an admission that her political
strategy to defuse the crisis had failed and that she was willing
to take real risks now to quell the three-year-old
disturbances. The paramilitary troops she had sent earlier had
failed to bring the well-armed extremists to heel. Her initial
reluctance to deploy regular troops probably resulted from both
the Army's aversion to involvement in internal security duties
and her concern over how the large number of Sikhs in the
service--about 10 percent of troops and 20-30 percent of the
officer corps--would react.
Several security-related considerations probably impelled
Gandhi to send in the Army:
-- She likely decided that the stepped-up terrorism by Sikhs
and their threat to blockade vital grain shipments from
Punjab posed an intolerable threat.
-- She feared that separatism was gaining ground among the
Sikh majority in Punjab) 25X1
-- She may have believed that Pakistan was preparing to take
advantage of the turmoil in Indian Punjab to seize
territories in northern India .I
Gandhi probably hoped also that her crackdown would undo
some of the damage to her political standing that had resulted
from mounting religious violence elsewhere in the country.
According to Indian political analysts, she wanted to show the
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302310001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302310001-3
majority Hindus, whose votes she sought, that she was willin4 and
able to assert government authority even at the cost of
alienating an important religious minority. Many Hindus believe
she has been too generous with minorities and too tolerant of
In our view, the scope of New Delhi's security initiatives
in Punjab made clear Gandhi's determination to eradicate Sikh
dissidence. Beginning in late May, the government:
-- Placed Punjab under Army control, imposed a news
blackout, and initially, banned travel to and from the
state.
-- Expanded the government's national security powers--
enabling it, for example, to set up in Punjab and other
disturbed states special courts for the trial of
dissidents.
-- Ordered military actions against some 40 Sikh temples
believed to serve as sanctuaries and arsenals for
extremists--including the sacred Golden Temple in
Amritsar.
-- Authorized the arrest of an estimated 5,000 suspected
Sikh dissidents, including moderate leaders. New Delhi's
White Paper on Punjab blamed the success of the
extremists in part on acquiescence by the moderates.
-- Announced that it would deal severely with Sikh soldiers
who had rebelled against their officers in several parts
of the country, apparently in response to rumors of
atrocities against Sikh civilians by security forces in
Punjab.
The unrest in Punjab in our view also provided Gandhi with a
justification for augmenting her military forces in a critical
border state. We estimate that between mid-May and mid-June, the
Army deployed 20,000-25,000 troops to Punjab from adjoining
regional commands to reinforce the more than 100,000 Arm
More Sikh Dissidence Likely
In our judgments Sikh alienation from the government in the
wake of the crackdown in Punjab--and now, the Hindu attacks on
Sikhs outside Punjab--will result in long-term resistance to New
Delhi's policies. A poll conducted by a respected Indian
publication in early July in four major cities outside Punjab
revealed that 55 percent of the Sikhs--compared with only 6
percent of Hindu respondents--considered the Army assault on the
-4-
SECRET
,25X6
25X1
2ox~i
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302310001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302310001-3
Golden Temple unjustified. Forty-two percent of the Sikhs, but
only 11 percent of the Hindus, believed that Sikhs should protest
in response.
Anger among Sikhs over the military action in Punjab so far
has been directed principally against New Delhi--culminating in
the asssassination of Indira Gandhi--but we believe Sikh outrage
still could rekindle violence against Hindus in the state,
particularly in light of Hindu violence against Sikhs since the
assassination. According to press reports, Sikhs at home and
abroad since June had demonstrated, attacked Indian Government
property, and in some instances, publicly threatened to
assassinate senior Indian officials. In Jammu-Kashmir, some
Sikhs retaliated against Hindu shrines as well as government
installations for the alleged pro-Hindu bias of Indira Gandhi's
policy in Punjab.
We believe that Rajiv will find it difficult to conciliate
moderate Sikhs without evoking a backlash from militants claiming
the mantle of the late extremist leader, Bhindranwale. Young
extremists foiled Indira Gandhi's efforts in late September to
stem growing Sikh unity against her government by removing troops
from the Golden Temple, according to press reports. The
militants took over the temple and raised the separatist banner
of Khalistan, forcing the government to send paramilitary forces
into the temple. In our view the incident presages the emergence
of a new militant Sikh leadership that will complicate eventual
efforts by moderate Sikh spokesmen--such as former member of
parliament Amarinder Singh--to reestablish a dialogue with New
Rajiv: Limited Leeway for Policy Changes
We judge that Rajiv Gandhi faces an unpalatable choice
between retaining extraordinary security measures in Punjab to
prevent an upsurge of violence before the national election due
to be held by the end of January, and attempting--with little
likelihood of success--to conciliate an angry minority group
whose dissidence poses a long-term challenge to stability in a
key border state. Rajiv may decide for several reasons--as his
mother apparently had--tom delay attempts at negotiations with
moderate Sikhs until at least after elections:
-- Anger among Hindus in the Hindi-speaking northern states
over his mother's asassination probably will make him
reluctant to offer concessions to the Sikhs publicly lest
he lose Hindu votes.
-- He may believe--as we do--that Sikh leaders would be
unwilling at this time to risk losing the support of
their coreligionists by accepting a compromise with the
government.
-- He probably has already written off Sikh votes and may
therefore believe he has little to lose by postponing a
response to Sikh concerns until after the election.
Rajiv maX choose--as his mother did in the past--to hold
secret discussions with some moderate Sikh leaders,
-5-
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302310001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302310001-3
including those still in detention, in an effort to pave
the way for future negotiations.
Sporadic terrorist incidents are likely to recur and will
continue to embarrass the government and cause concern for the
safety of government officials--particularly Rajiv Gandhi and
President Zail Singh. The assassination will likely compel the
government to step up security still more and restrict the public
activities of targeted persons. Sikh dissidents also have
hijacked Indian airliners twice in the past three months. Since
June, militants have breached the walls of major canals in
Punjab, damaged railway tracks, roads, and buildings, and
assassinated several government supporters and officials,
'
according to press reports.
Punjab and the National Election
Sikh discontent could affect both the timin and the outcome
of the national election, which is to be held before February.
Rajiv probably would prefer to proceed with elections in January
to capitalize on the current groundswell of sympathy. He could,
however, be forced to postpone them because of growing sectarian
violence as well as disorganization in his Congress Party's
election campaign. He could do so by using a constitutional
loophole that would permit him to extend the life of the lower
house of parliament by six months or by declaring a state of
Even if Rajiv does not postpone elections nationally, he may
decide to delay voting in Punjab to avoid violence. Postponing
the parliamentary elections in one or two states would not
invalidate the results of voting elsewhere, but a close contest
could raise questions about which party will lead the nation
aft~ting takes place in the states where it was delayed.
Punjab has in our view already contributed to shifts of
allegiance among religious minorities--Muslims as well as Sikhs--
that may endanger the Congress Party's hold on power. In recent
months, the perception that his mother was biased in favor of
Hindus has cost the party support among Muslims as well as Sikhs,
clouding electoral ros ects in some constituencies, according to
reliable observers.
Rajiv probably already has written off Sikh votes in the
coming national election. He may lose several parliamentary
seats as a result, but the impact of changing Sikh allegiances on
state politics is likely to be even more significant, according
to political observers. Indian press reports indicate that
growing Sikh chauvinism is eroding the Sikh support that has kept
the Congress Party in power in Punjab for 15 of the last 18
years. Sikh votes could sweep the Akali Dal or a coalition of
the national government's efforts to end dissidence in Punjab.
Sympathy for Rajiv may not gain him enough new support to
offset likely losses among Sikhs and Muslims. Staunch northern
Hindus may see Rajiv's efforts to protect Sikhs from further
-6-
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302310001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302310001-3
reprisals as a rejection of his mother's appeals to Hindu voters
over the past year. Any moves toward reducing sectarian tensions
by conciliating moderate Sikhs also will, in our judgment, risk
losing Hindu votes.
The Pakistan Factor
Rajiv inherits a government whose publicly expressed
suspicions of Pakistani support for militant Sikhs have strained
relations with Islamabad. Senior officials have publicly claimed
Pakistan--although they have not produced this evidence.
Despite the Indian .charges, we do not believe the Pakistan
Government has provided training to Sikh militants--in part
because Pakistan fears that New Delhi might retaliate
militarily. Officials of the World Sikh Organization told US
diplomats in Bombay late last summer that even when
representatives of their organization asked Pakistan's President
Zia for assurances of asylum, citizenship, and property rights
for Sikh refucaees, he merely advised them to avoid antagonizing
Pakistani officials, for their part, have indicated
to US diplomats their concern that since June, the Indians have
used the unrest in Punjab as cover for a substantial buildup
there of forces and weapons unrelated to internal security
requirements or efforts to seal the border with Pakistan--a
concern we believe is justified.
Implications for the United States
The direction of Rajiv's foreign policy remains unclear, but
if he blames India's domestic problems on outsiders--as his
mother did--Sikh unrest will continue to create problems in US-
Indian relations. Indira Gandhi repeatedly charged that support
from Sikhs living in the United States, as well as Canada, the
United Kingdom, and West Germany, was responsible for the growth
of Sikh separatism. She also publicly implied possible US
intelligence involvement with Sikh dissidents, although she
backed off sled by journalists to clarify her
statements.
Rajiv may choose to dissociate himself from reports carried
in the English-language Indian press implicating Washington in
his mother's assassination. The reports in our view replay
Soviet disinformation, which also has a1laaPr7 ;dint involvement
by Washington and Islamabad in Punjab.
privately acknowledged several months ago a ew e i a no
evidence of US complicity, and New Delhi's July "White Paper" on
Punjab avoided naming the foreion countries alleged to have aided
Sikh dissidents.
-7-
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302310001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302310001-3
Internal Distribution:
Original - DDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/EA
1 - C/PES
1 - D/NESA
1 - C/SO/D/NESA
2 - C/SO/S/NESA
1 - DDO/NE ~ 25X1
1 - DDO/NE 1X1
1 - CRES 25X1
1 - CPAS
1 - PDB Staff
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
2 - NESA/PS
2 - NESA SO S Branch
DDI/NESA/SO (6 Nov 84) 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302310001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302310001-3
SUBJECT: INDIA: THE SIKH CHALLENGE
Major General Kenneth D. Burns, USAF, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Room 4D765,
Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301
Mr. George S. Harris, Director, Office of Analysis for Near East-
South Asian, Department of State, Room 45422, Washington, D.C.
20520
Robert A. Peck, Deputy
Eastern and South Asian
Assistant
Affairs,
Secretary,
Department
Bureau of
of State,
Near
Room
6244,
Washington, D.C. 20520
Darnell Whitt, Intelligence Adviser to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, Room 3E228, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
20301
Dov S. Zakheim, Deputy Assistant Under Secretary of Defense f_or
Policy/Resources, Department of Defense, Room 3D777, The
Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301
Commander Ronald P. Zwart, US Navy, Near Eastern anc? South Asian
Affairs, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense,
Room 4D476, The Pentagon, Washington, n.C. 20301
_o_
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302310001-3