AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 16, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
Directorate of
Intelligence
Afghanistan Situation Report
re
NESA M 84-10284CX
OVA M84-101 75CX
16 October
A n
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01302200001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
i ur ac6nc i
AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
EFFORTS TO HALT CROSS-BORDER TRAFFIC
The latest Soviet effort to block insurgent supply routes is
likely to fail.
RECENT BORDER STRIKES
Soviet or Afghans have attacked Pakistani territory at least six
times since August. F1
PERSPECTIVES
THE AFGHAN INSURGENTS AND MEDICAL CARE
Insurgents suffer from a lack of trained medical personnel,
medical facilities, and medical supplies.
MOSCOW SHARPENS RHETORIC ON PAKISTAN'S ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN
Increased Soviet pressure was signaled by an editorial in June
and dramatized by Moscow's account of Gromyko's meeting with his
Pakistani counterpart at the UN.
16 October 1984
NESA M 84-10284CX
SOVA M 84-10175CX
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85TOO287ROO1302200001-5
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern
and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis.
Questions or comments on the issues raised in the publication
16 October 1984
NESA M 84-10284CX
SOVA M 84-10175CX
u
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85TOO287ROO1302200001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
vadz ko z` T81o'gtp Eshkham1
~~neeargnsi BALKH fhari "1
~~ ayman 1 t SAMANGAN/, i
LfN -\
}ashkar Gh
/ HELM.
PAKISTAN
addhad
Afghanistan
International boundary
Province boundary
* National capital
O Province capital
~-'-{- Railroad
Road
0 oU 100 150 200 Kilometers
4
0 50 100 150 200 Miles
t~~~. '61SrInpQar'_"
16 October 1984
NESA M 84-10284CX
SOVA M 84-10175CX
m
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
EFFORTS TO HALT CROSS-BORDER TRAFFIC
Babrak Karmal announced in mid-September an Afghan Politburo
decision to close Afghanistan's border with Pakistan to
insurgents. Since that time, Soviet forces have been
establishing ambush positions and mining insurgent infiltration
routes through Lowgar and Paktia Provinces,
Given the rugged terrain, insurgent familiarity with alternate
routes, and current troop levels, we doubt the Pak-Afghan border
can be closed. Moreover, the Afghan regime has had little
success with propaganda, and tribes are notorious for taking
bribes and continuing to help the insurgents. Soviet and Afghan
measures, however, have sometimes forced resistance convoys to
use longer and more hazardous trails.
16 October 1984
NESA M 84-10284CX
SOVA M 84-10175CX
1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
16 October 1984
NESA M 84-10284CX
SOVA M 84-10175CX
2
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
TOP SECRET
-- The US Embassy in Kabul reports that the UN is considering
reducing its personnel in Kabul because of increased insurgent
rocket attacks. Such a reduction would be a serious blow to
Afghan Government claims that Kabul is calm.
-- According to the French charge in Kabul, Jacques Abouchar, the
captured French journalist, admitted at a press conference on 11
October that he had entered Afghanistan illegally, but denied
that he had aided the resistance. At the press confe, an
Afghan official said that Abouchar would be tried. erenc
-- The minister-counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Kabul told a 25X1
West German diplomat that he represented the Soviets at the third
round of Geneva talks. Previous re orts had indicated that the
Soviets had not been at Geneva.
-- Kabul Radio reported last Thursday that nine insurgents have
been sentenced to death for setting off a bomb at Kabul Airport
on 31 August. F__]
16 October 1984
NESA M 84-10284CX
SOVA M 84-10175CX
3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
Iur .awnLI
-- According to official Pakistani figures, 2,658,725 Afghan
refugees were in Pakistan on 31 August, 205,019 less than a year
ago. refugees are still fleeing
Afghanistan and that the refugee population is growing. The
official figure--which we believe is still inflated--declined
because of a recount in the North-West Frontier Province.
Pakistani officials expect a recount in Baluchistan to bring a
further reduction in the official total. n
16 October 1984
NESA M 84-10284CX
SOVA M 84-10175CX
4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
The insurgents in Afghanistan suffer from a lack of trained medical
personnel, inadequate medical facilities, and inadequate medical
supplies. Much better treatment is available to them in Pakistan and,
to a lesser degree, Iran, but often requires arduous travel. Better
medical care inside Afghanistan would make the insurgents a more
effective fighting force and probably would improve their motivation as
well.
Even before the Soviet invasion, Afghans suffered from extremely poor
medical care. According to international health surveys made in-the
mid-1970s, only 15 percent of the rural population had access to
government health services--one of the lowest ratios in the world. The
surveys showed that 40 percent of the population suffered from
respiratory diseases, including tuberculosis, and from intestinal
parasites. Afghans generally did not live long enough to die of cancer
or heart disease; most died of measles, dysentery,. or pneumonia.
Since the invasion, medical conditions have become even worse.:
Afghan insurgents must contend with infected gunshot and shrapnel wounds
of the limbs that often require amputation; if the wounds are serious.
enough; insurgents sometimes must be transported hundreds of kilometers
for treatment in Pakistan or Iran. Insurgents also suffer from exposure
because of poor shelter and long marches in cold and hot weather..
Exposure, poor diet, and the stress of combat also aggravate the wide-
spread respiratory and intestinal diseases in Afghanistan. The parents
and children of insurgents, who sometimes accom an insurgent bands, are
even more vulnerable to exposure and disease.
Nearly all insurgent groups in Afghanistan suffer from a lack. of
trained medical personnel, inadequate medical facilities, and inadequate
medical supplies. few. insurgent.
16 October 1984
NESA M 84-10284CX
SOVA M 84-10175CX
5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
groups have regular contact with trained doctors or nurses, many of whom
have fled the country, been drafted into the Afghan Army, or work in
cities. Most insurgents either receive medical care from paramedics who
have had rudimentary training in Pakistan or with the Afghan Army, or
from totally untrained personnel--often mullahs--who are only qualified
to clean wounds and recite prayers.
Insurgent medical facilities and supplies are also poor.
medical instruments are primitive and
electricity nonexistent. Surgery is often performed with inadequate
pain-killers and disinfectants. Even when medicines are available,
insurgents usually cannot read those. labeled in foreign languages; pills
are often handed out without any understanding of their curative
functions. Opium is used, as it has been for generations, to treat a
wide variety of ailments.
The Cities and Eastern Afghanistan
25X1
25X1
Medical care appears to be somewhat better in the Afghan cities and
in the eastern part of the country.
for example, the medical situation is fairly good in Herat
City. Insurgents operate three clinics with 35 beds, a staff of 19
trained medical personnel, and a training facility where doctors teach
first aid. A team of three doctors travels by motor bike to treat
seriously wounded insurgents in outlying areas of Herat.
25X1
medicines can also be relatively easily
25X1
purchased in Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif, the country's fourth largest
city,
25X1
the medical situation is poor in Qandahar because o
25X1
the extensive fighting that has taken place there.
25X1
The medical situation in eastern Afghanistan is generally better than
elsewhere in the country because of the proximity to Pakistan and Kabul.
many insurgent bands have received
drugs and bandages purchased in Pakistan, and some bands see traveling
Afghan doctors fairly regularly. Some of the Afghan doctors are funded
by the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, whose director told the US
Embassy in 1983 that it had set up nine mobile clinics of which eight
were in the eastern provinces.
16 October 1984
NESA M 84-10284CX
SOVA M 84-10175CX
6
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
European Medical Personnel
Young European doctors and nurses, most of whom are French, provide
some of the best medical care for the insurgents in Afghanistan.
the Europeans, who treat both
insurgents and civilians, perform major surgery, particularly amputation
and appendectomies; establish inoculation programs, particularly for
tuberculosis; treat lesser illnesses; and train paramedics.
Insurgents have much better access to adequate medical personnel,
facilities, and supplies when they can get to Pakistan and, to a lesser
degree, Iran. One US diplomat, who has served in the border area,
reports that Pakistani officials say that Pakistani and Afghan doctors
and nurses are fairly numerous there. The diplomat believes that the
Pakistani doctors, at least are generally competent, although the
nurses are less so. 77
Medical facilities are also fairly good in the Pakistani border area.
According to the same diplomat, the Red Cross operates two hospitals
16 October 1984
NESA M 84-10284CX
SOVA M 84-10175CX
7
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
lug 01610111 61
expressly for Afghans wounded in fighting. The facility in Peshawar has
a surgical unit with 100 beds, a rehabilitation unit for paraplegics
with 100 beds (50 are reserved for Pakistanis), and an artifical limb
unit with about 50 beds; a smaller hospital in Quetta has 60 beds.
Insurgents also use Pakistani hospitals and clinics run by the UN,
Western organizations, and several insurgent groups, and clinics funded
by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 0
Medical supplies are available in quantity in the Pakistani border
area. According to the US diplomat, medicine manufactured in Pakistan
is both plentiful and cheap. Wheel chairs manufactured in Pakistan are
also available.
Insurgents are taking better advantage of medical facilities in
Pakistan, in our view. insurgent
leaders are more familiar with the expanding facilities across the
border than in the past. Insurgents also benefit from Red Cross
ambulances that have been stationed at five points along the border
since 1984 and which rush wounded insurgents to Peshawar. Vehicle-
owning entrepreneurs, moreover, have increased taxi service between the
Afghan border and Peshawar.
Insurgents who are seriously wounded in the western Afghan provinces
are sometimes sent to Iran for treatment.
the wounded are transported to Mashhad, the largest nearby
town in Iran, where they are treated by Afghan doctors.
Better medical personnel, facilities, and supplies in Afghanistan
would make a major contribution to the Afghan insurgency. It would also
reduce the necessity of transporting insurgents, often hundreds of
kilometers, for medical treatment in Pakistan and Iran. Many wounded
insurgents die during these arduous trips, often from gangrene. The
discrepancy between the quality and availability of medical care in
Pakistan and in Afghanistan, in fact, probably discouraged some
insurgents from risking combat far from the border.
Better care for insurgents and their families would also improve
morale. Insurgents who knew that adequate medical treatment was
available probably would be more willing to risk combat and fight
16 October 1984
NESA M 84-10284CX
SOVA M 84-10175CX
8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
i ur awnc i
aggressively once in combat. Similarly, an insurgent who knew that
someone in his insurgent group could provide competent medical care and
useful medical supplies to his family would respond with gratitude and
loyalty. Adequate medical treatment is an integral part of a well-
developed insurgency.
16 October 1984
NESA M 84-10284CX
SOVA M ;,4-10175CX
9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
I ur pLt.nc ^
MOSCOW SHARPENS RHETORIC ON PAKISTAN'S ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN*
Moscow has notably sharpened its public criticism of Pakistan for its
alleged support of Afghan insurgents. Increased Soviet pressure on the
issue was signaled in June in a rare PRAVDA editorial article on
Pakistan and was dramatized more recently in Moscow's acerbic account of
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's 20 September meeting with his
Pakistani counterpart at the United Nations. =
According to the official TASS account, Gromyko delivered an
unusually sharp rebuke to Pakistani Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan during
their regular meeting in connection with the opening of the UN General
Assembly session. For the first time at such a meeting since the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Gromyko reportedly charged that
Pakistan was "expanding" its "interference" in Afghanistan through
connivance in armed raids and warned that such actions "cannot but
affect" Soviet-Pakistani relations. Gromyko also called upon Islamabad
to display the "necessary realism" to encourage progress at the UN-
sponsored indirect talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan and affirmed,
as he has in the past, that the Soviet Union favors a "political
settlement of the situation around Afghanistan." sa
From 1980 through 1982, Soviet reports on comparable meetings have
included Moscow's charge that Pakistani territory is being used to
launch attacks into Afghanistan. None previously, however, had
portrayed an escalation of the Pakistani role. The PRAVDA account of a
10 June 1983 Gromyko-Khan meeting in Moscow was even milder, omitting
16 October 1984
NESA M 84-10284CX
SOVA M 84-10175CX
10
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
charges about Pakistani responsibility for hostilities and suggesting
positively that an Afghan political settlement would create "more
favorable conditions" for the development of Soviet-Pakistani
relations.*
Gromyko did not refer directly to Pakistan in his 27 September
address to the UN General Assembly, but his traditional call for a halt
to "outside interference" in Afghanistan was couched in sharper terms
than in recent years. As reported by TASS, Gromyko denounced the "foes
of the Afghan people" for "forming, arming, and infiltrating"
antigovernment "gangs of bandits and saboteurs" into Afghanistan. The
opening Soviet address to the General Assembly last year referred less
dramatically to "military incursions" and "outside interference." ? In
1982 Gromyko called for a halt to "armed intervention from the outside."
He last referred to Pakistan's role directly in his 1981 speech, when he
accused Pakistan of serving as the "main bridgehead" for "armed
intrusions."
Accusations of Pakistani involvement in an expansion of hostile
activities in Afghanistan was raised authoritatively earlier this year
in a 29 June PRAVDA editorial article. Taking particular note of the
visit to Pakistan in May by Vice President Bush, the editorial article
charged that during the Reagan Administration, Pakistan had been
transformed into a base for aggression against Afghanistan "on a far
broader practical footing than it was by that government's
predecessors." The Vice President's visit, PRAVDA asserted, heralded an
increased arms flow to Afghan insurgents and is evidence that
Washington, with Islamabad harnessed "even more firmly to its chariot,"
seeks not a normalization but a "further exacerbation" of the situation.
The editorial article elevated a number of familiar Soviet charges
against Pakistan to a more authoritative level and accused the Pakistani
leadership of pursuing policies incompatible with the security interests
*Gromyko's failure to attend the UN General Assembly meeting in
September 1983 meant that no comparable meeting with the Pakistani
foreign minister took place at that time. F--]
16 October 1984
NESA M 84-10284CX
SOVA M 84-10175CX
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
of South Asia and against the interests of its own people.
Specifically, PRAVDA charged that:
-- Pakistan is acquiring arms beyond its legitimate defense
needs, thereby posing a direct threat to India.
-- Pakistan has granted the United States access to military
bases in Pakistan, which in turn are assigned a "key" role in US
military plans in the region.
-- Islamabad is becoming "one of the main points of US
imperialist strategy" and is doing so "not by dint of
circumstance but in accordance with the conscious political
choice of the country's present leadership," which is attempting
to forge a new Middle East alliance involving Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, and Iran.
16 October 1984
NESA M 84-10284CX
SOVA M 84-10175CX
12
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5
Top Secret
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001302200001-5