PAKISTAN'S DEFENSES OPPOSITE AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001302020001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 31, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
31 August 1984
Pakistan's Defenses Opposite Afghanistan
Summarv
Islamabad's concern about the Soviet military
threat from Afghanistan has increased, but because the
Pakistanis remain most concerned about India, they have
maintained only relatively modest defenses opposite
Afghanistan. The Pakistanis would have difficulty
reacting Quickly to Soviet or Afghan airstrikes or
heliborne assault raids in the frontier region and
could not resist large-scale Soviet or Afghan
operations in their territory without significant US
support. They could, however, inflict high casualties
on Soviet or Afghan forces in ambushes or chance
encounters--particularly if enemy forces operated for
long periods in Pakistani territory. Pakistan has
asked the United States for radar surveillance aircraft
and early delivery of advanced air-to-air missiles.
This memorandum was prepared bvl Ithe
Pakistan/Afghanistan/Bangladesh Branch, South Asia Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Office of Soviet Analvisis. Information as
of 31 August 1984 was used in its preparation. Questions and
comments should be directed to Chief, South Asia Division, at
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Senior Pakistani officials have told US officials they
believe the Soviets intend to increase military oressure on
Pakistan because of their growing frustration and higher combat
losses in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis view the 13, 14, and
23 August bombinq attacks in the Parachinar area and the cross-
border artillery fire of 18, 19, and 21 August as deliberate
attempts by the Soviets to press Islamabad before the UN-
sponsored indirect talks on Afghanistan resumed in Geneva on
24 August. The Pakistanis assured US officials that Pakistan was
determined to defend its territory against Soviet attacks and
would stand firm on its principles at the Geneva talks despite
the increased military pressure. They asked for increased US
support--includinq radar surveillance aircraft and early delivery
of advanced air-to-air missiles--military equipment to strengthen
Pakistan's defenses opposite Afghanistan.
The Air Threat
Airstrikes against suspected insurgent camps and supply
lines in Pakistani territory would be the most likely Soviet
military actions to threaten Islamabad in the next year. As in
the past, most of the air attacks probably would occur in the
Parachinar area--an important area for insurgent infiltration
into Afghanistan--or in remote regions of the Pakistan Tribal
Areas along the border. If the Soviets were to mount frequent
airstrikes into Pakistani territory, they probably would fly MIG-
23 fighter patrols on the Afghan side of the horrRer durina the
attacks to deter or respond to Pakistani aircraft. In the event
of a major airstrike, Soviet MIG-23s probably would try to ore-
vent a Pakistani response by flying patrols near Peshawar and
Quetta airbases in Pakistan.
Pakistan's Air Defenses
Pakistan would be unable to conduct an effective defense
against Soviet or Afghan air incursions in the border region.
The Soviets have some 12 SU-25 attack planes, 30 modern MIG-23
fighters and 30 SU-17 fighter-bombers at Bagram, Kabul, and
Qandahar airbases in Afghanistan that could be used in cross-
border air attacks; the Afghan Air Force has some 30 SU-17/22
fighter-bombers and 40 MIG-21 fighters at these airbases. The
Pakistan Air Force has only some 40 F-6 fighters and 15 A-5
attack planes opposite Afghanistan even after being strengthened
in the last year by the deployment of a second F-6 squadron to
Quetta and the formation of a new A-5 squadron at Peshawar to
supplement the F-6 squadron already there. The F-6 squadron at
Mianwali in central Pakistan also could respond to air incursions
from Afghanistan. Pakistan's F-16s are based at Sargodha, closer
to the border with India, but could be moved quickly to Quetta or
SECRET
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Pakistan's F-6s and A-5s hoth are Chinese models of the
obsolescent Soviet MIG-19 and would be greatly outmatched in
aerial combat by the more advanced Soviet fighters in
Afqhanistan. Moreover, most of -A poor
repair and, will 25X1
need to be replaced in the next three to five years. Soviet MIG-
23s armed with medium-range radar-guided air-to-air missiles
would have an advantage over Pakistan's F-16 fighters. 25X1
The Pakistanis have limited capability to detect airs ace
violations along the border with Afghanistan. 25X1
Pakistan has only five air surveillance 25X1
radars deployed along the Afghan border and that their capability
to provide early warning of air incursions is seriously degraded
by the mountainous terrain alonq much of the frontier. Even
without the terrain problems, Pakistan's air defense system would
have little capability to detect and track aircraft at low alti- 25X1
tudes. most airs
ace violati
p
ons are
undetected because of Pakistan's poor radar coverage; visual
observers at remote outposts provide only marginal improvement.
Pakistan's air 25X1
defense system is still poorly inteqrated and slow in processing
and transmitting targeting information to fighter units.
Pakistani air controllers have difficulty directing aircraft to
aerial intercepts. In addition, the Pakistani airbases at
Peshawar and Quetta are not close enough to the most likely areas
of Soviet or Afghan air incursions for fiqhters to arrive in time 25X1
to engage intruding aircraft even though F-6s at both hasps ara
kept on six- - ute alert status.
the 13 August homhinq attack near 25X1
Parachinar had already ended by the time Pakistan Air Force F-6s
were scrambled and airborne. 25X1
The Ground Threat
Soviet or Afghan ground incursions are likely to be small in
size and short in duration, and the Soviets almost certainly
would try to avoid a military confrontation with the Pakistan
Army. The Soviets could mount quick heliborne raids into
Pakistani territory adjacent to Afghanistan's border regions
where resistance pressure on Afghan Army garrisons is greatest.
Large-scale military operations in Pakistan's border regions in
the next year would require the Soviets to significantly increase
their forces and logistics in Afghanistan. Soviet and Afghan
cross-border artillery fire aimed against Afghan insurgents usinq
Pakistan as a sanctuary and staging area, however, probably will
become more frequent in the next year.
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Pakistan's Ground Defenses
Pakistan's transportation system could not support a major
redeployment of forces from the Indian border, where most
Pakistani units are located. Moreover, most of the Pakistan
Army's ground combat units opposite Afghanistan--only four of
Pakistan's 19 divisions and an infantry brigade--are deployed
more than 20 kilometers behind the border to protect the major 25X1
supply lines. The paramilitary Frontier Corps, which lacks heavy
weapons and has only limited mobility, has primary responsibility
for defending the border with Afghanistan, but
have been augmented by
a few Pakistan 25X1
_
Army battalions in defensive positions--including bunkers and
artillery emplacements--at strategic border crossings. 25X1
sources indicate that additional 2bA1
forward a ensive positions have been prepared near major border
crossings that could be manned in case of intensified Soviet or
Afghan military pressure on Pakistan. 25X1
site Afghanistan are weak in mobility and firepower. The four
infantry divisions are not equipped with armored personnel
carriers, are under strenqth in vehicles, and have fewer than 120
tanks and 80 pieces of towed artillery.
tactical mobility along most of the border with Afghanistan is
also extremely limited because of rugged terrain and poor
roads. Little has been done since the invasion to improve the
logistics infrastructure in the west.
Islamabad regards the Parachinar salient in the Kurram
Agency and the Tribal Areas between Miram Shah and Wana as the
most vulnerable area to Soviet attack 25X1
The Pakistanis believe this area is more
suitable for maneuvering forces than elsewhere along the border,
and that the Pakistan Army could not rapidly reinforce there 25X1
because the road network is particularly bad. Most of the other
major attack routes--including the Arandu, Khyber, and Khojak
Passes--could be more easily defended because the attacking
forces would be channelled through narrow passes and vulnerable
to Pakistani counterattacks. 25X1
Outlook
The Pakistanis, who have acted with restraint toward past
border incidents, are reluctant to risk a major military confron-
tation with the Soviets--esoecially when tensions with India are
high. Despite increased Soviet military pressure, Islamabad
continues to regard India as its most serious threat and does not
plan to strengthen its defenses opposite Afqhanistan at the
expense of Pakistani defenses along the Indian border.
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The Pakistanis probably will continue to act with restraint
to air and ground incursions from Afghanistan. Pakistani
Frontier Corps and Armv units would fire on Soviet or Afghan
aircraft or ground forces attacking near their positions in the
frontier region, but we judge that Islamabad would keep Army
units deployed principally in defensive positions away from the
border both to avoid a major battle and to guard against deep
incursions. The Pakistan Air Force continues to adhere to rules
of engagement that prohibit firing on intruding aircraft less
than 10 kilometers inside the border. President Zia would come
under greater pressure to defend against Soviet or Afghan incur-
sions if they became more frequent and systematic or to make the
political concessions necessary to reduce the Soviet threat in
the border region.
Pakistan would have difficulty combating Soviet or Afghan
hot pursuit or quick heliborne assault raids against targets
within 10 to 20 kilometers of the border--particularly in remote
areas. The Pakistanis, however, could inflict serious losses on
small Soviet or Afghan forces in chance encounters and deliberate
ambushes. Islamabad does not expect that the Army could resist
large-scale Soviet operations across the border, and senior
Pakistani officials have said they would require significant US
suoport but that US combat troops would not be needed unless
there was a major invasion.
Imolications for the US
The Pakistanis are using the latest cross-horder_ incidents
to press the United States for new arms deals and accelerated
delivery of advanced weapons. Senior Pakistani officials have
told senior US officials that Pakistan could not challenqe Soviet
military incursions unless it had modern weapons comparable to
those of the Soviets. They warn that combat losses would under-
mine Pakistan's military credibility opposite Afghanistan and
could encourage the Soviets to escalate cross-border
operations.
Pakistan has pressed the United States for accelerated
delivery of the advanced AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missile and
for an early decision on the E-2C Hawkeve radar surveillance
aircraft. The Pakistanis say that their modern F-16 fighters
would be at a disadvantage against modern Soviet MIG-23s without
the AIM-9L and that the Hawkeve is essential for airborne radar
coverage of the rugged Afghanistan border, where terrain limits
the effectiveness of ground-based radar. While the AIM-9L would
irnorove Pakistan's capability to counter Soviet air incursions,
the Pakistanis would require considerable time to train with the
E-2C, which might not in any case he available for many years
unless manned by US crews. Islamabad probably will also ask for
advanced Stinger Post tactical surface-to-air missiles for
Pakistani ground forces. All of these systems would also enhance
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Pakistani capabilities against India--an important consideration
The Pakistanis will continue to judge the reliability of the
US commitment to Pakistan's security by the US response to their
arms requests. US unwillinqness to provide some of the military
equipment requested, however, probably would not cause Islamabad
to reach an accommodation with Moscow and Kabul so long as the
Pakistanis believed the United States would back them in a
confrontation with the Soviets.
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('RFT
SUBJECT: Pakistan'
s Defenses Opposite Afghanistan
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A/S0/P/Typescript file
DDI/NESA/SO
29 Aug 84)
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SUBJECT: Pakistan's Defenses Opposite Afghanistan
External Distribution:
1 - Captain Robert G. Anderson, USN, Chief, South Asian
Regional Plans and Policy Branch, JCS, Department of
Defense
1 - Mr. Peter A. Burleigh, Deputy Director for Intelligence
and Research, Department of State
1 - Lt. Col. David L. Fuller, k!LO/US Central Command
1 - Mr. Herbert Hagerty, Director, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and
Afghanistan, Bureau of Near East and South Asia Affairs,
Department of State
CENTCOM Hqs.,
MacDill AFB, FL 33608 (for Lt. Gen. Robert Kingston,
CINC, CENTCOM)
1 - Mr. Geoffrey T. H. Kemp, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, National
Security Council
2 - Mr. Steve Rosen, Deputy Director for Political-Military
Affairs, National Security Council
1 - Commander Ronald P. Zwart, Country Director for South
Asia, Department of Defense
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