AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001301980002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 28, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence 25X1
Afghanistan Situation Report
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28 August
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TOP SECRET
AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
INSURGENT RESURGENCE IN THE PANJSHER
Insurgents have been effectivel harassing Soviet and regime
forces in the Panjsher Valley.
IN BRIEF
PERSPECTIVE
PAKISTAN: SOVIET POLICY OPTIONS
The Soviets might calculate that greater military pressure on
Pakistan would hamper the Afghan insurgency, but a number of
military considerations tend to constrain Soviet adoption of the
more dramatic options. F7
PAKISTAN'S DEFENSES OPPOSITE AFGHANISTAN
Islamabad's concern about the Soviet military threat from
Afghanistan has increased, but because the Pakistanis remain most
concerned about India they have maintained only relatively modest
defenses opposite Afghanistan.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be directed to
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US Embassy sources report insurgents in the Panjsher are
carrying out hit-and-run raids and attempting to isolate -Soviet
and regime forces encamped in the upper and middle parts of the
valley.
In the weeks ahead, Masood probably will continue to
strengthen his position and step up harassment of Soviet and
Afghan forces in the Panjsher Valley. The insurgents may plan to
move gradually down the valley, attacking the weakest positions,
and attempt to disrupt resupply efforts. (S NF)
28 August 1984
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ENT RESURGENCE IN PANJSHER (C)
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PAKISTAN: SOVIET POLICY OPTIONS (UY
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Moscow is aware that the aid going through Pakistan for the Afghan
resistance is an important factor sustaining the Afghan insurgency. To
diminish Pakistani support, the Soviets at the moment have only limited
military options against Pakistan. These are unlikely, by themselves,
to change Islamabad's Afghan policy or reduce insurgent activity. More
substantial and effective military pressure--such as larger scale ground
attacks--would require a significant au mentation of Soviet forces and
accompanying logistics preparations. F7
The Soviets could increase aid to a variety of ethnic and political
groups opposed to Zia. They reportedly have longstanding ties to the
Pakistan People's Party, which participates in the coalition Movement
for the Restoration of Democracy, and opposes military rule in Pakistan.
Soviet covert activity and propaganda may work within the MRD to incite
disaffected students, lawyers, civil servants, and military officers
against Zia. Aid to pro-Soviet Pakistani Communists could also be
stepped up, but they are too weak to act alone. Past Soviet efforts
along these lines have not paid off, and we doubt that more Soviet help
would greatly increase the capabilities of these groups. 0
Another option that has also been tried without much impact is
fanning tensions between the Afghan refugees and Pakistani tribal groups
over the issues of land, water, and employment. The Soviet and Afghan
intelligence services have also long maintained links to Pakistani
Pushtun and Baluch separatist groups, but their appeal for Pakistan's
minorities has declined substantially since the Soviet invasion. These
groups are too weak at present to threaten Zia's grip on er, but
their potential for subversion deeply worries Islamabad. pow
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Sporadic or Sustained Strikes, Raids
The infrequency of air or artillery attacks on insurgent camps in
rPakistan, on Pakistani villages, or on Pakistani border posts minimizes
chances for a direct confrontation between Soviet or Afghan forces and
Pakistani forces. Brief airstrikes near the border have enabled the
Soviets to avoid an international outcry but have neither deterred
Pakistan nor significantly damaged the insurgents. Artillery strikes
would be limited by the range of the weapons, the need for resupply over
difficult terrain, and the need to control and adjust firing across
mountain areas.
A major punitive strike, such as the bombing of Peshawar, or
sustained raids would risk a major escalation of fighting. Raids by
small air-assault teams, supported by helicopters and fighter-bombers,
would risk strong opposition from Afghan insurgents and Pakistani
paramilitary forces and have more dams i9 ng international repercussions
because they would be harder to deny.
Limited Strikes Against Pakistani Regular Forces
A raid on Pakistani regular forces would bring an international
outcry and higher levels of support from the United States and China.
The Soviets would also have to consider at least the risk of
confrontation with the United States. The Pakistanis would react with
both air and air tfefense forces, and the international political costs
would be high. u
Occupation of Pakistani Territory
J The limited military advantages likely to result from such raids
might convince Soviet military planners that larger operations were
necessary, perhaps to seize key tactical positions along major lines of
communication east of the main operation to block Pakistani assistance
to the insurgents. In preparation for such a campaign, Moscow would
have to significantly augment its forces in Afghanistan. Cross-border
attacks would be costly and difficult for the Soviets to sustain.
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Rugged terrain would neutralize much. of the Soviet advantage in mobility
and firepower. The movement of Soviet forces and supplies would be
largely confined to narrow mountain roads, where they would be
vulnerable to attack by insurgent forces or small defending Pakistani
units. A large increase in troops or aircraft without an accompanying
expansion of support facilities would only aggravate the logistics
problems the Soviets currently have in Afghanistan. F-1
Major Invasion
The military effort required for a major invasion of Pakistan would
far exceed the effort needed for significant expansion of operations
inside Afghanistan. An invasion would have very high political and
military costs and would involve a substantial risk of Soviet-US
military confrontation. 0
Weighing the Options
The severity of Moscow's recent threats and evidence of Soviet
concern about losses and a general lack of progress suggest that the
chances of cross-border strikes are greater now than at any time since
the invasion. The Soviets might calculate that greater military
pressure on the Afghan refugee camps or on Pakistani targets would at
least make it more difficult for the insurgents to use Pakistan as a
safehaven, cause Islamabad to ponder the level of assistance to the
insurgents, and strengthen tani elements skeptical of the wisdom of
confronting Soviet might.
However, a number of purely military considerations--limited forces,
logistic infrastructure, and unfavorable terrain--tend to constrain
Soviet adoption of the more dramatic options such as large ground force
raids against insurgent camps or attacks on Pakistani forces. Military
.bureaucratic constraints also probably exist. The Soviet military's
approach to the war has been characterized by an attempt to do the
minimum necessary, to adjust at the margins when required, and to keep
the costs of the operation as low as possible. 0
The Soviets also risk that Pakistan would oppose new incursions with
greater force and in retaliation provide even more aid to the Afghan
insurgents. The United States, China, Saudi Arabia, and other nations
might also increase economic and military assistance to Pakistan and the
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Afghan insurgents. Greater Soviet military pressure could also have
important international political repercussions, including a worsening
of regional and Western fears about Soviet intentions, further erosion
of Soviet standing in the Muslim world, and deterioration of Moscow's
relationship with New Delhi. Moreover, given the resilience that
insurgents have shown following Soviet sweeps inside Afghanistan, Soviet
pressure on Pakistan would disrupt Afghan insurgent activity only
temporarily. 0
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Islamabad's concern about the Soviet military threat from Afghanistan
has increased, but because the Pakistanis remain most concerned about
India they have maintained only relatively modest defenses opposite
Afghanistan. The Pakistanis would have difficulty reacting quickly to
Soviet or Afghan airstrikes or heliborne assault raids in the frontier
region, and could not long resist large-scale Soviet or Afghan
operations in their territory without significant US support. They
could, however, inflict high casualties on Soviet or Afghan forces in
ambushes or chance encounters--particularly if enemy forces operated for
long periods in Pakistani territory. 0
Senior Pakistani officials have told US officials they believe the
Soviets intend to increase military pressure on Pakistan because of
their growing frustration and higher combat losses in Afghanistan. The
Pakistanis view the 13, 14, and 23 August bombing attacks in the
Parachinar area and the cross-border artillery fire of 18, 19, and 21
August as deliberate attempts by the Soviets to press Islamabad before
the UN-sponsored indirect talks on Afghanistan resumed in Geneva on 24
August.
Airstrikes against suspected insurgent camps and supply lines in
Pakistani territory would be the most likely Soviet military actions to
threaten Islamabad in the next year. As in the past, most of the air
attacks probably would occur in the Parachinar area--an important area
for insurgent infiltration into Afghanistan--or in remote regions of the
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Pakistan Tribal Areas along the border. If the Soviets were to mount
frequent airstrikes into Pakistani territory, they probably would fly
MIG-23 fighter patrols on the Afghan side of the border during the
attacks to deter or respond to Pakistani aircraft. In the event of a
major airstrike, Soviet MIG-23s probably would try to prevent a
Pakistani res onse by flying patrols near Peshawar and Quetta airbases
in Pakistan.
Pakistan would be unable to conduct an effective defense against
Soviet or Afghan air incursions in the border region. The Soviets have
some 12 SU-25 attack planes, 30 modern MIG-23 fighters and 30 SU-17
fighter-bombers at Bagram, Kabul, and Oandahar airbases in Afghanistan
that could be used in cross-border air attacks. The Afghan Air Force
has some 30 SU-17/22 fighter-bombers and 40 MIG-21 fighters at these
airbases. The Pakistan Air Force has only some 40 F-6 fighters and 15
A-5 attack planes opposite Afghanistan even after being strengthened in
the last year by the deployment of a second F-6 squadron to Quetta and
the formation of a new A-5 uadr n at Peshawar to supplement the F-
squadron already there.
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Soviet or Afghan ground incursions are likely to be small and short
in duration, and the Soviets almost certainly would try to avoid a
military confrontation with the Pakistan Army. The Soviets could mount
quick heliborne raids into Pakistani territory adjacent to Afghanistan's
border regions where resistance pressure on Afghan Army garrisons is
greatest. Large-scale military operations in Pakistan's border regions
in the next year would require the Soviets to significantly increase
their forces and logistics in Afghanistan. Soviet and Afghan cross-
border ? artillery fire aimed against Afghan insurgents using Pakistan as
a sanctuary and staging area however, probably will become' more
frequent in the next year. 77
Pakistan's Ground Defenses
Pakistan's transportation system could not support a rapid, large-
scale major redeployment of forces from the Indian border, where most
Pakistani units are located. Moreover, most of the Pakistan Army's
ground combat units opposite Afghanistan--only four of Pakistan's 19
divisions and an infantry brigade--are deployed more than 20 kilometers
behind the border to protect the major supply lines. The paramilitary
Frontier Corps, which lacks heavy weapons and has only limited mobility,
has Primary responsibility for defmdi7 the border with Afghanistan.
the Corps has been augmented by
a few Pakistan Army battalions in defensive positions--including bunkers
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and artillery emplacements--at strategic border crossings.
additional forward defensive
0
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Pakistan.
positions have been prepared near major border crossings that could be
manned in, case of intensified Soviet or Afghan military pressure on
Islamabad regards the Parachinar salient in the Kurram Agency and the
Tribal Areas between Miram Shah and Wana as the most vulnerable area to
Soviet attack, according to a senior Pakistani officer. The Pakistanis
believe this area is more suitable for maneuvering forces than elsewhere
along the border, and that the Pakistan Army could not rapidly reinforce
there because the road network is particularly bad. Most of the other
major attack routes--including the Arandu, Khyber, and Khojak Passes--
could be more easily defended because the attacking forces would be
channelled through narrow passes and vulnerable to Pakistani
counterattacks. =
The Pakistanis, who have acted with restraint toward past border
incidents, are reluctant to risk a major military confrontation with the
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The Pakistanis probably will continue to act with restraint to air
and ground incursions from Afghanistan. Pakistani Frontier Corps and
Army units would fire on Soviet or Afghan aircraft or ground forces
attacking near their positions in the frontier region, but we judge that
Islamabad would keep Army units deployed principally in defensive
positions away from the border both to avoid a major battle and to guard
against deep incursions. The Pakistan Air Force continues to adhere to
rules of engagement that prohibit firing on intruding aircraft less than
10 kilometers inside the border. President Zia would come under greater
pressure to defend against Soviet or Afghan incursions if they became
more frequent and systematic, or to make the political concessi nn
necessary to reduce the Soviet threat in the border region.
Implications for the US
The Pakistanis are using the latest cross-border incidents, to press
the United States for new arms deals and accelerated delivery of
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