AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001301940001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 14, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
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Afghanistan Situation Report
Top Secret
SSA Af 84-10245
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
GROWING SOVIET ROLE IN TRIBAL AREA
Ineffectiveness of Afghan officials has led Soviet advisers to
assume great 77 sibilities in the tribal area of eastern
Afghanistan.
Moscow's concerns about the war in Afghanistan continue to grow
as aircraft losses dramatically increased and maior combat
operations failed to secure new areas.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be directed
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oviet advisers are assuming
greater responsibility for the tribal area in eastern
Afghanistan. The Soviets, who had been concerned only with state
and party affairs, are now working at village level, negotiating
directly with village and tribal leaders, and are bypassing high
level Afghan officials. Their actions reportedly are prompted by
the ineffectiveness of Afghan officials resulting from party
factionalism.
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Increased Soviet involvement in the tribal area is one more
sign of the importance Moscow is attaching to stemming the flow
of insurgents and supplies from Pakistan. The Soviet advisers'
expanded role coincides with increased Soviet military actions in
Paktia Province this summer and renewed efforts to buy tribal
loyalties. The problems with party factionalism are unlikely to
improve in the near term. Parchami officials have long met with
difficulty in the region--a Khalqi stronghold since the days of
Taraki and Amin.
-- Last week Pravda charged that the US bears the "full weight of
responsibility" for the "worsening of the situation" in the
region around Afghanistan and said "new (Soviet) sacrifices" were
in the offing. These statements are probably in response to US
press reports that the US te- had decided to allocate more aid
to the Afghan resistance.
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Moscow's concerns about the war in Afghanistan continue to grow as
Soviet officials issued a demarche to Pakistan, cancelled an official
visit by a top-ranking Pakistani official, and increased discussion of
However, we believe these efforts will not help the Soviets remedy their
main problems: a chronic inability to locate and engage the insurgents,
ineffectively coordinated combat operations, and overall poor
performance of their personnel.
Growing Soviet Concerns
On 18 July, Moscow delivered a demarche to Pakistan to cease
assisting the Afghan resistance. Pakistani officials noted that this
demarche was different because it asserted that Pakistani actions
constituted a direct threat to Soviet civilians and military personnel
serving in Afghanistan. In addition, the Soviets cancelled the
scheduled late July visit to Moscow of Pakistani Foreign Secretary Naik,
with whom they had met in previous years. The Soviets explicitly linked
the cancellation to Pakistan's Afghan policy. 0
The demarche, to which the Soviets have not given any publicity, and
the cancellation of Naik's visit to Moscow indicate increasing Soviet
concern over the course of events in Afghanistan. Growing Soviet media
coverage of the Afghan war also suggests increasing Soviet concern. In
conversations with US Embassy officials in Moscow, Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Affairs officials indicated frustration about the continuing
failure to defeat the Afghan insurgents or cut off the insurgents'
international support.
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Soviet Weapons Changes
The Soviets continued to adjust weapons and tactics.
Soviets delivered 240-mm mortars, 152-mm guns, and 152-mm 2S3
self-propelled howitzers to artillery units, the first fielding of these
weapons with Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The new artillery is more
mobile and can fire heavier projectiles over longer ranges--as much as
18,500 meters for the howitzer.
The mid-July deployment of 46 MIG-23s fighters to Afghanistan to
replace MIG-21s will not significantly improve Soviet capabilities
against the insurgents, but probably will worry Pakistan. The MIG-23
represents an increased threat to Pakistan because it is more advanced,
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has a greater range, and can fire more modern air-to-air missiles than
the MIG-21.
Soviet and Insurgent Operations
We believe operations during July supported Soviet objectives to deny
the insurgents access to secure base areas, to disrupt insurgent supply
routes, and to protect the Termez-Kabul highway. Soviet forces
attempted to further consolidate their positions in the Panjsher,
launched major attacks in the Shomali, attempted to penetrate the
resistance in Paktia, and mounted sweep operations near the Salang Pass.
Insurgent activity in Kabul was high during the first week of the
month, then abruptly dropped off until the end of July. The spate of
assassinations of regime and party officials continued from June. Three
assassinations and two bombings, one of which reportedly killed 23
people, occurred in early June.
The shortage of electricity in Kabul during early summer was the most
severe in years, according to US Embassy officials. Since 14 July
electric power has been shut off daily from 0800 to 1800. The major
cause appears to be a shortage of water to drive hydroelectric power
stations and a shortage of diesel fuel to run a new generating station.
The water shortage this year reflects the lower than normal snowfall
this past winter.
The Soviets conducted major operations in the Shomali from mid- to
late July. US Embassy officers reported a continuous stream of tanks,
APCs, and trucks heading north from Kabul on 17 July. US Embassy
officials also reported waves of rocket-laden helicopters traveling back
and forth from Kabul to the Shomali on all but one day since 17 July.
These operations probably were designed to reduce insurgent activity
against nearby Bagram Airfield and along the main highway from Kabul.
The major Soviet operations in the Paghman area begun in June ended by
mid-July.
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Panjsher
The Panjsher was relatively quiet in July. Soviet efforts
concentrated on the lower valley to prevent reestablishment of insurgent
bases and guard access to the Termez-Kabul highwa . Meanwhile, the
Soviets continue to search for the elusive Masood.
The regime's resettlement efforts continue to encounter resistance.
Some 300 Panjsheris in Kabul were arrested when they refused to return
to the valley. In another incident, the regime sent eight busloads of
Panjsheris back to the valle x returned to Kabul and two were
captured by the insurgents.
The Soviets had no notable successes throughout the rest of
Afghanistan. Soviet efforts to control areas used by insurgent convoys
through Paktia led to heavy fighting there in mid-July, according to US
Embassy sources. F7
Moscow's demarche to Islamabad reflects its frustration over the
inconclusive Soviet offensives last spring, as well as its growing
concern over increased aircraft losses. Past Soviet warnings have not
been followed by significant border violt Moscow might now
feel a need to teach Pakistan a lesson.
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The Soviet operations in July have disrupted insurgent activities,
but are unlikely to lead to regime or Soviet control for extended
periods. The insurgents will probably return, as they have the past
five years, when the Soviets and regime forces depart. In the Panjsher,
increased insurgent activity during July concentrated on harassing
Soviet and Afghan bases and convoys. However, the insurgents will be
denied a major operational base in the main valley until the Soviet and
regime troops abandon their garrisons.
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Top Secret
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