AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001301910001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 7, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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1Sf~~~~C,f Directorate of
Intelligence
Afghanistan Situation Report
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
EVIDENCE OF WAR WEARINESS
Soviet retaliatory strikes are causing some. insurgents and
villagers to withdraw support from the resistance.
AFGHANISTAN: TENUOUS FOOD SITUATION
We believe overall food supplies during the past year have been
adequate to meet the needs of the civilian population and the
insurgents. However, disruptions In the distribution system,
poor harvests in a few areas, and higher prices probably have
caused periodic and localized shortages of food.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South
on the issues raised in the publication should be directed to
Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
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Soviet retaliatory strikes I I south of Kabul
are causing some insurgents and villagers to withdraw support
from the resistance
Insurgent and villager war weariness has usually been
temporary. It probably will abate after a respite from the
strikes. Some insurgent commanders may reduce the level of their
operations because villagers object; others will not, believing
the civilians must bear their share of the costs of the war.
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--On 3 August, President Babrak returned to Kabul from a month-
long medical check in the USSR, according to Kabul radio. Prime
Minister Keshtmand left for the USSR on 6 August.
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-- The Pakistanis have asked insurgent groups to move their
headquarters outside the city because of recent bombings In
Peshawar. The Pakistanis have made similar requests previously,
but never have pressed for compliance.
-- On 2 August, insurgents released to the Japanese Embassy in
Islamabad a Japanese diplomat captured on 22 June. Reporting
about how he was captured and why the insurgents held him so long
has been contradictory.
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AFGHANISTAN: TENUOUS FOOD SITUATION I
Overall food supplies during the past year probably have been
comparable to levels before the Soviet invasion and adequate to meet the
current needs of the civilian population and the insurgents. Soviet
operations, rather than policy, have had an adverse effect on
agriculture but have not significantly reduced overall levels of food
supplies. Disruptions in the distribution system, poor harvests in a
few areas, and higher prices Probably have caused periodic and localized
shortages of food.
Afghanistan's subsistence agriculture and food distribution system
are so fragile that a dramatic change could come quickly. The high
level of operations this spring and summer or an effort by the Soviets
to deny food to the insurgents and their rural supporters could lead to
additional shortages as early as this winter, and unfavorable weather
could lead to widespread shortages by early next year.
Agriculture Prior to the Invasion
Agriculture is the most important sector of the Afghan economy. In
the mid to late 1970s agriculture contributed more than 60 percent of
national income and employed about 80 percent of the population.
Afghanistan's cultivated land is scattered throughout the country,
mostly in valleys along rivers and other sources of water because
rainfall is uncertain and inconsistent. Only about 8 million of
Afghanistan's total area of 63 million hectares are arable. About 1.4
million hectares of irrigated land, approximately one half of the
irrigated land that is planted, has adequate water throughout the year
to make double cropping possible.
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Foodgrains occupy 90 percent of cultivated land.
-- Wheat, the primary grain crop and main food staple, is grown
on about 60 percent of the total cultivated area--2.4 million
hectares. It is grown throughout the country and on half the
irrigated land. In 1976 wheat production reached 2.9 million
tons and no imports were required.
-- Corn, used for, human consumption and animal fodder, is the
second most important cereal. It is planted on about 500,000
hectares and average production has been about 800,000 tons.
-- Rice and barley occupy another 500,000 hectares with total
yields up to 850,000 tons.
-- Truck gardens, orchards, and vineyards utilize less than 10
percent of the arable land, but yield an important harvest of
vegetables, fruits, and nuts.
Agricultural Problems and Resiliency
Since the Soviet invasion, the agricultural sector has faced serious
problems. large numbers of landowners
have fled the country, taking valuable machinery as well as finani
assets. The flight of more than 3 million people to neighboring
Pakistan and Iran and migration to the cities almost certainly have
reduced the cultivated areas. The press
have reported that military operations have resulted in burned crops,
damaged grain fields, and destroyed irrigation systems. In some cases
the Soviets have deliberately destroyed crops in retaliation for
insurgent operations. land along
major transportation routes and around military bases has been taken out
of production either because the Soviets want a security zone or the
farmers fear for their lives.
The Soviets, however, generally allow the agricultural sector to
operate as it did before the invasion. Government- roduced fertilizer,
for example, is sold freely throughout Afghanistan,
the Soviets have
rural insurgent-held
areas would only force them to increase shipments of food to urban
areas.
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said that cutting production of food in
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The primitive nature of Afghanistan's agricultural sector has
softened the impact of the Soviet occupation. Most farmers operate at
the subsistence level and are not heavily dependent on outside sources
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pesticides. In addition, the
destruction associated wit m~ itary operations is minor compared to
total land under cultivation.
A review of agricultural production for the past 15
years shows that Afghanistan's crop production is
dramatically affected when precipitation is inadequate.
Even in the better farming areas, rainfall averages less
than 16 inches a year. Winter snows and spring rains
provide almost all the water for irrigation; little, If
any, rain occurs during the summer months. Droughts occur
periodically, most recently in 1970-71 and 1977. In 1971
the wheat harvest was 20 percent below normal.
there were good
food crops in most regions during 1983. The major exception was In the
Khowst Valley where heavy fighting has resulted in abandoned fields and
unharvested crops. We estimate the 1983 wheat crop, an indicator of
total food Production, was between 2.5 and 3.0 million metric tons.
labor--may now be used in producing basic foodstuffs.
Production of Industrial crops, even by government records, has
dropped dramatically. Harvests of cotton, the most important commercial
crop, and sugar beets have declined by two-thirds since the mid-1970s.
We believe some of the resources used in producing these crops--land and
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Imports Fill Gap
We estimate that slightly more than 300,000 tons of wheat were
brought into Afghanistan from the USSR and Pakistan in 1983 to cover the
gap between supply and demand. According to Soviet and Afghan press
reporting, wheat imports from the Soviet
Union in 1983 were an estimated 160,000 to 180,000 tons. Most of the
Soviet grain is sent to Kabul where the population has increased to
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nearly 2 million from 750,000 before the invasion.
the movement of people from rural to urban areas,
disruption of transportation, and the government's inability to collect
grain and other agricultural products In insurgent-controlled areas left
urban areas with serious shortfalls.
Most of rural Afghanistan, which is controlled by the insurgents or
has only limited government control, appears to be almost self-
sufficient In food production.
most of the insurgents get their supplies from the local population and
do not carry large supplies of food while on operations.
We believe that in areas where domestic supplies are insufficient.
shortages are alleviated by Imports primarily from Pakistan.
about 140,000 tons of wheat are brought In
annually from Pakistan through unofficial channels. The US Embassy In
Kabul assumes that these supplies are diverted from the refugee camps.
Pakistanis.
Afghans purchase surplus grain from the
Military operations and patrols, however, have interfered with
internal' and external trading necessary to balance food deficit and
surplus areas and have caused higher prices. Goods used in barter are
visible and subject to destruction or confiscation. We believe there is
now a greater use of and more demand for money to buy basic commodities
and reduce the risks of transporting goods.
Increasing Food Prices
Food prices have climbed dramatically in the past four years, but no
faster than nonfood items according to spot price surveys and official
government statistics. Fragmentary reporting indicates a wide range of
prices from province to province depending on how self-sufficient the
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area is in food production and whether the survey was taken before or
after the harvest
wheat prices in insurgent-held areas of northeastern
man declined in 1983 from 1982.
We would expect price increases even without a shortage of food. The
local money supply officially has been growing at about 20 percent
annually. We believe that increases in the money supply, as well as
difficulty in transportation and distribution, have had a greater effect
prices for food. People in the urban areas probably have more
opportunities to earn money, have greater access to government food
We believe that higher prices are a problem for isolated rural areas
that are deficient in food production. These areas are likely to have
less access to currency and thus may not be able to afford the increased
on food prices than have actual shortages.
supplies, and are more closely associated with a cash economy.
Overall Food Situation
Food supplies in Afghanistan last year probably were near the levels
available before the Soviet Invasion. We believe 2.8 to 3.3 million
tons of wheat were available from domestic production and imports.
Afghanistan was considered self-sufficient in wheat in 1976 when
production reached 2.9 million -tons and the population was roughly 14.5
million.
-- The lower estimate--2.8 million tons of wheat--indicates there
was sufficient food in the country to feed the population at pre-
war levels if distributed properly.
-- The upper range of the estimate indicates there was about
400,000 tons above minimum requirements.
The tenor of current reporting indicates that supplies probably were
greater than the minimum. For the past year we have had little
reporting of severe food shortages.
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System Remains Fragile
Preliminary information indicates that food supplies in 1984
generally are still adequate with the possible exception of Farah
Province. Crops produced thus far this year--primarily winter wheat--
appeared to be of at least normal quantity.
sufficient water in rivers, canals, and reservoirs to satisfy
the needs of the spring growing season.
Afghanistan's food supplies, agricultural production, and food
distribution networks, however, are fragile. The advent of widespread
combat operations or a Soviet effort to deny food supplies could easily
upset the tenuous balance and lead to localized shortages in a few
months. in the Panjsher Valley, for
example, the fighting from April to June has left crops in the fields to
rot. If large areas of crops go unharvested and unplanted, and the
Soviets block the main entrances to the valley, the inhabitants are
likely to face shortages this winter. The same would hold true in other
areas of concentrated military activity.
Lack of precipitation would lead to more widespread and potentially
catastrophic food shortages. We already have reports that last winter's
snowfall was below normal. Certain areas of western and southwestern
Afghanistan reportedly are experiencing drought.
While the US Embassy in Kabul has indicated that it usually takes two
years of light snowfall to cause serious problems, insufficient snowfall
last winter probabl will reduce the water available
and fall plantinfl.
Spot shortages
attributed to bad weather are likely to be felt first in the western
provinces and the Hezarehjat--areas most inaccessible to supplies from
Pakistan or the northern provinces. We estimate, however, that it would
be sometime next year before severe weather conditions cause widespread
food supply problems.
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