(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001301850001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 20, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
20 July 1984
Pakistan: Challenges in the Next Year
Summary
Pakistan in the next year faces potentially
serious threats to its security from the Soviets
in Afghanistan and India. Islamabad's support for
the Afghan resistance has increased the risk of a
tougher Soviet policy toward Pakistan--including
limited cross-border attacks--if Moscow concludes
that President Zia's domestic support has
weakened, there are new strains in US-Pakistani
relations, or the United States is intensifying
its efforts through Pakistan to bleed the Soviets
in Afghanistan. Relations with India are tense
and could degenerate as a result of mutual
accusations of interference in each other's
affairs or Pakistan's nuclear program. The
likelihood of major coordinated Soviet-Indian
efforts to destabilize Pakistan is low.
In our view, however, Pakistan's most serious
challenges will be domestic rather than foreign.
Soviet and Indian regional policies are more
likely to be affected by developments in Pakistan
than the other way around. Both Moscow and New
Delhi could try to take advantage of Islamabad's
domestic difficulties to weaken and destabilize
Pakistan.
This memorandum was prepared by the
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh Branch, South Asia Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Office of Soviet Analysis. Information as
of 19 July 1984 was used in its preparation. Questions and
comments should be directed to Chief, South Asia Division
ESA M 84-10232
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 The Soviet Threat
-- Moscow regards President Zia's commitment to the Afghan
resistance as a major reason for its failure to control
Afghanistan, and the Soviets' growing frustration in
containing the insurgency increases their incentive to
intimidate and destabilize Pakistan:
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A significant increase in insurgent effectiveness in
Afghanistan could lead to a tougher Soviet policy toward
Pakistan--possibly including cross-border attacks:
-- So far, however, Moscow has not been willing to exert
greater pressure on Pakistan to control Afghanistan, and
the Soviet leadership probably will continue to avoid
policies that carry the potential of confrontation with
the United States.
A significant increase in casualties and equipment losses-
particularly aircraft--
would increase the chances of greater Soviet military pressure on
Pakistan.
That the Soviets have not increased pressure on Pakistan
probably reflects their appreciation that a tougher policy in the
present conditions would be less likely to alter Zia's policies
or lead to his overthrow than to strengthen his regime and result
in closer US-Pakistan ties, including in regional security
matters:
-- The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan actually has
strengthened Zia's hand at home by providing him
considerable latitude in dealing with domestic problems
and the political opposition, and allowing him to
resurrect security ties with the United States.
-- Most Pakistanis judge present Soviet capabilities to
pressure Pakistan as limited by the Afghan insurgency,
the relatively small force the Soviets have in
Afghanistan, and the still poorly developed military
infrastructure in Afghanistan.
The Zia regime would not be intimidated by the potential of
limited cross-border, raids by Soviet or Afghan forces so long as
it has US support.
The Soviets probably could not unilaterally destabilize
Pakistan, but they could take advantage of domestic unrest to try
to neutralize Pakistan. Moscow presumably might believe that if
besieged domestically, Islamabad would be vulnerable to outside
pressure to alter its foreign policies. The Soviets would have
to be careful, however, to avoid overt threats to Pakistan's
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security which might allow Zia to redefine the crisis from a
popular referendum on his rule to the issue of Pakistan's
survival as an independent country.
Even if Zia's regime collapsed, a successor government would
not necessarily be more accommodating to Moscow:
-- Another military regime would be likely to continue the
broad outlines of Zia's policies regarding Afghanistan,
closer relations with the United States, and a commitment
to Middle East security.
-- A civilian government--even one led by the "leftist"
Pakistan People's Party--would be constrained from a
radical reversal of policy by the national consensus on
supporting the Afghan insurgents and the attitudes of
important foreign allies, including China, Saudi Arabia,
The Indian Threat
Most Pakistanis view India as a threat to their country's
survival, and Zia has exploited this national consensus to
buttress his regime in times of domestic turmoil--most vividly,
last fall during the Sind crisis:
India and the Soviet Union share the common goal of
diminishing and neutralizing Pakistan's role in the region, but
from different perspectives:
-- While the principal Soviet concern is Afghanistan, the
Indians are worried that. US-Pakistani cooperation
undermines New Delhi's-regional political and military
dominance and threatens their security interests in the
Indian Ocean.
-- India sees the US-Pakistan relationship as having assumed
a dynamic of its own and no longer dependent on common
cause in Afghanistan.
It is from this perspective that India regards the US entree to
Pakistan--particularly the sale of modern arms--as destabilizing
t o
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' l _ a ..
r e g
o n
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The likelihood of a major Indo-Pakistan war in the next year
is slight, but the chances increase as tension grows amid mutual
recriminations of meddling:
-- Pakistan has been careful in the current Indian internal
crisis in Punjab State to avoid provocative actions that
could lead to an unwanted military confrontation, despite
its apprehension about India's extensive military
movements on its side of the border.
Prospects for Instability in Pakistan
Despite the external threats from the Soviets in Afghanistan
and India, Pakistan's most serious challenges are domestic.
President Zia stands a good chance of remaining in power for the
next few years because his political opposition is fragmented and
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lacks credibility. His handling of the Sind crisis last fall
strengthened his support in the Army. Nonetheless, there are
political, economic, and sectional factors that could quickly
undermine Zia's regime--and which could be exploited by the
Soviets and India:
-- Mismanagement of the transition to civilian rule--which
is to begin with elections promised by March 1985--by
precluding greater political activity and suppressing
opposition parties could result in a backlash against Zia
within his most important constituencies in Punjab
Province and in the Army.
-- A decline in the economy or a rapid drop in foreign
remittances would lead to opposition by important
interest groups and the public generally, particularly if
domestic competition for resources increased.
-- Failure to address political and economic grievances in
Sind and Baluchistan Provinces could lead to serious
ethnic violence with nationwide implications, including
the prospect of militant regional separatism.
-- The growing number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan could
aggravate all of these factors as they become a political
constituency in their own right, especially to the extent
they conclude they could never return to a liberated
Afghanistan.
Implications for US Policy
In view of Pakistan's uncertain situation in the coming
years, the United States will face potentially difficult policy
alternatives:
-- A US policy aimed at closer military cooperation with
Pakistan in regional security matters could be
counterproductive and harm Zia's political standing
because of the broad support in Pakistan for
nonalignment. Such a policy would further harm US
relations with India and aggravate Indo-Pakistan
tensions.
-- US support for the Zia regime in a time of domestic
turmoil could provoke widespread anti-Americanism in
Pakistan and potentially harm relations with a successor
government. On the other hand, failure to back Zia could
undermine his regime and leave Pakistan more vulnerable
to increased Soviet pressure from Afghanistan.
-- Failure of the US to meet Pakistan's expectations in the
arms supply relationship, or aid restrictions imposed
because of Pakistan's nuclear program, would reinforce
the view of many Pakistanis that the United States is an
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unreliable ally. In that case, Pakistan would be more
likely to reach an accommodation with the Soviets on
Afghanistan and probably accelerate its nuclear weapons
development. Either development would significantly
increase the external pressures on Pakistan
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SUBJECT: Pakistan: Foreiqn and Domestic Challenges
Internal Distribution:
Orig - C/SO/P
1 - DDI
1 - NI0/USSR-EE
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - VC/NIC
1 - NIC/AG
1 - C/PES
1 - PDB Staff
i - C/DDO/SE
1 - C/DD0/NE
1 - C/DDO/NE
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
2 - NESA/PS
1 - NESA/PS
1 - C/NESA/S0
1 - D/SOVA
1 - NESA/S0/P,r
1 - NESA/SO/P/Tvpescrint file
DDI/NESA/S0/P/
(19 July 84)
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SUBJECT: Pakistan: Foreign and Domestic Challenges (S)
External Distribution:
1 - Mr. Geoffrey Kemp, Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, Rm 351, Old EOB, National
Security Council
1 - Mr. Howard B. Schaffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State, for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Rm 6245,
State Dept
1 - Mr. James Larocco, Acting Director, Pakistan, Bangladesh
and Afghanistan, Bureau of Near East and South Asian
Affairs, Rm 5247, State Dept.
1 - Mr. Peter A. Burleigh, Deputy Director for Intelligence
and Research, INR/NESA, Rm 4636, State Dept.
1 - Mr. Ron Zwart, OSD/ISA/NESA, Rm 4D765, Pentagon
1 - Lt. Col. David 1. Fuller, WLO/US Central Command, RM
1B735, Pentagon
1 - Captain Robert G. Anderson, Far East/South Asia Division,
Plans and Policy Directorate, JCS, Rm 2D973, Pentagon
1 - CIA Liaison Officer, CENTCOM Hqs.,
MacDill AFB, FL 33608 for Lt. Gen. Robert Kingston, CINC,
CENTCOM
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