AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001301840001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 24, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Top Secret
Afghanistan Situation Report
24 July 1984
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
REGIME PERSONNEL CHANGES, FACTIONAL FIGHTING
Interior Minister Gulabzoi may have ended an accord he reached
with Babrak last winter to improve factional relations in the
Afghan party.
FIGHTING AND FOOD SHORTAGES IN THE HAZARAJAT
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Fighting between rival insur ent groups has recently caused food
shortages in the Hazarajat. 25X1
Nur Ahmad Nur, the number two man in the PDPA, has reemerged
after having been exiled to the USSR early this year.
INTERNATIONAL COSTS OF THE SOVIET OCCUPATION
International attention to Afghanistan has declined, and most
Soviet officials probably believe the political and security
liabilities of a withdrawal would more than offset the gains.
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This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be directed to
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TOP SECRET
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Afghanistan
0 50 100 150 200 Kilometers
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International boundary
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# National capital
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REGIME PERSONNEL CHANGES, FACTIONAL FIGHTING
President Babrak Karmal,
Defense Minister Qader, Communications Minister Watanjar, and
other high-level officials have recently been involved in serious
disagreements, some involving shootings. Press reports indicate,
moreover, that Finance Minister Wakhil was recently replaced and
that Babrak left Kabul to get medical treatment in Moscow.
Babrak's trip, probably a routine visit preceding his annual
vacation in the Crimea, may have prompted some of the rumors of
disagreements in the leadership. Such rumors, however, have also
foreshadowed party plenums and attendant leadership changes.
Moreover, the rumors have coincided with reports of increased
assassinations of party members in Kabul. Together, the rumors
and reports of assassinations suggest that Interior Minister
Gulabzoi, the head of the Khalgi faction, has ended an accord he
reportedly reached with Babrak last winter to improve factional
relations in the Afghan party.
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FIGHTING AND FOOD SHORTAGES IN THE HAZARAJAT
heavy fighting in recent months
between Iranian-backed and other insurgent groups has caused food
shortages in the Hazarajat region. One incident in Gereshk,
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along the main highway from Qandahar to Herat, reportedly
resulted in 350 insurgent casualties.
The fighting in the Hazarajat, sparsely populated and
generally self-sufficient in food, is a result of longstanding
differences between the patchwork of nationalities inhabiting the
region, exacerbated by Iranian influence.
Nur Ahmad Nur, the number two man in the PDPA, has reemerged
after allegedly having been exiled to the USSR early this year
for his role in fueling party factionalism. Last month he
published a major article on the POPA in a leading Soviet
journal, claiming membership increased last year from 90,000 to
115,000.
Nur's reappearance suggests he is still a force to be reckoned
with.
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TOP SECRET
Most political and economic sanctions imposed on the USSR for
invading Afghanistan have now been rescinded, and Moscow appears willing
to pay the residual international costs of continuing to try to
subjugate the country. The occupation reinforced international
perceptions of Soviet aggressiveness, fueled a Western defense buildup,
made Islamic and other Third World countries more wary of Soviet
intentions, and hampered Moscow's efforts to exploit the Nonaligned
Movement Restrictions on Soviet trade also gained impetus from the
invasion. Time and more recent international developments have eroded
attention to Afghanistan, however, and made the occupation less of a
factor in Moscow's foreign political and economic relations. Soviet
officials probably think that the political and security liabilities of
a withdrawal from Afghanistan would more than offset the gains.
The occupation aligned against Moscow many nations that normally try
to avoid making choices between East and West. The invasion galvanized
the Third World against Soviet policy in a way that previous Soviet
interventions, such as Czechoslovakia, had not done because a founding
member of the Nonaligned Movement was, invaded. The invasion was
"strongly deplored" by 104 members of the UN General Assembly in January
1980, and the USSR continues to pay a political price in annual UN votes
against its position by even larger majorities than the first vote.
Long-term Soviet efforts to steer the Nonaligned Movement into
positions contrary to Western interests were seriously damaged by the
occupation. Cuba had become titular head of the movement three months
before the invasion and was in a position to make pro-Soviet
pronouncements in the name of nonaligned countries. However, the
hostile reaction to Afghanistan prompted moderate members to act more
forcibly against Cuban activism on behalf of Soviet causes than they
might otherwise have done. Members of the International Parliamentary
Union, which is numerically dominated by the Third World, also became
less amenable to pro-Soviet initiatives.
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TUP SEGKET '
The 40 nations in the Islamic Conference reacted most strongly among
Third World countries and have played a key role in setting the critical
tone of nonaligned responses to the invasion. These countries saw the
invasion as a threat to the survival of Islam in Afghanistan. At a
special meeting in January 1980, the Conference attacked Moscow in
harsher tones than the UN resolution and put the force of Islamic unity
behind Pakistan's refusal to recognize and negotiate with the new Kabul
regime. Unwavering Islamic support for Pakistan's strong stand is one
of the most important lasting effects of the occupation.
The occupation undermined years of Soviet efforts to use religion as
a tool to woo Moslems abroad. Most Islamic countries have broken off
religious contacts with the Soviet government-controlled Islamic
organizations in the USSR.
For some Islamic countries, however, national interests have
prevailed over religious sentiments. Such nations as Syria and Iraq
have not let Islamic unity obstruct their military supply relationships
with Moscow. Poorer members of the Islamic Conference remain interested
in Soviet economic aid.
Pakistan and Iran
For Pakistan, more than for any other country, the new situation
created by the Soviet Army's presence in Afghanistan has remained a
central concern since the invasion. Pakistani refusal to endorse the
Soviet concept of a settlement under UN auspices, as well as Iran's
refusal to participate in UN talks, has prevented Moscow from drawing a
veil of international sanction over its occupation. Pakistan insists on
a fixed date for withdrawal of Soviet troops--which Moscow is unwilling
to set because it knows that the Babrak regime cannot survive without
its protection. Moscow regards the US-aided improvement of the
Pakistani armed forces in the wake of the Afghanistan invasion to be
against Soviet interests.
Iran's aid to the resistance, its refusal to have anything to do with
the Kabul regime, and its insistence that mujahideen leaders be included
in any political talks have helped frustrate Soviet efforts to
consolidate control in Afghanistan. The impact on Iran has been
obscured for the moment by its war against Iraq and tensions with the US
and Gulf countries. Some Iranian leaders have warned, however, that
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once the Iraqi war is over Iran will make a greater effort to help the
mujahideen in Afghanistan. The spirit of religious crusade now driving
the war against Baghdad could be turned on Kabul.
The occupation has encouraged a militant Chinese stand against Soviet
influence in Asia Beijing broke off an emerging political dialogue
with Moscow following the invasion and posed the Soviet occupation as
one of three obstacles to an improvement of relations when talks resumed
in 1982. Afghanistan is mainly a negotiating ploy for Beijing, however,
and would probably fall by the way were the USSR to offer concessions on
the other two obstacles--the Soviet military buildup along China's
borders, and Soviet support for the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea.
The invasion strengthened an already developing trend toward defense
cooperation between China and the US.
China probably was also encouraged by the occupation to make a new
effort to improve relations with India. Although the sporadic talks on
their disputed border that began in 1982 have not produced results,
Moscow clearly views any easing of relations as potentially harmful to
its interests in India.
The Soviet presence in Afghanistan, in combination with the fall of
the Shah of Iran, has focused US attention on South Asia and the 'Gulf
and consolidated support for the Central Command (earlier known as the
Rapid Deployment Force) that had been planned since 1977 but implemented
slowly. The invasion also reduced resistance in such countries as
Somalia and Oman to the American use of military facilities. A new
appreciation in the West of Moscow's willingness to use military force
to achieve political goals stimulated NATO to speed up its own defense
modernization and strengthened popular support for greater Western
military preparedness.
Although most Western economic sanctions specifically tied to
Afghanistan have lapsed, the invasion dealt the USSR a setback in its
efforts to develop trade ties with the West and obtain access to Western
technology. The argument for tighter controls on the transfer of
technology with potential military utility was strengthened by such
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events as the appearance in Afghanistan of Soviet Army trucks from the
Kama River plant; US technology in the plant was supposed to have been
only for use for civilian vehicles.
On balance, the occupation has stiffened popular sentiment in the
West against the USSR and contributed to a general reduction in the
scope of government contacts. These effects have been fading with time,
however. Countries like Japan and Australia that reduced official
contacts following the invasion have recently begun to resume normal
exchanges.
Potential Gains and Losses From Ending the Occupation
The atmospheric change in international relations that would be
produced by a Soviet withdrawal would not quickly translate into
substantially improved relations with the West. Enhanced Western
defense efforts in the Persian Gulf region, responsive to the danger
from Iran as well as the USSR, have developed considerable momentum that
would be hard to check. The Soviets probably have little hope that
Western technology restrictions would be eased, since they rest more on
overall perceptions of Soviet military and economic strength in relation
to the West than on actions in remote areas like Afghanistan. We do not
believe economic relations with the West would change significantly.
China would be unlikely to change its policies if the other major
obstacles to improved Soviet relations were not removed. Moscow might
hope for improved ties in the Third World, especially with Islamic
countries, but this would have scant immediate effect on Soviet security
and economic interests.
On the negative side, the Soviets probably calculate that, under
present conditions, a departure of their troops would lead to the
collapse of their client regime in Kabul, undermine Moscow's credibility
as an ally, and discourage present and prospective clients elsewhere.
It could even expose Soviet Central Asia to possible Islamic and ethnic
demands for similar release from Russian control. Moscow almost
certainly apprehends that, barring a major change in the current
situation, withdrawal would be seen in the West as a Soviet retreat in
the face of determined resistance and would encourage the West to step
up pressure on Soviet interests elsewhere around the globe rather than
create openings for renewed dialogue.
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TOP SECRET
On balance, the Soviets probably see little immediate value in
withdrawing from Afghanistan, little credit to be won in usable terms of
diplomatic or economic concessions from the West or the Third World. In
the 4 1/2 years since the outburst of worldwide outrage over the Soviet
invasion, foreign attitudes toward the USSR have come to depend less
upon Afghanistan than upon more recent and closer events like pressure
on Poland and the KAL shootdown. Although the suppression of the Afghan
resistance remains a complicating factor in foreign relations, Moscow
probably no longer feels that it is paying the international price that
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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