(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001301820001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 20, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
20 July 1984
Arab Support for an International Conference
on the Middle East
Summary
Recent endorsements by Syria, Jordan, Egypt,
Lebanon, and the PLO of a UN-sponsored international
peace conference on the Middle East chiefly reflect
Arab frustration over the lack of progress toward a
comprehensive peace settlement and increasing
skepticism that the United States can be evenhanded
or will exert pressure on Israel. The Arabs realize
that US and Israeli opposition makes it unlikely that
such a conference will be convened. They will keep
the proposal alive, however, mainly because it is a
politically convenient way to show support for the
Palestinian cause. Arab statements of support for an
international conference will place continuing
pressure on the US to soften its opposition to such a
meeting and will provide the USSR an opportunity to
align itself with moderate Arab opinion on the
This memorandum was prepared by the Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near
Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was coordinated with the office of
Soviet Analysis and the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and
South Asia. Information as of 18 July 1984 was used in its preparation.
Questions and comments should be directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division at
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Background
The nearly simultaneous statements of support by several Arab
governments for an international conference are partly the result
of prior endorsement of the concept in the United Nations. The
General Assembly, in a resolution passed last December, called
for a conference that would include the PLO, the United States,
the USSR, and "other concerned states" on an "equal footing" and
with "equal rights." The resolution also laid down several other
guidelines, including the right of the Palestinians to an
independent state and the rejection of Israeli policies and
practices in the occupied territories.
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar wrote in early March to
all members of the Security Council plus the PLO, Israel, and the
Arab states bordering Israel to solicit their views on a
conference. The proposal was a subject of Perez de Cuellar's
meetings in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel in early
June, as well as of Arafat's discussions with King Hussein in
Amman in early May. Nonetheless, the Arab leaders involved are
still not close to attaining a coordinated position regarding a
formula for negotiating a Middle East peace settlement.
General Arab Motives
The lack of movement toward a comprehensive settlement for
more than a year is a major reason that a UN-sponsored conference
seems to the Arabs to be worth touting, if not holding. From the
Arab viewpoint, further delay means more time for Israel to
establish new "facts" through settlement activity in the occupied
territories. The widespread assumption that the United States
will be preoccupied with its election campaign leads most Arabs
to conclude that peace efforts will remain on dead center through
The proposal for an international conference has also gained
support because of the increasingly prevalent view among Arabs
that the United States is no longer an honest broker in the
Middle East. Proponents of this view contend that Washington has
acquiesced in such Israeli actions as the bombing of the Iraqi
nuclear reactor in 1981 and the invasion of Lebanon in 1982.
They also point to efforts within the Congress to transfer the US
Embassy to Jerusalem. Arabs note that the United States did not
obtain Israeli support for President Reagan's peace plan of
September 1982, and many doubt that any US-directed negotiation
would place sufficient pressure on Tel Aviv to accommodate
Palestinian interests.
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We believe the Arab governments that have endorsed the
proposal for a conference hold little hope that one will be
convened, in view of US and Israeli opposition. They see no
significant costs in voicing support for the idea, however, and
several modest benefits:
-- Conveying an image of reasonableness by being
willing to negotiate.
-- Identifying regimes with the cause of Palestinian
Arabs.
-- Avoiding close identification with either superpower
(unlike Camp David).
-- Side-stepping inter-Arab differences by supporting a
negotiating procedure rather than a specific formula for
a settlement.
-- Exerting additional pressure on the United States
(and ultimately on Israel) to make greater concessions
to Palestinian interests.
Specific Arab Positions
Syria. Assad called for an international conference in a
speech on 10 May. When asked in the past whether Syria has an
alternative to Camp David, Assad has pointed to the Geneva
formula, in which the United States and the USSR have central
roles. The US Embassy in Damascus believes Assad may now be
exploring the possibility of UN sponsorship to diminish the
Soviets' ability to disrupt a conference. According to the
Embassy, the Syrians are concerned that the original Geneva
format would result in confrontation between the Soviets and
Arabs on one side and the Israelis and the United States on the
other.
With the dialogue between Arafat and Hussein stalled, Assad
probably sees this as a good time to sound out support for a
multilateral conference. Syria has tried hard during the past
year to prevent the Jordanian/PLO talks from leading to any new
initiative that would exclude Syria. Assad will continue to set
tough terms regarding peace talks, especially because his
minority Alawite regime would be politically vulnerable if he
appeared to abandon his claims to legitimacy as a champion of
Arab unity and the Palestinian cause.
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Jordan. King Hussein has publicly endorsed the concept of a
UN-sponsored international conference as the "only hope" for
ending the stalemate in the peace process. He supports it mainly
as a way to broaden responsibility for the peace process and move
away from exclusive reliance on the United States.
Hussein believes that Soviet participation is needed to solve
the region's problems and has consistently advocated Moscow's
inclusion. Jordanian officials admit they do not expect Moscow
to play a constructive role in negotiations. They believe,
however, that the lack of progress gives the Soviets
opportunities to expand their activities in the region. The
Jordanians believe that they, together with other Arab moderates
and the United States, would be better able to contain Moscow's
troublemaking by involving the Soviets in a multilateral
negotiation.
Egypt. The Mubarak government has consistently said it wants
to explore all possible avenues to a comprehensive Middle East
settlement. It contends there are positive and negative elements
in each of the peace plans that have been proposed, including the
Reagan, Brezhnev, and Arab League (Fez) formulas, as well as the
initiative that Egypt and France sponsored at the UN in 1982. In
Cairo's view, a UN-sponsored multilateral conference is one more
possibility to be given careful consideration, one that does not
contradict Egypt's commitment to the peace process launched at
Camp David. During French President Mitterrand's visit on 11
July, Mubarak said Egypt would attend such a conference if all
other concerned parties did likewise.
Support for the proposed conference enhances Mubarak's Arab
credentials at a time when he is trying to reintegrate Egypt into
the Arab world. It is also politically important for Mubarak to
show that Camp David did not mark the end of Arab-Israeli
negotiations, that the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty will not be
detached forever from the issue of a Palestinian homeland, and
that he is not in the pocket of the US when it comes to the peace
process.
Egyptian officials have freely acknowledged, however, that
there is little chance a conference will be convened.
Presidential adviser al-Baz recently told reporters "it might
take months or years" to arrange one. Egyptian officials
expressed similar doubts to Vladimir Polyakov, head of the Soviet
Foreign Ministry's Middle East Department, during his visit to
Cairo in April. According to a mid-level Egyptian official, the
Egyptians told Polyakov that a conference might ultimately be
useful but was impractical in the foreseeable future.
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The Egyptians share the Jordanians' view that the USSR has
little to contribute to the peace process but would do less
damage if it were included in a negotiation than if it continues
to be excluded. The recently announced resumption of
Egyptian-Soviet ambassadorial relations is consistent with this
view but has no specific connection with Cairo's support for an
Lebanon. Lebanon's favorable response to the Secretary
General's letter regarding an international conference is largely
pro forma. Lebanon's deep internal problems and its tenuous
position between its Arab neighbors and Israel limits the
government's interest in such a meeting. Beirut probably does
have some interest, however, in using a conference to bolster its
position once it begins negotiating with Israel over security
arrangements in the south and an Israeli withdrawal. Lebanon's
response to Perez de Cuellar's letter asserted that the
UN-sponsored armistice concluded in 1949 is the legal text that
controls Lebanese-Israeli relations.
The Lebanese Government is seeking US mediation in Lebanon,
both to settle internal disputes and in negotiations with Israel.
The government thus probably would heed any US request not to
participate in a conference if one were convened.
PLO. PLO Chairman Arafat strongly supports a UN-sponsored
international conference. The PLO considers such a meeting to be
the best chance for realizing Palestinian national aspirations
because the UN framework assures considerable sympathy for the
Palestinian cause. Moreover, the General Assembly resolution
calling for air n f- nce specifically affirms the PLO's right to
participate.
In approaching a conference, Arafat would consider the Fez
formula--which calls for a Palestinian state--to be his minimum
demand. He continues to insist on self-determination, national
independence, and the right of return as the only bases for peace
Outlook
As long as an international conference is not convened, the
Arab governments that have supported it probably will keep the
proposal on the table, frequently paying lip service to it in
public statements and occasionally making it the subject of
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private, bilateral consultations. There will almost certainly be
further endorsements of the idea in such forums as the General
Assembly, the Arab League, and the Islamic Conference. Any signs
of progress through other diplomatic channels,
however--specifically, through US-sponsored talks in which Israel
addresses the future of the West Bank--would tend to lower
enthusiasm for the proposal. F__1
In the meantime, the endorsement of the proposal by Jordan
and Egypt probably will encourage Assad to adhere to his demand
for a comprehensive approach toward a peace settlement. He has
probably already interpreted the Arab moderates' statements of
support for a conference as signs of further erosion of their
faith in step-by-step methods.
The Soviets have endorsed the UN proposal and claimed that it
is based on their own longstanding plan for an international
conference. Moscow prefers a forum modeled on the 1973 Geneva
conference--which it co-chaired with the United States--rather
than one under UN auspices. The Soviets probably believe,
however, that their support for a UN conference will cost them
little because US and Israeli opposition will prevent one from
convening anyway. They can be expected to exploit US opposition
in order to drive a wedge between the moderate Arabs and
Washington. Moscow will draw attention to the Arab endorsement
of a Soviet role when the orosoects for a Geneva-style gathering
seem more propitious.
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SUBJECT: Arab Support for an International Conference on the
Middle East
EXTERNAL:
1 - Richard W. Murphy, Department of State
1 - Robert Pelletreau, Department of State
1 - William A. Kirby, Department of State
1 - Peter Rodman, Department of State
1 - Alan G. Kreczko, Department of State
1 - David Greenlee, Department of State
1 - Kenneth C. Brill, Department of State
1 - David Mack, Department of State
1 - Howard Teicher, Department of State
1 - Gary Dietrich, Department of State
1 - DIA/DE-4, Plaza West Bldg.
1 - Maj. Kenneth D. Burns, Department of Defense
1 - Col Alfred B. Prados, Pentagon
1 - Donald Gregg, Office of the Vice President
INTERNAL:
1 - DDI
1 - C/PES
1 - C/ILS
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIC/AG
1 - SOYA/TWA
1 - D/NESA
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/AI
1 - NESA/AI/M
1 - NESA/AI/I
1 - NESA/AI/L
4 - NESA/AI/E DDI/NESA/AI/
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