AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9
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RIPPUB
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T
Document Page Count: 
17
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 16, 2010
Sequence Number: 
2
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Publication Date: 
June 19, 1984
Content Type: 
REPORT
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Directorate of Intelligence coy Afghanistan Situation Report NESA M 84-10211 CX SOVA M 84-10093CX 19 June 1984 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT Faced with a serious fuel shortage in Kabul, the government has announced steep price increases in diesel fuel and gasoline. NEW ROUND OF GENEVA TALKS Indirect talks will resume August, but progress toward an agreement is unlikely. AFGHANISTAN: EDUCATION AND INDOCTRINATION Soviet efforts to use the public education system to indoctrinate Afghan youth are unlikely to win many converts. The system has deteriorated seriously because the government cannot protect schools from urgents, and now functions only in the major cities. 19 June 1984 NESA M 84-10211 CX SOVA M 84-10093CX Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues raised in the publication should be directed 19 June 1984 NESA M 84-10211CX SOVA M 84-10093CX n Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Mashhad 36 Same and,S~?? O"VIET U ~Sheberghi ' v'aa1a-e' 6ALKH 8hazar1 1 JOWZJANI amangan 3 r^nManmanah ~tsarsANC,pN fashkarIGa NIMRUZ / HEL D Mermen ?? 11 ~ry "' 4 A N0 AR HA r'aaraY/i"1 .+~ Khocog 'P GHlNSA Afghanistan International boundary -.- Internal administrative boundary it National capital o Internal administrative capital Railroad Road 0 50 100 150 200 Kilometers 0 50 160 150 200 Miles ?~+( ,Jammu 64 Boundary re0retenralion is ~' - --- not necestarll~ authoritative,---.---- i - 19 June 1984 NESA M 84-10211CX SOVA M 84-10093CX 25X1 ui Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 KABUL FUEL PRICES INCREASE The Afghan regime announced on 6 June that gasoline prices were being raised 135 percent and diesel fuel 65 percent, according to the US Embassy. The Afghan government offered financial assistance to owners of private tanker trucks and was considering similar aid to drivers of government-owned tankers. 19 June 1984 NESA M 84-10211CX SOVA M 84-10093CX 1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Afghanistan imports all its gasoline and diesel fuel from the USSR and the Soviets may now be requiring the regime to pay a higher price. Fuel prices in Afghanistan were low by world standards. The price hike probably also reflects the continuing fuel shortage in Kabul. Insurgent attacks on tanker convoys, the fuel pipeline to Bagram Airfield, and bridges have strained the fuel supply system and caused shortages in Kabul since early this year. Government financial assistance is designed to induce 25X1 19 June 1984 NESA M 84-10211CX SOVA M 84-10093CX 25X1 2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 TOP SECRET NEW ROUND OF GENEVA TALKS (C) UN Special Mediator Diego Cordovez announced on 13 June plans for a new round of Geneva "proximity talks" between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Cordovez said that in mil visits to Kabul and Islamabad, he found "a real determination to move forward" and cited, without elaboration, Kabul's satisfactory response to his invitation for a new round of talks. Comment: Cordovez' optimism notwithstanding, prospects for the new talks are dim. Neither party seems eager to make concessions on the central issues which have stymied earlier Geneva rounds: (1) linkage between the withdrawal of Soviet troops and guarantees of noninterference by Pakistan and other states, and (2) Pakistan's refusal to negotiate directly with the present Afghan government. Both sides, however, believe maintaining the appearance of negotiations is politically advantageous. or Afghanistan. killing 6 children and wounding a woman. Pakistani officials have given US diplomats contradictory accounts of the incident and disagree about whether the children were killed in Pakistan -- According to the Pakistani press, on 16 June two Afghan aircraft bombed a refugee camp about 300 yards inside Pakistan, 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 19 June 1984 NESA M 84-10211CX SOVA M 84-10093CX 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 -- Pakistani officials are concerned about the quantity and quality of arms that have entered Pakistan from Afghanistan. Bandits once armed with .303 rifles now have AK-47s. Some tribes have RPGs, mortars, and Iandmines. 19 June 1984 NESA M 84-10211CX SOVA M 84-10093CX 25X1 A Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 AFGHANISTAN: EDUCATION AND INDOCTRINATION Afghanistan's education system is in a shambles. Never widely effective, the system has seriously deteriorated since the Communist takeover, primarily because the government cannot protect the schools. The regime uses what is left of the education system mainly as a mechanism to indoctrinate students, and to reward them for party and military service. Thousands of Afghans each year also receive education and indoctrination in the USSR. In our view, the program will be successful with only a small share of Afghan students. Before the Soviet Invasion Afghanistan's education system has always been dismal by Western standards. the system met the needs of only a fraction of the people before the Communist takeover in 1978. Advancement in the schools often depended on government favoritism. Despite two decades of government claims of concern over illiteracy, 3 less than 20 percent of Afghan youth had access to schools. More than 80 percent of those enrolled attended substandard primary schools, which lacked adequately trained teachers and such basic materials as pencils and paper. Secondary school enrollment accounted for barely four percent of the 9 total school enrollment. Of those fortunate enough to graduate, only one percent could gain admission to a university. Afghanistan nevertheless had been improving its schools. the numuer or eiemeniary anu secondary schools had doubled in a 10 years before the April 1978 revolution, reaching a total of 2,700. A new curriculum, developed witn the help of Columbia University, was being implemented. 19 June 1984 NESA M 84-10211 CX SOVA M 84-10093CX 25X1 25X1 25X1 r' Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 TOP SECRET Deterioration and Indoctrination We believe that the school system has ceased functioning everywhere but in a few major cities. By mid-1983, the number of elementary an secondary schools had dropped to 50. Kabul University--the only major university in the country--saw enrollment drop from 14,000 in 1978 to 6.000 in 1983 according to a former Afghan professor. the other post-secondary institution, Nangarhar University in Jalalabad, was attended only by about 30 women in autumn 1983; prior to the Communist takeover, enrollment was about 400. Before 1980, as is common in male-dominated Muslim societies, men comprised most of the student body. Now most of the students are women. Most eligible men have fled the country, joined the resistance, or been conscripted. The few remaining male students Ire members KHAD (the Afghan intelligence service) or the ruling party. since the Communist to eover percent of Afghanistan's teachers have fled the country or have been executed or imprisoned. A third of the teachers and administrators now are Soviet, and the rest are poorly qualified Afghan party members. According to US Embassy sources, the Soviets control the teacher training programs and seminars, including those funded by UNESCO. materials espousing ideology contrary to Communism are destroyed, and owners of "subversive" literature are interrogated or imprisoned. 25X1 25X1 Curriculum Changes 25X1 Most of the Soviet-prompted curriculum changes are desioned to promote Communist ideology. 25X1 traditional disciplines are arge neglected. In the elementary and secondary schools, the 25X1 curriculum developed through Columbia niversit was replaced with the Soviet curriculum in the winter of 1979 and reduced from 12 years to 10. Afghan textbooks are published in Tashkent. -- US Embassy sources report that a recent law on middle schools declares that important goals are "to inculcate a revolutionary spirit in youth, to strengthen their devotion to party 19 June 1984 NESA M 84-10211CX SOVA M 84-10093CX 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 TOP SECRET principles, and to prepare them to defend the achievements of the April revolution." -- In the first grade, the first lesson concerns the April revolution; Marxism-Leninism is introduced in the ' second grade. -- According to US Embassy reports, a Ministry of Education document prescribes that children in the seventh grade study "Socialism, the Dream of the World's Working Class," "The Struggle of the Two World Systems," and "The Three Principal Forces of the Revolution." These subjects are also taught in the higher grades, along with others concerning the party. the A ril 1978 revolution, and aid from the "fraternal" USSR. Religious education before the revolution, although included in the public school curriculum, was conducted primarily by clergy, either in the public schools, or more commonly in schools attached to mosques. Socialist indoctrination appears to have replaced religion in the public system, but the mosque schools still function, when local security conditions permit, in both government and insurgent controlled areas. Kabul University's curriculum has undergone similar changes, In May 1978, required subjects were introduced concerning Marxist-Leninist theories of economics, history, and sociology. Russian language also became mandatory. The world literature course deals only with Marxist authors, and Afghanistan's history has been rewritten to emphasize Soviet aid and Western colonization. US Embassy sources indicate that the social xience texts at Kabul University are sophisticated rehashes of party formulas carried regularly in the regime press. Pro-government clergy are trained both at the university and in the USSR. As part of its propaganda effort, the regime has introduced widely ourses in Kabul. 7 the course content is almost wholly political. Of the approximately 2,000 persons who attend the courses most are women Ithe Soviets require many civil servants to have a good working knowledge of Russian or face dismissal. 3 25X1 25X1 25X1 19 June 1984 NESA M 84-10211CX SOVA M 84-10093CX 25X1 7 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 TUP SECRET Patronage and Rewards The Soviets and the Afghan re ime use the education system to d militar service and rty work. since 198', students--even those in medical training--have been promoted on the basis ork rather than academic achievement. the caliber of students deteriorated mare y after t e Communist takeover, because admission examinations to Kabul University have been waived for students who entered the Army upon graduation from secondary school. As of fall 1983, men are no longer admitted to the university until they have completed three years of military-,or police service, Party members, are admitted to the university without having to take the require entrance examination. As early as 1981, the regime would not give anyone a diploma for secondary or university studies until completion of military service. Afghan Students in the USSR Thousands of Afghans annually attend Soviet institutions of higher and vocational education. According to Kabul press reports in January 1984, Afghan students in the USSR were attend in 66 educational institutions at 24 different locations. many students who return rom training in the USSR show greater loyalty and dedication to the regime than before: others, however are not successfully indoctrinated. many Afghan students return emoitterea by their Soviet experience and complain that Russians sometimes blame Afghans for the war and for Soviet casualties. 5 25X1 25X1 25X1 f o 25X1 3 10 19 June 1984 NESA M 84-10211CX SOVA M 84-10093CX 8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 TOP SECRET Popular Reaction, Insurgent Attitudes In Afghanistan, the use of schools to propagate Communist ideology has reinforced widespread hostility to formal education. Even before the Communist takeover in 1978, many, especially in rural areas, distrusted government schools. In their view, government teachers, usually outsiders from cities and larger towns, corrupted the young, especially girls, by teaching concepts contrary to local tradition. Rural Afghans also questioned the value of formal education for children destined to be hersdmen and subsistence farmers. the insurgents attack schools when they are used to garrison soldiers or when the party youth association takes over rooms for propaganda and indoctrination activities. Prime Minister Keshtmand publicly charged in February 1984 that in the last three years insurgents had destroyed 1,847 schools. in 1983 attendance at a large school in Mazar-e Sharif had decreased because some parents resented the indoctrination efforts, and because they and others feared an insurgent In our view, it will take many years, at best, for efforts to produce significant change in Afghan attitudes through the education system. First, to rebuild and control the schools, the Soviets and the Afghan regime would have to establish control over most of the countryside and fully secure the major cities. The prospect of that happening in the next few years is dim. Second, most Afghans have little interest in education, distrust the Kabul regime, and distrust nonreligious education. Finally, most Afghans being educated in the USSR as well as the Afghan youth who share the Young Pioneer experience probably will reject the doctrinal aspects of their Soviet training because it is incompatible with their own background and beliefs. Still, even if indoctrination through the education system does not win many converts, 25X1 19 June 1984 NESA M 84-10211CX SOYA M 84-10093CX Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 TOP SECRET it probably will eventually provide the Soviets with a dedicated minority of competent Afghan Communists to run the government. 19 June 1984 NESA M 84-10211CX SOVA M 84-10093CX 25X1 9n Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9 Top Secret Top Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001301710002-9