(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001301690001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 11, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence igence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
11 June 1984
Israel: Labor Prepares for the Election
Summary
The Labor Party has an impressive lead in
public opinion polls over the ruling Likud bloc
with less than two months until the parliamentary
election on 23 July. Labor has set aside its
ideological and personality feuds and united
behind Party Chairman Shimon Peres. Its
lead--which has remained strong for more than six
months--shows no signs of dwindling the way it did
in 1981. Nevertheless, a Labor victory is not
assured, in our judgment. Labor must maintain
party and leadership unity and convince the
electorate--particularly Sephardi voters--that it
is committed to looking after their interests.
Labor is targeting three groups of voters:
disillusioned Sephardi supporters of Likud, young
"Lebanon War graduates" who are voting for the
first time, and Israeli Arabs. Labor hopes to
attract an additional 100,000 votes over its total
in 1981, which would give it about five more seats
in the Knesset and reduce its dependence on
smaller parties to form a governing coalition.
This memorandum was prepared of the 25X1
Israel/Palestinian Branch, Arab-Israeli Divisio, Office of Near
Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information as of 11 June 1984
was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome 25X1
and should be addressed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, at
11ESA M#84-10209
25X1
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US-Israeli relations will figure prominently
in the campaign. Likud will trumpet Israel's
strong relationship with the United States, Labor
probably will try to counter by warning that
Likud's approach to strategic cooperation with
Washington could draw Israel into conflicts having
little bearing on Israeli interests.
Getting Its Act Together
Since the Labor Party went down to defeat at the hands of
Menachem Begin's Likud in 1977, Labor has been viewed by the
Israeli public as a faction-torn minority party lacking strong
leadership. Labor is no longer seen this way by many Israelis.
Labor today is much more united than it was before the two
previous Knesset elections (in 1977 and 1981), and it clearly has
the early lead in the current campaign.
Labor Chairman Shimon Peres deserves much of the credit for
restoring the party's credibility, in our view. He has done
extremely well during the past six months in establishing a
united leadership and laying the groundwork to unseat the ruling
Likud bloc. Peres and his principal rival, former Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin, apparently have set aside their bitter personal
rivalry, which has plagued Labor for the past decade. Peres also
persuaded former President Yitzhak Navon not to seek the party's
top position. Labor thus was spared a potentially divisive
leadership fight that would have seriously damaged the party's
prospects of returning to power in July. Navon's inclusion in
the Labor leadership, in our judgment, has improved the party's
electoral anneal, particularly among his fellow Sephardi voters.
Labor has taken other steps to maintain internal harmony
over the course of the campaign. Labor leaders have decided, for
example, not to name a "shadow cabinet" before the election. In
1981 party infighting over who was to get which slot in the
shadow cabinet was a major distraction.
Labor also is trying to prevent unauthorized policy
statements that Likud could attack. In addition to Peres, Rabin
has been chosen as the principal Labor spokesman on defense and
foreign policy issues and Gad Ya'akobi on economic matters.
Similarly, the Labor Party leadership has clamped down on efforts
by the party's many factions to publicize and build support for
their positions on election issues. For example, the US Embassy
in Tel Aviv reports that Labor leaders have persuaded the party's
"peace faction" not to press for a full-scale party debate on its
proposals for revitalizing the peace process. They argue that
internal party discussion on negotiating strategy would
"complicate" Labor's election campaign.
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Party unity was an important consideration in the selection
of Labor's list of candidates for the Knesset. In our judgment,
Peres and his colleagues on the selection committee accommodated
most of the conflicting demands of the party's factions in
preparing the list. There are eight newcomers who are likely to
win seats in the Knesset. Two are prominent Sephardim--former
President Navon in the second slot and Israel Kessar, newly
elected Secretary General of the Histadrut, in the sixth
position. The list easily won the endorsement of the Labor Party
Central Committee, and, according to the Embassy, the mood in
party headquarters afterwards was optimistic.
Public Standing
The Labor Party continues to hold an impressive lead over
Likud in opinion polls.* Polls conducted since early elections
were agreed upon in late March show Labor winning about
55 Knesset seats and Likud 40. Israelis also believe Labor is
better able to deal with the country's problems than is the
ruling Likud bloc, according to recent polling data.
The polls show that Labor is ahead of Likud in the critical
battle to capture the so-called "floating vote"--about 20 percent
of the Jewish vote. Israeli pollsters describe the floating
voter as one who identifies with one camp emotionally but will
abandon it for another party if he believes that party's policies
are better for the country. Israeli pollsters estimate that in
the last two el ud won nearly 80 percent of the
floating vote.
Peres, meanwhile, has begun to overcome his chronic public
image problem. In public opinion polls, support for Peres as a
potential prime minister has increased from 2-3 percent a year
ago to 4.9 percent last December and 14.8 percent in May. We
believe Peres's public image will continue to improve as the
election approaches, given the lack of enthusiasm for Shamir's
leadership and the decision by Navon and Rabin--who had
consistently scored higher than Peres in these polls--not to
contest his leadership.
* The results of public opinion polling in Israel should be
evaluated carefully. Israeli polling techniques have been
criticized as falling short of those common to professional
polling organizations in the United States. This said, data
cited in this paper represent trends in public opinion that are
noteworthy, in our judgment. In 1981, the polls accurately
predicted that the election would end in a virtual dead heat.
Labor saw its huge lead in the polls dwindle in the months prior
to the election as a result of Begin's charismatic campaigning
and decisions on economic and national security matters that won
wide popular support.
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Campaign Strategy
Labor realizes that it is not enough for the party to
receive as many as or slightly more seats than Likud. It needs
substantially more because of the problems of forming a
coalition. Labor has fewer potential coalition partners than
Likud and is thus more dependent than Likud on its own
performance in the election. Labor could not set up a coalition
with the parties to the right of Likud and will not align with at
least one party to its left, the Israeli Communist Party, which
To maximize its performance, Labor is targeting three groups
of voters that it hopes to attract into its camp: disaffected
Likud supporters; young first-time voters many, of whom fought in
the war in Lebanon; and the Israeli Arab population. Rabin told
visiting US officials in April that Labor hopes to pick up an
additional 100,000 votes over its 1981 total from these groups.
This would give Labor approximately five more Knesset seats than
it won in 1981 and redurp ;tG HA^endence on smaller parties to
Disillusioned Likud Supporters. We believe Labor's campaign
will focus principally on Sephardim who voted previously for
Likud but have been alienated by the government's economic
policies. Israeli pollsters say that Likud has fewer "diehard"
supporters--those who remain faithful despite their party's ups
and downs--than Labor. Only about half of those who voted for
Likud in 1981 are committed to supporting Likud now, according to
recent polls, while about 85 percent of Labor's supporters are
considered diehards. Polls conducted over the past six months
show that about 13 percent of Likud's supporters in the last
election now say they will vote for Labor. In contrast, only one
kud's current supporters come from Labor's ranks.
I
The main focus of Labor's campaign will be the economy.
According to recent polls, approximately 80 percent of all
Israelis have lost confidence in the government's handling of the
economy, and Labor will attack the records of Begin and Shamir.
Sephardim are particularly worried that the policies of Likud
Finance Minister Cohen-Orgad will lead to long-term erosion in
real wages, sustained high unemployment, and severe cutbacks in
social services. They fear the economic remedies will hurt them
more than any other segment of Israeli society.
To capitalize on Sephardi disillusionment with Likud, Peres
and his colleagues must still overcome Sephardi mistrust and
hostility toward the Labor movement, which they regard as a
bastion of Ashkenazi elitism in Israel. US Embassy reporting
indicates that Sephardi skepticism about Labor's sensitivity to
their community has not diminished in the seven years since Labor
was last in power. Peres, in particular, is detested by large
numbers of Sephardim who see him as the leading symbol of
Ashkenazi domination in Israeli society.
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Lebanon War "Graduates." Labor hopes to take advantage of
public dissatisfaction and concern about the invasion of Lebanon
and the Army's continuing presence there, but it is uncertain how
prominent this will be as a campaign issue. We believe much of
the momentum of the antiwar movement has diminished, and the
public is reluctantly resigned to a prolonged Israeli stay in
south Lebanon. In recent conversations with Embassy officers,
Labor officials have said their private polls indicate Lebanon is
not a major issue now because the public perceives very little
difference in the positions of the Labor Party and Likud. We
believe Labor will try to sharpen the distinction by hammering
away at the failures of Likud from the beginning of the war in
Lebanon to the present. Labor hopes to attract the support of
young Israelis voting for the first time whose politic
awareness has been influenced by the Lebanon morass.
Labor will argue that it would get the Army out of Lebanon
within three to six months after taking office and would take
appropriate measures to secure the northern border. Once the
Army has withdrawn, Labor believes security can be assured
through reliance on the Army of South Lebanon in the area
adjacent to the border, a UNIFIL presence further north, and
Israeli "freedom of action" to reenter Lebanon if these
arrangements fail to maintain adequate security.
Israeli Arabs. Labor is making a major effort to appeal to
Israeli Arab voters, who constitute 10 percent of the electorate,
most of whom have voted Communist in previous elections. Labor
received 29 percent of the Israeli Arab vote in 19 81 , and several
party activists have told Embassy officers they believe Labor may
win as much as 45 percent of the Arab vote in July.
Labor hopes to take advantage of the disappointment of
Israeli Arabs with what Likud has done to support development in
the Arab sector and open up job opportunities for Arabs. In this
regard, the Histadrut--the Labor Party-controlled trade union
federation--announced a plan last month to develop industry in
Arab and Druze areas in Israel. Peres also has pledged that a
Labor government would increase Arab Dartic-inatinn in "all
decisionmaking bodies in Israel."
Labor's ability to deliver on its promises to the Arabs is
limited by its need to satisfy other constituencies, particularly
the Sephardim who are competing for the same resources that the
Arabs would hope to obtain from a Labor government. On the other
hand, Israeli Arabs are eager to increase their influence within
the Labor Party and Histadrut, in our judgment, and they can only
do this if they help Labor defeat Likud. Israeli Arabs also
perceive that the issue of full citizenship rights in Israel is
tied to a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and they
regard Labor as much more likely than Likud to enter into
negotiations with Jordan on the West Bank.
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Israeli Arabs believe Peres is more sensitive than Shamir to
their situation in Israel, and, in our judgment, Navon's presence
on the ticket probably will also attract Arab voters. Navon's
call as President in September 1982 for an investigation of the
Sabra and Shatila massacres was received with widespread approval
by Israeli Arabs.
Other Issues
Labor officials have told the Embassy that Peres will listen
to, but not comment on, ideas related to the peace process,
apparently fearing damaging preelection leaks. In campaign
appearances, Peres has been "hardening" the Labor position by
calms for extending Israeli sovereignty to the Jordan Valley.
During the remainder of the campaign, Labor will try to
avoid speculating on future peace process strategy and
concentrate instead on procedural aspects of the issue. Labor
will declare its intention to undertake several confidence-
building measures--including a freeze on settlement activity near
heavily-populated Arab areas--to get the peace process moving
Labor also will criticize the Likud government for
contributing to the freeze in relations with Egypt, but this
issue probably will not be as prominent as the economy and
Lebanon. Social issues, including the tension between Sephardi
and Ashkenazi Jews, will be featured in the campaign as well.
Former President Navon has stated that he will speak out
primarily on the erosion in toe moral and social fabric of Israel
as he seeks votes for Labor.
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Outlook
Shimon Peres and his Labor associates have a significant
advantage over Likud, which is beset by leadership and factional
problems, with less than two months to go until elections.
Labor's lead in the polls is impressive and shows no signs of
slipping the way it did three years ago. Nevertheless, a Labor
victory is not assured, in our judgment. Public opinion in
Israel is very fluid and sensitive to events. Labor owes its
lead more to Likud's failings than to confidence in Labor's
policies.
Prime Minister Shamir is in a position to influence events
for political advantage, although we believe he is unlikely to do
anything dramatic to turn the election around for Likud. Shamir
is reluctant to risk a confrontation with the United States
during a critical election campaign, in our view, and the
public's disillusionment with the war in Lebanon militates
against major military action that could result in the loss of
more Israeli lives.
Recent polling data indicate the question of leadership is
uppermost in the voters' minds and will outweigh the public's
evaluation of the policies and issues Labor and Likud will raise
in the campaign. With the departure of Menachem Begin and his
firm control over the country's affairs, voters will look at
Shamir's record with a critical eye, in our judgment, and will
weigh carefully his leadership against what Peres and his team
are offering. Labor will have to convince voters that its new-
found cohesion is more than a passing phenomenon.
Above all, Labor must increase its appeal to Sephardi
voters, who form the backbone of Likud's support. The absence of
Begin's charismatic appeal to these voters and their growing
disillusionment with Likud present new possibilities for Labor.
The inclusion of former President Navon and the Histadrut's
Israel Kessar in the Labor leadership will also help. But the
party will have to overcome a legacy of Sephardi alienation from
the Labor movement and demonstrate that it is committed to
looking after Sephardi interests.
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SECRET
Results of 1981 Election and Current Projections
for 23 July Election
1981 1984 1
(poll projections)
Coalition
Likud 48 2 39
National Religious Party 6 3 4
Agudat Israel 4 5
TAMI 3 3
Tehiya 3 5
Telem 4
Opposition
Labor Alignment 47 52
Citizens' Rights Movement 1 2
Shinui 2 1
Rakah (Communist) 4 -
Yahad (Weizman) - 4
1 Projection based on
poll conducted in late May by Modi'in
Ezrahi and reported in Ma'ariv on 29 May.
2 Includes seats held by Yitzhak Peretz and Ammon Linn who
defected to Labor in mid-1982.
3 Includes seat held by Haim Druckman who left in early 1983 to
form MATZAD Party. Druckman's MATZAD has united with Hanan Porat
(ex-Tehiya) and elements of Poalei Agudat Israel (Agudat Israel
Workers) to form the Morasha (Tradition) Party in the July
elect ion.
4 Telem disbanded after the death of its founder Moshe Dayan in
October 1981. Ex-Telem Knesset members Yigal Hurvitz and
Mordechai Ben-Porat each has formed his own list to run in the
July election.
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SUBJECT: ISRAEL: Labor Prepares for the Election
NESA M#84-10209
VIA - PDB'ers
1 - Vice President Bush
1 - George P. Shultz (Secretary State)
1 - Ambassador Robert C. McFarlane (White House)
1 - Richard Murphy (Department of State)
1 - Casper Weinberger (Department of Defense)
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - PDB Staff
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/NESA
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/AI
2 - NESA/AI/I
DDI/NESA/AI/I 11June84)
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