AFGHANISTAN: VICTORY ELUDES SOVIETS IN THE PANJSHER VALLEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001301660002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 11, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
iF
Washington. Q C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
11 June 1984
Afghanistan: Victory Eludes Soviets in the Panjsher Valley
Summary
The Soviets' seventh offensive into the
strategically located Panjsher Valley, designed to
deal a major blow to the insurgents, achieved no
important gains. Although the Soviets committed
more air and ground power to the operation than in
previous campaigns, they repeated past mistakes.
`D
The insurgents are likely to emerge from the
offensive with a significant psychological victory
that will leave them as strong as ever and more
united. They probably will continue to increase
pressure on Soviet supply lines, and because of
their ability to evade the Soviets will provide
few occasions for major battles. 25X1
If the Soviets had destroyed the guerrilla
organization in the Panjsher, it would have been a
significant blow to the insurgents. The overall
Afghan resistance effort, however, probably would
This memorandum was prepared by the 25X1
Pakistan/Afghanistan/Bangladesh Branch, out sia Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Office of Soviet Analysis and Directorate of
Operations. Information as of 8 June 1984 was used in its
preparation. Questions and comments should be directed to Chief,
South Asia Division, 25X1
NESA M 84-10206
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only have been temporarily affected. Other
insurgent groups likely would have continued
operations in the northeast.
Seventh Offensive
The Soviets began their seventh offensive into the Panjsher
Valley on 20 April 1984, launching large-scale air and artillery
attacks against suspected insurgent positions. The offensive
ended almost 19 months of relative peace in the valley. We
believe the Soviets decided to abandon negotiations with Panjsher
Valley resistance leader Masood on extending the truce and to
resume operations in the area in response to more frequent
attacks by Panjsher guerrillas against Soviet and Afghan
facilities and convoys outside the valley. The Soviets also were
undoubtedly concerned about the continuing buildup the
Panjsher insurgents' military capabilities. 25X1
The offensive into the Panjsher began, for the first time in
Afghanistan, with high-altitude bombing missions by Soviet-based
TU-16s and SU-24s. The Soviets also increased their air assets /,!/ /
at Bagram airbase, from which they flew medium and low altitude
sorties against targets in and near the Panjsher. Some 20,000
Soviet and Afghan troops, the largest number ever assembled for a
Panjsher operation, were committed to the campaign. Major units
moved into the valley accompanied by over 500 armored vehicles
and by late April some had advanced almost to Khenj. 25X1
The Soviets began a new phase of combat in late April and
early May by making a greater attempt than in previous offensives
to seal the Panjsher and prevent insurgents from escaping. A
large number of Soviet troops entered the Andarab Valley,
northwest of the Panjsher, apparently to try to strike at J0
insurgents who use the Andarab as a route to and from the 25X1
Panjsher and to find and destroy Masood's bands. Soviet and
regime forces also moved into several of the smaller side valleys
adjacent to the Panjsher, where they met stiff resistance.
Soviet Goals Frustrated
The Soviets, despite the unprecedented intensity of the
campaign, failed to destroy the Panjsher Valley resistance or
eliminate Masood, who has become a symbol to the insurgents.
-- The insurgents successfully attacked behind Soviet lines and
used mines to inflict what the Soviets probably believe are
high casualties, given the low level of fighting.
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High-altitude bombing was inaccurate and of limited
effectiveness against Masood's mobile insurgent groups.
Their mountain bases, defensive positions, and supply lines
are almost invisible targets. Civilian casualties also appear
to have been low because most left the valley before the
offensive.
-- Clearing operations in the side valleys have
interdict guerrilla supply or escape routes.
failed to
We believe the Soviets underestimated the capabilities and
strategy of Masood's guerrillas.
the insurgents had long anticipate a ~oviet assault in the //
Panjsher Valley this spring on the expiration of the cease-fire, T/ f~
were
ell
and in our jud
ment
w
ed
g
,
fire to build his forces, improve his relations with other are
a
insurgent groups, strengthen his defenses. and increase his
Cooperation among insurgents was significantly better than 25X1
during previous Soviet operations in the Panjsher Valley. Groups
from as far away as Ghazni as well as the Shomali and nearby ;_
areas have provided assistance to the Panjsher insurgents. We
believe many resistance leaders, particularly those in the
northeast, have offered Masood some support, but his progress in (l j
achieving long-term cooperation of all area insurgent groups is
likely to be slow. Some insurgent bands reportedly ignored unity
appeals and continued to obstruct Masood's supply lines.
Soviet Plans 25X1
The Soviets apparently intend to leave a sizable force in
the Panjsher to deny Masood's forces the valley's use as base,
but we do not believe the Soviets will maintain a force large /
enough to secure the entire valley. A large force would have
problems maneuvering in the valley's narrow confines, be
difficult to supply
and be more vul
bl
t
i
,
nera
e
o
nsurgent
attacks. The Soviets also would significantly decrease their
capabilities to respond to challenges elsewhere in Afghanistan
unless they bring more troops into the country. Use of Afghan
troops for garrison duty in the Panjsher probably would be
counterproductive because the Afghans are poorly trained and
The Soviets may try to negotiate a new cease-fire with
Masood while maintaining troops in the valley to ensure his
compliance with the conditions of any anraomcnf
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The Soviets may try to resettle the Panjsher Valley with
regime loyalists and conduct extensive propaganda campaigns to
dissuade civilians in the area from supporting the resistance. 'rd, /
We believe that most Panjsheris who have fled the valley will be
reluctant to return, fearing reprisals by the insurgents or
renewed Soviet bombing campaigns. Many of those who do return
probably will collaborate clandestinely with the insurgents,
providing warning of impending Soviet attacks and supplying
Masood's forces with food and financial assistance. 25X1
Soviet control of the Panjsher Valley would not be a
critical blow to the resistance in the northeast in fur i iirlnmcn+
Outlook 25X1
Moscow could decide to implement tactical changes if the 25X1
campaigns this spring and summer end without decisive Soviet
gains, perhaps reemphasizing small unit actions as it did earlier
in the war. The Soviets may send in more battalion-sized units, ,
but we see little evidence that they are preparing to implement
major changes in manpower levels. The Soviets will not receive
much assistance from the impotent Afghan military. 25X1
Continued frustration in containing the insurgency could
cause Moscow to consider limited cross-border forays into
Pakistan. The Soviets almost certainly recognize, however, that
the political costs of such attacks d be great and the
military benefits uncertain. L -1 25X1
Masood's survival will increase his prestige and that of the
Panjsher insurgents both within the country and
internationally. He probably will be able to expand his
organization in northeastern Afghanistan. The Panjsher
insurgents' victory will also boost the morale of the insurgency 25X1
rye a whnlo
Even if Masood were killed, we believe the overall
resistance would suffer only a temporary setback. Other
insurgent leaders in northern Afghanistan--as effective as Masood
but less known outside the country--would continue their
operations, perhaps subsuming remnants of Masood's organization
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Dakow-ye
Payan D,;
Hazrat-elBaba
Kabul International
Airport
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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Victory Eludes Soviets in the Panjsher
Internal Distribution:
Orig - C/SO/P
1 - DDI
1 - C/DDO/NE
1 - C/DDO/NE
1 - C/DDO/NE
1 - C/TWAD/SOVA
1 - C/TFD/SOVA
1 - VC/NIC
1 - NIC/AG
1 - C/PES
1 - PDB Staff
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - CPAS Foreign Liaison Staff
1 - CPAS/ISS
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
2 - NESA/PS
1 - C/SO/D
1 - C/SO/PAB
1 - Chrono
DDI/NESA/SO/PI
(11 June 84)
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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Victory Eludes Soviets in the Panjsher
Valley
External Distribution:
1 - Howard B. Schaffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Rm 6245, Department
of State
1 - Mr. Ronald Zwart, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
OSD/ISA, Rm. 4D765, Pentagon
1 - Capt. Robert G. Anderson, Far East/South Asia Division,
Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rm
2D973, Pentagon
1 - Mr. Peter Burleigh, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Rm
4524A, Department of State
1 - Ms. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Room 392. EOB, National Security
Council, Washington, DC 20506
1 - Lt. Col. David L. Fuller, WLO/US Central Command, Rm.
1B735, Pentagon
1 - Situation Room, West Wing, The White House, 1600 Penn Ave.,
Washington, DC 20500
1 - Ms. Phyllis Oakley, Desk Officer, (Afghanistan), Rm. 5247,
Department of State
1 - Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt, Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, Executive Secretary, Rm.
372, National Security Council, The White House,
Washington, DC 20500
1 - Mr. Gary Posz, Acting Director, PAB, Bureau of Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs, Rm. 5247, Department of State
1 - Mr. Philip S. Kaplan, Staff Director, S/P, Rm. 7316,
Department of State
1 - Mr. Elie Krakowski, OSDISP, Rm. 4B659, Pentagon
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