TUNISIA: MORE TROUBLES AHEAD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001301600001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 23, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washin~on, D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
23 May 1984
summa ry
The prospects for stability in Tunisia are
poor. President Bourguiba's failure to address
the root causes of growing popular discontent is
radicalizing Tunisia's pragmatic religious
leadership and trade union, has provided new
opportunities for Libyan meddling, and may prompt
intervention by the armed forces in the post-
Bourguiba era. Civil disorders similar to the
bread riots last January could occur with little
warning and accelerate the erosion of government
authority. This bodes ill for US interests in the
region. Opposition to US policies among newly
radicalized Tunisians is growing, and may soon
prompt the government to assume a more pro-Arab
and non-aligned foreign policy.
Moving Toward Crisis
After Tunisia gained its independence from France in 1956,
President Bourguiba enacted broad social and economic programs
designed to modernize Tunisia at a gradual pace. These policies
have brought steady economic growth, a relatively modern social
and economic infrastructure, and a basically P7estern-oriented way
of life. They also have generated unrealistic popular
expectations for prosperity and opportunity, as well as an
This memorandum was prepared by Office of Near Eastern and
South Asian Analysis. Information as of 14 May 1984 was used in its
preparation. Canirents and queries are welcane and should be addressed to
Chief, Arab-Israeli Division
NESA M#84-10194~~
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.uneasiness about the country's national identity, especially
among the country's youth. (Over 70 percent of the population is
less than 27 years old.) Moreover, as Tunisians have gained
broader educational and social benefits, they have chafed under a
political system dominated by one man, largely closed to all
except Bourguiba's handpicked elite, and increasingly insensitive
to public opinion.
Bourguiba has maintained a stranglehold on power, stifling
political expression and forcing the government to rule from an
increasingly narrow power base. The US Embassy in Tunis reports
that ruling class insensitivity to popular needs led to the
decision last year to double the price of bread, the staple of
poor Tunisians. The riots that followed in January left hundreds
dead or injured, several thousand under arrest, and seriously
dislocated economic plans.
The riots highlighted the declining popularity of the ruling
Destourian Socialist Party--the country's principal political
institution. Party leaders failed to anticipate the intensity of
the reaction to the price hikes. Moreover, party members did not
respond to government efforts to mobilize them to help bring the
disorders under control. The riots finally ended when Bourguiba
ordered in the Army and abruptly rescinded the price increases.
The Leadership Vacuum
Bourguiba in recent years has, with a few exceptions,
divorced himself from the main currents of national life,
ignoring Tunisia's growing social and political problems. The
82-year-old President for Life is nearing the end, dwelling on
past achievements, and increasingly out of touch with the forces
influencing Tunisian society.
Bourguiba's age and failing hea t permit him to deal with onl
one or two issues a day.
Prime Minister Mzali--the
President s handpicked and constitutionally designated
successor--has further hurt government authority. Mzali's
failure to fulfill promises to supplement incomes of the poor to
protect them from the bread price increases helped trigger the
January disturbances. His statements concerning the restoration
of the increases--leaked by foreign newsmen--prolonged tensions
and further discredited the government.
Mzali's blatant effort to put the blame for the bread riots
on then-Interior Minister Guiga, one of his chief political
rivals, further damaged his credibility outside official
circles. A Mzali-appointed commission investigating the causes
of the riots recommended that Guiga be tried for treason for
presumed political disloyalty during the disorders.
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The US Embassy in Tunisia says that poor Tunisians believe
the government is unfairly indicting Guiga for his unwillingness
to order the killing of protesters. We believe that Guiga
misjudged the intensity of the riots and that the poor
performance of the security forces clearly exposed operational
deficiencies caused by their mismanagement under Guiga. We see
little evidence, however, of a politically motivated effort b
Guiga to weaken Mzali by withholding the security forces. 25X1
We are unsure of Bourguiba's attitude toward Mzali, although
he apparently intends to retain him as prime minister despite his
political liabilities. 25X1
Bourguiba was unha wit Mzali s erformance during the bread
riots. however, suggests that 25X1
Bourguiba later changed his mind and that he is pleased with
Mzali's efforts to prevent a recurrence. 25X1
The "Corrective" Movement
Despite his political ineptness, Mzali is one of the few
government leaders who is aware of the depth of the problems
Tunisia faces, including the need for political reform, according
to the US Embassy in Tunis. Recently, however, Mzali has favored
easing discontent through economic development. He apparently
shuns political liberalization because it would antagonize the
authoritarian Bourguiba and thereby weaken his position as prime
Press reports indicate that Mzali is giving priority to
development projects in the poorer southern and western regions
where the bread riots began. Tunis has lobbied for increased aid
on concessional terms from the United States, Canada, Western
Europe, Australia, Saudi Arabia, and several regional development
organizations. Tunisia also has solicited a loan of $70 million
from France for food imports and balance of payments support.
Mzali has revised the budget at Bourguiba's direction
following the disturbances to lessen the burden on the poor. The
new budget shifts more of the cost of development to the middle
and upper classes by increasing taxes on items such as liquor,
cigarettes, and gasoline. It retains governme nt subsidies on
bread and other cereal products.
These measures, however, have so far failed to placate the
poor. Disadvantaged Tunisians say that Mzali's programs are not
working and accuse him of protecting the interests of a corrupt
privileged class that siphons off welfare funds meant for them.
Moreover, the US Embassy in Tunis reports that poor Tunisians are
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concerned over the continued erosion of their purchasing power by
inflation, a problem they believe the government has ignored.
The Embassy says this is causing restiveness among the poor and
fostering the view that the government gives with one hand and
takes back with the other.
The Opposition--What Next?
Radical Muslims are particularly interested in exploiting
discontent because of Bourguiba's long record as a secularist.
quasi-legal fundamentalist groups 25X1
are acquiring a growing following in the urban slums and
countryside, among university students with poor job prospects,
most dangerously, among lower and middle ranking members of the
armed forces. Attempts by Tunisian security forces to check
fundamentalist activity have so far failed. Members of the
mainstream Islamic Tendency Movement (ITM)--the country's largest
fundamentalist organization--claim credit for fomenting some of
the bread riots last January, even though many leaders of the
Movement were imprisoned several years ago. Security officials
have confirmed the participation of fundamentalists, but the
extent of their involvement is unclear. 25X1
Bourguiba's continuing rebuff of ITM demands for legal
status in our view is eroding the political strength of
pragmatists in control of the organization. Several ITM leaders
stated recently that they were having difficulty restraining
their younger, more radical members from agitating against the
government. The ITM leadership supports policies based on a
return to more conservative Islamic doctrines to halt what it
regards as the moral decay brought about by Bourguiba's strong
secularism. More radical Muslims in the ITM and among small
Islamic extremist groups want to replace the government entirely
with religious leaders.
radical
student members of the ITM at Tunis University sponsored the
recent protests against the appearance on campus of Minister of
Family and Women's Advancement Fathia Mzali, the wife of the
Prime Minister. We believe that the militants, by their open
opposition, were attempting to increase pressure on their
leadership to take a firmer antigovernment stand as well as to
further discredit Mzali. The demonstrations have indirectly
stimulated more popular discontent by prom tin the heav handed
intervention of security forces on campus.
The country's trade union leadership is under similar
pressure from its more radical members to wring political
concessions from the government. The militants within the
General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT)--the country's main
labor union federation--are calling for a more confrontational
approach to achieve a more equal distribution of wealth and power
between workers and privileged Tunisians. The radicals have
sponsored major strikes against the government to achieve their
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aims. There were violent labor protests in 1978 requiring Army
intervention and the arrest of key labor leaders.
Several wildcat stikes early this year prompted UGTT
Secretary General Habib Achour to publicly urge negotiations.
Achour has so far been able to maintain a delicate balance
between representing the workers and cooperating with the
government, but without government concessions he will be
increasingly hard pressed to maintain discipline.
The Army--Where Does It Stand?
The officer corps--drawn from the Tunisian establishment--
has a strong stake in stability. The swift and effective
performance of the Army in suppressing the 1978 labor riots and
the bread riots last January demonstrated its leaders' loyalty to
Bourguiba's political order. Moreover, the Army's quick return
to the barracks soon after the disturbances subsided illustrated
their discipline.
Nevertheless,
senior officers are uncomfortable with assignments to put down
civil unrest and fear that Mzali will call on them again. A
recurring need to suppress disturbances, resulting in civilian
casualties, would undermin '
commitment to the regime.
that a group of senior officers has told Mzali that they
will not support orders to deploy against unarmed civilians. The
officers, in our view, are trying to dissuade Mzali from calling
on them again.
We believe that Mzali's efforts to strengthen the security
forces, including the National Guard, are designed to lessen
reliance on the Army during times of unrest. Mzali appointed
tough-minded "law-and-order" men and political loyalists to the
posts of Director General of National Security and Commander of
the National Guard shortly after the bread riots last January.
he also has approved
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personnel increases for the National Guard and is reequipping and
retraining it for riot control. Several hundred Army personnel
were transferred to the National Guard two months ago part of the
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P4zali's efforts are unlikely to strengthen the internal
security forces significantly.
the ability of the security forces to
suppress domestic unrest is seriously hampered by organizational,
training, equipment, and intelligence problems, by manpowe r
shortages, and by political rivalries in the command structure.
This means that Mzali will have to call on the Army to hut. ~--l~.~wn
unrest, which may prompt the officer corps to throw its weight
behind a replacement and the rank-in-file to perform in a
lukewarm fashion.
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Prospects
There is little likelihood that Tunisia is in for an
economic boom and the ruling elite is not going to reallocate
power and wealth in any meaningful way. The domestic scene,
therefore, is likely to become more volatile over time, providing
opportunities for extremist Muslims and radical leftist trade
union members to gain influence and for foreign states such as
Libya to promote instability. In the worst case, the militants
in Tunisia's labor and Islamic movements will take control of
their organizations or establish splinter groups with broad
appeal. This would endanger the fragile wage agreements between
labor and government and probably result in disorders, sporadic
terrorism against symbols of government authority, and
intervention by the armed forces.
Bourguiba's stubborn resistance to reform is generating the
political climate conducive to such disorders. The inept
leadership of Mzali has made him the immediate target of
discontent, but Tunisia's social and political problems go beyond
Mzali to the authoritarian order established by the Presidenr_.
If Mzali is removed from office--and this appears doubtful in the
near term--Mzali's successor is likely to encounter similar
difficulties in gaining political credibility. Mzali's removal,
however, might temporarily ease discontent and position a leader
with stronger political skills to assume the presidency if
Bourguiba dies soon after the new prime minister is appointed.
We believe that Bourguiba's death or incapacitation and
Mzali's succession could ignite popular protests. There would
also be bitter political squabbling within official circles. The
US Embassy in Tunis reports there is increasing discussion among
some Tunisians of military intervention and we believe that if a
succession crisis were prolonged there would be direct military
participation in the political process.
Worsening domestic problems in Tunisia almost certainl
stimulate ex anded Libyan troublemaking.
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Libyan leader Qadhafi,
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may already be urging radical 25X1
Muslims to expl
Tunis Universit
faction sympath
Tunisian border
Qadhaf i will ha
oit unrest. Recent antiregime demonstrations at
y were sponsored by a radical fundamentalist
etic to Libya. The recent infiltration across the
of Libyan dissidents intending to assassinate
rden his resolve.
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-Implications for the United States
The US Embassy in Tunis reports that resentment toward US
policies in the Middle East among increasingly radicalized young
Tunisians is growing rapidly. The Embassy says that these
attitudes, influenced by Arab arguments of a US bias toward
Israel, have begun to affect political debates in official
circles. Tunisian leaders cannot ignore this body of opinion
with impunity. These attitudes have resulted in increasingly
vitriolic attacks on US policies in the Tunisian press--even in
government-controlled publications. Tunis's role as headquarters
of the Arab League means that these statements carry more weight
in Arab circles than Tunisia's small size and population would
We believe the Tunisian Government may soon begin
withholding some diplomatic support for the United States and
strengthening its pro-Arab and nonaligned posture in response to
those domestic pressures. Tunisia's continued dependence on US
military and economic assistance--it has received over S1 billion
in US economic aid alone since 1956--militate against stronger
anti-US actions any time soon. Tunisian military officers are
well-disposed to the US, and Bourguiba himself has often referred
to the US Sixth Fleet as Tunisia's "shield in the
Mediterranean."
Although less likely, Tunisia's need to demonstrate its non-
aligned credentials may push it closer to the Soviet Union in the
post-Bourguiba era. This--in the worst case--could complicate US
strategic planning in the region. US contingency planning for a
NATO-Warsaw Pact war presumes uninterrupted naval movement
between the eastern and western Mediterranean through the Sicily
Strait, a 140 kilometer-wide passage between Tunisia and
Sicily. A Tunisian regime that allows substantial Soviet access
to Tunisian facilities would compel NATO to devote more assets to
keeping this vital sea lane open during wartime. Soviet Navy
vessels are now permitted port calls and use of Tunisian ship
repair facilities under a commercial agreement.
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SFC'RFT
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M# 84-10194
SUBJECT: TUNISIA: Troubles Ahead
DISTRIBUTION:
External:
Vice President Bush, The White House
Department of State (Shultz)
Department of Defense (Weinberger)
Department of Defense (Armitage)
Department of Defense (Williams)
Department of Defense (Ikle)
Joint Chiefs of Staff (Vessey)
National Security Affairs (McFarlane)
National Security Council (Kemp)
National Security Council (Dur)
Department of State (Howe)
Department of State (Murphy)
Department of State (Montgomery)
Department of State (Harris)
Department of State (Nassif)
Internal:
1 - DDI
1 - N IO/NESA
1 - C/PE S
1 - C/NE/DDO
1 - CPAS/ILS
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/NESA
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/AI/D
2 - NESA/AI/M
DDI/NESA/AI/M/
16 May84)
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