AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001301540001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 8, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

8 May 1984
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Afghanistan Situation Report
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
The pipeline to Bagram improves the Soviets' capability to
replenish POL reserves in Afghanistan, but is vulnerable to
PERSPECTIVE
PAKISTAN-SOVIET RELATIONS
The US Embassy in Islamabad concludes there is little likelihood
for change in Pakistan's policy toward the USSR.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis.
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International boundary
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* National capital
* Internal administrative capital
Railroad
Road
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The POL pipeline from the Soviet border near Termez to Bagram
Airbase was completed in August 1982 and extends 375 kilometers
across often rugged terrain. The pipeline runs above the ground
and parallels the main highway from the Soviet border to Kabul.
There are at least 48 pumping stations and seven POL transfer
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stations along the pipeline. Many of the pumping stations are
located near company- or battalion-sized security posts, with the
rest protected by smaller units.
The pipeline improves the Soviets' capacity to replenish POL
reserves in Afghanistan, but they are still dependent on tanker
trucks for more than half of their fuel requirements. The
pipeline has an estimated capacity for handling 4.8 million
liters of fuel per day, but its actual average daily flow
probably is significantly less because of weather and terrain
problems and frequent insurgent attacks. The insurgents also tap
into the pipeline to obtain fuel for themselves. The pipeline is
difficult to protect because of the terrain.
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the Soviets are
conducting sweep operations southwest of Qandahar. Major
elements of the airborne battalion at Bost were gone and five
additional MI-24 helicopter gunships had arrived at the airfield,
presumably to provide air support.
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PAKISTAN-SOVIET RELATIONS
(The following is a condensed version of an assessment by the US
Embassy in Islamabad.)
President Zia and his closest advisors perceive the Soviet Union and
potential Indo-Soviet collusion as major threats to Pakistan's security.
In confronting the challenges posed by the Soviet Union, Islamabad has
sought to pursue a balanced policy. The Soviets have not yet made an
all out effort to persuade Islamabad to change its policies, but as long
as the US-Pakistan relationship remains close, we see little likelihood
of a significant shift in Islamabad's attitudes toward the Soviet Union.
Pakistan's Soviet Policies
President Zia, the Pakistani military and civil service, and the
landowning elite see the Soviets as a direct and long term threat to
Pakistan's sovereignty, integrity, social structure and Islamic
orientation. They realize that, with a significant troop presence in
Afghanistan, the Soviets can launch a direct attack on Pakistan and
believe that in the long term, consolidation of the Soviet position in
Afghanistan will lead to increased Soviet efforts to bring Pakistan into
the Soviet sphere of influence.
Pakistanis in the elite also see the Soviets as offering significant
indirect challenges to Pakistan's security. They fear, for example,
that a government sympathetic to the objectives of the USSR may come to
dominate Iran. Zia and his associates are concerned that Soviet
machinations in the Persian Gulf and support for radical Islamic states
could weaken and even destroy Saudi Arabia and other moderate states to
whom Pakistan looks for political and financial support.
India remains the central foreign policy and security issue for
Pakistan. There is a pervasive fear that India's desire for dominance
in South Asia represents a threat to Pakistan's ability to pursue
independent foreign, economic and security policies, and that Indian
objectives have at a minimum tacit Soviet support. In assessing
Pakistan's security environment, the Zia regime is fully aware that it
cannot cope with a direct military threat from the Soviet Union, and has
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sought closer relations with the US, in addition to its already close
ties to China.
While Islamabad welcomes a renewed relationship with the US, many
officers see the US as having been an unreliable ally in the past. They
realize that the US and Pakistan do not share the same perceptions of
the threat posed by India and are convinced that the US would not come
to Pakistan's assistance even if India attacked Pakistan at Soviet
behest.
Pakistani-Soviet Relations Since 1979
These considerations underlie Islamabad's policy toward the Soviet
Union, which has emphasized the use of international pressure to
persuade the Soviets to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan.
Islamabad has also contributed directly to the Afghan cause, by
welcoming over two million Afghan refugees, by allowing the resistance
parties to establish themselves on Pakistani soil, and by other
measures.
At the same time, the Zia regime has endeavored to avoid unnecessary
confrontation with the Soviets and has sought to maintain an ongoing
dialogue with Moscow on Afghanistan which would permit the return of the
refugees. These talks to some extent reduce the Soviet pressure on
Pakistan and to some degree deny the Soviets grounds for charging that
Pakistan is pursuing "imperialist agression" against the Karmal
government in Kabul.
The Soviets so far have not made an all out effort to persuade
Pakistan to alter its policies, although they have repeatedly made
threats. Soviet Ambassador Smirnov offered the most direct challenge
when, in an interview in December 1983, he stated that Afghanistan and
the Soviet Union might take joint action to stop intervention in
Afghanistan's internal affairs from Pakistan. Although there have been
over 400 violations of Pakistan's airspace and territory since December
1979 most have not been attacks. Several air strikes on border villages
have resulted, however, in a number of injuries and deaths and caused
apprehension about Soviet intentions. Chernenko's refusal to meet
privately with Zia at the Andropov funeral could presage a new phase of
increased pressure.
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If seemingly reluctant to wield the stick as heavily as they might,
the Soviets have chosen not to put forward much in the way of desirable
concessions. They have given Islamabad little hope for a settlement on
Afghanistan in keeping with UN General Assembly resolutions. Although
expressing a readiness in principle to withdraw their forces, the Soviet
position is encumbered with conditions unacceptable to Pakistan. The
Soviets, moreover, have backed away from concessions which the UN's
Special Representative alleges they made at Geneva. The Soviets have
also reacted rather coolly to Pakistani suggestions for better
relations. The USSR continues to emphasize its relationship with India
and Defense Minister Ustinov's recent visit seems to have reaffirmed
this commitment.
Prospects
A significant shift in Pakistan's policies toward the Soviet Union
does not seem probable under present circumstances and an increase in
Soviet efforts to pressure the Martial Law Administration in our view
would backfire. In all likelihood, attacks such as the January 27
bombing of a border village, in which over. forty Afghans and Pakistanis
died, heighten fears of the Soviets and increase demands for closer
relations with the US.
The Soviets in any case may be pursuing a different
strategy--awaiting a change of government in Islamabad. In the last
several years, efforts to subvert the Zia regime seem to have increased.
The Soviets might hope to enjoy somewhat greater influence in dealing
with a civilian Pakistani government. Various Pakistani
elites--including many members of the political opposition, the media
and even some Foreign Ministry officials--believe that Islamabad should
seek an overall accommodation with the Soviet Union. They argue that
the Soviets, as a superpower on Pakistan's doorstep, not only cannot be
ignored but should be accommodated. They assert that the US is too far
away and unreliable, while China and Saudi Arabia are too weak.
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At the very least, increased Soviet pressures and incentives could
complicate Pakistani decisionmaking on Afghanistan. The Soviet factor
would also weigh more heavily if US support for Pakistan falters.
Pakistan, well aware that it cannot long alone oppose Soviet policies in
South and Southwest Asia, has to have external support if it is to
achieve its foreign policy objectives.
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