AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001301030001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 20, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
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Afghanistan Situation Report
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20 March 1984
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
DESERTIONS AND MUTINIES INCREASE
Widespread mutinies and desertions in the Kabul area followed the
extension of service there from three to four years. 25X1
PERSPECTIVES
PAKISTAN AND THE REFUGEES
Afghan refugees have not become a heavy economic liability for
Pakistan, but in some circumstances serious problems between them
and Pakistanis could grow, causing Islamabad to seek an
accommodation with Kabul and Moscow.
AFGHANISTAN: CHANGING INSURGENT DYNAMICS
Studies of a number of tribal Insurrections suggest that the
Afghan resistance is now in transition to a modern nontribal
insurgency that will be more difficult for the Soviets to defeat.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and
South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or
comments on the issues raised In the Publication h Irected to
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DESERTIONS AND MUTINIES INCREASE
The Afghan Government extended mandatory service for soldiers
stationed in Kabul from three to four years on 8 March, causing
widespread desertions and mutinies, according to US Embassy
sources. The next day half of the military posts near Kabul
airport were unoccupied.
about 120 Afghan soldiers from the 8th Division
estroye two military posts before loininq insurgent forces in
the Paghman area, west of Kabul.
The regime presumably increased the term of service because
its recent conscription campaigns have failed. The change is
likely to affect most Afghan troops because soldiers are usually
assigned to Kabul at some point in their enlistments. It will
also increase the number of civilians, particularly men, fleeing
Afghanistan. News of the desertions in Kabul may encourage
troops in other Afghan units to mutiny or desert.
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-- Soviet Ambassador Tabayev indicated
that the upcoming Cordovez visit is unlike to lead to progress
in the UN negotiations. Babrak Karmal
"unyielding" on the Afghan regime's position.
Chinese aid to the resistance would continue despite Soviet
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efforts to repair Sino-Soviet relations in other areas.
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Afghan refugees in Pakistan have not become a heavy economic or
political liability for Islamabad. Frictions between them and
Pakistanis could grow, however, and lead to serious problems for
Islamabad in some circumstances. A sharp increase in tensions between
Pakistanis and the refugees would erode political stability in Pakistan
and perhaps cause Islamabad to seek an accommodation on the Soviet
presence in Afghanistan with Kabul and Moscow.
The Refugees
Pakistani Government registration figures indicate that about 2.8
million Afghans are in Pakistan. The US Embassy, however, believes that
multiple registrations, the registration of nonexistent dependents, and
the return of some registered refugees to Afghanistan have inflated this
figure. Based on reports of discrepancies between registrations and
numbers actually in some refugee camps, the embassy believes that
between 1.75 and 1.9 million Afghans are in Pakistani refugee camps.
New refugees continue to arrive in Pakistan but,
the rate is now 2,000 to 3,000 a month compared to
100,000 or more a month a few years ago. Heavy fighting near the border
can still bring a surge--170,000 in the last four months of 1983--but we
believe most of these refugees return home when military operations die
down.
Most of the predominately Pushtun refugees reside in areas of
Pakistan where cultural differences with the local population are
minimal. About three-fourths are in the North-West Frontier Province
near the Afghan border, and most of the remainder are in Baluchistan,
primarily in Pushtun areas. Less than 2 percent are in Punjab and Sind
Provinces. Islamabad plans to transfer about 300,000 refugees to camps
in western Punjab, but less than 100,000 had moved by early February.
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According to the Pakistani press, refugees are barred from buying
real estate or engaging in business activities that would lead to
permanent residence, but other economic activity is permitted. Most
live in camps near the Afghan border by choice. Refugees are free to
live in any part of Pakistan, although Islamabad has put restrictions on
the movement of large groups. Some refugee groups that migrated
seasonally from one part of Afghanistan to another have tried to follow
the same pattern in Pakistan.
Some Pakistanis claim that the refugees are taking jobs from local
Pakistanis, forcing up rents and food prices, and living better than
Pakistanis on largess from Islamabad. We believe that these claims are
exaggerated and that the economic burden for Pakistan has not been
excessive. the direct cost to
Pakistan of supporting the refugees is about $180 million a year, or
some 2.5 percent of the budget. The movement of food and other refugee
supplies costs Pakistan about $75 million. Other expenses include
salaries of about 6,000 Pakistanis involved with refugee issues,
education for some 70,000 refugee students, and support for 85 health
units. When dealing with the. United States and international relief
agencies, we believe there is a tendency for Islamabad to pad its
expenses.
Even if the Pakistani cost figures are accurate, however, they do not
reflect the indirect benefits Pakistan receives from the relief effort.
The US Embassy estimates that between 110,000 and 150,000 tons of
donated food--a quarter to a third of the total supplied by
international organizations--is reexported by the refugees to
Afghanistan or sold in Pakistan. We believe that the proceeds from
these sales generally remain in Pakistan. Pakistani businessmen, such
as tent manufacturers and millers, have had lucrative contracts with
relief organizations, and other Pakistanis are employed by these groups.
The UN refugee organization estimates that it will spend about $60
million in Pakistan in the coming year, including $7 million to help
defray the Pakistani Government's administrative expenses.
Some Pakistanis probably have lost jobs to refugees, but US officials
report that most refugees have filled vacancies caused by the migration
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of Pakistani workers to the Gulf or are doing work done historically by
migrant Afghan tribesmen. Because the refugees apparently receive more
than enough food from international donors, and because prices have
risen in parts of Pakistan where the refugee presence is negligible, we
believe that there is little connection between the refugee influx and
inflation. Nonetheless, US officials report that pressures generated by
the refugees have had some impact on rents, at least in Quetta and
Peshawar.
The 70,000 Afghans being educated by Pakistan constitute only a small
percentage of the over a million Afghan refugee children in the country.
Moreover, less than one percent of Pakistan's medical personnel are
assigned to refugee health centers. Pakistanis who lack adequate health
care or whose children cannot go to school, however, are likely to
believe that they suffer from the diversion of resources to the
refugees.
US officials report that many Pakistanis believe the refugees have
been a primary cause of growing crime and disorder in the North-West
Frontier and Baluchistan. The evidence is contradictory. Refugees have
committed some murders and robberies, and fighting between rival
insurgent groups has occasionally broken out in Pakistan. 25X1
however, the crime rate in the province 25X1
has not increased since the refugees began arriving. a 25X1
whispering campaign has linked refugees to every unsolved crime.
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Violence has increased in Kurram Agency where there have been serious
clashes between rival Shia and Sunni Pakistani tribes. Their dispute is
centuries old, but we believe that the arrival of enough Afghan Sunnis
to double the agency's population has contributed significantly to
sectarian tensions. In the Khyber Agency, on the other hand, an
increase in violence has been sparked by government efforts to eliminate
heroin production and appears unrelated to the refugees.
We do not expect tensions between refugees and Pakistanis to become a
serious problem. There were more violent incidents and protests against
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the refugees in 1983 than in previous years, but the number was
small, and we know of only about a dozen serious incidents.
In some circumstances, however, government and popular attitudes
toward the refugees'could change markedly and the situation could
deteriorate.
-- If there were a significant decline in jobs for Pakistanis in
the Gulf, competition between returning workers and refugees
could become severe enough to lead to violence.
-- If foreign assistance declined, Islamabad would have to assume
more of the relief effort and cut back on other Pakistani
programs, or reduce support for the refugees. The latter option
might cause a violent reaction in the camps and greater refugee
pressure on local economies.
-- If Soviet military pressure drove hundreds of thousands of
additional Afghans into Pakistan, facilities in areas where most
refugees now live would be overburdened, lowering living
standards and increasing tensions. If the government tried to
move the refugees to other areas, it would meet resistance both
from Afghans unwilling to leave the border areas and from
Pakistanis in non-Pushtun areas.
-- If the refugee stay is prolonged, overgrazing by refugee herds
and the felling of trees for firewood could cause an economic
decline that would increase antirefugee sentiment. As the
refugees come to see themselves as permanent residents,
competition for political power could also become a problem.
Baluch tribesmen, for example, fear that Pushtun refugees will
join the large number of Pakistani Pushtuns in Baluchistan
Province and seize political control.
If the refugees become a serious economic burden or if tensions between
refugees and Pakistanis cause serious civil disorders, we believe
Islamabad would be more amenable to an arrangement with Kabul and Moscow
that facilitated the return of the refugees and ended Pakistani support
for the resistance. Should many of the refugees nevertheless remain in
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Pakistan, as we believe likely, the task of integrating them into
Pakistani society would be difficult, and Islamabad might be saddled
with a permanent refugee community.
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AFGHANISTAN: CHANGING INSURGENT DYNAMICS
The failure of the Soviets or their Afghan allies to quell the
resistance movement that began in 1978 has allowed time for the
beginning of a more modern and durable insurgency. Studies of a number
of tribal insurrections during this century suggest that Afghanistan's
tribal and ethnic groups were vulnerable to a quick defeat because of
traditional leadership problems, feuds, and economic hardships. The
Soviets and the regime were unable to defeat the mujahedin because they
committed too few resources to the fray, however, and now they will have
to undertake the arduous task of building a body of supporters who can
regain control of key rural areas. Their success in this endeavor is
not inevitable. In the years ahead they will face better organized and
better trained insurgents who will be more aware of the need for a
coherent political organization.
A Rising of the Tribes
The war in Afghanistan has undergone major changes since the initial
uprising against the Marxist regime in 1978.
-- The rebellion at first was a tribal insurgency*, a mass
uprising of various tribal and ethnic groups led by political and
religious leaders who used traditional methods and institutions
to mobilize the rural population.
*The term "tribal insurgency" is used here only as an identifying term.
Most of the Afghan insurgents cannot be called "tribal." Many are
linked by ethnic origin yet have lived in a religious-feudal structure
one evolutionary step above tribalism. The severe, mountainous terrain
was the dominant factor leading to the development of the numerous
Afghan groups and continues to inhibit the formation of a regional
identity.
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-- As is usually the case in tribal insurgencies, the rebellion
was initially very successful. The local leaders quickly gained
control of much of the rural area where the regime's security
forces and administrative structures were rapidly eliminated.
-- Government forces had neither sufficient discipline nor
training to fight more than a few bands at a time. Conscripted
soldiers displayed low morale and growing reluctance to fight
their own Muslim countrymen on behalf of a Communist regime. By
late 1979 resistance forces were poised to capture major urban
areas.
The Soviet invasion and the coup d'etat in Kabul led to a new phase
in the insurgency.
-- As a result of more vigorous government and Soviet ground
operations and frequent air strikes, some communities suffered
considerable damage, and local institutions came under severe
pressures.
-- Faced with persistent retaliation--especially airstrikes--and
economic hardships, hundreds of thousands of Afghans fled to
Pakistan or Iran.
-- Some leaders responded to these pressures with informal
accommodations and laissez-faire policies with the Communist
forces.
A considerable number of tribesmen are determined to continue the
fight, but they have trouble mounting a coherent threat to the regime.
-- Weaknesses in local leadership make ,it difficult to create a
cohesive force or pursue sustained objectives.
-- Manpower usually cannot be spared from economic activities for
long periods; some groups fear heavy casualties that would make
it even more difficult to sustain agricultural production.
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-- Rivalries among tribes, clans, and religious and political
factions result in bloody bickering and hinder effective military
coordination between groups.
The Soviets and their Afghan allies, however, have failed to take
advantage of these basic weaknesses.
punitive actions by modern military forces an t e
limitations of tribal societies normally cause a steep decline .in
insurgent control after the initial success. In Afghanistan, the
Soviets and the Kabul regime simply had too few troops and supporters to
return to the countryside and begin measures to win public support.
Towards a More Lethal Insurgency
It now appears that the Afghan insurgents, under military pressures
from the Soviet Union, are going through a transitional phase.
-- The destruction of local institutions in areas of intense
military pressure has resulted, in some cases, in the development
of more modern rural insurgencies with nontribal organizational
features.
-- In other areas, such as the Panjsher Valley, local leaders
seem to have acceded to Westernized commanders who have
demonstrated military leadership.
We believe, based on studies of previous insurgencies, that the
transition phase may last several years.
-- As long as some local groups maintain their traditional
organizations and leaders, they may come to some accommodations
with the Soviet-supported regime if the latter can develop a more
flexible political approach along with a more effective army.
-- A large number of local groups have been so severely defeated
or their economic bases so shattered that their traditional
institutions no longer exist and accommodation is almost
impossible. -- Tribesmen from this category form the bulk of the
rural refugees in Pakistan and Iran.
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-- Tribesmen who have elected to remain in Afghanistan and resist the
government, however, are likely over time to become part of larger
groups with more modern organizational structure. Overcoming
longstanding ethnic rivalries will be difficult, but Masood's success in
forging alliances in the northeast suggests that the task is not
impossible.
Looking Ahead--Elusive Soviet Success
We believe that as nontribal, nonlocal insurgent organizations
develop, the Soviets will find it more difficult either to reach an
accommodation with individual insurgent groups or to destroy them. A
key factor will be the effectiveness of the "new" insurgents in creating
disciplined and coherent organizations.
-- As the transition progresses, other key elements will be the
ability of new groups to retain and gain local sympathizers and
committed supporters and to mobilize public opinion in opposition
to government programs and tactics.
-- Key points for the government will be its ability to build
responsive local political organizations, to avoid self-
defeating punitive expeditions against rural populations, and to
develop better motivated armed forces from new and younger
recruits.
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