AFGHANISTAN: STATUS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE RESISTANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001300260001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 19, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Afghanistan:
Status and Prospects for the Resistance
Talking Points for the DCI
19 January 1984
Four years after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
resistance has become an eff ective force that controls much of
the country. The Soviets have become increasingly concerned by
the costs and difficulties of containing the resistance. Barring
a dramatic change in Soviet policy or a significant reduction in
f oreign support for the insurgents, we believe the resistance
will continue near current levels for the next two to three
Reqime Losses
Large-scale Soviet and Afghan operations in 1983 failed to
weaken the resistance:
Soviet and regime forces were unable to inflict a major
defeat on the resistance in 1983.
The Afghan Government failed to increase the area of the
country under its control. It remains about 30 percent,or
the same as in 1982.
The Kabul regime controls about two-thirds of the
population, less than in 1982.
-- The Soviets have failed so f~.r to rebuild the Afghan Army
into a force ca able of eff ctively fighting the
resistance.
Our estimates indicate that
Soviet costs in the war ave been much higher than Moscow
expected
We estimate that more than 17,000 Soviets have been killed
or wounded in Afghanistan. The Afghan Army has suffered
nearly 50,000 casualties and nearly 80,000 men have
deserted.
The insurgents have shot down or, destroyed in airfield
attacks some 400 (and perhaps as many as 500) Soviet and
NESA M 84-10031CX
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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Status and Prospects for the Resistance
Afghan aircraft (mostly helicopters), and nearly 150 more have
been lost in accidents. Heavy machineguns have been the
insurgents' most effective antiaircraft weapon, but they are
becoming more proficient with SA-7 heat-seeking missiles.
-- Approximately 10,000 Soviet and Afghan armored vehicles
and trucks have been destroyed or damaged in the war.
- We estimate that direct Soviet military costs in
25X1 Afghanistan probably total more than $14 billion since the
reduce their military effort in Afghanistan.
Soviet Options
Despite increasing Soviet concern about losses, we judge
that Moscow still finds the costs of the war bearable and believe
that in the long run it will defeat the resistance. We believe
there is no immediate prospect that the Soviets will decide to
--r-.....,. i?ouLycll~.
activity and broad opposition from the Afghan people, however, we
believe these programs have been implemented in only a few
The Soviets have begun a number of economic, educational,
social, and political programs in Afghanistan aimed at eventually
turning the country into a viable Soviet-dominated communist
There are some Soviet options--such as a massive
reinforcement of the approximately 100,000 Soviet troops now in
Afghanistan, major cross-border operations into Pakistan, or a
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Afghanistan: Status and Prospects for the Resistance
widespread scorched earth policy against civilians--that might
drastically reduce the insurgency in the next two years:
-- Moscow, however, would be reluctant to assume the high
political, economic, and military costs associated with
these options, in our judgment.
-- The denial of Pakistan as an insurgent sanctuary would
i
ser
ously weaken the resistance.
We judge that Moscow will not withdraw Soviet troops from
Afghanistan as part of a political settlement if it would appear
to result in the collapse of the Soviet-dominated government.
The Soviets continue with the UN-sponsored indirect talks on
Afghanistan in order to appease world opinion and in hopes of
persuading Pakistan to enter direct negotiations with the Kabul
i
reg
me, a move that would imply recognition.
Increasing Insurgent Effectiveness
The Afghan resistance appears more effective now than at any
time since the Soviet invasion in 1979:
-- Resistance leader Masood--the most prominent if not most
effective insurgent commander--has expanded his
guerrillas' area of operations to the north and east of
the Panjsher Valley, where he continues to observe a tacit
cease-fire with the Soviets.
-- The resistance has besieged major government garrisons and
towns in Paktia Province in eastern Afghanistan since
spring. An elite Soviet-trained Afghan brigade was routed
i
n early spring and government units in Khowst are still
dependent on air transport for resupply.
-- The insurgents have expanded the war with attacks in and
around major cities, especially Kabul. Although the
government maintains control of Kabul, resistance activit
the Soviet Army headquarters in Kabul was attacked a
number of times
By the end of the year, insurgent activities threatened
government control in other major cities--including
Qandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif.
The insurgents have also become more effective in
disrupting the Afghan economy. There were frequent
attacks on the electrical grid last spring and supply
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Afghanistan: Status and Prospects for the Resistance
convoys continue to be regular targets of the insurgents.
Resistance checkpoints to collect taxes or to steal goods are
also common.
~i'he resistance has shown improved proficiency with
25X1 antiaircraft weapons-- rinci all heav machine uns--mortars and
grenade launchers
(there is more tactical cooperation between different
resistance groups, particularly in the Kabul area.
Prospects for the Resistance
We judge that the resistance will become more politically
sophisticated and militarily effective in the next two years, but
will remain vulnerable:
-- The most serious threat to the resistance is civilian war-
weariness and the loss of popular support that over the
long term would directly .affect the insurgents' will to
continue fighting.
-- Tactical cooperation among insurgent bands will continue,
but deep ideological, political, and r-eligious differences
will prevent resistance unification.
-- Continuing--and probably increasing--Soviet and Kabul
regime efforts to subvert the resistance by negotiating
tactical truces with some insurgent groups, encouraging
defections, and infiltrating insurgent bands, could
We believe that insurgent acquisition of additional
antiaircraft weapons--primarily more heavy machineguns as well as
heat-seeking missiles--mortars and grenade launchers would
strengthen the resistance and increase Soviet losses. More
emphasis on urban attacks--particularly against Soviet military
targets in Kabul--would increase the pressure on the Soviets and
give greater publicity to the continuin resistance in our
view.
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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Status and Prospects for the Resistance
Distribution:
Copy: - 1
`~ 5 - CPAS
b - C/PES
7 - NIO/NESA
8 - D/NESA
9 10 - NESA/PS
11 - iJESA/SO
12 - NESA/SO/P
DDI/NESA/SO
(19 January 84 )
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