AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 10, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
j L, -Top -,Secret-
Afghanistan Situation Report
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
TOP SECRET
IN BRIEF
December ended without a major incident in Kabul but with
security deteriorating in other key cities; the Soviets showed
concern over casualties, equipment losses, and morale problems.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be directed to
25X1
25X1
10 January 1984
NESA M 84-10012CX
SOVA M 84-10005CX
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
TOP SECRET
6o Urgench
od
E 4., U
hakhrisab
_~_ __ amangan? `-
Mayman~ll t !SAMNC~1N
HLAN
~KAPISA
KONARHP
Ch Ikar pmUdJeLAGHMAN o0)
I BAWL' I 7j.-
/ ~ If8
Ghazni)
ac
.Dangara
ndaher
HAR
deyz"
AKTIA
"Zareh
Sharai
al-At, - -',t
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
t
Fort Sao;.-mark e
FChitral
NORTH-WES
FED
ADMIN
TRIBAL
AREAS
36
KHORASAN
HESTA
iSTAN
Kattakurgai
Sam
10 January 1984
NESA M 84-10012CX
SOVA M 84-10005CX
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
owl r7LV11G1
regime officials attempted to
recruit to 3,000 Waziri tribesmen from the southeastern
border area to serve as militiamen in Kabul. Tribal elders
10 January 1984
NESA M 84-10012CX
SOVA M 84-10005CX
25X1
25X1
2-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
refused to send their people as far as Kabul to fight and
they were only seeking arms and money
from the, regime, with no intention of acceding to regime
requests.
City government complained of compulsory Soviet
indoctrination courses, of Soviet advisers' patronizing and
humiliating behavior, and of Soviet disregard for the safety of
Afghan soldiers during clashes with insurgents.
10 January 1984
NESA M 84-10012CX
SOVA M 84-10005CX
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
The Soviets celebrated the end of the fourth year of their invasion
of Afghanistan by allowing the government to stage a 20,000-strong
demonstration protesting the US "invasion" of Grenada. The fourth year
ended in December without a major incident in Kabul; with security
deteriorating in other key cities; with the Soviets concerned about
casualties, equipment losses, and morale problems, and again discussing
changes in tactics; with winter weather hampering Soviet and Afghan
j Government operations; with little hope for progress in the UN talks;
and with no end to the Afghan resistance in sight. The fifth year
begins with the resistance at its strongest since the invasion but still
unable to cause serious and sustained trouble for the Soviets and Afghan
regime.
The Afghan resistance was unable to pull off its anticipated
spectacular antigovernment incident in Kabul to mark the fourth
anniversary of the invasion. The US Embassy reported that insurgent
plans were frustrated by enhanced security measures in Kabul that
included a larger number of government troops on patrol, more Soviet
soldiers at key intersections, and round-the-clock helicopter patrols
over the city on 27 December. Nonetheless, the Embassy observed that
there were more shooting and explosions in and around Kabul in late
December than in recent weeks, although there was no significant damage
or Soviet and government casualties.
The insurgents' inability to mount sustained attacks in Kabul in
1 December is indicative of the Soviets' emphasis on maintaining the
pretense of security, stability, and popular support in the Afghan
capital. The Soviets organized two guided tours of Kabul for Western
supporters to show how happy the Afghans are under the new regime. We
believe the Soviets recognize that a deterioration of security in
Afghanistan's capital requiring significantly and visibly enhanced
20 security measures would give the resistance greater international
publicity and credibility and more foreign support, and would increase
the pressure on Moscow to negotiate a political settlement.
10 January 1984
NESA M 84-10012CX
SOVA M 84-10005CX
25X1
25X1
4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
mug HbVIIb 1
The Panjsher Truce
3 0
Security in other major cities. worsened in December, however. US
Embassy sources reported that resistance activity in Jalalabad increased
greatly, including a daylight attack on KHAD headquarters. In Qandahar,
the insurgents denied the government meaningful control of the city;
attacked an Afghan corps headquarters causing heavy regime casualties;
and even established a judicial system that, according to one source of
the Embassy, was recognized by the city's mayor. Insurgent pressure on
key towns in Paktia Province also continued in December.
The resistance maintained pressure on Soviet and Afghan supply lines
throughout the month:
4
3
-- There were frequent attacks on convoys in eastern Afghanistan,
particularly in the Salang Pass, according to Embassy sources.
-- The insurgents captured a government outpost at Torkham, which
is a major transit point for Afghan Government exports.
-- Government garrisons in Paktia remained dependent on air
c transport for resupply because of insurgent attacks on supply
lines.
.4
3
A US Embassy source alleged that the Soviets had increased
f
A source of the US Embassy reports that the Soviets are willing
10 January 1984
NESA M 84-10012CX
SOVA M 84-10005CX
orces in the Salang Pass to counter
their
Panjsher guerrillas subordinate to Masood.
25X1
25X1
25X1
5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
 io
?i
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
to pay Masood as much as 20 to 30 million Afghanis for an explicit
extension of the Panjsher truce. 25X1
Soviet and Afghan Operations
The Soviets and Afghan Army conducted fewer major operations in
December because of bad weather and increased concern about security in
the cities. Following the completion of the Guldara Valley offensive in
early December, Soviet and Afghan troops launched major operations in
Lowgar, Kapisa, and Parvan Provinces, around Ghazni and Jalalabad, and
we believe poor weather conditions will prevent the
oviets from launching many major offensives until spring.
the Afghan Army continued
its intensive campaign to conscript soldiers for forces that are
undermanned and plagued by a high rate of desertion.
the regime has begun drafting women for civil service so that more
men would be freed for military service.
commissions led by the Chief of
the General Staff's Operations Directorate and the First Deputy Chief of
the Political Directorate were in Afghanistan in mid-December to review
the readiness and morale of Soviet units and the abilities of their
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
10 January 1984
NESA M 84-10012CX
SOVA M 84-10005CX 25X1
6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
z
4
It
the internal and international political, repercussions.
We believe there will be little improvement in morale and the
Soviets' combat performance in Afghanistan unless Moscow authorizes a
significant troop increase and new tactics allowing greater initiative
to tactical commanders. The Soviets have too few troops to control the
countryside or even to adequately protect supply lines. Soviet
operations are also too rigid and predictable to inflict a decisive
defeat on the insurgents. In our judgment, the Soviets are unlikely to
substantially increase the number of troops in Afghanistan because of
10 January 1984
MESA M 84-10012CX
SOVA M 84-10005CX
7
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
iz
Islamabad.
The UN Talks
The Pakistani Foreign Minister told the US Ambassador that UN special
representative Cordovez was scheduled to resume his diplomatic efforts
in late March 1984 on the basis of an agreed memorandum of understanding
that clears the way for substantive discussions on a timetable for
Soviet troop withdrawals and international guarantees. The UN
memorandum is now acceptable to Pakistan because it no longer requires
direct negotiations or a signed final agreement between Kabul and
UN diplomats remain pessimistic about the prospects for the Cordovez
shuttle, however, and may decide to cancel his mission. The US Mission
at the UN reports that Cordovez and his aides believe* that neither the
USSR nor the US is genuinely interested in a negotiated settleme
allow the UN efforts to continue principally for appearances.
10 January 1984
NESA M 84-10012CX
SOVA M 84-10005CX
8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7
Top Secret
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300100002-7