AFGHANISTAN: 1984 GRAIN ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001200720001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 10, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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p
10 DEC 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: (See Distribution List)
Chief, Strategic Resources Division
SUBJECT: Afghanistan: 1984 Grain Assessment
1. The attached memorandum is the follow-up to our
preliminary October assessment of selected crop areas in
Afghanistan. It provides a comprehensive look at regional crop
conditions, and gives our best estimate of 1984 wheat output, a
useful indicator of total food production. It also includes a
discussion of Kabul's tenuous food situation. The paper is based 25X1
principally on analysis of satellite imagery taken during the
1984 crop season, and is augmented with meteorological data
2. This assessment was produced by
Agricultural Assessments Branch,
Strategic Resources Division, Office of Global Issues, with a
contribution from Office of Near East and South
Asian Analysis.
3. Comments and questions are welcome and may be addressed
to the Chief, Agricultural Assessments Branch,
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Attachment:
Afghanistan: 1984 Grain Asse
GI M 84-10219, December 1984,
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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: 1984 Grain Assessment
OGI/SRD/AAB/ ((December 1984)
Distribution:
1 - Mr. Frank McNeil, State
1 - Mr. Manny Rubio, Director/White House Situation Room
1 - White House Situation Room
1 - Mr. Geoffrey Kemp, NSC
1 - Mr. Elmer Klumpp, Agriculture
1 - Mr. Douglas P. Mulholland, Treasury
1 - Mr. Byron Jackson, Commerce
1 - Mr. Charles W. Greenleaf, Jr., AID
1 - Mr. Dennis Murphy, State
1 - Mr. George S. Harris, State
1 - Ms. Lillian Harris, State
1 - Ms. Phyllis Oakley, State
1 - Messrs. Peter Modley and Michael Egbert, State
1 - Mr. Jonathan Olsson, State
1 - Captain Robert Anderson, JCS/J-5, Pentagon
1 - Colonel Alfred Prados, DIA/DIO, Pentagon
1 - SA/DDCI
1 - Executive Director
1 - DDI
1 - DDI/PES
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - N I O/W
1 - NIC/AG
1 - OCR/ISG
1 - C/DDO
1 - C/DDO/NE/
1 - C/DDO/NE/
1 - DDI/ASG/AMB
1 - C/CPAS/CSG
1 - CPAS/ISS
4 - CPAS/PDG/IMC/ICB
1 - D/NESA
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - C/NESA/SO/P
1 - NESA/SO/P
1 - D/OGI, DD/OGI
1 - C/OGI/GD
1 - C/OGI/GD/NE
1 - C/OGI/GD/ERA
1 - C/OGI/ECD/CM
1 - C/OGI/TNAD/NAR
1 - C/OGI/SRD
5 - C/OGI/SRD/AAB
1 - OGI/EXS/RG
1 - C/OGI/EXS/PG
8 - OGI/EXS/PG
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
10 DEC 1984
Afghanistan: 1984 Grain Assessment
Summary
A comprehensive analysis of satellite imagery and
meteorological data indicates that grain crops this year in
Afghanistan suffered moderate damage from adverse weather.
Military operations did not have a significant impact on
production except in the Panjsher Valley, which produces less
than one percent of the total grain crop. We estimate that some
2.7 million tons of wheat--the country's most important food
grain--were harvested this year, 300,000 tons less than the
estimated output in 1983. About 60 percent of the shortfall is
from the dryland crop in the northern plains region, where
drought cut production by approximately one-fourth from a year
ago. A slight decrease in yields of irrigated crops--caused
principally by the drought, but also by military activity--
accounts for the balance of the deficit.
Despite the downturn in wheat production, overall food
supplies in Afghanistan should remain generally adequate through
the winter, assuming that wheat imports match last year's
estimated level of 300,000 to 360,000 tons. Nevertheless,
serious localized shortages are likely in .areas of concentrated
fighting--such as the Panjsher Valley--and in remote areas where
weather-induced crop damage was most severe. Moreover,
Afghanistan's entire food supply chain--from farm to marketplace--
remains extremely fragile. A Soviet effort to deny food to the
insurgents could quickly lead to more widespread shortages.
Wheat imports from Pakistan--an important supplier--may be
reduced in the coming months because of Soviet attempts to stem
insurgent infiltration from that country, and Islamabad's reduced
harvest. The 1985 winter wheat crop--just recently planted--is
already being threatened by the carry-over effects of this year's
drought.
This paper was prepared by
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Agricultural Assessments Branch, Strategic
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Resources Division Office of Global Issues (AAB/SRD/OGI), with a
contribution from
Office of Near East and South
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Asian Analysis. Comments and questions may be addressed to
Chief, Agricultural Assessments Branch, OGI, on
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Afghanistan: 1984 Grain Assessment
Background
Agricultural Constraints. Most of Afghanistan is unsuitable
for agriculture because of extensive areas of mountains, deserts,
and forests. Soils are poorly structured, the arid continental
climate--characterized by hot, dry summers and wet, often harsh,
winters--severely limits agricultural output, and precipitation
in most areas of the country is inadequate to support dryland
farming. Furthermore, farming practices are primitive and
largely of a subsistence nature. Little use is made of chemical
fertilizer, pesticides or new seed varieties. Farm operations
are mostly non-mechanized, with men and draft animals providing
Cropping Patterns. Afghanistan contains approximately
8 million hectares of arable land, less than half of which is
cultivated due to limited supplies of water. Some 3.3 million
hectares of the arable land are irrigated, but because of
fallowing practices, only about three-fourths of this area is
cropped each year. Irrigated land produces approximately
85 percent of the country's food and industrial crops. Dryland
crops occupy about 900,000 hectares and are concentrated mainly
in the foothills of the northern plains region (Figure 1).
Grain crops occupy nearly 90 percent of the total cropped
area including nearly all the dry land farming. Wheat, mostly
winter wheat, is the staple crop in the Afghan diet and takes up
about 60 percent of the area sown to grain. Other grains include
corn, rice, and barley. Wheat yields are low by world standards,
averaging only about 16-17 quintalsl per hectare on irrigated
land and about five to six quintals on dry land. By comparison,
Soviet farmers in neighboring Central Asia republics obtained an
average of 24 quintals per hectare of winter wheat on irrigated
land and 10 quintals on non-irrigated land during the 1976-80
Population Trends. Approximately 3.5 million people, out of
a pre-war population estimated at 15.3 million, have fled the
country to Pakistan and Iran. Rapid growth, however, brought the
population back to roughly 14 million by 1984. The exodus
occurred primarily from the provinces bordering Pakistan and, to
a lesser extent se bordering Iran, according to
analysis of satellite imagery. Most of
the refugees have been from the agrarian and pastoral sectors,
which made up 85 percent of the population prior to the Soviet
occupation. In addition, many people have migrated to the cities
1 A quintal equals 0.1 metric tons.
GI M 84-10219
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in order to escape the military conflict in the countrvside and
to take advantage of better food supplies.
Transportation and Food Distribution Networks. Food
distribution and transportation networks are poorly developed in
Afghanistan. While military actions may have placed new strains
on the system, distribution of food to major markets, or cities,
has not been significantly affected according to embassy
reporting. The vast majority of farmers and villagers--located
great distances by foot trails from any road--are isolated from
the principal food markets and have few, if any, grain storage
facilities. Although the primary road system--which connects the
major cities--has remained intact throughout the Soviet
occupation, some isolated insurgent attacks have taken place.
Our analysis of satellite imagery indicates that bus and truck
movement of food supplies have not been impeded significantly on
Impact of the Soviet Occupation
Numerous reports from embassy have stated
the Soviets have deliberately destroyed crops and disturbed the
fragile irrigation system. Extensive imagery covering about 95
percent of Afghanistan's agricultural area does not substantiate
the field reporting. According to imagery analysis, it appears
that Soviet military actions have not been directed against
Afghan agriculture except in the Panjsher Valley, where less than
one percent of the total grain crop is produced. We estimate
that about three-quarters of the grainfields there were either
destroyed or abandoned because of the fighting. For example,
crops throughout the valley were burned, including those already
cut and shocked, while others suffered damage from mililtary
vehicle trackage. This damage implies a military-related loss of
about ^7,500 tons, or only about three percent of this year's
In the rest of the country, imagery shows that:
o cropping operations from spring through fall of 1984 took
place on schedule;
o irrigation systems--vital to crop production and vulnerable
to disruption--were functioning normally;
o there has been no apparent change in total arable land use
since last year--continuing abandonment of agricultural land
near the Pakistan border has been offset by increased
cultivation in Herat and other provinces.
The Soviets and the Afghan central government are continuing
measures begun prior to the Soviet occupation to bolster
agricultural output. These include increasing the availability
of fertilizer and improved varieties of wheat, the amount of
agricultural machinery, and the number of technical advisors.
For example, several large farm equipment yards were identified
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throughout the country on satellite imagery in or near the main
cities. These equipment yards contain Soviet grain combines,
probable forage harvesters, tractors and farm trailers. New
equipment was seen arriving at these yards on flatbed trailers
several times during 1984. Soviet grain combines were also
observed at a major transshipment facility on the Afghan-Soviet
border (37-13N 067-25E), probably awaiting shipment to
Afghanistan.
1984 Weather Summary
Available meteorological data--although generally sparse and
incomplete--indicates that precipitation throughout Afghanistan
was about 50 percent below normal during the November 1983-May
1984 period2 (Figure 2). This was corroborated by satellite
imagery which showed that the country's snowpack, river flows,
and lake and reservoir levels were all down from a year ago.
Hardest hit was the northern plains region, where virtually all
of the non-irrigated crops are grown. Rainfall during the
critical February-April period was less than half of normal.
Indeed, rain occurred only on 17 days compared to the average of
Despite the precipitation shortfall, we believe that total
irrigation supplies this year were only slightly less than in
1983. Satellite imagery showed that most of Afghanistan's rivers
had enough water to keep irrigation canals fully charged during
periods of peak need. Only in a few cases did river beds dry up
earlier than normal. Groundwater reserves also appeared
generally adequate during 1984. An estimated 20 percent of the
irrigation water comes from underground canals--known as kar ezs--
1984 Wheat Crop
We estimate the 1984 Afghan wheat crop--the country's most
important food grain--to be about 2.7 million tons, 300,000 tons
less than last year's estimated output.3 This assessment is
based primarily on analysis of satellite imagery, and is
supplemented with meteorological data. Total sown area is
estimated to be 2.6 million hectares, the same as in 1983.
Approximately 95 percent of the country's agricultural areas were
analyzed using medium-resolution imagery acquired during the 1984
growing season. In addition, 65 point targets--averaging about
2 All precipitation in Afghanistan occurs during the November
May period.
Afghan government statistics--normally derived from very
limited and unreliable information--put the 1983 wheat crop at
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20 square miles each and located throughout the country--were
analyzed using high-resolution imagery (Figure 1).
Some 60 percent of the wheat shortfall is from the dryland
crop in the northern plains region--estimated to be down
25 percent from last year's estimated output of 600,000 tons.4
Our preliminary estimate of dryland wheat production--made in
mid-October--suggested a 30 percent reduction from last year, but
subsequent analysis of additional satellite imagery revealed that
crops in the north-central provinces of Balkh, Samangan and
Baghlan were slightly better than first estimated. In the rest
of the northern plains region, no changes were warranted on the
basis of the new imagery; we continue to estimate that wheat
yields in the west--in the vicinity of Meymaneh--fell by nearly
two-thirds compared to 1983, while those in the east-- ear Qonduz
and Taloqan--were cut by about one-third.
An estimated five percent downturn in wheat output on
irrigated land accounts for the remainder of this year's
shortfall. The reduction is due primarily to the smaller
supplies of irrigation water that resulted from the November-May
dryspell, and to a lesser extent from militar activity,
especially in the Panjsher Valley.
Regional Crop Assessment
Eastern Valleys (Kapisa, Laghman, Konarha, Parvan, Vardak,
Ghazni, Paktia, Paktika, Lowgar, Nangarhar, and Kabol). This
region, consisting of the 11 provinces surrounding Kabul,
contains approximately 30 percent of the country's agricultural
land, including some of the most fertile and high-yielding
valleys in Afghanistan. It is, however, also the area most
affected by the Soviet occupation. The major valleys and basins
include Panjsher, Charikar, Nangarhar, Konar, Ghazni, Lowgar, and
Khowst. Many of the these valleys have been the sites of heavy
The long, narrow Panjsher Valley, northeast of Kabul, has
suffered the most from the Soviet occupation. Satellite imagery
taken from May through September 1984 showed that Soviet and
Afghan military operations in the valley caused the destruction
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or abandonment of about 75 percent of the grainfields there.
Although such losses will have little impact on total Afghan
grain output this year--only about 7,500 tons because the valley
is only a minor grain producer--they almost certainly will be
devastating to the people who remain in the valley. Since 1979,
more than half of the population has fled the area because of
Most of the damage in the valley is estimated to be a direct
result of military operations, including damage caused by armored
vehicle trackage, construction of military bivouacs, bomb blasts,
and artillery shelling. What appeared to be deliberate burning
of grainfields--both before and after harvest--was observed
throughout the valley The heavy fighting also led to
sizable abandonment o grainfields as the population exodus
appears to have continued this year. Post-harvest grain shocks
that were observed on early August imagery had not yet been
removed from fields by.September. Normally, shocks are removed
within a few days after harvest in order to prevent yield
The grain crop in the basin near Charikar, 40 miles north of
Kabul, was generally as good as in 1983. The rivers and
irrigation canals contained water throughout the growing
season. Crop damage from armored vehicle trackage and bomb
blasts--as observed on imagery--was confined to less than one
percent of the cultivated fields, and thus had virtually no
affect on overall grain production. This fertile valley
traditionally produces surplus grain for the Kabul region
o~ od vars and could possibly have done so again in 1984.
during
The Nangarhar Valley surrounding Jalalabad, 40 miles east of
Kabul, also appeared to produce a good grain crop in 1984 despite
the fact that some agricultural areas near the Pakistan border
remained abandoned. Rivers and canals had sufficient water
throughout the growing season, and harvesting took place on
schedule--from mid-May through early June. Mechanical combine
harvesting was observed just west of Jalalabad. Sitings of
trucks and animal packtrains throughout the year on the main road
through I the Khyber Pass indicated that it was operational.
Conditions in the Konar Valley, adjacent to the
Afghan/Pakistan border, were similar to those in 1983. A few
large areas of agricultural land, mostly on the east bank of the
Konar River, remained abandoned. Elsewhere, summer crops (corn,
rice, and barley) appeared to be doing very well as of mid-
July. In addition, mule packtrains were seen on several of the
many trails that cross the Afghan-Pakistan border here carrying
supplies into the countr , almost certainly for the insurgents
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Crop yields in northern Ghazni and southern Vardak Provinces
were not as good as last year because of inadequate irrigation
supplies. The main river that flows through the city of Ghazni
(33-32N 068-23E) dried-up prematurely in earl M , leaving some
of the irrigation canals without water Several dry
irrigation canals were also observed in Vardak Province--in the
vicinit
of She
kh
b
d
y
y
a
a
(34-04N 068-45E).
Grain shock analysis indicates that yields around the city
of Kabul were generally good this year. Some rivers were lower
than in 1983, but water flows appeared adequate for irrigation
needs. Nevertheless, military vehicle trackage caused minor
damage to crops located to the west of the city, and there was
some increased abandonment of agricultural land near a few of the
lar
i
i
ger m
l
tary installations.
Based on a comparative analysis of grain shocks
in I?owaar
Moreover, because the irrigation canals were dry_in July,
yields of summer crops probably were reduced as well
Agricultural abandonment did not appear to have increased in the
i
prov
nce since last year.
Grain yields in Paktia and Paktika Provinces, both adjacent
to the Afghan-Pakistan border, are expected to match last year's
level. Irrigation supplies were adequate throughout the crop
season, and no military damage to cultivated fields was evident
on imagery. Even so, total production will be below last year's
level and far below the provinces' potential because the
abandonment d--begun in 1980--continued this year
Northern Provinces (Badghis, Faryab, Jowzjan, Balkh,
Samangan, Konduz, Takhar, Badakhshan, and Baghlan). This region,
referred to as the "breadbasket" of Afghanistan, contains
approximately 50 percent of the country's agricultural land,
including nearly all the dryland crops. The drought this spring
decreased the yields of dryland crops, mostly wheat, by an
estimated 25 percent from 1983. Irrigated crops, on the other
hand, appear to have been supplied with enough water from rivers
and groundwater reserves to have made a good crop in most
areas. The one exception to this was in Faryab Province--in the
vicinity of Meymaneh--where the main river ran dry by May. As a
result
we beli
h
,
eve t
at yields of both dryland and irrigated
cr o
i
h
s
n t
at province were unusually poor this year
Compared to 1983, we estimate that the yields of dryland
crops in the western part of the region--Badghis Faryab and
Jowzjan Provinces--fell by nearly two-thirds 1 -1 while
those in the east--Takhar and Badakhshan Provinces--were reduced
by about one-third. In the central part of the region--Balkh,
Samangan, and Baghian Provinces--yields are likely to be at least
as good as last year The war appeared to have had
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little effect on agricultural production in these provinces, as
no significant military activity was observed in the cultivated
areas. Mechanized combine harvesting was observed in several
provinces.
Central Mountain Provinces (Bamian, Ghowr, and Oruzgan).
This area of steep mountains and small narrow valleys, also known
as the Hazarehjat Region, contains less than five percent of the
country's agricultural land. Analysis of a limited amount of
imagery taken during 1984 indicates that there was probably
enough water in the rivers to satisfy irrigation requirements.
Late September imagery showed good summer crop yields in the
vicinity of the Bamian Valley (34-50N 067-50E). The effects of
the war appeared minimal in this region.
Western Border Provinces (Herat, Farah, and Nimruz). This
region, adjacent to Iran, is nearly all desert and contains only
about 10 percent of the country's agricultural land. Crops are
concentrated along the few rivers which flow out of the central
mountains. Despite heavy, ongoing military activity in this
region, especially in the Herat area, agricultural output appears
to have been unaffected. There is no evidence from imagery of
deliberate crop burning or destruction of irrigation systems by
military forces. Analysis of straw shocks in Herat Province
indicates little, if any change in grain production between 1984
and 1983. Lower yields resulting from a reduction in the amount
of irrigation water available from the Harirud River probably was
offset by a slight expansion in the area sown to grain this year
Numerous pieces of Soviet farm machinery--including grain
combines, probable forage harvesters, small tractors, and farm
trailers--were observed inside a large farm equipment yard in the
city of Herat New equipment was observed arriving on 25X1
flatbed trailers severa times during the year.
Several villages, along with the associated agricultural 25X1
land, were abandoned in Nimruz Province adjacent to the Iranian
border. Similar abandonment was also observed here last year and
appears to be no greater this year. 25X1
The South (Helmand, Qandahar, and Zabol Provinces). Like
the Western Border Provinces, these provinces are mostly desert
and contain approximately 10 percent of Afghanistan's cultivated
land. Crops are concentrated along the Helmand and Arghandah
Rivers, and in a few groundwater-dependent areas along the
southern edge of the central mountains. This region experienced
heavy military activity during 1984, but as in Herat, neither
crops nor irrigation systems were deliberately attacked,
according to imagery analysis.
Grain yields here are expected to be slightly less than in
1983 even though the main rivers generally had enough water for
irrigation needs A few secondary rivers as well as
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some groundwater reserves ran short of water during the summer,
thereby reducing the yields of summer crops
Tenuous Food Situation
Based on our estimate of the 1984 Afghan wheat crop--2.7
million tons--overall food supplies in Afghanistan should remain
generally adequate through the winter, although serious localized
shortages are likely in areas of concentrated military activity--
such as the Panjsher Valley--and in remote areas where drought
cut crop output markedly. This outlook assumes that wheat
imports this year from the USSR and Pakistan will reach last
year's estimated level of 300,000 to 360,000 tons. Afghanistan
was generally considered self-sufficient in wheat supplies in
1976, when wheat production was 2.9 million tons and the
population was roughly the same as today.
Historically, many severe food shortages in Afghanistan have
originated in the dryland agricultural regions. Drought not only
reduces grain production drastically but also desiccates the
grazing pastures used by the nomadic herdsmen who make up about
10 percent of the population. When this occurs the farmers and
herdsmen face possible starvation because they typically reside
in remote regions with poorly developed food markets and
transportation networks. Indeed, previous food aid has usually
gone to the cities first even though the major need was in the
remote countryside areas. More recently, Soviet operations have
caused some disruptions in food availability, but have not
significantly reduced total supply levels.
Since the Soviet occupation, Kabul has nearly doubled its
imports of foreign grain as a means to alleviate food shortages,
especially in urban areas. This policy appears to be working.
The US Embassy in Kabul reported in October that food supplies
there--including meat, fruits and vegetables, and staple items--
were roughly equal to the adequate levels of a year ago. In
addition, the average level of all food prices in Kabul, while
climbing dramatically in the past four years, has not risen any
faster than nonfood items, according to spot price surveys and
official government statistics (Figure 3). Although information
on the food situation in the countryside is fragmentary at best,
State Department personnel who recently interviewed Afghan
refugees in Pakistan concluded that few, if any, areas of
Afghanistan were facing a serious food supply problem.
5 Soviet and Afghan press reports indicate that wheat imports
from the USSR in 1983 were 160,000 to 180,000 tons, most of which
j
was sent to the ma
or ties, especially Kabul.
140,000 to 180,000 tons of wheat are
imported annually from Pakistan through unofficial channels.
Virtually all of this grain is destined for rural areas outside
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Even so, the entire Afghan food supply chain--from the farm
to the marketplace--remains fragile. An escalation in the
fighting or a Soviet effort to disrupt the food distribution
network could easily upset the tenuous balance, thereby leading
to more widespread shortages. Moreover, recent Soviet efforts to
stem insurgent infiltration from Pakistan, combined with
increased transportation costs and Islamabad's reduced wheat
harvest may result in smaller wheat imports from that country.
Finally, this year's drought has greatly depleted the water
reserves upon which the 1985 winter wheat crop--just recently
planted--depends for good germination. As a result, the crop is
already extremely vulnerable to moisture stress. Without at
least average snowfall this winter, Kabul almost certainly will
be faced with a harvest shortfall again next year.
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Figure 2
Percentage of Mean Precipitation in Afghanistan, November 1983 - May 1984
-,ardak
hey `ad
Ghazni
4
ZAbol
A0
8adksai
M -
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FIGURE 3. Afghanistan: Kabul Prices Indexa
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Afghan Government Stotistks
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Nonfood (tfRs
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