MAJOR LDC DEBTORS: FINANCIAL IMPACTS OF AN OIL PRICE DECLINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001200610001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 25, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIR ATE OF INITUIGENCE
25 October 1984
Major LDC Debtors: Financial Impacts of
an Oil Price Decline
Summary
Assuming that a small decline in world oil prices -- say $2/bbl --
anerges from the 29 October OPEC emergency meeting, we believe the financial
impacts on most key LDC debtors will be moderate. Certainly a number of LDC
debtors -- notably Brazil, the Philippines, and South Korea -- would obtain
significant savings on their oil import bills. In addition, we believe Trost
oil-exporting debtors would be able to manage the drop in foreign exchange
earnings they would incur, because they have adequate financial resources.
Even with a small price drop, however, Egypt and Nigeria would confront --
serious new financial strains because of their high dependence on oil export
earnings coupled with currently tenuous financial positions. Finally, over
the medium term all of the debtors would benefit from sanewhat faster BCD
growth and easing of interest rates, which probably would be prompted by a
lower oil price.
If a major oil price drop were to occur, the implications for some other
oil exporters also became serious. With a drop in oil prices to around $20 a
barrel, for example:
o Mexico would lose $5 billion in foreign exchange earnings. Such a drop
would result in a substantial increase in banker resistance to signing
on to the new nulti-year rescheduling package and lead to a renewal of
credit difficulties for Mexico.
o Venezuela would see its exports drop by $4 billion. Even with its
ample reserves of $12 billion, we would expect Caracas to experience
even greater difficulty than currently in obtaining new money.
contained herein is updated through 25 October 1984. Ca ments may be directed
to Chief, Economics Division 25X1
This memorandum was prepared byl
Econanics Division, Office of Global Issues. The in ormation 25X1
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o Indonesia would lose $3 billion in export earnings. Although quick
implementation of austerity measures in the past has kept up Jakarta's
credit standing, this position could quickly erode following such a
Disruptions to the international financial system from sharply lower oil
prices also could occur in other countries that are less dependent on oil
earnings. For example, Peru and Argentina already are in desperate financial
straits. A reduction in their export earnings, which would follow an oil
price decline, could push them closer to the brink of declaring a moratorium
on debt payments.
With respect to the oil-importing LDCs, a decline in oil prices would not
be enough by itself to substantially ease their debt problems. Most of the
larger debtors -- particularly in Latin America -- are unable to attract any
new lending from foreign creditors outside of their debt restructuring
packages. Moreover, capital flight remains a problem as does a lack of
foreign direct investment. Still, to the extent that faster DBCD growth and
an easing of interest rates result from a lower oil price, the combination
could lead to same easing of financial pressure.
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Major LDC Debtors: Financial Impacts of an Oil Price Decline
Introduction
OPEC's benchmark oil price is again in jeopardy. In early 1983, a
British price cut, coupled with a precipitous drop in Nigerian production,
triggered a $5.50 per barrel reduction in Nigeria's official price. OPEC
responded by dropping its benchmark price from $34 to $29 per barrel. Last
week, first Norway and then the United Kingdom reduced their official prices
in reaction to weak spot prices. To avert a buyer exodus, Nigeria followed
with a price drop of $2 per barrel, undercutting Norwegian and UK prices by 65
cents. OPEC has called a meeting for 29 October to determine their
response.
A sustained decline in oil prices of $2 per barrel, or even more if OPEC
discipline unravels, would have large repercussions on sane LIE debtors.
Major oil-exporting debtors would face substantial reductions in their export
earnings and hence their ability to meet debt obligations. At the same time,
oil-importing countries would realize savings on their oil bill. In any case,
world oil price shifts will introduce an important new element into the
unfolding financial outlook for LDC debtors.
LDCs: Current Financial Situation
Even though some progress is being made, the LDCs continue to be affected
by severe debt problems. Total LDC external debt continues to grow; we
estimate it will hit about $750 billion by yearend 1984. Growth has slowed
from previous years -- both because of lower LDC external financing
requirements and the reluctance of commercial banks to lend to financially
troubled countries -- but debt service ratios remain very high for some of the
key debtors (Table 1). Moreover, the need for economic adjustment in debt-
troubled countries has pushed a record number of IICs to implement austerity
programs under the guidance of the IMF.
Overall capital flows continue to be a problem for LDCs, particularly
Latin America. Extensive capital flight over the past several years -- we
estimate it may have reached $100 billion during 1979-83 -- has slowed but is
still occurring. In addition, foreign direct investment remains stagnant, and
prospects for future growth are not good. These factors, combined with the
dropoff in bank lending, are raising serious doubts among financial analysts
about the ability of Latin American countries to resume economic growth and
development any time soon.
Several positive actions, however, recently have emerged. Creditor banks
have granted multi-year debt restructurings to Mexico and Venezuela, an
indication that creditors are moving toward a longer term approach to debt
problems as opposed to annual restructurings. According to many forecasters
the Western economic recovery, led by the United States, should continue
through 1985 and should boost LDC exports as well. Moreover, interest rates
have declined slightly in the last month. Softer oil prices are also aiding
the oil-importing LDCs.
GI M 84-10196
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Table 1
KEY DEBTORS: DEBT SERVICE RATIOS, 1983
Debt Servilce/
Exports
(Percent)
Interest
Exports
Argentina
70
40
Brazil
75
43
Chile
61
34
Ecuador
48
26
Egypt
33
15
Indonesia
19
11
Mexico
65
31
Nigeria
21
10
Peru
65
30
Philippines
41
28
South Korea
20
12
Venezuela
31
18
Ratio of total debt service (medium- and long-term
principal repayments plus interest payments of all
maturities) to exports of goods and services.
Ratio of total interest payments to exports of goods
and services.
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Oil Price Outlook
Recent reporting suggests OPEC will try to support the current $29
benchmark price. OPEC's success in maintaining the benchmark in the inmediate
period will depend on whether Nigeria can be persuaded to rescind its price
reduction and whether OPEC members can agree to and implement production cuts
in line with market requirements.
We believe OPEC will have a difficult time maintaining the current
benchmark price. First, there has been a steep decline in non-Cormiunist oil
demand since 1979, spurred by price-induced conservation and substitution.
Second, oil inventory reductions and increased production from non-OPEC
producers have added to supply. Despite OPEC's attempt to reassert control
over prices through production ceilings, most mothers have been unwilling to
adhere strictly to production and pricing guidelines. As a result of these
factors, spot oil prices have been soft and have undermined official prices.
OPEC's current enormous production overhang of sane 9 million b/d of surplus
available capacity will continue to encourage cheating among members,
maintaining downward pressure on oil prices. Consequently, we view a drop in
OPEC prices of $2/bbl or so as quite possible.
We believe there is a smaller chance that oil prices over the next year
could plummet, perhaps to around $20 per barrel. This could occur in at least
a couple of ways:
o OPEC collectively could reach the conclusion that current oil prices
are much too high from the view of their best long-term interests. At
current prices, continued conservation and substitution adjustments, as
well as production increases in non-OPEC countries, are keeping the
market for OPW/oil flat. A substantial price reduction would alter
these trends. -
o The conflict of interests among OPEC members could increase
dramatically, resulting in a further loss of production discipline.
For example, the major debtors in OPEC -- Nigeria, Venezuela, and
Indonesia -- have a great incentive to over-produce. Collectively they
now have about 0.7 million b/d in surplus capacity. Additional
supplies on the market would place more downward pressure on prices and
threaten OPEC's already tenuous March 1983 accord.
Foreign Trade Impacts
The impact of any oil price decline on the major LDC debtors will depend
chiefly on their foreign trade position in oil. In the short run any oil
price decline will reduce the foreign exchange earnings of the oil-exporting
countries, while resulting in savings on the oil bill of importing
countries. LDC debtors such as Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, and Venezuela
1' According to embassy reporting, a Nigerian official has suggested that OPEC
should "fight back" against the Norwegian, British, and other high cost
producers by taking advantage of OPEC's low production costs through allowing
the current artificially high price to fall.
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would find themselves with less foreign exchange to meet their import spending
and debt service obligations. South Korea, the Philippines, and other debtors
highly dependent on oil imports would be able to increase imports of non-oil
goods and perhaps improve their debt service record. The foreign trade
impacts would not end here, however, as any oil price decline would start up a
global adjustment process that would involve further trade shifts and require
probably two or more years to work out.
To quantify the impacts of oil price declines on key debtors, we have
made the simplifying assumption that export and import volumes stay constant
at 1984 levels. We then calculated the dollar impacts of two scenarios which
should bound any price decline: a pric~ reduction of $2 per barrel and a
reduction of $9 per barrel (Table 2).
The Losers. If prices decline only $2/bbl, we anticipate that of the
major debtors only Egypt and Nigeria would experience increased financial
problems. With this price fall, Egypt's oil earnings would fall by $160
million, representing almost 5 percent of total exports. Nigeria's losses
would be $800 million or 5 percent of total export earnings. Given a mice
fall of $9 per barrel, almost all of the oil-exporting debtors would face
serious problems. The revenue losses of Mexico would be $5 billion, 20
percent of exports, while losses in Nigeria and Venezuela would amount to
around $4 billion, representing 25 percent of their exports.
These countries and other oil-exporting countries would have essentially
four options for adjusting to these revenue losses:
o Cut imports.
o Draw down foreign exchange reserves (including foreign assets).
o Increase foreign borrowing.
o Delay foreign debt service payments (run arrearages).
In most cases, countries would choose sane combination of these policies
depending on their credit standing, foreign exchange reserve level, and
ability to manage import cuts. Thus, such troubled debtors as Mexico and
Nigeria probably would have little success in borrowing additional new funds
unless special help was provided. At the same time, according to press
reports, Mexico has foreign exchange reserves of about $7 billion and
Venezuela of $12.5 billion, which could provide a cushion if desired.
Alternatively, a decision to maintain reserves would, as in the case of simply
low foreign exchange holdings, imply sane canbination of import cutbacks and
arrearages on debt payments. Delaying debt payments could be the preferred
option, especially for countries like Nigeria that already have made
substantial reductions in imports.
21 We are assuming across-the-board cuts in oil prices even though prices for
different types of oil may not change uniformly. Thus, for some countries
such as Mexico, the revenue loss may be less because of their export product
mix.
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Major LDC Debtors: Impacts of Alternative Oil Price Declines
Net Oil Exports a Net Oil Trade Estimated
1984 Balance, 1984a Impact of
(thousand b/d) (million US$) Oil Price
Declines on
Trade Balance
(million US$)
of -$2/bbl of -$9/bbl
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Ecuador
Egypt
Indonesia
Mexico
Nigeria
Peru
Philippines
South Korea
Venezuela
5 52 -5
-456 -4790 +330
-67 -700 +50
145 1300 -110
218 2200 -160
934 10,000 -680
1550 15,275 -1130
1120 12,800 -820
50
-200
-550
1298
-15
+1500
+220
-480
-720
-3070
-5090
-3680
525 -40 -160
-2100 +150 +660
-5720 +400 +1810
13,300 -950 -4260
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Debtors with excess oil productive capacity would have the additional
option of increasing their oil exports, although such a move would almost
certainly risk an unraveling of prices. Of the major LDC debtors, Nigeria
currently has about 500,000 b/d of surplus productive capacity and Venezuela
and Indonesia each have about 100,000 b/d. I _J
The Winners. Sane of the major LIE debtors are heavily dependent on oil
imports and would realize substantial savings if oil prices decline. Brazil
and South Korea would save $0.3 to 0.4 billion dollars each under a $2 per
barrel price decline, and about $1.5 billion dollars each under a $9 per
barrel price decline.
These countries and others that are net oil importers would also face
sane policy decisions.
o In particular, there would be an excellent opportunity to raise
government revenues relatively painlessly by imposing a tax on each
barrel of oil that matched any price decline. Domestic oil prices
would be maintained, thus not disturbing investment projects and energy
consumption patterns which depend on a roughly $30 per barrel oil.
price. Governments especially in need of funds, such as Brazil and the
Philippines, could find this tax policy attractive.
o Alternatively, sane countries could choose simply to pass the full oil
price reduction to their domestic economies. The oil bill savings
would allow greater imports of other goods. At the same time, the oil
price decline would also encourage a greater volume of oil imports,
especially after an adjustment period of several years.
Second Order Effects. LID debtors that sell substantial amounts of goods
to oil exporting countries could find markets in these countries diminishing
following an oil.price decline. At the same time, however, markets in the oil
importing countries, including most of the OECD, would be expanding with the
increased purchasing power of consumers in those countries. Thus, although
initially exports to the oil producers might drop faster than new exports to
oil-importing countries would increase, after a year or two these effects
would tend to cancel each other out.
Because most of the OECD imports oil, any price decline will tend to
stimulate the OECD economies: consumers' purchasing power would increase,
producers' energy production costs would fall, and hence demand for and
production of non-energy goods would grow. Greater OECD growth would lead to
greater demand for inports, including from LDCs. Although the diverse
carposition of LDC exports makes it difficult to assess which countries would
benefit most from OECD growth, export oriented countries such as South Korea
and Brazil would be in the best position to gear up for increased export
demand.
Interest Rate Impacts
An oil price decline could have an effect on interest rates. Over the
longer run, interest rates reflect both real supply and demand conditions for
credit as well as the anticipated rate of inflation. A falling oil price
would reduce the component of interest rates that reflects future inflation.
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While increased real incomes in the OECD could lead to greater savings and
hence a tendency for lower interest rates, such income growth also would
result in greater credit demand so that these effects would tend to wash
out. Furthermore, credit demand could grow faster than savings if some of the
oil-exporting countries were able3t~o continue to increase their borrowing as
l
i
ower earn
ngs. -
they adjusted to
Overall, however, it sears likely that, if anything, interest rates would
tend to fall with an oil price decline. Some analysts have predicted that a
$2 per barrel oil price cut would lead to a 1-percentage-point drop in
interest rates. In this case, all of the major LDC debtors would gain,
particularly those with proportionately large debts at floating interest
rates, such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Nigeria (Table 3).
A Closer Look at the Oil-Exporting Debtors
The impact of lower oil prices would vary among key oil-exporting
debtors. Mexico would be hit hard by lower oil revenues, largely because the
country still has little roan to maneuver. Imports have been cut to the bare
minimum over the past three years, and non-oil exports -- although growing, --
would not be able to pick up the slack generated by large oil revenue
losses.
Z A small drop in oil prices could be absorbed by Mexico
because sane cushion has been built into the restructuring package, but a
large price decline would pose serious problems. Many banks -- some of which
are already reluctant to participate in the restructuring -- could find it
even harder to justify their participation. In the worst case, Mexico would
be unable to meet its interest payments, which would put a large burden on
major creditor banks.
Venezuela probably would be able to absorb a small drop in oil prices
because of its relatively better financial position. Foreign exchange
reserves remain high, and the recent restructuring package with commercial
banks will reduce debt service requirements over the next several years. The
package likely will be signed by the individual banks because of its overall
benefits for both creditors and debtor. Banks, however, could be reluctant to
participate in new loans over the medium term should Venezuela not take
actions such as drawing down reserves to make up for the loss in revenues from
oil exports.
Indonesia also would be able to adjust to a small price decline, although
at sane cost to its economic growth prospects. Although Jakarta could not
expect much help from non-oil exports, the government could reduce spending on
development projects as it did in 1983. This in turn would bring about a
reduction in imports of capital and intermediate goods which would offset the
?1 We estimate that OPEC states together will borrow $8 billion from banks and
official creditors this year. Indonesia, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia will
account for most of the borrowing.
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Major Debtors: Impact of an Interest Rate Decline
Net Savings from a
One-Per e nt age-Point
Drop in Interest Rates
(Million US$)
Argentina
310
Brazil
780
Chile
130
Ecuador
50
Egypt
30
Indonesia
50
Mexico
710
Nigeria
120
Peru
50
Philippines
130
South Korea
220
Venezuela
210
1These data are derived from the change in net debt
(gross debt less deposits) that is on floating
interest rates.
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loss in oil revenue. Foreign exchange reserves also provide a cushion in the
near term. Even with a sharp drop in oil prices, Indonesia would not have
immediate debt repayment problans because of the favorable structure of its
repayment schedule. Moreover, creditors likely would respond favorably to an
Indonesian cutback in spending so that the country's credit rating would not
be severely altered.
Egypt could be hard hit by falling oil prices because of its precarious
financial situation. Banks currently view Egypt as a below average credit
risk, and a loss of oil income -- which accounts for over 60 percent of
exports and over 20 percent of exports of goods and services -- could lead to
debt repayment difficulties. Cairo would press the United States even harder
for debt relief on Foreign Military Sales credits and might have to seek
rescheduling from other private and official creditors. A significant
reduction in prices could also interrupt Egyptian oil exploration efforts,
hindering the future growth of oil production. Moreover, deepening financial
problems in Persian Gulf countries could reduce the need for Egyptian migrant
labor.
Nigeria currently is under serious financial strain. Lagos has major
debt servicing problems, with a large build-up of arrearages on short-term and
dwindling foreign exchange reserves. If its recent oil price cut is
maintained, the annual loss in export earnings would be same $800 million,
according to our estimate. Reduced oil revenues would put increased pressure
on Lagos to cut spending and reduce imports and to reach agreanent with the
IMF on a standby arrangement. The impasse with the Fund likely will continue
through yearend, however, because of the overrrnent's unwillingness to
implement a devaluation.
Ecuador probably would be able to absorb a small drop in oil prices.
Quito is close to reaching a new standby arrangement with the IMF which will
be followed by bank negotiations on a debt restructuring and new money.
Ecuador's economic team has been cooperative with the IMF and will probably
take the steps necessary to adjust to lower oil export revenues. A large fall
in oil prices, however, could make creditors reluctant to provide newer
since some banks already are balking at increasing their exposure.
Implications
We believe lower oil prices would on balance contribute appreciably to a
more robust world economy, especially after an adjustment period of several
years. ODCD growth would be promoted and interest rates probably would
ease. However, sane LDC debtors that depend heavily on oil exports would be
in a much more precarious financial situation, particularly if an oil price
decline were substantial. Egypt, Mexico, and Nigeria are especially
vulnerable because of their lack of maneuvering room; Egypt has few
alternative exports, Mexico already has severely cut imports, and Nigeria has
large arrearages and dwindling foreign exchange holdings.
The risks of a moratorium on debt service payments by one of these
countries thus would increase if oil prices were to plummet. Initially these
countries probably would, start to run more arrearages in their debt payments
and also attempt to negotiate much improved debt terms and new credit.
However, private creditors would be very reluctant to extend new loans after a
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fall in oil prices. Only relatively small amounts of forced new lending would
be likely as creditors attempted to protect outstanding loans.
Disruptions to the international financial system fran lower oil prices
also could stem from some other countries that are less dependent on oil
earnings. For example, Peru and Argentina already are in desperate financial
straits. Even a small reduction in their export earnings, which would follow
an oil price decline, could push them closer to the brink of declaring a
moratorium on debt payments.
With respect to the oil-importing LDCs, a decline in oil prices would not
be enough by itself to substantially ease their debt problems. Most of the
larger debtors -- particularly in Latin America -- are unable to attract any
new lending fran foreign creditors outside of their debt restructuring
packages. Moreover, capital flight remains a problem as does a lack of
foreign direct investment. Still, to the extent that faster OEM growth and
an easing of interest rates result from a lower oil price, the combination
could lead to same easing of financial pressure.
We expect creditors to look at the oil-importing LDCs more favorably in
the event of lower oil prices, but this could be overshadowed by lender
concern for the financial situation of the major oil-exporting debtors.
Mexico, in particular, would attract lender attention because of the size of
the country's debt and the implications for the international financial system
as a whole. Thus, the overall positive impact on oil-importing LDCs probably
would be realized more over the medium term than in the short term.
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SUBJECT: Major LDC Debtors: Financial Impact of an Oil Price
Decline
OGI/ECD/DI&FI/RRamsson/bas/6763
Distribution:
Secretary D. Regan
Treasury
R. T.
Beryl
James
Robert
Thomas
McNamar
Sprinkel
W. Conrow
Cornell
Dawson
it
Charles Dallara
Charles Schotta
James A. Griffin
Doug Mulholland
Manuel Johnson
George Hoguet
David Mulford
Christopher Hicks
Secretary G. Shultz
Kenneth Dam
Hugh Montgomery
Michael Armacost
Ralph Lindstrom
W. Allen Wallis
Langhorne Motley
Richard Burt
Richard McCormack
Chester Crocker
Paul Wolfowitz
Richard Murphy
J.C. Kornblum
Richard Combs
Lauralee Peters
Peter W. Rodman
Byron Jackson
Lionel Olmer
Warren E. Farb
"
"
it
it
State
it
"
it
it
it
it
It
"
it
it
It
it
"
Commerce
it
"
NSA
'I
Roger Robinson
Douglas McMinn
David Wigg
NSC
It
it
Randall Fort
Leo Cherne
Alan Greenspan
Edwin Truman
PFIAB
Federal Reserve Board
Henr
Wallich
11
y
Anthony Solomon
David Roberts
Federal Reserve Bank, N.Y.
Federal Reserve, N.Y.
DIA
25X1
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Distribution: (Continued)
1 - Steve Farrar
1 - William Isaac
DCI
ExDir
SA/DDCI
DDI
ADDI
Ch/PES/DDI
David Low
NIO/Economics
Ch/DDO/AF
Ch/DDO/EA
Ch/DDO/EUR
Ch/DDO/LA
Ch/DDO/NE
Ch/DDO/SE
IAD/OCG/PEL
D/ALA
Ch/ALA/SAD/R
D/OEA
D/EURA
Ch/EURA/EE/EW
D/SOVA
D/NESA
DD/OGI, D/OGI
Ch/OGI/SRD
Ch/OGI/ISID
Ch/OGI/TNAD
Ch/OGI/ECD
Ch/OGI/ECD/FI
Ch/OGI/ECD/DI
DDO
Ch/D
Ch /D
Ch/OGI/ECD/CM
Ch/OGI/ECD/T
CPAS/ISS/SA/DA
Ch/OGI/Pub
OGI/EXS/PG
OMB
FDIC
NIO at Large
OGI/CO
25X1
25X1
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