MEMORANDUM ENTITLED THE SOVIET ARTIC: ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001200360001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 13, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central intelligence Agency
AIENIORANDU`4 FOR: Albert S. Chapman
Office of oceans and Polar Affairs
Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Department of State
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Chief, Geography Division, OGI
SUBJECT: Memorandum entitled The Soviet Arctic:
Environment and Economic Activity
F
25X1
1. Enclosed is the final version of an expanded and classified
memorandum we sent to you on 16 March 1984 detailing significant economic
activity in the Soviet Arctic. It includes additional data on environmental
constraints and economic costs of exploiting resources in the Soviet Arctic,
as well as brief summaries of other Arctic activities including fishing,
lumbering, and animal husbandry. As you requested, we have also enclosed
100 copies of each of the unclassified maps on the Soviet Arctic for inclusion
in your review of United States Arctic Policy for the National Security
2. The research and analysis for the text and graphics were done by
Eurasia Branch of the Geography Division, OGI, on the basis of a variety of
classified an unclassified information drawn from recent Agency publications
as well as from open-source literature.
3. If you have any questions concerning this memorandum, please call me
Enclosures:
1. Soviet Arctic: Environment and Economic Activity
GI M 84-10151, December 1984
2. Maps on the Soviet Arctic F_
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SUBJECT: Memorandum entitled The Soviet Arctic:
Environment and Economic Activity
DDI/OG I/GD/ERA
(13 December 1984)
Original - Albert S. Chapman, State Department
1 - SA/DDCI
1 - Executive Director
1 - DDI
1 - DDI/PES
1 - NIO/Econ
1 - NIO/USSR-EE
1 - CPAS/ISS
1 - CPAS/CDP/CC/SOV-EUR
1 - D/OGI, DD/OGI
8 - OGI/PG/Ch
1 - SOVA/SE/M
1 - SOVA/SE/R
1 - SOYA/SE/I
1 - State/INR/GE
1 - OGI/SRD/PR
1 - C/GD/OGI
2 - GD/ERA File
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D.C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
12 December 1984
The Soviet Arctic: Environment
and Economic Activity
Summary
The Soviet Arctic, once valued primarily as a strategically
located border wasteland for military bases, has in the past two
decades become the main resource frontier of the Soviet Union and a
mainspring of future Soviet economic development. Despite its remote
location and extremely harsh environment, which continue to constrain
all aspects of resource exploitation and to add significantly_ to
developmental costs, the Arctic region supplies a wide variety of
important natural resources that are in short supply in other regions
of the Soviet Union. Valuable hydrocarbons of Arctic West Siberia are
now the mainstay of Soviet energy production -- contributing some 60
percent of the USSR's total oil output and over 50 percent of its
natural gas -- and will continue to dominate for at least the rest of
the 1980s and probably well into the 1990s. Mineral deposits in the
European, East Siberian, and Far Northeastern Arctic continue to
account for the majority of Soviet nickel, cobalt, apatite, and
diamonds and to be substantial contributors to coal, tin, and gold
production. Arctic seas constitute a major source of Soviet fish, and
the northern Siberian forests provide substantial amounts of timber
and furs . 25X1
This memorandum was prepared by I I Geography ZoA-I
Division, Office of Global Issues. The information contained herein
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is updated to 4 September 1984. Comments may be directed to
Chief, Geography Division
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To ensure the prolonged economic viability of this remote and
inhospitable region, the Soviets have continued to invest heavily in
developing the necessary infrastructure and transportation links with
industrial supply centers and markets. Particular emphasis has been
placed on maintaining and supplementing their huge fleet of cargo
vessels and powerful icebreakers operating in the waters along the
northern coast -- the Northern Sea Route. Improvements to river
transport facilities and construction of railroads, roads, and
pipelines in areas of concentrated resource exploitation have also
been afforded a high priority as the Soviets strive to tap their
Arctic resources and to maintain their overall capabilities to operate
effectively in this remote but strategic frontier. 25X1
Continuing Soviet investment in developing its Arctic territories
is virtually assured as long as alternative sources of energy and
other valuable natural resources are lacking. As they press farther
northward and eastward, however, the Soviets will be required to
commit ever larger amounts of both manpower and capital to overcoming
the environmental and logistical constraints to accessing and
exploiting their richly endowed frozen north. 25X1
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The Soviet Union has been far more active than other countries in
developing its Arctic territories -- which constitute more than one-
third of its total land mass.* In the years since the 1917 Socialist
revolution, the Soviets have increasingly looked to the development of
their frozen north as a means of attaining economic self-sufficiency
and establishing a northern defensive barrier against their enemies.
As a result, what was once a virtually uninhabited wasteland now
boasts a population of more than 4 million engaged in resource
extraction, fishing, forestry, and military activities. Several
cities (Murmansk, Vorkuta, Surgut, Nizhnevartovsk, Norilsk, and
Yakutsk) have populations of over 100,000; many others, es eciall in
the West Siberian region, have over 10,000 inhabitants.
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While national security concerns have driven much of this growth,
the major thrust came in the 1960s, when the Soviets -- faced with a
growing depletion of energy and other natural resource supplies in the
European USSR -- discovered oil and gas in West Siberia. In the two
succeeding decades, they have both accelerated the development of this
hydrocarbon-rich region -- swelling its population from 186,000 in
1959 to 1.1 million in 1983 -- and expanded their search for Arctic
resources farther eastward and northward to include not only the more
inaccessible and inhospitable East Siberian and Far Northeastern
regions but the adjacent Arctic seas as well. The Soviets have long
dominated these frozen waters by virtue of their Arctic sector claim,*
the establishment of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), and later, their
declaration of 12-mile territorial waters.* In recent years, however,
they have expanded this control by claiming sovereignty over the
economic resources they contain. With their March 1977 unilateral
establishment of a 200-mile fishing zone and their February 1984
declaration of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone, the Soviets have
claimed jurisdiction over the natural resources of the seabed and
overlying waters of nearly 3.6 million square kilometers of the Arctic
seas. 25X1
*The Soviet Arctic, in this paper, is defined as the area north
of 60 degrees latitude in Siberia and north of the Arctic Circle
in European USSR, which generally conforms to the Soviet's "Far
North" region. (See foldout map: The Soviet Arctic)
*In a 1926 decree, the USSR claimed all lands and islands within
a sector bounded by the North Pole, the USSR's northern coast,
and the meridians marking the coast's eastern and western
extremities. This sector amounts to 44 percent of the Arctic
Polar region.
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Despite its obvious economic benefits, resource development of
the Soviet Arctic is fraught with problems and constraints that
increase with the distance from the country's heartland. Not the
least of these is the higher cost of exploitation due to the
inhospitable environment and difficulties of transportation and labor
supply. (See figure 2). The Soviet government has for the most part
been successful in providing sufficient inducements -- including wage
differentials and fringe benefits -- to recruit and maintain a labor
force adequate for developmental activities, although worker turnover
remains high. (See figure 3). Resource exploitation and development
of an effective transportation system in the harsh climate and
difficult terrain of the remote Arctic, however, continue to present a
formidable challenge, despite already enormous capital investment.
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Severe climate, rugged and swampy terrain, and subsurface
permafrost (permanently frozen ground) combine to make the Soviet
Arctic one of the most forbidding areas of the world. All endeavors
entail a struggle against the environment and result in sharply
increased costs to exploit the region's increasingly important
economic resources.
Climatic Conditions
The bitterly cold temperatures that characterize the prolonged
winters of the Soviet Arctic result from its far northern location and
its distance from the moderating influences of the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans. Apart from the approximately one-quarter of the
Barents Sea adjacent to the Kola Peninsula -- which remains ice-free
yearround -- the Arctic seas dominating the region are frozen for much
of the year and act as a snow-covered landmass, producing extremely
low coastal temperatures. Even on the relatively warm Kola Peninsula,
which benefits from the tempering influences of its contiguous waters,
temperatures remain below freezing for five months of the year.
Toward the Arctic interior, temperatures gradually decrease because of
continentality -- with East Siberia consistently recording the coldest
winter temperatures of the entire northern hemisphere. 25X1
Although these frigid temperatures produce the frozen ground
required for land operations in the predominantly soggy Arctic
terrain, they also seriously impair the effectiveness of men and
machines. According to a scale developed by Soviet researchers to
measure the duration and severity of the Arctic winter cold, all
regions experience some days with average mean temperatures of -15?C
-- when metal parts and components begin to break -- and -30?C -- when
steel breakages occur en masse. Despite references to the use of
special "northern" technology the Soviets continue to use standard
equipment in the Arctic, with the result that costly breakages occur
three to five times more frequently than at mid-latitudes. The
combination of low temperatures' and the windchill factor force
frequent work stoppages throughout much of the Arctic, substantially
reducing workers' efficiency. Winds of 4 meters per second (9 MPH) or
greater occur on about 60 percent of winter days throughout most
regions except for the coldest sections of central East Siberia, where
light winds and calms are frequent. Winds also adversely affect
machinery by speeding the freezing process of components -- especially
of internal combustion en ines -- and generally reducing the frost
resistance of metals. 25X1
During the relatively warm and short summer, snow and surface ice
melt, causing extremely muddy, boggy conditions that reduce the
service life of vehicles and machinery and make cross-country movement
and construction difficult. Swarms of flies and mosquitoes, which
saturate the regions during the warm season, take an additional toll
on worker efficiency and health. 25X1
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Precipitation can cause problems during the summer and winter.
Summer air masses moving across the region are often accompanied by
heavy thunderstorms that cause flooding. The Soviets recently
attributed much of their failure to reach 1983 West Siberian oil
production goals to heavy late summer rains and flooding, which washed
out access roads and disrupted oilfield power supplies. Winter
snowfalls are not heavy, but snow cover in the European North and in
West Siberia accumulates to 30 centimeters (12 inches) or more, lasts
about half of the year, and can disrupt construction and
transportation. Snow cover is lighter in East Siberia but lasts for
seven to eight months. Drifting snow at times severely impedes
overland transport, allows movement by tracked vehicles only, or
forces plowing to keep winter roads open. 25X1
The terrain and natural vegetation of the Soviet Arctic limit the
accessibility of many areas and confine most economic activities to a
few seasons. The dense forest belt that stretches across the entire
Siberian area south of the Arctic Circle has contributed to the
virtual isolation of the region from the rest of the country; access
to the Far Northeast is further complicated by its rugged mountains.
Moreover, the tundra zone existing as a broad band adjacent to the
northern coasts as well as the swamps that cover over half of-West
Siberia turn into spongy morasses during the summer thaws -- rendering
them virtually impenetrable without construction of extensive roadbeds
or artificial islands of sand and fill dirt. Throughout West Siberia,
the rivers are shallow and flanked by marshy flood plains; during the
spring thaw they overflow their banks compounding the region's problem
of soggy ground. The spring flood waters of all of the main Arctic
rivers -- the Ob'- Irtysh, Yenisey, and Lena -- which flow from the
south, are jammed by ice that has not yet melted in the north and
broad areas are inundated. I 25X1
Underlying the terrain of nearly all of the Soviet Arctic is a
foundation of permafrost, a climate-dependent phenomenon that occurs
where mean annual temperatures are below freezing. In the northern
half of the area, it generally occurs in a continuous mass and lies
within 1 or 2 meters of the surface. At its southernmost limits,
permafrost appears in sporadic patches of no more than 25 meters
thick. (See figure 4).
Coping with permafrost adds considerably to the complexity and
cost of development activities in the Arctic. The seasonal freezing
and thawing of the surface cause the ground to alternately heave and
slump, breaking foundations and collapsing structures built on them.
Foundations set in permafrost transfer heat to it, thereby extending
the unstable area of freezing and thawing. As a consequence,
buildings constructed in most parts of the Soviet Arctic require
extraordinary insulation as well as special foundations that are able
to withstand the effects of the unstable ground. Foundation
construction, which usually involves driving wood or steel pilings
into partially frozen or boggy ground, is especially expensive. The
Soviets estimate that these pilings account for 15 to 20 percent of
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construction costs in permafrost areas. Roads and railroads
constructed on permafrost require extensive roadbed preparation that
is costly in labor, equipment, and material. Several Soviet
statements place the cost of this kind of construction at about 1
million rubles per kilometer -- almost double the cost in more
hospitable climates. All phases of oil and gas exploration and
extraction are affected by permafrost: seismic exploration is
complicated by it, special muds and concretes are required to avoid
freezing and thawing problems, and well casings must be carefully
insulated to prevent collapse. the 25X1
additional cost of constructing pipelines in permafrost amounts to
almost 40 percent. 25X1
Soviet economic development of its Arctic has been greatest in
the most accessible and environmentally favorable regions where the
largest concentrations of hydrocarbons and other resources most
essential to the domestic economy are found. Consequently the most
developed of the regions is the European North, which encompasses the
Kola Peninsula and the coastal zone up to the Ural Mountains.
Railroads connect valuable nickel, coal, apatite, iron, and aluminum
resources to the industrial USSR. West Siberia is nearly in the
midstage of its development, with significant hydrocarbon and-timber
exploitation well under way and with the rudiments of a transportation
system in existence. Hydrocarbon exploration is just beginning in
East Siberia, but for many years the region has been the site of
nickel, cobalt, platinum, and diamond exploitation as well as the
natural habitat of valuable fur-bearing animals. The Far Northeast --
the most remote and least developed of the four regions -- produces
gold, tin, and coal from numerous small sites. 25X1
Hydrocarbons
The Soviet Union ranks first in world oil and natural gas
production. Moreover, with what are by most estimates among the
largest petroleum reserves in the world as well as an estimated 43
percent of world gas reserves, it can be expected to maintain high
fuel production well into the next century. Much of the Soviets'
energy wealth can be attributed to their efforts during the past two
decades to discover and exploit the hydrocarbon-rich regions of the
Soviet Arctic. To date, these efforts have been concentrated on the
West Siberian Basin, which in 1983 accounted for some 60 percent of
the USSR's total oil output and over 50 percent of its gas output.
While there are some producing oilfields in the European Arctic region
and hydrocarbon exploration has begun in the East Siberia and, to a
lesser extent, in the Far Northeast and off the Arctic coast in the
Barents Sea, West Siberia -- where most of the vast reserves have been
assessed and the infrastructure to support exploitation and
transportation has been developed -- will probably continue to be the
Soviets' leading hydrocarbon-producing region into the 1990s.
Oil Reserves. Of the Arctic oil-bearing regions, the west
Siberian Basin, most of which is in the Arctic area, contains the
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largest oil reserves. Proved reserves, which include only drilled and
well-explored reserves, are estimated at 33.3 to 48.4 billion barrels
or some 66 to 68 percent of the total Soviet reserves in this
category. Included in these estimates are proved reserves of gas
condensate (categorized by the Soviets with oil), which amount to 6.8
to 10.9 billion barrels. Potential reserves in West Siberia, which
include those partially explored or geologically inferred, amount to
58 to 78 billion barrels -- some 65 to 75 percent of the Soviet total
of potential reserves. Proved reserves of the European Arctic are
found in the Komi ASSR's Timan-Pechora Basin; only a small portion of
its estimated at 3 to 3.5 billion barrels are located north of the
Arctic Circle. East Siberia, which occupies the largest portion of
the Soviet Arctic, has a potentially favorable area for oil and gas
occurrence of over 3 million square kilometers. Based on preliminary
exploration, however, proved reserves in this region are estimated at
only 0.5 to 1.0 billion barrels while potential reserves are estimated
at between 3 and 11 billion barrels. Little 'nf ation is available
about reserves in the Far Northeast. r 25X1
Oil Production. The Soviets produced 12.3 million barrels of oil
(including gas condensate) per day (mb/d) in 1983 and have set goals
of 12.4 mb/d for 1984 and 12.6 mb/d for 1985. Attainment of these
goals will be heavily dependent on production from West Siberian
oilfields -- whose share of their total oil output the Soviets expect
will increase from 60 percent in 1983 to 63 percent by 1985.
Additional increases (from .38 to .46 mb/d) are expected from fields
in the Timan-Pechora Basin of the north European USSR during the 1981-
85 Five Year Plan, but only afefeww Producing fields of this basin are
north of the Arctic Circle. 25X1
The search for Arctic oil began in the West Siberian Basin in the
1960s as petroleum production in the then major producing areas, such
as the Volga-Urals and Soviet Central Asia, was stagnating or
declining. Since the 1970s, this basin has contributed the most to
the growth of the Soviet oil industry and during recent years has been
solely responsible for the small increase in overall Soviet production
totals as output from its fields has continued to grow -- from 6.2
mb/d in 1980, to 7.1 in 1982, to 7.3 in 1983. 25X1
Three mammoth fields -- Samotlor, Mamontovo, and Fedorovo --
dominate West Siberian oil production, even though the first two are
in decline. Samotlor produces 2.8 mb/d, Fedorovo .73 mb/d, and
Mamontovo .56 mb/d. Other new West Siberian fields of lesser quality
such as Vatyegan, Kholmogor, and Sutormin are now beginning production
or are being expanded. (See figure 5). 25X1
Although West Siberian oil production is expected to increase for
several years, the rate of growth has slowed and segments of the
Soviet oil industry are arguing for a shift of focus to East Siberia
and to the offshore basins of the Arctic seas. The Soviets
acknowledge, however, that oil production from these areas will not be
a factor until the next decade. 25X1
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Gas Reserves. According to Soviet estimates published in 1983,
the Arctic areas of Siberia contain about 75 percent of the Soviet
Union's estimated 34.3 trillion cubic meters (m3) of explored natural
gas reserves. Northern West Siberia predominates with an estimated
24.8 trillion m3, while almost 1 trillion m3 are located in Arctic
East Siberia. Exploration and discovery of reserves in the West
Siberia area accounted for most (92 percent) of the increase in
estimated Soviet reserves between 1974 and 1980. 25X1
Several supergiant gasfields in West Siberia -- where the Soviets
are currently concentrating their exploitation efforts -- hold the
majority of these natural gas reserves, with Urengoy being the
largest.
Rese
rves (in billion cubic mete
as of January 1980
rs)
Supergiant
Explored
Probable
Urengoy
7,770
285
Yamburg
4,096
661
Zapolyarnoye
2,632
39
Bovanenko (Yamal)
2,239
1,912
M
h'
d
1
243
vez
ye
e
,
Kharasavey (Yamal)
861
404
Kruzenshtern (Yamal)
363
757
Yamburg Gasfield, located just to the north of Urengoy, is currently
beginning development; initial production is scheduled to begin about
1986 or at least sometime in the late 1980s. Zapolyarnoye Gasfield,
lying about 130 kilometers northeast of Urengoy, and the three
remaining supergiants on the Yamal Peninsula, located 450-500
kilometers north of the Arctic Circle, are not yet scheduled for
exploitation. 25X1
According to 1980 Soviet estimates based on preliminary
exploration, recoverable gas resources in Yakutsk ASSR and
Krasnoyarskiy Kray -- the Arctic sector of East Siberia -- amount to
989 billion m3. In the Far Northeast little exploration work has been
done and no overall estimates of gas reserves are available. In 1982
some exploratory drilling took place in an area near Anadyr', south of
the Chukotsk Peninsula facing the Bering Sea. Showing some signs of
oil and gas deposits, this area may be targeted for more detailed
exploration in future. 25X1
In the European Arctic the only onshore gas reserves are located
in the northern Timan-Pechora Basin. The Layavozh Gasfield, lying
north of the Arctic Circle, contains a little over 100 billion m3 of
probable reserves. The offshore extension of this basin, however,
probably contains most of the gas reserves in the area. 25X1
Gas Production. Exploitation of natural gas deposits in the
Soviet Arctic lagged slightly behind oil development during 1965 to
1975, but by 1983 Arctic natural gas -- almost all from northern West
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Siberia -- accounted for over 50 percent of the USSR's production of
536 billion m3. 25X1
The Medvezh'ye Gasfield, the first of the West Siberian fields to
be exploited, plateaued in 1977 at about 70 billion m3 per year.
Urengoy Gasfield was discovered in the mid-1960s, but production did
not begin until 1978. With the concentration of Soviet exploitation
efforts on this field, Urengoy produced about 29 percent of the USSR's
natural gas output in 1983 -- including that for the Export Pipeline
to Western Europe. It is expected to peak at a production rate of 250
to 270 billion m3 per year and to account for 34 percent of 1984
production. Arctic gasfields in areas other than West Siberia are not
expected to be a significant factor in national production before thE25X1
1990s, although small gasfields in East Siberia now supply Norilsk
and Yakutsk via pipelines not connected to the national network.
Offshore Hydrocarbons. The continental shelf areas of the Soviet
Arctic are the largest in the world -- covering almost 4 million
square kilometers (a little more than half the area of the contiguous
United States). Encompassing seaward extensions of onshore basins
known to contain hydrocarbons as well as individual Arctic sea basins
with geologic formations potentially favorable for the occurrence of
hydrocarbons, these shelf areas provide the Soviets with opportunities
for extensive future hydrocarbon exploration. 25X1
Offshore exploration in the Soviet Arctic is in the preliminary
stages. The western Arctic seas, in particular the Barents Sea and
parts of the Kara Sea, have for the most part been covered by seismic,
gravity, and aerial magnetic surveys. In addition, the Soviets have
conducted some exploratory drilling on islands and archipelagos of the
western Arctic seas and have drilled into the southern edge of the
western Arctic waters from improvised fixed platforms. Most recently,
they have begun amassing more detailed information on the extent of
offshore hydrocarbon occurrence by drilling farther offshore, in
deeper waters of the Barents Sea. To facilitate their search for oil
and gas under the difficult environmental conditions existing in the
icy Arctic seas the Soviets in 1979 ordered three specially built
drill ships from Finland -- each of which is capable of drilling to
depths of 6,000 meters from waters up to 300 meters deep. By 1982,
the Rauma-Repola Company had delivered all three of the vessels -- the
Valentin Shashin, the Victor Muravlenko, and the Mikhail Mirchink.
Also ordered from the Rauma-Repola Company for delivery in 1985 are
two huge jack-up drill rigs (each costing some 72 million rubles)
which can operate in Arctic seas drilling to over 6,000 meters in 100-
meter waters. 25X1
Barents Sea. Because of optimistic preliminary surveys,
generally shallow depths (many areas, especially in the southern
sector, are less than 200 meters deep), and the least amount of sea
ice of the all the Arctic seas, the Barents Sea has been targeted
first for extensive surveys by the Arctic drilling ships. The Soviet
search for energy in these waters, however, has been impeded by their
longstanding dispute with Norway over some 150,000 square kilometers
of Barents Sea continental shelf -- a dispute which derives from the
conflicting methods used by the two countries in defining maritime
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boundaries.* Although the two countries have generally refrained from
conducting seismic surveys or exploratory drilling in this portion of
the shelf, in 1983 the Soviet's Valentin Shashin began oil-drilling
operations at a point estimated to be 1 mile within the disputed area
-- provoking the Norwegians to dispatch a Coast Guard vessel to
monitor operations. Negotiations to resolve this dispute have
occurred with increasing frequency in recent years; at the most recent
round, in December 1983, the Soviets proposed an interim agreement
that would allow resource exploitation pending a final settlement of
the boundary. Meanwhile, a bilateral agreement permits the two
nations to fish in the southern part of the disputed area. 25X1
The status of Svalbard, a Norwegian archipelago straddling the
Arctic Ocean and the Barents Sea, compounds the Soviet-Norwegian
dispute. Under the 1920 Spitzbergen Treaty, Norway maintains
sovereignty over the islands. The treaty, however, did not cover
Svalbard's continental shelf resources, which Norway claims
exclusively. The Soviets claim that, as a signatory to the 1920
treaty, they also have rights to resource exploitation on the shelf.
Outside the disputed areas the Soviets have signed an agreement
to cooperate with the Boconor Consortium (formed by seven Norwegian
companies) in exploring Barents Sea oil and gas deposits. In-the
southernmost area, between the islands of Novaya Zemlya and the
mainland, the Timan-Pechora Basin extends beneath the water creating a
large offshore area with considerable hydrocarbon potential.
According to USGS estimates, undiscovered recoverable hydrocarbon
resources of the Timan-Pechora/Barents Sea area amount to 8.3 trillion
m3 of natural gas and 25.3 billion barrels of oil. 25X1
Kara Sea. During the next Five Year Plan (1986-90) the
Soviets may extend offshore drilling to the Kara Sea, which lies off
the coast of northern West Siberia. Some of the known onshore giant
and supergiant gasfields extend into these waters, giving the area
significant hydrocarbon potential. The Oil and Gas Journal reported
in 1982 that a Soviet study placed Kara Sea gas resources at nearly 11
trillion m3. Soviet geologists believe that large oil and gas 25X1
accumulations may be found in the southwestern part of the Kara at
relatively shallow depths of 1,000 to 2,000 meters.
Laptev, East Siberian, Chukchi, and Bering Seas. Much less
is known about the hydrocarbon potential underlying Arctic seas in the
eastern sector of the Soviet Arctic, where only gravity and magnetic
surveys have been conducted. Because of the region's harsh climate
and difficult ice conditions, only a giant find would be economical to
exploit. Although a 1983 USGS survey concluded that the hydrocarbon
potential of the northeastern Siberian continental shelf was poor, A.
A. Meyerhoff, a US consulting geologist, believes the Chukchi Sea
*The Soviet position is based on their 1926 decree claiming an
Arctic sector enclosed by the meridian lines to the Pole. Norway
maintains that the boundary should be an equidistant line between
its mainland and island territories and those of the USSR.
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Basin area may be a continuation of the hydrocarbon-rich strata of
northern Alaska. In addition, the Anadyr' and Khatyrka depressions of
northeastern Magadan Oblast probably extend into the Bering Sea toward
US waters south of St. Lawrence Island. 25X1
Despite increased costs incurred as a result of adverse
environmental conditions and the remoteness of exploitation sites, the
Soviets extract more Arctic minerals than any other country. Mineral
exploitation is most heavily concentrated in the north European
Arctic, which is closest to the Soviet industrial and population base
and to links with the main transportation network. Mineral
exploitation is less developed in remote East Siberia and the Far
Northeast, which can be reached only by lengthy water routes using the
Northern Sea Route supplemented by river transport and by a few road
and air links to central cities. (See figure 6). ~I 25X1
The Norilsk area, between East and West Siberia, is the most
important extraction and processing center in the Soviet Arctic. The
Norilsk Complex produces about half of the nickel and nearly half of
the cobalt refined in the Soviet Union. In addition, Norilsk ores
yield copper and valuable platinum-group metals. The Soviets plan to
increase nickel and cobalt production by 30 percent during the 11th
Five Year Plan and most of the increase will probably come from the
Norilsk area. Because of the importance of Norilsk, the Soviets
have prioritized yearround operation of the Northern Sea Route between
Murmansk and Dudinka, the main river port serving Norilsk, for
shipments of ore and concentrates and for delivery of supplies to the
mining center. 25X1
The Kola Peninsula in the north European region also contains
large mining and metallurgical operations for nickel, as well as for
phosphate-bearing apatite, iron ore, and copper. Copper-nickel ores
extracted and processed at Monchegorsk, Nikel', and Zapolyarnyy yield
a substantial part of the USSR's nickel as well as valuable byproducts
such as cobalt, silver, gold, platinum, and copper. Together the Kola
centers and Norilsk produce most of Soviet refined nickel and
cobalt. 25X1
The world's largest apatite deposits are located in the
Kirovsk-Apatity area of the Kola Peninsula, which in 1982
produced 17.7 million tons of apatite concentrate used to supply
about 70 percent of the raw materials for Soviet phosphate
fertilizers. The Soviets plan to increase apatite. production at
Kirovsk-Apatity to 19 million tons in 1985 and to build a third
concentration plant there.. Iron ore extraction on the Kola
Peninsula is centered at Olenegorsk, which has proven reserves of
over 300 million tons.
The most important coal-producing area in the Soviet Arctic
is the Pechora Basin in the northern Urals. Centered on the
cities of Vorkuta and Inta, the basin produced 28 million tons of
coal in 1983; about 60 percent of its output is coking coal.
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With explored reserves of some 9 billion tons, the Pechora Basin
is likely to continue as an important coking coal source in the
future. Large unexplored coal resources are in East Siberia's
Lena and Tunguska Basins, most of which lie in the Arctic
region. The Soviets estimate that these basins contain some 58
percent of the overall geological coal resources of the USSR.
Since, however, only a small percentage of these have been
explored and since they are so remotely located, they probably
will not be exploited to any significant degree in this
century.
Numerous small mining sites in East Siberia and the Far
Northeast regions of the Arctic produce minerals of national
importance for the Soviet Union. Substantial amounts of gold are
mined in the Far Northeast, particularly from sites along the
Kolyma River. Magadan Oblast in the Far Northeast is the largest
Soviet gold-producing region; in 1980 Magadan placer mines
accounted for about 26 percent of the Soviets estimated gold
production of 315 metric tons. Because of its importance as a
source of hard currency, the Soviets attach a great deal of
importance to the mining of this mineral -- as evidenced by the
construction of a nuclear powerplant at Bilibino, a main gold
mining support city located north of the Arctic Circle. In
addition, much of the cargo carried on the eastern sector of the
Northern Sea Route is designated for the gold exploitation
areas.
Although not as significant as gold, diamond sales are
estimated to be an important earner of foreign exchange for the
Soviet Union. Since they were discovered in the mid-1950s,
diamonds from the Yakutsk ASSR of Eastern Siberia have dominated
Soviet production (accounting for about 90 percent). Mirnyy,
with a population of over 30,000, is the center of the Soviet
diamond industry -- which in 1978 produced about 8 million carats
(approximately 20 percent gemstones and the rest of industrial
quality).
Tin mining areas in the Arctic regions of the Far Northeast
and East Siberia account for a large share of Soviet tin
production. In 1975 tin produced in the Soviet Arctic amounted
to nearly 10,000 tons. Because demand for this metal is high,
however, the Soviets continue to import large amounts of it.
Scheduled increases in tin extraction and production in East
Siberia will probably be used to offset domestic deficits. In
addition to tin, a major mining and concentrating complex at
Iul'tin in the Far Northeast produces substantial amounts of
tungsten.
Fish constitutes about 15 percent of the animal protein in
the Soviet diet; Soviets eat over three times as much fish per
capita as do US citizens. On the basis of partial 1981 data, we
estimate that Arctic waters supply the Soviets with some 2
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million metric tons of fish annually -- about 20 percent of their
total sea catch. About 1.5 million tons come from the Barents
Sea, the Svalbard/Bear Island area, and the Norwegian Sea, which
is a relatively recent contributor to the Soviet catch. The
Arctic waters of the Bering Sea, which constitute only a part of
the valuable northwest Pacific fishing grounds, probably provide
nearly a half million tons.
Soviet fishermen were forced to change some of their
traditional Arctic fishing patterns in the 1970s, when many of
the popular fish stocks dwindled as a result of uncontrolled
fishing and when most coastal nations established unilateral
control over fish resources within 200 miles of their shores. As
a result whitefish has been replaced by capelin and blue whiting
(processed mostly as fish meal) as the most popular Soviet
species, with the latter being caught in newly established
fishing grounds in the Norwegian Sea. The Bering Sea off the
northeastern Siberian coast continues to be an important source
of Alaskan pollack. When the US withdrew Soviet fishing quotas
because of the Afghanistan invasion, the Soviets ceased fishing
in the Bering Sea off the coast of Alaska, and Soviet factory
ships purchased fish caught by US fishermen under terms of a
joint venture with a private company. In July 1984, US policy
was revised to permit the Soviets to take about 50,000 tons of
fish in US waters, including those in the Bering Sea.
The Soviet Arctic contains a wealth of timber resources that
will remain largely unexploited until adequate transportation
routes can be developed to provide access to them. Although only
scrub forests and tundra grow north of the Arctic Circle,
extensive coniferous forests (taiga) abound south of it. Larch
is the predominant species -- especially east of the Yenisey
River -- but good stands of pine, fir, spruce, and birch occur in
many Arctic forests. The East Siberian region contains the
largest forested areas. Much smaller forests occur in the swamps
and floodlands of West Siberia and in the rugged uplands of the
Far Northeast region.
Timber cutting and wood processing activities are
concentrated along main rivers and the few existing railroads.
The Ob'-Ivdel' railroad, for example, was constructed
specifically to access timber stands -- mostly pine -- and to
transport wood products to markets. When railroads to Surgut and'
Vorkuta gave the Soviets access to oil, gas, and coal resources,
they also opened up some areas for timber exploitation. Some
logging also takes place along the Ob', Yenisey, and Lena Rivers,
where the northward flowing arteries are used to carry log rafts
to processing centers and to main ports of Salekhard/Labytnangi,
Yakutsk, and Igarka. Because of its location on the Yenisey and
its connection to the NSR, Igarka has become the main timber
transshipment port in the Soviet Arctic; in 1981 over 1 million
cubic meters of timber was shipped out via the NSR.
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Animal Husbandry
Tending, hunting, and trapping animals provides the
livelihood for many of the indigenous peoples of the Soviet
Arctic,'where the environmental conditions preclude significant
agricultural activity. Reindeer herding exists throughout the
region -- providing meat and milk for food and hides for
clothing. Reindeer thrive in the treeless tundra and on the
northern edge of the taiga, where the land is frozen for much of
the year and waterlogged for the remainder. As a result of the
Soviets' denomadization policy, most reindeer herding has been
collectivized, with only a few herders allowed to follow reindeer
migrations. Numerous reindeer collective and state farms now
span the entire northern Arctic region. Of the 2.2 million head
of Arctic reindeer, slightly more than half are located on farms
in East Siberia and the Far Northeast -- farms in the Chukotsk
area alone have 539,000.
Although reindeer herding constitutes the largest and most
important animal husbandry activity, some dairy and meat cattle
are raised in pastures along the Viluy, the southern Ob', and the
Lena Rivers of West and East Siberia. Hog raising is minimal,
but the number of hogs in the area of West Siberia's main support
cities has increased (from 9,000 in 1975 to 61,000 in 1982) --
probably to help feed the growing population of workers engaged
in the oil/gas industry. East Siberia is the main supplier of
valuable sable, fox, and mink furs, which are purchased by the
government. The number of individual hunters and trappers,
however, has been gradually shrinking as increasingly more fur-
bearing animals are being raised on farms located in the Siberian
forests and in Arctic coastal areas, where the remains from fish
processing plants are used to feed the animals.
Despite enormous capital investment, Soviet efforts to
develop the transportation systems needed to support resource
exploitation in their Arctic territories have been severely
constrained by the region's remote location, difficult terrain,
and harsh climate. Although air, water, and land transport
routes span vast distances -- usually thousands of kilometers --
to connect material suppliers and markets in the European USSR
with the main Arctic cities and settlements, resource
exploitation sites of ten lie hundreds of kilometers beyond these -
regional centers. No all-weather roads connect the Arctic
regions to the industrialized parts of the USSR, and only a few
of the key regional cities are interconnected. Railroads -- the
backbone of Soviet transportation elsewhere -- are lacking in all
but a few Arctic regions. Water transport -- the principal mode
of Arctic transportation -- is seriously impeded during the long
winters by the severe icing, which makes the region's rivers and
most of the NSR impassable. Air transport, while providing an
effective alternate mode of transportation, is extremely
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costly. I 25X1
In overcoming these obstacles, the Soviets will continue to
be forced to make difficult decisions concerning the priorities
they assign to developing the various modes of Arctic
transportation. Recently, particular emphasis has been placed on
updating the fleet of icebreakers that extend the navigation
season of the NSR and on constructing the lengthy cross-country
pipelines that link formerly inaccessible Arctic energy resources
to Soviet industries and consumers. Construction of roads and
rail lines, however, lags far behind and continues to be
constrained by high costs, long distances, and harsh
environmental conditions.
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Approximate Distances to Key Arctic Resource Centers (Kilometers)
Resource
it
ti
l
By air via great
te f
om
l
i
By water from: By rail from:
on
a
exp
o
center
:
e rou
r
c
rc
Ri
po
ver
rt on
Moscow
Novo
sibirsk
Murmansk Tr
via NSR Si
and rivers ra
ans-
berian
ilroad Moscow
Moscow to
Nearest
rail city
West Siberia
Surgut
2100
800
3800 1
1-1600
2800
Nizhnevartovsk
2300
700
4100 1
3-1600
3000
Novyy Urengoy
2300
1200
2500 2
5-2800
3500
(Nadym on water)
Norilsk
2800
East Siberia
Yakutsk
4800
2700
5200 1
800
--
7300
Vilyuysk
4400
2300
5200 2
400
--
5200
Khatanga
3400
4000
3600
--
--
4100
Far Northeast
Anadyr'
6100
4800
6300
--
--
8500
Cherskiy
5500
4000
4600
--
--
7300
Zyranka
5300
3700
5400
--
--
7300
European:
Murmansk
1400
Vorkuta
1800
2700 2
2-2400
2200
(Labytnangi
on water)
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Water Transport
In the absence of an effective road and rail network leading
to most of the Arctic region, the Soviets have relied heavily on
marine transportation, which can move large quantities of cargo
over long distances at low cost. The Northern Sea Route, which
extends along the entire Soviet Arctic coast, has long been an
important northern supply route to Arctic sea and river ports.
Supply routes from the south are provided by arterial rivers
flowing northward from key ports that junction with the Trans-
Siberian railroad -- the only cross-country east-west
transportation route in the USSR. The BAM (Baikal-Amur Mainline)
railroad being constructed north of and parallel to the Trans-
Siberian will provide additional tie-ins to Siberian cities and
resource development areas as it intersects major rivers of East
Siberia.
Northern Sea Route. Established in the 1930s, the NSR is
still the primary maritime lifeline for cities along the Arctic
coast. Extending over 6,000 kilometers, the route is completely
ice free only in the westernmost sector at Murmansk.
Icebreakers, however, keep the route open from Murmansk to
Dudinka on the lower Yenisey almost yearround except for a short
six-week period in May and June when the river ice is breaking
up. The Murmansk-Yenisey route accounts for about 3 million tons
of cargo out of the annual total of nearly 7 million tons carried
In the central portion of the NSR, where particularly heavy
icing occurs in key straits off the East Siberian coast, shipping
lasts only from August to October. Navigation is also seasonal
in the eastern sector, lasting from June to December in the
Bering Sea off the Soviet eastern coast and from mid-June to mid-
October in the East Siberian Sea off the northeastern extremities
of the USSR.
Besides Noril'sk, the western sector of the NSR serves the
oil and gas exploitation areas of West Siberia through ports on
the Ob' River estuary. The seasonal ports in the central and
eastern NSR serve mineral exploitation in East Siberia and the
Far Northeast. Severe icing and an early onslaught of the Arctic
winter, however, can jeopardize activity, especially in the
eastern sector. In October 1983, for example, some 40 supply
vessels were stranded in the ice in the Chukchi Sea off the
northeastern Arctic coast, forcing the Soviets to use all
available icebreakers to effect rescue operations.
Indications are that the Soviet Union intends to maintain
and supplement its extensive fleet of over 400 vessels operating
along the NSR. Icebreakers are instrumental in keeping the
western sector open and the eastern sector navigable as long as
possible. Three nuclear-powered icebreakers are the backbone of
the fleet -- the Sibir', the Leonid Brezhnev (formerly named the
Arktika), and the Lenin; a fourth, the Rossiya, was launched in
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November 1983 and will join the fleet in 1984 or 1985. The USSR
and Finland are collaborating on a new shallow-draft nuclear-
powered icebreaker for the Yenisey River to be constructed during
the period 1986-90.
Several other types of diesel-powered icebreakers are
employed along the NSR -- many built by Finnish companies. In
addition, in 1983 Finnish shipbuilders delivered two of seven
extremely shallow draft (2.5 meter) icebreakers for operation on
the Ob' and other Siberian rivers.
Besides icebreakers the Soviets have invested heavily in
multipurpose icebreaking freighters capable of negotiating ice up
to 1 meter thick. Two Finnish companies (Wartsila and Valmet)
were contracted to construct 14 of these cargo vessels designated
the Norilsk class; so far 11 have joined the fleet. Capable of
carrying 200,000 tons of cargo, the vessels combine special
features of a container carrier, Ro-Ro ship, and a bulk carrier;
they can also deliver cargo directly onto ice if port facilities
are lacking. In addition the Soviets are constructing their
first nuclear-powered icebreaking lighter and container ship..
The ship can carry 70 to 80 lighters (barges), each with a cargo
capacity of 360 tons.
Rivers. Inland waterways provide the easiest approach
routes to many of the interior Arctic regions and to parts of the
Arctic coast. Although their use is seasonal, the northward
flowing rivers of Siberia are of great importance for movement of
freight and passenger traffic, surpassing the NSR in volume.
More than half of the freight shipments for the West Siberian oil
and gas complex are carried by river transport and, according to
Soviet journal Rechnoy Transport, by the end of the 11th Five
Year Plan (1985) river transport will account for 53 percent of
total shipments, railroads for 45.4 percent, and maritime for 1.6
percent.
Vessels on the Ob' and Irtysh Rivers supply bulk cargo to
main bases in the West Siberian oilfields at Surgut and
Nizhnevartovsk and to the support city of Nadym in the gasfield
exploitation area of northern West Siberia. The Yenisey traffic
handles some of the mineral export from and supplies to the
Norilsk area via the ports of Dudinka and Iqarka. River vessels
on the Lena River bring cargo southward from the NSR ports and
northward from Ust'-Kut ports on the BAP![ railroad. Kolyma River
vessels carry bulk cargo between NSR ports and mining areas and
also link the NSR ports to the Yakutsk-Magadan highway.
The short river navigation season--ranging from four to five
months in the southern Arctic to one month in most of the north--
magnifies the need for maximum efficiency at ports. As river
traffic has increased throughout the Arctic, the provision of
effective port loading facilities and adequate storage space has
not kept pace. The situation is most acute in West Siberia,
where resource development activities are most intensive. As a
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result, during the current Five Year plan, the Soviets are
concentrating their efforts on improving facilities at major
ports and on building new Ports in the oil and gas region.
construction that would more
an ou e the quayage and docking space at Sergino, Labytnangi
and Staryy Nadym, in addition to new port development near
Urengoy. The lack of sufficient cranage for transloadina
operations at most Arctic river ports
indicates that even with such improvements, most facilities are
inadequately mechanized to cope with large seasonal
concentrations of freight.
Rail, Road, and Air Transport
Although water transport provides the initial access. to
Arctic areas and dominates Arctic freight shipments, rail, road,
and air transportation are also important for resource
exploitation. The only operating railroads connected to the
national network are the few trunk lines leading to base cities
centered in resource areas -- in West Siberia, to Surgut,
Nizhnevartovsk, Novyy Urengoy, and the Ob' River at Labytnangi
and Sergino; in the north European USSR, to Murmansk,
Arkhangelsk, and Vorkuta. Although distances are great and -,_
these lines often are only single tracked, they provide'important
all-weather connections with industrial centers of the Soviet
Union. An isolated railroad connects the Norilsk mining complex
with the port of Dudinka. In East Siberia the Soviets plan to
extend a BAM branch line 800 kilometers northward into the Arctic
region to Yakutsk.
Main road links in the Arctic are few and far between. Only
the Kola Peninsula and the Yakutsk-Magadan areas have long-
distance all-weather roads. Instead the Soviets are
concentrating road development on the construction of yearround
hard-surfaced connections between established port or base cities
and resource exploitation sites. For exploration access to
Arctic wilderness areas the Soviets use winter roads built by
Air transport to all major cities in the Arctic and to most
base cities in the hydrocarbon exploitation areas is provided by
Aeroflot, the Soviet civilian airline. Although the most
expensive means of transportation, aircraft are essential for
transporting people and priority freight into the Arctic when
other modes are shut down. Intraregional air operations are
confined to hard surface runways in summer; in winter, however,
air transport expands with the use of snow airfields, constructed
by packing snow on frozen ground. In resource exploitation areas
helicopters are widely used to transport people and construction
materials. In West Siberia, for example, helicopter pads are
located at almost every settlement and drilling area.
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Pipelines
High on the list of Soviet priorities is the construction of
trunk pipelines from West Siberia to the more developed areas of
the country. Five large-diameter (1,020 to 1,220 millimeter)
pipelines carry West Siberia crude oil to refineries in the
Volga, Ural, and Siberian areas; numerous gas pipelines span vast
distances carrying fuel for industries and power plants in the
European USSR. During the current Five Year Plan the Soviets
invested some 25 to 30 billion rubles in constructing six new
1,420-millimeter cross-country gas pipelines emanating from the
huge Urengoy field. Despite the environmental and logistical
problems, by April 1984 four of the lines -- including one
intended exclusively for exporting gas to Western Europe -- were
operating, although probably not at full capacity. Another was
recently completed. The gas export pipeline is currently
transporting gas to domestic consumers.
Much of the enormous cost of constructing these pipelines
results from their remote location originating far from supply
centers as well as the harsh environmental conditions and the
difficult terrain, especially along the Siberian sector of the
route. Swampy areas necessitate the use of expensive anchoring
techniques to prevent the pipes from floating to the surface;--
permafrost areas require costly insulation in pipeline trenches
to prevent heat transfer to the unstable ground. To minimize
costs in preparing pipeline routes and to facilitate repair and
maintenance, the Soviets have concentrated their trunk pipelines
along a few corridors. To save time and prevent pipe damage
through numerous transloadings onto railcars, trucks, and barges,
the Soviets are increasing shipments of large-diameter pipe, all
of which is imported, via the Northern Sea Route to Novyy Port in
West Siberia.
The accelerated pace that has characterized Soviet Arctic
development during the last two decades is likely to continue for
the foreseeable future, despite the necessarily higher costs
incurred from operating in this remote and environmentally
hostile region. The rapid depletion of hydrocarbons and other
vital natural resources in the European USSR and the progressive
leveling off of oil and gas production in the West Siberian Basin
through the 1990s will almost certainly drive the Soviets farther
eastward and northward--first into the remotest areas of West
Siberia, where reserves have already been explored, and
eventually into East Siberia and the Barents and Kara Seas, where
preliminary surveys indicate potentially rich hydrocarbon
reserves.
The degree to which the Soviets will be successful in
further tapping their enormous Arctic resources will depend in
large part on their willingness and ability to develop the
infrastructure--particularly the transportation networks--and to
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acquire the technology necessary to overcome the locational and
environmental constraints imposed by their remotest frontier.
After more than half a century of confronting the Arctic
environment--through scientific, military, and, most recently,
economic activities--the Soviets have emerged as one of the
World's leaders in cold-weather operations, including permafrost
construction. In addition, they have recognized opportunities to
reap large dividends not only from improvements in domestic
technology but from imports of foreign technology, mostly from
the West. Recent and planned acquisitions of Finnish and
Norwegian technology will facilitate the Soviet search for energy
supplies in the frozen Arctic Seas, and the continuing investment
in powerful icebreakers and ice-going freighters will enable them
to further extend the navigation season on the Northern Sea
Route. Nonetheless, development of land access routes is in its
infancy and the entire Arctic transportation system is in need of
expansion, improvement, and better integration.
As the Soviets press deeper into their frozen north,
developmental activities will become increasingly more costly--
both in terms of the capital expended and in terms of the
manpower and material diverted from other sectors of the economy
and other regions of the country. As long as they lack viable
alternatives for acquiring key resources needed both for domestic
consumption and for foreign export, however, the Soviets can be
expected to remain committed to developing their vast Arctic
storehouse.
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R001200360001-1