ARGENTINE NUCLEAR POLICY: RESISTING INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001200220001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 25, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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I JUN 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: (See Distribution)
SUBJECT: Argentine Nuclear Policy: Resisting
International Controls
1. The attached memorandum examines Argentine nuclear
policy under the Alfonsin government with the objective of
determining Buenos Aires' commitment to nonproliferation. The
proliferation threat associated with the continued existence of
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in Argentina provides the
context for analysis of long-term policy implications.
2. This memorandum was prepared by
International Security Issues Division, Office of Global
Issues.
3. Your comments and suggestions on this memorandum are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Weapons Proliferation
Branch, OGI,
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Argentine Nuclear Policy: Resistin
International Controls
GI M 84-10115, June 1984
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SUBJECT: Argentine Nuclear Policy: Resisting International
Controls
OGI/ISID/WP,
(25 June 84)
Distribution:
1 - The Honorable Langhorne Motley, State
1 - The Honorable Richard T. Kennedy, State
1 - The Honorable James C. Malone, State
1 - Mr. James Devine, State
1 - Mr. Michael Guhin, NSC
1 - Mr. Lucian Pugliaresi, State
1 - Mr. Frederick F. McGoldrick, State
1 - Mr. Alan Sessoms, State
1 - Mr. Thomas Gabbert, State
1 - Mr. Carlton Thorne, State
1 - Mr. Joerge Menzel, State
1 - Mr. W. Dean Howells, Jr., State
1 - Mr. George Bradley, State
1 - Mr. Harold Jaffee, DOE
1 - Ms. Sheila Buckley, Pentagon
1 - Mr. Lewis Dunn, NWC
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 - SA DDCI
1 - Executive Director
1 - DDI
1 - DDI/PES
1 - D/OGI, DD/OGI
1 - CPAS/ILS
1 - ISID
1 - N IO/AL~
1 - ISID/WP
1
1 - C/PG/OGI
8 - OG /,P-S
1 - ALA
/NED
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
25 June 1984
Argentine Nuclear Policy:
Resisting International Controls
Summary
The Alfonsin government over the past few months has made
several policy statements that convey a strong reluctance to make
any major nonproliferation commitments. Although the nuclear
program is coming under greater civilian control and may
experience some cutbacks due to financial constraints, the
government wants to deflect domestic criticism that it is
sacrificing Argentina's nuclear independence. As a result,
Alfonsin is refusing to make international legal commitments that
would bring Argentina's entire nuclear program under IAEA
safeguards. Alfonsin is likely to honor his electoral campaign
to prohibit nuclear weapons development, but the Argentine effort
to obtain a complete nuclear fuel cycle outside international
safeguards is reinforcing concern in neighboring Latin American
countries (particularly Brazil) and could disrupt relations with
Western supplier states, particularly the United States which
have rigorous nonproliferation policies.
This memorandum was prepared by (International 25X1
Security Issues Division, Office of Global Issues. This analysis
is based on information as of 25 June 1984. Comments and queries
are welcomed and may be addressed to the Chief Weapons
Proliferation Branch, OGI, 25X1
GI M 84-10115 25X1
June 1984
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Argentine Nuclear Policy:
Resisting International Controls
The first six months of Alfonsin's presidency clearly
indicate that although he remains personally committed to
nonproliferation objectives, the president does not intend to
make major changes in Argentina's longstanding policy to achieve
nuclear independence. Policy formulation in general was
complicated by the outgoing military junta which revealed in late
November 1983 that the country's nuclear scientists had made a
breakthrough in the area of uranium enrichment technology--a
crucial step in the ability to make nuclear weapons-grade
material. Popular support for Argentina's achievements in
advanced technology remains strong because it is one area where
the nation has been able to demonstrate its superiority over
other Latin American countries. With the exception of India, no
other developing nation possesses as sophisticated a nuclear
energy program and the industrial-technical infrastructure to
sustain it.
We believe that the preservation and protection of the
country's nuclear independence-has become an overriding national
security objective in the minds of most Argentines. The
opposition Peronist party has embarked on a media campaign to
make certain that Alfonsin does not stray from this goal. The
words and actions of Alfonsin and his nuclear advisors toward the
following four issues provide a gauge for measuring the prospects
for change in Argentine nuclear policy:
? Buenos Aires' attitude toward the Nonproliferation
Treaty,
? The prospect of Argentine participation in the nuclear
free weapons zone established by the Treaty of
Tlatelolco.
? Argentine willingness to consider international
safeguards on indigenous nuclear facilities, particularly
the Pilcaniyeu enrichment facility.
? Buenos Aires' commitment to require IAEA safeguards for
all Argentine nuclear exports.
GI M 84-10115
June 1984
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The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
The Argentines have always been skeptical, if not hostile,
towards the Nonproliferation Treaty because it requires
signatories to place all future nuclear facilities under IAEA"
safeguards. We believe the Falklands War in 1982 reinforced
Buenos Aires' hostility to the NPT because the presence of
nuclear-powered British submarines in the South Atlantic
highlighted ina public manner what the Argentines feel is the
"discriminatory" nature of the treaty. This criticism of the
NPT, however, is largely rhetorical because the NPT does not
prohibit any, sianatory from utilizing nuclear energy for naval
propulsion.
Buenos Aires subsequently demonstrated its contempt for the
NPT in late 1982 by notifying the IAEA that it would no longer
permit IAEA inspectors from NPT states to visit safeguarded
Argentine nuclear facilities. More recently, the Alfonsin
government has used anti-NPT rhetoric to strengthen its public
image of "toughness" in defending Argentine national security
interests. Foreign Minister Caputo in press interviews and his
address before the Geneva Disarmament Conference in February 1984
harshly condemned the Treaty as "discriminatory", characterizing
it as a farce in view of the massive nuclear arms build up of the
Soviet Union and the United States.
We believe Caputo's focus on the issue of nuclear
disarmament contained in Article VI of the Treaty has telegraphed
Argentine interest in a confrontational approach with the nuclear
weapons states. In conjunction with Caputo's address in Geneva,
President Alfonsin sent a letter to the Chairman of the
Nonaligned Movement--Indian Prime Minister Gandhi--pleading for a
special NAM ministerial meeting in Buenos Aires to organize a
Third World effort to focus criticism of the nuclear weapons
states. We believe this action is particularly significant
because Argentina and India, prior to the 1980 NPT Review
Conference, mobilized developing countries party to the NPT to
attack the superpowers for their failure to make progress on
nuclear disarmament. This effort succeeded in preventing the
Review Conference from drafting a final declaration reaffirming
the Treaty's effectiveness--an outcome which, if repeated at next
year's Review Conference, could seriously weaken confidence in
The Indians have not yet called for a special NAM
ministerial meeting, but they joined the Argentines in public
support for the new "four continent peace initiative" which calls
for the nuclear weapons states to halt the testing, production,
and deployment of nuclear weapons. This initiative which was
announced on 22 May received the public support of four other
countries--Mexico, Greece, Sweden, and Tanzania. It could lead
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to a summit meeting of Third World leaders to discuss nuclear
disarmament issues along the lines originally suggested by
Alfonsin.
The Tlatelolco Treaty
The Tlatelolco Treaty, which outlines the basic elements for
a nuclear weapons free zone for Latin America, has caused concern
among Argentine leaders since it was open for signature in the
late 1960s. The basic Argentine fear stems from concern that
Article 13 of the Treaty might require Argentina to open all its
nuclear activities to IAEA inspection (comprehensive safeguads).
Argentine governments have rationalized the failure to ratify the
treaty on the grounds that the United States and the IAEA have
interpreted its provisions--such as the one allowing "peaceful
nuclear explosions--in ways that Argentina finds unacceptable.
We believe the Alfonsin government shares this longstanding
fear that the Tlatelolco Treaty compromises Argentine nuclear
independence but, for political purposes, does not want to appear
hostile to the idea of a nuclear weapons free zone in Latin
America. As a result, the Alfonsin government is following the
practice of its predecessors by playing a cat-and-mouse game with
supplier states concerning the conditions under which Buenos
Aires might ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty. For example, the
Argentines have informed Washington that they are willing to hold
preliminary discussion with IAEA officials to explore ways to
reach a safeguards arrangement that would not "discriminate"
against Argentina or violate its nuclear independence. According
to US diplomatic reports, another option that has received some
consideration is the possibility of Argentine ratification
without putting the treaty into force until other non-
signatories--Brazil, Chile, and Cuba--take the same step.
Argentine officials have also indicated to the United States that
they are open to the idea of a special safeguards system for
Latin American countries modelled on the EURATOM safeguards
system in Western Europe.
Despite the appearance of some forward movement, we believe
the Alfonsin government will refuse to make any firm commit-
ments. It is under intense political pressure from the
opposition Peronistas who have claimed that the Tlatelolco Treaty
is worthless because it does not prevent outside nuclear weapons
states from introducing nuclear weapons into the region. To
support this argument, the Peronistas and several newspapers have
revived the issue of Britain's use of nuclear-powered submarines
during Falklands War. The Peronistas have also suggested that
the United States has made debt renegotiations conditional upon
acceptance of international safeguards, an accusation that has
generated a strong nationalistic reaction.
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The Pilcaniyeu Enrichment Facility
Argentine opposition to international treaties that are
designed to further nonproliferation objectives has become a more
urgent issue within the past year in view of recent Argentine
achievements in the field of advanced nuclear technology. The
unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility in Pilcaniyeu now
highlights the proliferation threat. Buenos Aires' reluctance to
open this facility to IAEA inspections reinforces concern,
particularly among other Latin American countries, about long-
term Argentine intentions.
A resolution to this problem would not necessarily require
Buenos Aires to ratify the NPT or the Tlatelolco Treaty. The
Alfonsin government could unilaterally accept IAEA safeguards on
the Pilcaniyeu facility and still preserve its right to develop
other indigenous nuclear facilities in the future. We believe
that such a gesture would help assuage concern in neighboring
countries and constitute a big step in creating the conditions
for the resumption of US nuclear assistance to Argentina.
Despite these factors, the Alfonsin government is unlikely
to reverse its opposition to safeguards for the enrichment
facility. According to diplomatic sources, the
Argentines do not want to reveal the "technical secrets"
associated with their version of gaseous diffusion technology.
The fear of negative public reaction to anything that might
compromise Argentine nuclear independence no doubt plays a role
in the government's attitude.
Argentine Nuclear Exports
Argentine's long-term interest in becoming a nuclear
exporter poses a challenge to the nonproliferation regime in view
of the technical sophistication of the national nuclear
program. The Argentines have already built a small research
reactor for Peru and, before the end of this decade, may be in a
position to export nuclear materials such as enriched uranium and
heavy water. The possibility that Buenos Aires might actually
share some of its indigenous technology magnifies the
proliferation threat.
Although the Argentines resist comprehensive safeguards over
their own nuclear program, the Alfonsin government appears
willing to adhere to international norms in the nuclear export
field. One of Alfonsin's top nuclear advisors in discussions
with US officials in March reaffirmed an earlier Argentine
commitment to require IAEA safeguards for all nuclear
transfers. This commitment may soon be put to the test.
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Prospects
We believe that the rigid Argentine opposition to
international controls over the domestic nuclear program will
continue. We believe any Argentine leader who considers placing
the entire nuclear program under IAEA safeguards faces the
prospect of a serious political backlash.
There is, however, an outside possibility that Buenos Aires
might reassess its goal of completing an indigenous nuclear fuel
cycle outside safeguards if:
? The nuclear rivalry with Brazil appeared to be getting
completely out of hand; or
? The Argentine plan to purchase additional nuclear power
reactors required acceptance of comprehensive
safeguards.
Signs of nuclear rivalry have developed within the past six
months. According to diplomatic reports, Brazilian officials
have grown more mistrustful of Argentina's nuclear intentions and
now seem determined to equal Argentine achievements in certain
advanced nuclear technologies such as uranium enrichment. A
full-scale nuclear arms race in terms of active weapons programs,
however, is still probably several years down the road. We doubt
Buenos Aires will embrace comprehensive safeguards unless the
benefits of pushing Brazilia to take the same step simultaneously
are clear and unambiguous. The risk for Argentina in holding
back is that the longer it maintains indigenous nuclear
facilities outside IAEA safeguards, the greater the motivation
for Brazil and perhaps Chile to move ahead in exploring their own
nuclear options--outside safeguards--that have potential military
applications.
Argentine plans to purchase more nuclear power reactors will
depend on the country's ability to solve its serious financial
problems, but such plans, if they materialize, will pose problems
for Buenos Aires' policy against comprehensive safeguards. In
keeping with their nonproliferation policies, the United States
and, in all likelihood, Canada, will prohibit firms from
submitting bids for future Argentine contracts in the absence of
comprehensive safeguards. Under these circumstances, Argentina
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might turn to West Germany which does not insist on as rigid
safeguard requirements for its nuclear exports. For example,
Bonn agreed in the late 1970s to build Atucha II without
insisting on comprehensive nuclear safeguards. Under established
international norms, supplier states are not required to insist
on comprehensive safeguards. 25X1
The Argentines may believe that they can once again success-
fully play suppliers against one another to obtain additional
power reactors without having to accept rigorous safeguards
requirements. We believe, however, that Buenos Aires will find
this objective more difficult to achieve in the future because:
? The unsafeguarded Pilcaniyeu enrichment facility now
symbolizes in graphic terms the persistent Argentine
desire to preserve a nuclear weapons option.
? The West Germans will come under greater pressure in the
London Suppliers Group to refrain from any new supply
commitments to Argentina in view of the direction of its
nuclear program.
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