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CIA-RDP85T00287R001101270001-1
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Publication Date:
February 16, 1984
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Central Intelligence igence Agency
International Financial Situation Report #25
16 February 1984
Summary
Several Latin American countries are following up on some of the speeches made during
the Quito conference held in early January, including calls for a new approach to handling the
debt problem and for acceptance by creditors of co-responsibility with the debtors in solving the
debt crisis. There was no indication that these countries will seek to jointly renegotiate their
debts, but several of them may band together in proposing that creditors substantially ease loan
terms. Major developments in recent weeks include:
o Foreign banks have nearly completed the signing of their $6.5 billion new money loan
for Brazil. Despite the expected easing of Brazil's immediate cash problems, many
international bankers and Brazilian officials continue to anticipate renewed financial
problems later this year.
o Embassy Lagos reports that a senior level Nigerian official sees little chance of signing
an IMF letter of intent before June.
This situation report was prepared by analysts of the Intelligence Directorate. Comments are
-
welcome and may be addressed to the International Finance Branch, Office of Global IssuesF
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KEY ISSUE
Latin American Joint Proposals for Reducing Debt Service Costs
In contrast to previous debt conferences, several Latin American countries are
following up on some of the speeches made during the Quito conference held in early
January. In particular, calls continue for a new approach to handling the debt problem
and for acceptance by creditors of co-responsibility with the debtors in solving it. Press
reports indicate that presently several Latin American governments are more actively
proposing that creditors grant softer terms on new and existing loans, including fixed or
below-market interest rates as well as lower spreads and fees and longer maturities and
grace periods.
o On 5 February, Presidents Betancour of Colombia and Alfonsin of
Argentina jointly emphasized the need for frank dialogue with creditors
so as to work out affordable debt payment terms, according to a press
report. Both leaders indicated that the current loan terms are
detrimental to the development and political stability of Latin
America.
o According to an Embassy report, Alfonsin-while in Caracas attending
the inauguration of President Lusinchi-called for common financial
policies among Latin American countries to strengthen their
international position. Alfonsin and Lusinchi stated jointly that the
necessary measures of austerity and rationalization must not
significantly affect economic development plans, according to a press
report.
There is no reason to believe that these countries will seek to jointly renegotiate
their debts, but several of them may band together in proposing that creditors ease loan
terms, even substantially beyond those recently given to Mexico, Brazil, Peru, and
Ecuador. For example, the Colombian Foreign Minister on 10 February indicated that
the Latin countries should take actions aimed at extending maturities and reducing
interest rates, but every country should carry out its own negotiations, according to a
press report. In our judgment, Latin American countries will continue to propose softer
loan terms in upcoming meetings, such as the OAS special committee on Finance and
Trade and the Inter-American Development Bank meeting-both to be held at the end of
March. Provided the Brazilian government does not support joint proposals for
substantially softer loan terms, we believe bankers will not be greatly disturbed by these
actions.
DEVELOPMENTS IN MAJOR COUNTRIES
Mexico
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Mexico City recently announced a series of measures to assist the private sector
in meeting its debt obligations.
o In mid-January, Mexico City expanded the FICORCA Program-which
provides firms with foreign exchange at subsidized rates-to debts
contracted after December 1982, according to Embassy reporting. To
qualify for the program, however, new borrowings must be for at least
$100,000 and have an eight-year repayment schedule and a four-year
grace period. According to press reporting, smaller credits with
maturities of at least 2.5 years will be considered on a case-by-case
basis.
o Foreign exchange will be available at the controlled rate for the
payment of suppliers' credits due in 1984, according to Embassy
reporting. As a result, the private sector should be able to avoid
rescheduling this debt. Mexico also extended the deadline for making
peso deposits on overdue supplier credits by one month to 15
February. Mexico City still plans to transfer these funds to foreign
creditors on 7 March 1984.
o To ease the financial burden of firms with large peso debts, Mexican
treasury officials announced that companies will be allowed to
capitalize all or part of their past due interest payments and that
domestic loans can be restructured for up to eight years.
Brazil
Foreign banks have nearly completed the signing of their $6.5 billion new money
loan for Brazil, according to statements made by Central Bank President Pastore to the
press, and probably will begin disbursements soon.
Despite the expected easing of Brazil's immediate cash problems, many
international bankers and Brazilian officials continue to anticipate renewed financial
problems later this year.
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Argentina
We expect bankers to await a preliminary agreement with the IM
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new money available.
In our judgment, Grinspun
is likely to hold off talks on rescheduling the external debt-now estimated at some $44
billion or $5 billion higher than the figure used by the previous government-until both
IMF and Paris Club agreements are close at hand. In the interim, we expect liquid
reserves-currently estimated by the Embassy at about $700 million-to grow as
arrearages are allowed to accumulate.
REGIONAL SITUATIONS
Latin America
Among Latin American countries, Venezuelan President Lusinchi dismissed
Central Bank president Diaz Bruzual, Chile is scheduled to begin negotiations with its
bank advisory committee on new money for 1984, and Peru restructured $2 billion in debt
Venezuela
Newly inaugurated Venezuelan President Lusinchi issued an executive decree to
dismiss controversial Central Bank president Diaz Bruzual because he was an obstacle to
Venezuelan economic policy, according to Embassy and press reports. Lusinchi appointed
Benito Raul Losada - the Central Bank president during 1974-78 - to replace him. Diaz
Bruzual has indicated his intentions to fight the dismissal by appealing to Venezuela's
Venezuela's creditor banks believe that private sector companies will finally pay
some $700 million in interest arrearages, according to press reports. Diaz Bruzual had
prevented private firms from obtaining foreign exchange to service their debts.
Although public and private interest arrearages soon may be cleared up, bankers do not
expect swift progress on restructuring Venezuelan debt. A recent meeting with the three
co-chairmen of the 13-member bank advisory committee was postponed by Lusinchi
because the new finance minister, Manuel Azpurua, was not yet ready to begin formal
discussions, according to the press. The bankers suggested that the meeting be
postponed for a few weeks. The Embassy also reports that the new administration is
currently organizing a debt negotiation team.
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Lusinchi stated in his inaugural address on 2 February that Venezuela will pay all
its foreign debts, according to Embassy and press reporting. He cautioned, however, that
Venezuela will not permit debt repayments to hinder the country's capacity to achieve
some economic growth. The US Embassy believes that this statement confirms their
judgment that Lusinchi will not seek an IMF stabilization program but rather will aim at
gradual adjustment that would appease international bankers. Lusinchi promised to
announce an economic adjustment plan that would rebuild investor confidence in
Venezuela.
The bank advisory committee in late January granted Venezuela another 90-day
deferral on principal repayments, according to press reporting. This is the fourth
extension of Venezuela's debt moratorium since it stopped paying principal on most of its
public sector debt in March 1983. According to press reporting, one of the co-chairmen
of the bank advisory committee stated that Venezuela could complete the debt
refinancing in late April or early May.
Finance Minister Caceres was to begin negotiations with the bank advisory
committee this week for a new money loan for 1984(
During the past month, Chilean officials signed agreements with international
banks to restructure about $1.6 billion in short- and medium-term credits to five public
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companies - Banco Central de Chile, Empresa Nacional de Electricidad, Banco de Chile,
Banco de Santiago, and Banco del Estada - constitute approximately two-thirds of the
total foreign debt to be refinanced by commercial banks. the 25X1
bank advisory committee believes all 24 companies will sign restructuring agreements by
the end of March. Under terms of the agreements, payments due between 31 January
1983 and 31 December 1984 will be refinanced as an eight- ear loan with a four-year
grace period. Chile is guaranteeing the refinancing credits. 25X1
Last week's agreement with the bank advisory committee for a nine-year
restructuring of some $2 billion in short- and medium-term debt at sharply reduced
interest spreads will provide a political boost for the Belaunde government. The
rescheduling, annnounced at meetings in New York last week, called for a cut in interest
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charges by 0.6 percentage point to 1.625 percentage points above LIBOR, a five-year
grace period, and a reduction of front-end fees by half a percentage point. The financial
package received favorable press treatment at home where both President Belaunde and
Finance Minister Rodriguez Pastor have been under fire for their handling of the
economy. Rodriguez Pastor indicated publicly that Peru requested no new funds in 1984
beyond disbursement of the $200 million in loans delayed due to Lima's failure to meet
IMF target . Bankers affreed to disburse these funds against the newly revised IMF
agreement.
Peru and the IMF have signed a new letter of intent for an 18-month standby
agreement worth some $265 million; it replaced the $700 million Extended Fund Facility
initiated in mid-1982. Embassy sources report that the new program calls for limiting
payments for military imports to $200 million in 1984, down from an estimated $350
million last year.
Ecuador
According to
steering committee reached preliminar
half 1984 on somewhat softer terms.
Embassy reporting, Ecuador and its bank
y agreement to refinance debt maturing in first
The steering committee has also agreed to suspend second-half 1984 debt
payments until December to give the next government, which takes office in August,
time to negotiate a new accord with the IMF and international creditors. The US
Embassy anticipates that Quito will continue discussions with bankers to obtain $500
million in new money necessary to cover its current account deficit, although
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bankers will likely resist commitments until Quito reaches a new
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agreement with the Fund. Delays in reaching such an agreement by the new President-
who will be elected in the May runoff-would strain Ecuador's cash position and probably
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force the government to run up its arrearages well beyond last year's $500 million.
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Bolivia
We believe prospects for clearing up arrearages and reaching an IMF agreement
are dim. We estimate that Bolivian exports will increase by only 1 percent in 1984,
which would be insufficient to eliminate overdue payments. The IMF negotiations
remained deadlocked over the budget deficit, and we believe it will be politically and
technically difficult for La Paz to scale down the budget deficit from 20 percent of GDP
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in 1983 to 4-5 percent in 1984 as the IMF is likely to demand. Moreover, according to
Embassy reporting, the Siles government's recent concessions to labor-wage increases
and temporary price controls-will impede negotiations with the IMF.
Eastern Europe
In Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia and the IMF are continuing talks on a 1984 standby
agreement, and Poland's rescheduling talks with foreign creditors have made little
progress.
Yugoslavia
After a one-week postponement, an IMF team went to Belgrade this week for the
third round of talks on a standby agreement for 1984. Negotiators will try to break the
deadlock on several tough issues, particularly the IMF's demand that Yugoslavia
introduce positive real interest rates by yearend. According to Embassy reporting,
Belgrade is willing to make this adjustment only in gradual stages over a two-year
period.
to the Embassy, the IMF has added a requirement that Yugoslavia devalue the dinar
18 pby mid-March; Yugoslavia has offered to devalue by 12 percent. F
In our assessment, reaching agreement will be complicated by the Yugoslavs'
tough stand on these issues. A high-ranking Yugoslav official has admitted publicly that
the government is considering a so-called black option that would reject IMF support
entirely. We believe failure to reach agreement with the IMF, however, will jeopardize
assistance from Western governments and rescheduling efforts with Western banks.
Poland
Rescheduling negotiations with banks and the Paris Club have made little
progress. In November, government creditors had demanded that Warsaw pay obligations
under the rescheduling agreement for 1981 before starting talks on further debt relief.
The Poles did not pay, and Polish officials told the West Germans and British that they
would not pay without new credits.
After postponing a meeting set for January, the Paris Club met on 6 February to
consider a response. Polish officials claimed they did not have enough time to prepare
and did not attend the meeting. According to Embassy Paris, the discussion was
dominated by the creditors' concern that the banks will continue to receive payments as
scheduled. At the same time, the creditors wanted to offer a sweetener to bring the
Poles back into the negotiations. West Germany proposed a rescheduling package
covering obligations for 1982-84 which would be contingent on payment of arrearages
from 1981.
the proposal, but because of US objections, the delegates agreed to seek concurrence
from their capitals. The next meeting is tentatively set for early March.
According
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Western Europe
In Western Europe, serious problems have emerged between Portugal and the IMF
regarding 1984 targets, and the international banking community is becoming concerned
about Greece's economic situation.
Portugal
According to Embassy reporting, serious problems have emerged between the
Portuguese government and the IMF regarding renegotiation of 1984 targets. The IMF
was unable to complete the work planned for the recent February mssion due to
insufficient data collection and preparation on public companies and inadequate policy
articulation by Portuguese officials. To complete the mission, the government must send
a team to Washington before the end of February with the necessary data. The IMF will
then decide whether a basis exists under which certain standby targets might be
renegotiated. As a consequence of the IMF's inability to complete the review at this
time, Portugal would be temporarily unable to make further drawings under the standby
agreement after 31 March.
Greece
The international banking community is becoming increasingly concerned about
the continued deterioration of the Greek economy
External debt has risen by 50 percent during the past two years to $13 billion.
Greece has more than $3 billion in foreign debt maturing in 1984, but
international reserves amount to only $850 million, representing less than one month of
imports 20-percent annual inflation rate
and a fiscal deficit that exceeds 15 percent of o date, the country has had few
problems in raising external credits.
Philippine Prime Minister Virata hopes to sign an IMF letter of intent by late
February, but negotiations may stretch until the May elections.
Elsewhere, Indonesia successfully marketed a $500 million syndication.
Philippines
Prime Minister Virata, in a conversation on 26 January with Treasury officials,
predicted that a letter of intent could be signed with the IMF by the third week of
February, but the Philippine government will stretch negotiations
until the May parliamentary elections. According to Embassy reporting, Virata indicated
that the Fund is willing to tolerate a dual exchange rate system on a temporary basis.
However, Manila is balking at the IMF's demand for a devaluation of the peso prior to the
May elections, and it is not clear that Marcos is willing to accept even the two-tiered
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rate. Commercial banks in Manila are responding positively to a Central Bank pledge to
accept peso deposits in exchange for a Central Bank guarantee to pay dollars at an
unspecified future date
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Fernandez said that he Plans chap es in personnel and in the organization of the Central
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involved in the falsification of Central Bank reserves data-are likely candidates for
dismissal. Fernandez said the Central Bank is currently setting aside foreign exchange to
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bring all public sector interest arrearages current through yearend 1983.
The IMF remains troubled by Manila's management of foreign exchange controls,
Philippine banks are reportedly offering to
place deposits with foreign banks in exchange for new lines of credit.
if Manila could plug these and other foreign exchange leakages, it could
maintain interest payments through the current moratorium. While such measures are
maintaining trade finance at only half of last October's levels, inventories are now
running low; we expect large worker layoffs if agreement is not reached with the IMF
Indonesia
Embassy and press reports indicate that Indonesia has received an enthusiastic
response to its long awaited $500 million loan syndication. Indeed, the loan was sold
down within a week, and Indonesia has agreed to take a $600 million loan. Indonesia had
originally intended to enter the financial markets in late 1983 but postponed its
borrowing out of concern over possible adverse market reaction due to events in the
Philippines. Indonesia has no immediate need for the funds, and bankers expect Jakarta
to use the loan to bolster the country's estimated $4.5 billion in foreign reserves. In
order to insure the success of the syndication, Indonesia, like South Korea, has been
forced to price its loans more attractively. The eight-year loan has been split into a
$375 million tranche priced at 0.75 percentage points above LIBOR and a $125 million
portion at 0.2 above US prime. Last year's $500 million credit was for eight years at a
spread of 0.5 percentage points above LIBOR.
Africa/Middle East
Nigeria
Embassy Lagos reports that a senior level Nigerian finance ministry official sees
little chance of Si nin an IMF letter of intent before June.
A Nigerian delegation is
currently meeting with the Fund in Washington.
Nigerian Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Finance, Alhaji, indicated to US
Embassy and Treasury officials that a Fund program is "absolutely essential." In addition
to a three-year extended facility of between $2.7 and $3.2 billion, Nigeria also intends to
renew its drive for a Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) on the basis of a shortfall in
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oil export revenues.
The Nigerian government is anxious to conclude refinancing discussions with
commercial and official creditors prior to signing an agreement with the IMF. According
to Embassy reporting, Nigerian officials noted that as long as trade finance lines remain
blocked, Lagos is at a disadvantage in negotiations with the Fund. However, most
official creditors continue to link the rescheduling of $2 billion in officially guaranteed
trade credits and the extension of new credits to an IMF agreement.
Nigeria remains curren on me ium- erm o iga ions
according to Embassy reporting, has no intention of rescheduling these obligations.
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Trade Trends in Key Debt-Troubled Countries
Million US Dollars at a Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate
Quarterly
1983
1981
1982 82I
82II
82III
82IV 831
8311
83111
Jul
Se
C
~!ja
onment
Argentina
Exports
Imports
9,140
9
430
7,620 8,780
5
340 6
490
8,340
5
5,980
7,380
7,800
7,440
7,770
7,620
7,750 7,
930
New import control system imposed
Balance
,
-290
,
,
2
,450
4,840
4,770
4,280
4,840
4,880
4,860
5,020 4,
750
last month
Brazil
Exports
Imports
23,290
24
080
,280 2,290
20,180 21,680
21
070 22
080
2,890
19,930
21
600
1,140
20,170
20
2,610
19,070
3,520
20,810
2,600
23,110
2,890
22,430
2,760
21,910
2,730 3,
23,300 22,
180
090
.
Embassy reports full year 1983 surplus
Balance
,
-790
,
,
-890 -400
,
-1
670
,770
19,880
17,560
16,220
16,060
14,780
17,170 16,
240
at $6.5 billion, and Jan. 1984
Chile
Exports
Im
o
t
3,910
6
360
3,820 3,910
,
3,880
-600
3,850
-810
3,590
3,250
3,660
6,890
4,170
6,370
3,940
7,130
3,420
6,130 5,
4,380 4,
850
020
surplus at $8.7 billion annual rate.
p
r
s
Bala
,
-2
450
3,530 4,210
4,390
2,960
2,770
2,820
2,690
2,970
2,240
2,770 3,
900
nce
Costa Rica
Exports
Im
o
t
,
960
1
210
290 -300
870 920
-510
920
890
840
820
800
840
790
1,480
810
970
990
1,180
820
1,610
1,070 1,0
120
80
p
r
s
B
l
,
870 860
880
890
820
900
990
980
950
960 1,0
30
a
ance
Ecuador
Exports
Imports
-250
2,540
2
250
0 60
2,140 2,360
1
990 2
290
40
2,190
2
0
0
-50
2,250
-20
1,800
-110
2,280
-180
2,210
10
2,020
-130
1,940
110
2,160 1,9
50
60
Embassy reports $900 million trade
Balance
,
290
,
,
150 7
,
4
2,120
1,510
1,560
1,440
1,290
1,320
1,340 1,2
10
surplus for full year 1983
Indonesia
Exports
I
t
22,260
1
0
22,290 22,390
150
22,400
130
20,730
290
23,270
720
18,030
770
15,930
730
16,750
620
17,470
820 7
17,160 15,6
50
10
.
mpor
s
B
l
3,270
16,860 15,920
17,400
15,260
18,260
20,580
13,950
14,460
14,950
14,480 13,9
30
a
ance
Ivory Coast
Exports
I
t
8,990
2,530
2
5,430 6,470
2,300 2,820
5,000
2,350
5,470
1,870
5,010
2,160
-2,550
2,400
1,980
1,720
2,290
1,780
2,520
2,040
2,680 1,6
1,380 1,9
80
20
mpor
s
Balance
,380
150
2,180 2,580
2,150
2,070
1,940
2,150
1,760
1,600
2,180
1,570 1,0
60
Kenya
Exports
Imports
1,180
2,130
120 240
1,050 1,130
1
740 2
180
200
1,030
1
670
-200
1,000
1
220
930
250
820
-40
800
180
680
-140
560
-190 8
770 7
60
10
Narobi has slashed duties on most
Balance
-950
,
,
-690 -1
050
,
,270
1,340
1,070
1,140
1,020
760
840 1,2
60
imports by an average of 15 percent
Mexico
Exports
Imports
19,380
24
070
,
21,580 17,470
14
560 22
400
-640
20,170
16
620
-270
24,360
-410
24,520
-250
19,970
-
-340
20,700
-340
21,820
-200
20,840
-70 -5
22,240 22,3
50
70
.
Mexico has eliminated licensing
Balance
,
-4
690
,
,
7
020 -4
930
,
3
5
12,120
7,400
6,560
8,810
8,800
7,670
9,430 9,2
90
requirements for about 5 percent
,
,
,
,
50
12,240
17,120
13,410
11,890
13,020
13,170
12,810 13,0
80
of its imports.
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Trade Trends in Key Debt Troubled Countries- (continued)
Million US Dollars at a Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate
Annual
Quarterly
1981
1982
821
8211
82111
821V
831
8311
83111
Jul
Aug
Sep
Comment
Morocco
Exports 2,390
2,060
1,990
1,950
2,130
2,190
2,020
2,000
2,040
1,910
2,000
2,200
Imports 4,400
4,310
4,290
4,330
4,580
4,100
3,660
3,390
3,910
3,590
4,250
3,890
Balance -2,010
-2,250
-2,300
-2,380
-2,450
-1,910
-1,640
-1,390
-1,870
-1,680
-2,250
-1,690
Nigeria
Exports 17,370
14,280
15,120
13,040
13,880
15,120
6,920
12,000
14,300
14,300
14,300
14,300
Military gov't has tightened import
Imports 19,600
15,120
19,280
16,760
11,160
13,320
9,560
9,360
9,200
9,200
9,200
9,200
and foreign exchange restrictions.
Balance -2,230
-840
-4,160
-3,720
2,720
1,800
-2,640
2,640
5,100
5,100
5,100
5,100
Peru
Exports 3,250
3,290
3,210
3,470
3,160
3,210
2,680
3,250
2,840
2,960
2,870
2,690
5-10 percent tax imposed on
Imports 3,450
3,600
4,120
3,540
3,540
3,230
2,530
2,420
2,540
2,300
2,560
2,770
traditional metals exports.
Balance -200
-310
-910
-70
-380
-20
150
830
300
660
310
-80
Philippines
Exports 5,650
4,970
5,080
5,190
4,760
4,830
4,660
4,780
4,920
5,370
4,810
4,590
Philippine press reports a sharp rise
Imports 8,470
8,270
8,590
8,370
7,960
8,260
8,200
8,220
7,680
7,390
7,970
7,670
in the 4th qtr. trade deficit.
Balance -2,820
-3,300
-3,510
-3,180
-3,200
-3,430
-3,540
-3,440
-2,760
-2,020
-3,160
-3,080
Venezuela
Exports 20,120
16,440
18,600
16,200
16,600
18,530
14,990
16,970
14,730
14,730
14,730
14,730
Imports 13,110
12,580
12,520
13,080
12,990
11,670
10,020
8,120
8,020
8,020
8,020
8,020
Balance 7,010
3,860
6,080
3,120
3,610
6,860
4,970
8,850
6,710
6,710
6,710
6,710
Zaire
Exports 660
570
700
590
500
500
610
560
520
440
600
520
Imports 670
480
570
520
470
380
370
570
510
470
490
580
Balance -10
90
130
70
30
120
240
-10
10
-30
110
-60
Total
Exports 134,630
123,460
126,160
121,650
122,080
127,900
108,440
116,450
117,530
116,330
119,520
116,720
Imports 134,880
112,500
128,380
118,800
103,000
99,650
91,820
83,920
83,920
80,680
86,070
84,800
Balance -250
10,960
-2,220
2,850
19,080
28,250
16,620
32,530
33,610
35,650
33,450
31,920
Note: Exports f.o.b. and imports c.i.f. are based on IMF International
Financial Statistics and are seasonally adjusted; consequently
quarterly data may not add to annual totals.
Numbers in bold are CIA estimates
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01101270001-1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001101270001-1
SUBJECT: International Financial Situation Report #25
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Sec. D. T. Regan Treasury
R. T. McNamar 11
Beryl Sprinkel
David Chew
Robert Cornell
Thomas Dawson
Charles Dallara
Charles Schotta
Stephen Canner
Doug Mulholland
Manuel Johnson
George Hoguet
Sec. George Shultz State
Kenneth Dam it
Hugh Montgomery
L. Eagleburger
Ralph Lindstrom
W. Allen Wallis
Langhorne Motley
Richard Burt
Richard McCormack
Chester Crocker
Paul Wolfowitz
Nicholas Veliotes
J.C. Kornblum
Lionel Olmer
Roger Robinson NSC
Douglas McMinn
Randall Fort PFIAB
Leo Cherne PFIAB
DCI
ExDir
SA/DDCI
DDI
ADDI
Ch/PES/DDI
David Low, NIO at Large
NIO Economics
NIC/AG
DDO
Ch/DDO/EPDS
Ch/DDO/AF
Ch/DDO/EA
Ch/DDO/EUR
ti
NSA
X16 February 1984
49 Ch/DDO/LA
50 Ch/DDO/NE
51 Ch/DDO/SE
52 IAD/OGC/ENO/PE
53 D/ALA
54 D/OEA
55 D/EURA
56 Ch/EURA/EE/EW
57 D/SOVA
58 D/NESA
59 DD/OGI, D/OGI
60 Ch/OGI/SRD
61 Ch/OGI/ISID
62 Ch/OGI/GD
63 Ch/OGI/ECD
64-65 Ch/OGI/ECD/IF
66 Ch/OGI/ECD/IT
67 OGI/CO
68 Chief, CPAS/ILS
69-76 OGI/Pub
1-
1-
1-
Edwin Truman, Federal Reserve Board
Henry Wallich, Federal Reserve Board
Anthony Solomon, Federal Reserve of
New York
1 - Leo Cherne, PFIAB, New York
1 - Alan Greenspan, PFIAB, New York
1 - Doug Mulholland, Treasury
1 - John Davis, State
1 - Paul McGonagle, State
1 Stephen Bosworth, State
1 - J.D.Bindenagel, State, (for pass to
Ambassador Arthur Burns)
1 - Martin Feldstein, CEA
1 - David Wigg, CEA
5- Dave Peterson, Commerce
1 - Warren E. Farb, Commerce
25X1
25X1
1- DIA 25X1
1 - Steve Farrar, OMB
1 - William Isaac, Federal Deposit 25X1
1-
1 - Ch/ECD
1 - Ch/ECD/IF
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001101270001-1