(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001101240001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 25, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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I I
Central Intelligence Agency,,
Washington, D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
26 JAN 1,994
MEMORANDUM FOR: David Wigg
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Chief, International Finance Branch
Office of Global Issues
SUBJECT : LDC Debt Crisis and Financial Situation in Six Key Debtor
Attached is the material you requested for inclusion in the, briefing book for
former presidents. It contains our assessment of the current LDC debt crisis and
financial situations in six key LDC debtors. If you have any questions, please feel free to
call
Attachment:
The LDC Debt Crisis: An Overview,
GIM 84-10020, Jan 1984
(TI M 84 - i oo 2O
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SUBJECT: The LDC Debt Crisis: An Overview
OGI/ECD/IF 25Jan84
Distribution:
Original LDXd to addressee
1 - addressee
1 - SA/DDCI
Executive Director
DDI
DDI/PES
NIO Economics
CPAS/ILS
D/OGI, DD/OGI
OGI/PG
OGI/ECD
OGI/ECD/IF
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Summary
During the past year and a half, rescue packages coordinated by the IMF have
forestalled default by debt-troubled LDCs and have averted a major disruption of the
international financial community. The IMF, bankers, industrialized country and LDC
debtor governments are currently negotiating 1984 debt relief packages. Again the
strategy depends heavily on the cooperation of all players and confidence that the LDCs'
ability to service the debt is improving.
Interest rates, bankers fees, and IMF conditionality are the major issues in the
current negotiations. An increasing number of debtor countries are seeking easier terms
an new and restructured loans from banks. The IMF must set revised economic targets,
and it risks losing the cooperation of debtors if they judge IMF demands as too harsh and
likely to spur unrest.
While most observers believe that 1984 LDC financing packages will be
completed, longer-term and more difficult aspects of the debt crisis remain, including
changes in LDC development policies and ensuring world economic recovery. For some
debtors, only a fundamental restructuring of domestic markets can ensure long-term
growth and financial viability, but such a restructuring will involve difficult social and
political decisions. For their part, the industrialized countries have a responsibility to
resist strong protectionist sentiment and encourage LDC export expansion.
Among individual debtor situations, Brazil and Mexico are likely to co lete their
1984 packages during the next month, m Without 25X1
an IMF arrangement in place, the financial situations of Argentina, the Philippines and
Nigeria are less certain. For Buenos Aires, seasonal foreign grain sales and the
willingness of creditors to cooperate at least initially with the new government are likely
to temporarily ease difficulties. According to the Embassy in Manila the Marcos
government is counting on the United States and Japan to provide bridge financing until
an impasse with the IMF over devaluation can be resolved. The new Nigerian government
must clear up some $5 billion in unpaid trade bills before the IMF or bankers will consider
new lending this year. In Venezuela's case, I 25X1
commercial banks probably will refinance the debt without an IMF 25X1
program. As a result of tight exchange controls and import restraints, foreign reserves
have increased to about $11 billion, a factor providing Caracas some leverage in working
unilaterally with the banks.
GI M 84-10020
January 1984
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The LDC Debt Crisis: An Overview
During the past year and a half, rescue packages coordinated by the IMF have
forestalled default by debt-troubled LDCs and have averted a major disruption of the
international financial community. These packages have included debt restructuring, new
commercial bank and IMF lending, and official bridging loans and export credits. In return
debtor countries have agreed to undertake stringent economic adjustment measures. 25X1
Creditors and debtors are negotiating 1984 debt relief packages. Again the strategy
depends heavily on the cooperation of all players and confidence that the LDCs' ability to
service the debt is improving. Currently, confidence is bolstered by OECD economic recovery,
improved LDC export prospects, and lower or at least stable interest rates. An expectation
that domestic political opposition to austerity measures will remain manageable is also an
integral part of maintaining banker cooperation. 25X1
Interest rates, banker fees, and IMF conditionality are the major issues in the current
negotiations. An increasing number of debtor countries are seeking easier terms on new and
restructured loans from banks, including longer grace periods and lower interest spreads.
According to public statements by Brazil's former Central Bank President, some LDC officials
perceive themselves to be in a stronger negotiating position this year following recent public
statements by the IMF Managing Director and US Federal Reserve Chairman calling for lower 25X1
bank fees. Still, heavily exposed banks probably will resist a substantial reduction in interest
spreads charged to countries that have not demonstrated progress in improving their external
positions. Moreover, bankers also worr that concessions granted
to one country may lead other debtors to demand similar relief. 25X1
For its part, the IMF must decide how stringent revised economic targets should be and
how rigidly they should be enforced. On the one hand, the Fund risks losing the cooperation of
debtors if they judge IMF demands as too harsh and likely to spur social and political unrest.
On the other hand, creditors are looking to the Fund to oversee needed reforms before they
will disburse new capital. Debtors are publicly questioning the efficacy of current IMF
prescriptions, which have caused more inflation, unemployment, and reductions in living
standards than had been a ected, and they are likely to demand more lenient programs in the
months ahead. 25X1
While most observers are optimistic that 1984 LDC financing packages will be
completed, longer-term and more difficult aspects of the debt crisis remain, including needed
changes in LDC development policies and ensuring world economic recovery. In some debtor
countries, present development policies have created a gross misallocation of resources which
has sustained large inefficient public sector enterprises and bureaucracies. For these debtors,
only a fundamental restructuring of the domestic markets can ensure long-term growth and
financial viability, but such a restructuring will involve very difficult social and political
decisions. For their part, the industrialized countries have a responsibility to resist strong
protectionist sentiment and encourage LDC export expansion. Their monetary and fiscal
policies will also be an important ingredient in sustaining the world economic recovery
essential to LDC debt-servicing capabilities.
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Country Outlooks
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President Miguel de la Madrid's tough austerity measures have eased considerably
the economic crisis he inherited last year. By complying with an IMF stabilization
program, Mexico obtained over $6 billion in IMF and commercial bank financing last
year. In addition, about $23 billion in public sector debt owed to commercial banks in
1983-84 was restructured over eight years. Mexico's bank advisory committee has just
approved the government's request for $3.8 billion in new commercial bank credit with
substantially more attractive terms than last year's $5 billion commercial loan. Mexico
also is likely to obtain $2.5 billion in official trade credits this year. While the new
commercial bank credits are expected to be ratified, final agreement may slip beyond
the 27 January target date The government, 25X1
however, should not experience any interim financing gaps, because it has ample funds
from last year's $5 billion increase in net foreign reserves and also has available
undisbursed funds from last year's commercial loan. Mexico's 1984 IMF program is
expected to be formally approved in mid-February. 25X1
President de la Madrid will have to hold the economy on a tight leash during the
next two years if progress on inflation, foreign exchange-rate stability, and restrained
expansion of the debt burden is to continue. His task will not be easy because under any
policy option, Mexicans face continued high levels of unemployment and depressed levels
of personal consumption over the next couple of years.
Economic management problems are likely to mount as the clear justification for
austerity fades, political pressures for noticeable improvement in domestic economic
conditions intensify, and the private sector financial difficulties continue. Because well-
organized interest groups have a hearing at the highest level in Mexico's political system,
the government probably will face growing pressures for higher subsidies, generous wage
increases, and a return to an overvalued exchange rate. Still, President de la Madrid
should remain in control because of early compromises with organized labor leaders and
general acceptance by the business community of the need for austerity.
Brazil is currently trying to line up an $18.1 billion financing package for 1984
which includes a) $6.5 billion in new bank credit, b) $5.3 billion in bank refinancing of
1984 debt maturities, c) $3.8 billion in official rescheduling of 1983-84 debt maturities,
and d) $2.5 billion in export credits from industrial countries. 25X1
this package, as well as close to $16 billion in interbank deposits and 25X1
short-term trade credits, is slated to be completed by the end of January, although
difficulties in lining up small commitments remain. In return Brazil has agreed to new
performance criteria under its 1983-85 IMF program which will require more restrictive
fiscal, monetary, and wage policies than undertaken last year. Disbursement of new bank
and IMF credit again will be contingent upon meeting quarterly economic objectives.
Last year noncompliance delayed new mone disbursements and led to the buildup of
interest and other payments arrearages. 25X1
We foresee continuing difficulties in implementing this year's program. Press
reports indicate that Brazil's austerity efforts have met with a rising tide of protest
among nearly all sectors of society and the political opposition movement is becoming a
significant force. The Figueiredo government is increasingly obliged under the ongoing
political liberalization to heed public opinion and share decisionmaking with Congress.
While Brasilia will strive to keep the program on track and maintain workable relations
with foreign creditors, it probably, will be hard pressed to withstand domestic pressures
for modifications to these policies.
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Although the austerity program required by the IMF will debilitate economic
activity through at least next year, the economy would plummet even further if new bank
and IMF disbursements were withheld. The government may have to risk its working
relations with the IMF and bankers, however, if domestic disorder spreads and Brasilia
abandons the program or declares a debt moratorium in order to deflect public
resentment and shore up the government's legitimacy.
President-elect Jamie Lusinchi has stated publicly that his number one priority
after taking office on 2 February is to reschedule Venezuela's $16.4 billion of public
sector debt due in 1983-84. Caracas declared a moratorium on principal repayments-
including short-term obligations-last March and requested a refinancing. A bank
advisory committee had insisted that a refinancing could not occur until an IMF
stabilization program was in place. Former President Herrera was unwilling to submit to
IMF austerity measures in an election year, and negotiations stalled. Teo new
government is also opposed to an IMF agreement.
commercial
banks probably will reschedule the debt without an IMF program, provided Caracas clears
up over $800 million in arrearages on both public and private sector debt and undertakes
a viable economic program that can keep interest payments current. Lusinchi probably
will be able to meet these conditions, because Venezuela's balance-of-payments position
has improved as a result of tight exchange controls and import restraints; foreign
reserves have increased to about $11 billion, a factor
providing Caracas some leverage in working unilaterally with the banks.
Set against these relatively favorable developments on the international financial
front is the probability that Caracas will face domestic difficulties. Meeting bankers'
requirements for domestic economic improvements likely will require basic policy
adjustments - cuts in costly subsidies, a leaner public sector, devalued exchange rates,
and removal of price controls - that will make it difficult for Lusinchi to fulfill
campaign promises and high expectations from both the rural and labor sectors, the
backbone of his support. Moreover, if the debt refinancing agreement does not go
through, Caracas may be forced to accede to even more austere reforms advocated by
Argentina
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Although the Alfonsin government has stated publicly its willingness to refinance
1982-83 debt arrearages and maturities due in 1984 and to negotiate a new IMF program,
it is likely to be several months before any agreements with lenders can be reached. At
recent banker meetings in New York, Economy Minister Grinspun proposed that banks
disburse the remaining $1 billion of a $1.5 billion medium-term loan arranged last year,
even though disbursements ceased because of noncompliance with the 1983 IMF
program. Buenos Aires would return the entire disbursement plus some of its own
reserves to cover both a scheduled $350 million commercial bridge loan due this month
and to bring interest arrearages current through the end of 1983. (Buenos Aires
instituted a de facto payments moratorium ccumulated some $2.5
billion in arrears by yearend.) bankers, however, are 25X1
reluctant to make any disbursement without a time-consuming revision of IMF
performance targets. Grinspun told bankers he expects to complete a new IMF
arranLyement by May provided the program allows for some stimulation of the economy.
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Seasonal foreign grain sales and the willingness of creditors to cooperate at least
initially with the new government are likely to temporarily ease Argentina's payments
difficulties. A major confrontation with lenders could arise in mid-to-late 1984, however,
when a resurgence of inflation and larger government deficits spurred by the government's
planned demand stimulation policies, including social welfare programs and subsidized interest
rates, is expected. IMF disbursements under any new program would probably cease as would
any new commercial credits tied to the IMF arrangement. In addition, Grinspun is an ul?.proven
debt negotiator, and could provoke an impasse
with the international financial community---
Philippines
Although it has been more than three months since the government announced a 90-day
standstill on principal repayments to commercial banks and initiated talks with the "1,F on a
new $650 million standby program, the Philippines' financial situation remains unsettled.
According to Embassy reporting, President Marcos, who is concerned about the political
impact of further currency devaluation before the National Assembly elections in May, is
resisting the IMF's demands for a floating exchange rate. Efforts to secure new bank loans and
reschedulings with private and official creditors are stalled pending the results of the Fund's
negotiations.
According to the Embassy, the government is counting on the United States and Japan
to provide bridge financing until a proposed $1.6 billion new bank facility can be signed.
Official donors, however, will require the collateral of an IMF arrangement. The longer the
financing stalemate continues, the more serious will be the impact on the economy, which is
already experiencing severe contraction due to a cutback in trade financing.
The ability of the Marcos government to weather its financial troubles will depend
largely on Marcos's ability to ease the international financial community's fears about political
instability. Marcos probably has the power to accomplish this by moving ahead on the Aquino
investigation and making political reforms aimed at ensuring fair elections in May that
political opponents are demanding. Nevertheless, the near certainty of further devaluations
and other austerity measures will complicate Marcos's difficulties by adding to the grievances
of labor, the middle class, and the business community. Organized protests prompted by
economic problems will continue to add to international perceptions of serious political
instability, and Manila will have great difficulty breaking this circle of events.
Nigeria
Major General Buhari's new military government in Lagos faces an extremely difficult
economic position. foreign official assets - at less than $1 billion - 25X1
cover only 2 months' imports; some $6.5 billion in unpaid trade bills must be refinanced before
the IMF or bankers will consider new lending this year; Nigeria's domestic economy is in most
severe economic recession since the 1967-70 civil war, with last year's economic output
roughly 20 percent below that of 1981; and import cuts have affected machinery and industrial
inputs, forced many factories to close, and boosted urban unemployment to near 30 percent of
the urban labor force. 25X1
Buhari's pledge to honor "genuine" debt obligations and to
pursue talks with the IMF, World ank, and foreign creditors is being viewed cautiously but
optimistically by commercial creditors. Creditors were reassured on 3 January when Lagos
made the first principal repayment on $2 billion of trade credits refinanced during 1983, and
again last week when repayments due on a 1978 loan were received. The new government did,
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however, postpone talks with the IMF scheduled for 10 January, to allow time for revision of
the former administration's budget and to devise a new strategy for renegotiating some of the
terms reached with the Shagari government, according to the Embassy. Devaluation and
reschedulinLT of arrearaeres have been major sticking points in the IMF talks which began last
summer.
Some ~ have voiced doubts about Buhari's appreciation of the depth of Nigeria's
financial difficulties and his ability to formulate a strategy to deal with the situation. Buhari
has promised quick improvements in living standards, and he will want to reach an
accommodation with the IMF and creditors which will permit expanded imports. On the other
hand, negotiations over IMF austerity conditions could be difficult and protracted, as Buhari
will need to take an even tougher stance in negotiating performance criteria in order to keep
his promises to the people. As the regime becomes increasingly aware of its inability to
produce a rapid recovery, it could attempt to make the West and the international financial
community scapegoats. Continued economic stagnation is likely to erode public support for
the new government as well as weaken the military's cohesion and spawn coup plotting.
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Tabular Material
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LDC and European Countries Debt Reschedulings
Num
Resch
ber
edu
of
lings
Number of Amount
Countries Rescheduled
(billion US$)
1975
2
2
0.5
1976
2
2
0.5
1977
4
3
0.4
1978
6
4
2.2
1979
8
6
6.2
1980
12
12
5.0
1981
15
14
5.0
1982
16
12
10.1
1983
36,
-
25
54.3
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1983 LDC and East European Debt Restructurings
R
(m
Afl unt -
estructured
illion US$)
Maturity
(years)
Grace
Period
(years)
Interest Rate
(percentage points
above Libor)
New Money
Cannitments*
(million US$)
Private Restructurin
s
g
Argentina
November
5
500
Brazil
Februar
,
5.0
3.0
Chile
y
4,800
8
0
1,500
July
.
2.5
2.125
4
40
Costa Rica
1,300
7.0
4
0
,
0
September
615
.
2.125
1
300
Cuba
December
8.0
4.0
2.250
,
225
Dominican Republic
130
7.0
3
0
September
568
.
2.250
0
Ecuador
Malawi
October
1,210
5.0
6.0
1.0
1
0
2.250
0
Mexico
March
57
6.5
.
3
0
2.250
431
Nigeria
Aug/Sept/Oct
22,k .'t
8.0
.
4
0
1.875
0
July
1
350
.
1.875
5
000
September
,
3.0
5.5
1.500
,
0
Panama
480
2.8
3
5
September
185
.
1.500
0
Peru
Poland
July
380
6.0
8.0
3.0
3
0
2.250
93
October
1
400
.
2.250
450
Rcm nia
June
,
601
10.0
5.0
1.750
0
Togo
October
84
6.5
3.5
1.750
0
Uruguay
Yugoslavia
July
629
7.3
6.0
0.0
2
0
2.000
0
September
1
400
.
2.250
240
Zambia
October
,
67
6.0
3.0
1.750
600
7.0
3.0
2.250
Official Restructurings
Brazil
Central African Republic
November
Jul
3,800-
9.0
5.0
Costa Rica
y
13
9.5
5
0
January
200
.
Cuba
March
8.3
3.8
Ecuador
413
8.5
3
5
Liberia
July
December
200
7.5
.
3.0
Malawi
22
10.0
5
0
Mexico
October
June
30
8.0
3
.
.5
Morocco
2,000
5.5
3
0
Niger
October
November
600
8.0
4
.
.0
Peru
27
10.0
5
0
Romania
July 1
Ma
,044
7.5
3
.
.0
Senegal
y
148
6.0
3
0
Sudan
December
Februar
8
9.0
4
.
.0
Togo
y
536
15.0
5
5
Zaire
April
December
300
9.5
5
.
.0
Zambia
1
,000
11.0
5
0
May
375
9.5
5
.
.0
* Funds committed by banks that are associated with the restructuring as part of a financial package.
Source: = Embassy, and press reports.
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Table 3
Selected LMF Standby and Extended Arrangements, as of December 1983(a)
Date of Expiration Amount of
Arrangement Date Agreement
Amount
Available
1984
Jan 1983
Apr 1984 1,650
1,000*
Barbadas
Oct 1982
May 1984 35
10
Central African Rep.
Apr 1983
Apr 1984 20
10
Chile
Jan 1983
Jan 1985 550
230
Ecuador
Jul 1983
Jul 1984 173
85
Ghana
Aug 1983
Aug 1984 262
180
Guatemala
Aug 1983
Dec 1984 126
100
Hungary
Dec 1982
Jan 1984 523
Fully drawn
Kenya
Mar 1983
Sep 1984 194
110
Korea, South
Jul 1983
Mar 1985 633
400
Liberia
Sep 1983
Sep 1984 61
40
Mauritius
May 1983
Aug 1984 54
40
Morocco
Sep 1983
Mar 1985 330
200
Panama
Jun 1983
Dec 1984 165
100
Philippines
Feb 1983
Feb 1984 347
250*
Jun 1981
Jun 1984 1,213
Senegal
Sep 1983 Sep 1984 69
45
Solomon Islands
Jun 1983 Jun 1984 2
1
Somalia
Jul 1983 Jan 1984 66
Fully drawn
Sri Lanka
Sep 1983 Jul 1984 110
65
Sudan
Feb 1983 Feb 1984 187
25
Togo
Mar 1983 Apr 1984 24
8
Turkey
Jun 1983 Jun 1984 248
150
Uganda
Sep 1983 Sep 1984 105
60
Uruguay
Apr 1983 Apr 1985 416
215
Western Samoa
Jun 1983 Jun 1984 4
1
Zambia
Apr 1983 Apr 1984 234
130
Zimbabwe
Mar 1983 Sep 1984 333
220
Brazil
Feb 1983 Feb 1986 4,663
1,500
Dominica
Feb 1981 Feb 1984 9
1
Dominican Republic
Jan 1983 Jan 1986 408
130
Grenada
Aug 1983 Aug 1986 15
6
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Malawi
Sep 1983 Sep 1986 110
30
Mexico
Jan 1983 Dec 1985 3,752
1,600
Peru
Jun 1962 Jun 1985 715
35U*
Argentina fell out of compliance in August
1983. Currently negotiating for a new lean.
Hungary requested a one year, $450 million
standby program,to be considered by the Fund in
January.
The IMF found the Philippines cut of *con>pliance
and suspended disbursements in Sept 1983.
Manila is negotiating a new 18-month, $650
million standby for early 1984.
In March 1983, the IMF blocked release of $190
million Bucharest was scheduled to draw in
second half 1983. Bucharest will probably allow
the current agreement to expire without further
drawdo n before a new agreement covering 1984-85
is signed.
5u5 ndrA d~ yours men+s o~ MAIL..ui I(uti`uaf Are mu~t A vd~.'n
J
Disbursements were suspended in late 1983,,,
Peru is in a noncompliance situation and.is
negotiating a new IMF program.
? Access to these tunds is currently suspended Mcause of noncompliance.
(a) Countries with Fund agreements 'which expired in Iecember include: Costa Rica, Honduras, South Africa, Thailand, and Yugoslavia.
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Table 4
1984 DEBT RESCHEDULINGS
o = official
c = carimercial
Africa/Middle East Ivory Coast(o,c)
Liberia(c)
Madagascar(o,c)
Morocco(c)
Nigeria(c)
Senegal(c)
Zan-bia(c)
Asia Philippines(o,c)
Latin America Argentina(c)
Bolivia(c)
Brazil(c)
Chile(c)
Daninican
Republic(o)
Ecuador(c)
Guyana(o)
Honduras(c)
Jamaica(c)
Mexico(c)
Nicaragua(c)
Peru(c)
Venezqe l a (c )
Probable Possible
Angola(o,c) Mauritania(o,c)
Egypt(o,c) Nigeria(o)
Ghana(o,c)
Guinea Bissau(o,c)
Sanalia(o)
Sudan(o)
Upper Volta(o)
Argentina(o) Colcanbia(c)
Cuba(o c) Guatemala(c)
Paraguay(c)
Hungary(c)
Eastern Europe Poland(o,c)
Yugoslavia(o,c)
Hungary(c)
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Table 5
Major Debtors: 1984 Bank Reschedulinffs
(Billion US$)
Country
Argentina
Amount to be
Rescheduled
21.0
Related
New Money
2
0
Brazil
5.3
.
6
5
Chile
2
1
.
.
1
0
Ecuador
0.6
.
0.5
Ivory Coast
0
8
.
0
1
Morocco
1.0
.
Nigeria
5.0
Peru
0
3
.
0
5
Philippines
9.5
.
1
7
Poland
1.5
.
0
2
Venezuela
16.4
.
Yugoslavia
1.0
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01101240001-4
25X1