(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001100620001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 25, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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But Moscow is not convinced that the benefits that
accrue to East Germany add up to a net advantage for
the Warsaw Pact. True, closer ties with the West make
political capital domestically.
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
25 September 1984
The East German Question Revisited
Summary
The German question is back, but with a new
twist. When it was last at center stage in the early
1970s, the East Germans had to be forced by the Soviets
to negotiate a treaty with West Germany. The roles are
now reversed. For the past year East Berlin has been
eager to engage in a dialogue--with---B-onn-- at a- tim-e -wh-e-n
Moscow--still smarting from its failure to prevent INF
deployments--has emphasized confrontation with the
West, and particularly the basin countries, for
agreeing to deploy.
East German party leader Honecker clearly has a
different view. He favors "limiting the damage" caused
by the deployment and his tactics have paid
dividends. Two large credits guaranteed by Bonn have
helped strengthen the East German economy at a time
when Soviet support has begun to tail off. The
concessions Honecker has made--relaxed travel
arrangements for West German visitors and a dramatic
increase in East German emigration--entail some risks
but are popular measures which provide Honecker some
This memorandum was prepared byl I Chief,
East European Division, Office of European Analysis. It includes
contributions from the West European Division, Office of European
Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and
questions are welcome and should be addressed to
Chief, East European Division, EURA
EURM84-10178
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East Germany less of an economic burden for the Soviet
Union and might even provide access to advanced
technology. There is also a chance that German
togetherness would reduce Bonn's commitment to NATO.
But at least some Soviet leaders appear more concerned
that closer intra-German ties could not only threaten
the internal situation in East Germany, but also
encourage elements in West Germany, and elsewhere in
Eastern Europe, that want to change the post World War
II status quo.
These Soviet concerns apparently were the primary
reason for Honecker's postponement on 4 September of
what would have been the first trip to West Germany by
an East German leader. Both Germanys will probably
pause now to reassess and consolidate, but we-would
have expected such a slowdown even if the trip had
occurred. Moscow, having asserted its prerogative to
determine the pace of intra-German relations, seems
willing to let Bonn and East Berlin resume their
dialogue at a lower level as long as it focuses for the
moment on more limited economic and technical issues.
Moscow's enthusiasm for intra-German relations may
increase if Honecker is able to entice the Kohl
government into broader discussions of security
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Background
Last October in a letter to Chancellor Kohl, East German
party leader Honecker threatened a "new ice age" in relations
between the GDR and the FRG if INF deployments went ahead. Such
rhetoric was consistent with the total support East Berlin had
given to the Soviet campaign on this issue. Two weeks after the
letter was published, a similar threat appeared in the communique
from the Gromyko-Honecker talks in East Germany. It warned of
"serious losses" for West Germany's Ostpolitik and claimed INF
deployments would endanger the normalization of intra-German
relations achieved in the treaties signed in the early 1970s.
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It is now obvious that Honecker--acutely aware of the
substantial financial advantages provided in recent years by East 25X1 -
Germany's special relationshi with Bonn--had no intention of
carrying out these threats.
is a er priori y was rama Ica y 25X1
reinforced in a speech by Honecker on 24 November two days
after
the Bundestag voted to approve INF deployment. 25X1
Honecker told a party plenum at that time that, although
deployment had caused "serious damage" in relations with West
Germany, he was "in favor of limiting the damage as much as
possible." He added it was vitally important to continue the
political dialogue and, departing completely from the notion of
an ice age, said he favored "every opportunity for
negotiations." He dutifully supported the Soviet decision on
counterdeployments, but tempered his support by stating the
decision to station missiles in East Germany had "caused no joy
in our country."
In any case, intra-German relations--which had already
received a significant boost from the DM one billion West German
credith_guarantee in June 1983--continued to move ahead as if the
INF controversy did not exist.
-- Agreement was reached for improving postal and
telecommunication services.
After years of contentious negotiations, the East
Germans agreed to transfer control of a West Berlin
commuter rail system to the West Berlin government.
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A number of West German politicians began making
official or personal visits to East Germany.
East Germany eased emigration restrictions; at least
33,000 have left for West Germany so far this year
compared to the normal 8-10,000 annual average. Unlike
past years this group contained large numbers of young,
even well-trained East Germans.
The amount of money West German pensioners were required
to exchange when visiting East Germany was reduced.
Other travel restrictions were eased, including an
increase in the numbers of days West Germans were
allowed to spend in East Germany from 45 to 60.
The East Germans have slowly been dismantling the
automatic "shooting devices" along the intra-German
border.
The second "jumbo loan" guaranteed by Bonn amounting to
DM 950 million was announced on 25 July.
Tentative agreement was reached on scheduling of
Honecker's first visit to the FRG.
the
Soviets were indeed getting increasingly uneasy a ou the course
of intra-German relations. In meetings with US and Allied
officials, Soviet diplomats criticized both West and East Germans
for their proliferation of contacts. Press coverage criticized
centrifugal tendencies in the Warsaw Pact, warned against Western
efforts to divide the Pact, and expressed Soviet concern over the
development of "European" rather than East Bloc attitudes on the
part of some East European states.
On 21 July, four days before agreement was announced on the
new West German credit to East Germany, Pravda warned that
"linkage" between West German credits and East German concessions
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on human contacts "risks overstepping the mark and going too
far." Two days after-the agreement was announced, Pravda weighed
in again, accusing Bonn of using "economic levers and political
contacts" to solicit concessions on matters of principle.
Nevertheless, East Berlin implemented the humanitarian
concessions associated with the credit agreement on 1 August as
scheduled. The next day Pravda followed up on the attacks laid
out on 27 July and again charged Bonn with wanting to undermine
socialism in the GDR. During August, the Soviets put strong
pressure on Honecker to cancel his trip to the FRG
The renewal in early September of Soviet press
attacks against Bonn's alleged revanchism was followed quickly by
an East German announcement postponing the visit.
The sharp Soviet reaction to the July agreement--compared to 25X1
Moscow's reaction to similar arrangements made between-the--two---
Germanys in 1983--can be attributed, at least in part, to the
obvious linkage between the humanitarian concessions and the
credits. Last year East Berlin had a grace period of several
months before it made any humanitarian concessions. This delay
created political problems for Chancellor Kohl. This year, as
noted above, the concessions were implemented almost immediately
by East Germany while Bonn made a public announcement connecting
the new credits with a list of 11 concessions. 25X1
GDR Motivation
East Germany Js not in the habit of getting out of step with
Soviet policies. Why then did its intra-German policy exceed the
bounds? Why did it deliberately risk Soviet displeasure by
cultivating West Germany? The economic advantages for East
Berlin are important, although the present condition of the East
German economy is not desperate enough for it to be the sole
reason Honecker risks alienating Moscow.
West German assistance, however, has played an important
role in helping East Berlin to deal with serious financial
problems that threatened its solvency and could have forced it to
make an embarrassing request for debt relief from Western
governients and banks. In trying to cope with mounting debt
servicing problems, East Berlin in 1982 implemented a drastic
adjustment program that allowed it to run trade surpluses, but at
the cost of slower growth and declining living standards. East
Berlin's special ties with West Germany helped cushion the impact
of the adjustment program since it was able to increase imports
from West Germany--by use of clearing account facilities and West
German trade credits--to help compensate for cutbacks in imports
from other Western countries. Moreover, in June 1983 and July
1984, East Berlin received large hard currency loans guaranteed
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by Bonn that provided direct assistance and also helped to
As a result of adjustment measures and West German support,
the East German economy has successfully weathered its serious
financial crisis and shows signs of recovery. Last year East
Germany ran a $1.3 billion hard currency trade surplus, reduced
that the grow rate of real GNP rebounded to 2 percent in 1983,
after stagnating in 1982. The West German credit guarantees have
helped restore bank confidence in the GDR and, in response,
interest charges are fallin and the East Germans are able to
borrow again.
But serious problems remain. The GDR's debt is still high
and a serious deterioration of East-West relations could cause
liquidity problems. The economy is inefficient and technology-
poor by Western standards. In addition, coincident with East
Germany's financial problems, the Soviet Union has become less
supportive. Since 1981, Moscow has been unwilling to increase
deliveries of raw materials, including oil, and has insisted that
the bilateral terms of trade be turned sharply in its favor.
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The concerns of East German leaders about the disenchanted
populace they rule are closely associated with the economic 25X1
imperatives that drive East Berlin closer to Bonn. In the
absence of political linkage between the citizenry and the
government, legitimacy of rule depends almost entirely on the
results achieved by those in charge. A society--already
discontent because it is not as free as it would like--can become
explosive if the system imposed without its consent reduces
rather than enhances its prosperity. Most East Germans can
compare, their circumstances with their Western counterparts by
watching West German television. 25X1
The East German leadership has continued to assign a high
priority, therefore, to improving the standard of living. East
German statistics and a large volume of anecdotal evidence
indicate that an improvement has occurred in the past year,
following the downturn brought on by serious financial
problems. The West German "jumbo" credits this summer and last,
plus the other advantages East Germany enjoys from intra-German
commerce, contributed to this improvement.
retail sales have been up and
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Allowing average citizens increased opportunities to travel
betyieen West and East Germany also helps promote a general sense
of well-being in East Germany. The East German Lutheran Church's
call on 23 September for additional relaxations on travel
restrictions is indicative of the wide support on this issue. It
is generally appreciated that the Soviet Union is against this
freedom of movement, and Honecker gains a certain amount of
popular respect for standing up to Moscow on this and other
issues connected with the warming trend between the two
Germanys. At the same time the unprecedented level of emigration
permitted in. the first half of 1984 gave the regime the
opportunity to expel some of its most persistent agitators.
In sum, it would appear that East German leaders allow West
Germans more access to the --Eas-t --German p eople, -despite Sovi-et -- -
misgivings, because they believe that a reasonably content
population is one that is more easily controlled. We do not have
a good sense for just how restless the East German populace was a
year ago or how much pacifying is required. We are confident,
however, that the regime is keenly aware that a delicate balance
exists between the level of contacts that provide for a more
satisfied population, and that unknown point at which the cross-
border cultural and political influences that derive from these
contacts spawn pluralistic political trends that threaten the
regime's control.
East Berlin also pursues a political agenda of its own with
Bonn, and has shown renewed interest in it since the
postponement. It includes the following demands for greater
formal recognition from Bonn:
recognition of, or possibly only "respect" for East
German citizenship;
elevation of the two countries' diplomatic missions to
actual embassies;
realignment of the intra-German border from the east
shore to the center of the Elbe River; and
abolition of the Salzgitter data center--which
coordinates the monitoring of East German human rights
abuse (particularly in connection,with border control)
as if they were subject to West German criminal law.
East Germany's decision to pursue closer relations with Bonn
in the last 20 months, despite Soviet anxieties, probably was
encouraged by the unsettled leadership situation in Moscow.
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Honecker may have calculated that his margin for maneuver would
be greater during a period when the Soviet hierarchy was
preoccupied with internal politics.
the East Germans may have been receiving
mixed signals from Moscow. Honecker may have convinced some
elements of the Soviet leadership that better relations between
Bonn and East Berlin served Moscow's interest by driving wedges
between NATO allies and by gaining access to hard currency and
advanced technology. Whatever Honecker's strategy, it is now
clear he underestimated underlying Soviet opposition to his
plans.
West Germany's Objectives and Tactics
We believe the Kohl government's policy toward Eastern
Europe in general and East Germa-ny -in---par-tacular _ts motiva-t-ed by
four factors:
Domestic political considerations. Kohl is determined
to demonstrate to the West German electorate that his
government is willing and able to carry on a dialogue
with the East. His resolve increased during the period
leading up to INF deployments when his political
opponents charged that a decision to deploy would
destroy relations with the East. Since the Soviet Union
appears equally determined to remain ill-humored, 25X1
maintaining a dialogue with Eastern Europe takes on
greater importance in achieving this goal.
Promote intra-German reconciliation. It is also good
politics for any West German government to do what it
can to improve the living conditions of fellow Germans
in the East and to promote increased contacts. Although
reunification is not thought to be a realistic near term
goal, Kohl is worried about declining interest in
reunification among the young and believes that East-
West contacts and awareness of the national question
must be nurtured if reunification is to remain in the
German consciousness. 25X1
International considerations. Many West Germans believe
that promoting a network of political, cultural and
economic ties with the East will help ease East-West 25X1
tensions and encourage political change in the East.
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Economic benefits. Although the current commercial
relationship'with East Germany results in a net loss for
Bonn, the goodwill generated in the relationship could
open additional markets throughout Eastern Europe,
including East Germany. This prospect is politically
significant in view of the continuing high unemployment
The Kohl government is determined that nothing it does in
the intra-German field will lessen its commitment to the West.
Indeed, we believe that the government's intra-German policy--
combined with the negative Soviet reaction to it--has helped
deflect attention in West Germany away from the breach in the
longstanding consensus on security issues caused by INF
deployments. Bonn's high political stake in the intra-German
relationship raises the cost of breaking it off, however, and
increases the risk that it will eclipse or conflict with some
policy goals of higher priority to NATO Allies.
Security issues are likely to play a greater role in future
intra-German discussions. The East Germans clearly are pressing
for inclusion of security topics on the agenda--their talks with
the Social Democrats on 20-21 September led to a joint call for
intra-German negotiations on chemical-weapons-free zones in
Europe;-because they could then argue to Moscow that they are in
a position to woo West Germany away from NATO. In the wake of
the Honecker trip postponement, we believe it may well be more
difficult politically for Kohl to avoid discussing security
issues. The Social Democrats have increased their pressure in
this area, and we sense a growing belief in West German that
Bonn's acquiescence in such discussions would increase Honecker's
room for maneuver vis-a-vis Moscow. The Kohl government is
unlikely to, or does not intend to deviate from established NATO
positions--a factor which, from its perspective, makes it easier
to agree to discuss these issues. Still, the mere fact of its
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willingness to consider concepts such as non-use force and
nuclear free zones in an intra-German forum could give spore
public credibility to concepts opposed by the Alliance.
Elsewhere in the Bloc'
Like East Germany most of the other East European states are
concerned that Moscow's intransigence on European security issues
will undermine any hope for-improvement in East-West economic
relations. .Help from the West is needed now more than ever
because Moscow is conducting bilateral economic relations with
its CEMA allies on much tougher terms than it has in the past.
For these reasons the East European states were relieved when the
CEMA summit in June seemed to confirm the acceptance of continued
The relief was brief.. The 21, 27 July and 2 August Pravda
articles criticizing the latest German agreements reopened the
issue. Hungary, which has closer economic ties to the West than
any other East European state, came to East Berlin's defense with
three major press articles (28 July, 2 and 5 August) applauding
the constructive cooperation between the two Germanys. This
remarkable exchange was brought to a halt and replaced by what we
judge must have been a Moscow-coordinated Warsaw Pact media
campaign, including articles in the Hungarian press and an
interview of Honecker on 17 August, denouncing the evils of West
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Although the Honecker interview largely represented a
faithful rendition of the Soviet position on a host of issues, it
also had passages that reflected the continuing differences
between East Berlin and Moscow. Several times during the
interview Honecker stressed the need for a political dialogue on
disarmament issues and reminded his audience that East Germany is
striving to "limit the damage" between the two German states
caused by the stationing of missiles in the FRG. These remarks
were omitted from the Pravda replay of the interview, on 20 -
August. Indeed, Honecker's "limiting the damage" theme has not
played well in Moscow since it was first aired last November.
The Pr arda piece on 2 August, for example, took particular 25X1
exception to the idea that the two Germanys have a particular
mission to "limit the damage" caused by INF deployments.
We expect the East Europeans to continue to assert
themselves, particularly when they see an opportunity to increase 25X1
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economic ties with the West. Like Honecker, Bulgaria's Zhivkov
has postponed his September visit to West Germany, but Romania's
Ceausescu intends to visit Bonn in October as scheduled.
Hungarian party chief Kadar--who hosted Chancellor Kohl in June--
will travel to Paris in October. Arrangements have also been
made for a visit by West German Foreign Minister Genscher to
Poland in November. All of this enthusiasm for high level East-
West contact detracts from the atmosphere of heightened tension
in Europe that Moscow has tried to foster since INF deployment.
The View From Moscow
The Soviets are well aware that the lack of unity in their
alliance presents opportunities to the West, in the words of a
Central Committee official '"to estrange and Wrench the--soctal-i-s-t--
states away from the USSR_ and to try and change their
socioeconomic system." In a recent speech in Sofia, Party
Secretary Gorbachev underlined Moscow's particular concern about
differentiated Western policies that base rewards to East
European countries on the degree to which their foreign policy is
autonomous and independent of Moscow. Soviet officials have also
expressed displeasure over the tendency of some East European
states to express common "European" interests in dialogue and
cooperation that differ from those of both the United States and
Soviet anxiety over West German efforts to gain influence in
Eastern Europe is greatest where East Germany is concerned.
Despite a pervasive system of internal controls and a massive
Soviet troop presence, Moscow has always held lingering doubts
about what really happens when East and West Germany get
together. Such doubts can only have been heightened by East
Germany's open defense of its cooperation with Bonn and the
expressions by both Kohl and Honecker regarding a "community of
responsibility." From Moscow's perspective, a special
relationship between the two German states would not only allow
for a more independent East German policy, but could also form
the basis of a central European community of interests that would
include, those East European states (Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Romania) which for historical reasons have less to fear from
German revanchism.
In addition to these concerns, some Soviet leaders also
apparently believe that Honecker's cooperative attitude toward
Bonn is undermining their efforts to portray East-West relations
as having deteriorated dangerously, primarily as a result of
NATO's INF deployments. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
made clear last fall
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that he thought Honecker's warning of an "ice age" in intra-
German relations if Bonn continued to support US INF policy was
F_ I
the proper approach.
While the Soviet leadership undoubtedly is united on the
basic outline of policy toward Eastern Europe, there is
considerable evidence that it has been divided over how to handle
Honecker's planned visit to West Germany.
Despite critical media commentaries in late July and
early August, Soviet press play in the weeks prior to
the cancellation of the Honecker visit seemingly
fluctuated between harsher and more moderate treatment
of intra-German developments
In mid-August, the Soviet Charge to East Berlin spoke
optimistically to a US diplomat about the chances that
the visit would take place as scheduled, although only a
week earlier he claimed the visit was in jeopardy.
Preparations for the visit, including negotiations on a
joint communique, continued in Bonn and East Berlin
until the end of August. 25X1
Moscow's apparent uncertainty over the broader questions of
closer intra-German cooperation may, in part, be attributable to
differing bureaucratic and institutional perspectives among
Soviet officials concerned with intra-German and East-West
issues. Western diplomats and observers, for example, have noted
differences between Soviet officials with economic
responsibilities who seemingly support a pragmatic policy of
cooperation with the West, and more orthodox political hardliners
who appear to want more limited economic contacts in order to
convinc the West of the seriousness of the confrontational
atmosphere created by INF deployments.
There a so appear to be differences between po itica1
officials primarily concerned with Bloc relations, who tend to 25X1
give precedence to Bloc discipline and cohesion, and those
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officials whose main responsibility is Soviet relations with
2
Western Europe.
These variances appear to reflect the bias of middle level
officials charged with different resposibilities rather than a
serious disagreement at the top. Still the persistence of
apparently contradictory signals prior to Honecker's postponement
seems to indicate indecisiveness at the top that will add to the
uncertainty among Soviet and East European officials.
Outlook
The US Embassy in Berlin reports that an East German
specialist on international politics who acts as an adviser to
the SED recently said that Moscow has put "a cap on the pace
intra-German relations." -This strikes us as an appropriate
metaphor. There was an u-nmistakeable "enough is enough" tone to
the public scolding Moscow gave in July and early September, to
all those involved in promoting intra-German relations. Although
Honecker had to revise his judgment of how, far was too far, he
probabaly retains some freedom of action.
Even before the postponement, we did not expect any major
evolution in intra-German affairs during the remainder of 1984.
The Honecker visit to West Germany would have been projected and
perceived more as a historical first than a substantive visit.
Moscow clearly is not in a mood for additional humanitarian
concessions, and East Berlin has no pressing need for another
credit guarantee. Nevertheless, the politically. sensitive
negotiations toward a bilateral cultural agreement have
continued, and talks on a number of other issues are possible.
The two sides may sign an agreement later this year to clean up
the Werra River. Honecker also still seeks to preserve his room
for maneuver vis-a-vis Moscow by drawing Bonn into formal
discussion of security issues--or at least increasing domestic
pressure on Kohl to acquiesce in such discussions in the -
future.
Another credit for humanitarian concessions agreement
comparable to the 1983 and 1984 agreements seems unlikely in the
near future unless the signals from Moscow change. Even then,
Moscow may demand that Bonn be more accommodating on issues
relating to East German sovereignty. Although the West German
constitution prohibits the government from endorsing any
2 Articles by Deputy Central Committee Chairman for Bloc
relations Rakhmanin, for example, warn about the dangers of ties
to the West while comments by West European 'specialists like
Portugalov and Davydov often support East-West cooperation.
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agreement that confers recognition of East German sovereignty,
some of these issues can be finessed.
East Germany, meanwhile, will continue to search for areas
of accommodation with Bonn within whatever margins Moscow will
tolerate. East Berlin may also continue to pursue its national
priorities--while remaining a loyal member of the Warsaw Pact--in
less sensitive areas than intra-German relations. The
concurrence of views that exists in East Berlin, Budapest,
Bucharest, and Sofia may still give them the courage to lobby, as
they have in the past year, for changes they believe are
necessary for the vitality of the Bloc as a whole. If the
Soviets are completely insensitive to alternative views within
their alliance, it could add to the tensions within the Pact and
make the management of that alliance more difficult.
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SUBJECT: The German Question Revisited
Distribution: OUTSIDE ONLY
1 - J. F. Matlock, Jr., NSC
1 - D. R. Fortier, NSC
1 - R. W. Robinson, NSC
1 - D. Gregg, NSC
1 P. R. Sommer, NSC
1 - P. J. Dobrianksi, NSC
1 - T. Cobb, NSC
1'- J. Lenczowski, NSC
1 - R. Lilac, NSC
1 - F. C. Ikle, DoD
1 - R. N. Perle, DoD
1 - R. S. Lauder, DoD
1 - F. J. Gaffney, Jr. DoD
1 - J. R. Stanford, DoD
1- A. W. Marshall, DoD
1 - K. L. Adelman, ACDA
1 - H. Montgomery, State/INR
1 - H. Myers, State/INR
1 - J. T. Chain, State/PM
1 - R. Dean, State/PM
1 - J. Kornblum, State/EUR/CE
1 - T. M. Niles, State/EUR
1 - R. M. Palmer, State/EUR
1 - R. N. Haass, State/EUR
1 - J. R. Dobbins, State/EUR
1 - J. McLaughlin, State/EUR
1 - R. J. Bartek, State/PM
1 - R. R. Burt, State/EUR
1 - J. H. Kelly, State/EUR
1 - T. W. Simons, State/EUR/SOV
1 - J. Azrael, State/PP
1 - R. Baraz, State/INR
1 - R. E. Combs, Jr., State/EUR/EE
1 - D. Herspring, State/EUR/EE
1 - J. Dan 1 k, State/INR
1 - DIA
1 - DIA
1 - A. Armstrong, NFIB
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01100620001-3
SUBJECT: The German Question Revisited
Distribution: INSIDE ONLY
1 - DCI with attachments (sent)
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1 ; D/EURA without attachments (sent)
1 - C/EURA/EE
1 - SOVA
1 -
1 -
1 - PDB/Staff
1 - George Kolt, NIO/EUROPE
1 - Fritz Ermarth, NIO/USSR
1 - EURA/WE
1 - DC/EURA/EE
1 - C/EURA/EE/CE
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1 - C/EURA/EE/EW
1 - SOVA
1 - C/EURA/WE
1 - Production File
1 - EURA/EE/Chrono File
4 - CPAS/IMC/CB
2 - EURA/Production Staff
1 - EURA/EE/NE
1 - EURA/EE/NE
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01100620001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01100620001-3
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01100620001-3