THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001001750001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/03: CIA-RDP85T00287R001001750001-9
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Memorandum for:
The attached briefing paper was requested
by Ty Cobb, NSC. It covers the background and
prospects of the Italian Communist Party (PCI).
Distribution:
Orig - Ty Cobb, NSC
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - DDI Registry
1 - OD/EURA
2 - EURA/Production
4 - IMC/CB
1 - EURA/WE
EURA/WE/CM I(30March84)
EURA
Office of European Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence
'F(AM M-100(0~
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The Italian Communist Party
I. How Powerful are the Italian Communists?
The Italian Communist Party (PCI) is the largest Communist Party in
Western Europe. The parliamentary elections last June, which saw the gap
between the Christian Democrats and the PCI narrow to about 3 percentage
points in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate, has left the Communists
within striking distance of becoming the largest party in the country when the
next national election takes place. With 30 percent of the vote, it is the
second largest party in Italy.
-- PCI support is not limited to blue collar workers. It also draws
substantial support from the upper and middle classes.
-- The Communists have established a significant presence nearly
everywhere in Italy. They are strongest, however, in the urban
areas of the center and northwest of the country.
II. The Communist Position Today
The Christian Democrats lost more than 5 percentage points in the
elections last June, a landslide defeat by Italian standards.
-- The election results have made it mathematically possible for the
first time for the Communists and smaller parties to form a
government without the Christian Democrats.
-- This is not very likely at the moment because of the rivalry between
the Socialists and the Communists and the suspicion with which
Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer and Socialist leader Bettino
Craxi regard each other.
appear to be interested in the possibility of an arrangement with
the Communists. Some Communist and Christian Democratic politicians have
hinted publicly at interest in a possible deal, and
= there have been secret exploratory talks between left-wing Christian
Democrats and Communist leaders. The DC politicians presumably have in mind
something which would fall short of actual Communist participaton in the
government. They may view the so-called "historic compromise" of 1976-1979,
in which the Communists traded their support for Christian Democratic-led
governments for concessions on social and economic issues, as a possible
mode 1.
The prospects for a deal between the Christian Democrats and the
Communists in the near future also appear remote.
-- Left-wing Christian Democrats know that. this could cause a split
with anti-Communist factions within their party.
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-- Communist leader Berlinguer could also have trouble selling a deal
-- many Communists feel they were double-crossed and put off with
promises during the period of the "historic compromise."
Nevertheless, the prospect of a deal between the Christian Democrats and
the Communists cannot be totally disregarded. Many Christian Democrats and
Communists can agree on one thing -- their dislike for Socialist leader Craxi.
-- He is in many ways a more dangerous political rival to both parties
than they are to each other because his party is in a position to
siphon off support from both the Communists and the DC
III. Origins of Communist Strength
The Communists owe their pivotal position on the Italian political scene
to historical and socio-economic factors.
-- They established their credentials as patriots through their leading
role in the underground resistance to Mussolini and the German
occupation. Unlike the situation of the British or American
Communists, they are not generally seen as the agents of an alien
power.
-- As the preeminent party of opposition, they have been able to
establish themselves as the spokesman of the discontented and have- 25X1
nots in postwar Italy. Their supporters include industrial workers
and unemployed or underemployed university graduates, as well as
those repelled by the corruption of the Italian political system.
The Communists have made the most of these advantages through strong
organization and good leadership.
-- They have buttressed their reputation as patriotic Italians by
distancing themselves from the Soviets -- condemning, for example,
Soviet abuses of human rights, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and
the military coup d'etat in Poland.
-- They have established themselves as "democrats" and "responsible"
participants in the political system -- rather than enemies of
democracy -- by building a long record of responsible participation
in Parliament and opposition to political terrorism.
IV. Changes in Italian Communism
The evidence suggests that in addition to taking advantage of the system,
the Italian Communists to some extent have been coopted by it.
-- The public record) )indicates that
there are no-responsible leaders the who think
seriously of;establishing Communist rule or a one-party state in
Italy.
Lingering hopes.of this kind appear to have been dispelled by the fall of the
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Allende government in Chile in 1973. Leaders drew the conclusion that there
was no hope for a Communist government to survive in a Western country unless
it was supported by an overwhelming majority of the population -- not a
realistic possibility in Italy.
The evidence indicates in fact that the domestic political tactics of the
Communists are not too dissimilar from those of the other Italian parties.
Their major goal is to win representation in the government through the
control of one or more ministries. They would hope to use this not only to
pursue programmatic goals, but also as evidence of "respectability" to enhance
their appeal at the polls.
Under the circumstances in which they would be likely to share in
power -- as part of a multi-party coalition -- they would be
compelled to behave like the other parties, compromising on one
point to secure concessions on another.
V. Communist Internal Problems
Moreover, the successes of Italian communism have not come free of
cost. Traditional Communist voters have not been able to accept the party's
willingness to support centrist governments and austerity measures that hit
workers the hardest.
Although the Communists held steady in the last elections, they have
slipped more than 4 percentage points from the high reached in 1976.
The party's drift toward compromise with the "bourgeois" parties and
its dropoff in the polls have strengthened a trend toward
factionalism within the party leadership. At least five factions,
ranging from old-line Stalinists to Social-Democrats can be
identified.
Although the prominence of moderates in the party leadership makes the
Communists more acceptable partners to the other Italian parties, their
internal divisions also rob them of much of the organizational advantage they
have enjoyed in the past.
VI. Significance for the United States.
The relatively modest goals and internal problems of the Communists does
not mean that their participation in government would be a matter of
indifference to the United States. Although no puppets of the Soviet Union,
few Italian Communist leaders are disposed toward friendship with the United
States. There is little reason to doubt that once in government, they would
attempt to nudge Italy in the direction of a more neutralist stance.
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