CENTRAL AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000901470001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 28, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Ca*M n 8dtce AAncy
28 August 1984
SUBJECT: Central American Neqotiations
OVERVIEW
The environment surrounding the various multilateral and
bilateral negotiations in Central America appears conducive to at
least some movement toward partial settlements and bilateral
agreements. The Sandinistas will try to play this to their
advantage to reach accords on security matters while avoiding a
binding regional pact that would include agreements on arms
control and democratic practices.
The Contadora countries--Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and
Panama--appear increasingly concerned that US military
involvement in Central America will escalate in the months ahead
and are pressing the Central Americans for a settlement soon.
-- In their rush for an agreement, the Contadora countries
are increasingly likely to push for a partial settlement.
-- Nicaragua could add to such pressures by making some new
concessions and endorsing many of the Contadora July
proposals.
Other negotiations that are now under way could introduce
further complications for the Contadora talks and US regional
interests.
-- Nicaragua probably is pushing for a border agreement with
Costa Rica in the French-sponsored talks, and San Jose may
be receptive.
-- The European foreign ministers are likely to at least
implicitly endorse even partial settlements such as those
contained in a Contadora draft treaty.
The US-Nicaragua talks are not presently having a major
impact on the Core Four governments of El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Costa Rica, but the initiation of these bilateral
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talks probably led the Central Americans to perceive themselves
freer to explore bilateral agreements with Managua.
Despite the various pressures for quick agreement and
partial settlements, the contending parties remain far apart on
the most sensitive issues. A comprehensive regional accord seems
unlikely before the end of the year and the various exploratory
bilateral talks could deadend as a result of a variety of
incidents. Nonetheless, neither the Contadora nations nor the
Central Americans can abandon regional talks without incurring
unacceptable political costs. The next several months will
likely see all sides advancing a series of counterproposals.
The Contadora Perspective
The four Contadora mediators--Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia,
and Panama--have attempted to accelerate the pace of negotiations
since July when they formulated a draft agreement. The Contadora
countries seem to be tiring of the negotiating process, and
probably are acutely aware that their prestige is tied to
obtaining results. The mediators probably are also motivated by
a fear that US military involvement in the region will escalate
in the months ahead.
The Contadora group has attempted to pressure the Central
Americans by portraying this week's meetinq in Panama of the nine
vice foreign ministers as a "last phase of refinement and
perfection" of a draft agreement. They probably intend to issue
a revised draft after the?meetinq. According to US Embassy
reporting, the Core Four believes, however, that the draft
contains serious defects and that the mediators are protecting
the Sandinistas from direct negotiations on the most sensitive
political and military issues.
In their rush to achieve a settlement, all of the Contadora
sponsors seem willing to support a treaty that falls well short
of addressing concerns of the United States and pro-US
governments in the region. For example, the present draft
already suggests that negotiations on arms control he deferred to
a later stage. If the Contadora group fails to obtain a Central
American agreement soon, it may increasingly resort to proposals
for a partial settlement.
Mexico has been Nicaragua's firmest supporter within the
Contadora group, and it is likely to continue in that role
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despite some recent signs of a Mexican policy shift toward more
evenhandedness. We believe President de la Madrid remains
sympathetic to the revolutionary aspirations of the Sandinistas
and will defend their interests in the negotiations even while
privately counseling Managua to be somewhat more flexible.
Although Venezuela and Colombia over time have served as
counterweights to Mexico's pro-Sandinista tilt within the
Contadora group, both countries now seem committed to rapidly
finalizing a peace treaty. The Contadora process is a keystone
of Colombia's foreign policy, and a role in producing a regional
peace treaty would solidify President Betancur's coveted image as
the hemisphere's foremost peace broker. Venezuela's Lusinchi is
privately more skeptical of Contadora's potential, but he
probably reasons that by making a concerted push, his
administration can escape blame if the process collapses.
Lusinchi reiterated to the US Ambassador in early August his
distrust for Sandinista electoral promises, hut we doubt that the
Venezuelans would risk isolation within the Contadora group by,
for example, trying to toughen the sections of the draft treaty
that deal with internal democratization.
Panama has had a minor role in the Contadora qroup, and its
perspective has generally been favorable to Nicaragua. The
Panamanians are trying to protect their nonaligned credentials
while defusing possible domestic criticism from the left. They
are unlikely to become more sympathetic to Core Four concerns
even after President-elect Barletta takes office in October.
Core Four Position
The Core Four have not strongly stated their problems with
the Contadora draft publicly for fear of being perceived as
obstacles to an agreement. Nevertheless, despite slightly
differing emphases, Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica agree
that:
-- The proposed agreement is too weak on democratization and
verification issues.
-- Any agreement should he adopted as a formal treaty.
-- A partial agreement, particularly one that postpones an
arms control accord, is to be opposed.
Honduras and El Salvador are likely to lead opposition to
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Contadora proposals for an immediate withdrawal of foreign
military advisers.
While the US regional allies agree on most points, they are
not completely unified and have had difficulties in coordinating
their positions in the past. Guatemala has preferred to sit on
the sidelines, and did not take part in formulating a counter
proposal to the Contadora draft agreement last fall. In
addition, the US Embassy believes that El Salvador may not be as
willing as other countries to accept arms control proposals, and
Honduran-Salvadoran rivalries may cause some problems when
detailed negotiations are begun on an acceptable military
balance.
Nicaragua's Views
The Sandinistas probably have few hopes that regional
negotiations can resolve their problems with their neighbors at
an acceptable cost.
Ithe present
'ontaaora ara t provisions on democracy are not particularly
onerous--except for the provision for dialogue with the
insurgents--and the Sandinistas will be more likely to accept
them once their election is safely behind them. The Sandinistas
probably will pursue the tactic of pushing for immediate
agreements in areas where there is consensus--such as ending aid
to insurgent groups--while deferring difficult issues for
later.
Parallel Negotiations
Three sets of other negotiations--Costa Rica-Nicaragua and
US-Nicaragua bilateral talks, and the 28-29 September meeting of
EEC foreign ministers in San Jose--have been billed as
complementary to the Contadora talks. Each of these can
introduce additional complications for Contadora and US regional
interests.
Costa Rica-Nicaragua Border Talks. Costa Rican and
Nicaraguan representatives met in Paris in mid-July to discuss a
French-proposed demilitarized zone alonq their border. The Costa
Ricans have told US officials that they do not expect an
agreement to be reached. Nevertheless, recent Costa Rican
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efforts to rebuild ties to Europe to counter the impression that
San Jose is under excessive US influence indicate that President
Monge may be willing to reach a settlement outside of the
regional talks. Such a bilateral accord would disrupt Core Four
unity and accelerate pressures on the Hondurans to conclude a
similar agreement separate from the regional negotiations.
Nicaragua has renewed its call for joint border patrols with
Honduras, pointing to the Costa Rican example.
The Costa Ricans have told US officials that the Sandinistas
appeared disinterested at the Paris talks, which we doubt. It
would serve Nicaraguan interests to press for an agreement before
the September EEC meeting to prove that Managua can he
reasonable.
US-Nicaragua Talks. President Lusinchi, speaking for the
Contadora group, told the US Embassy in July that the mediators
believe the bilateral talks will strengthen regional
negotiations. The Core Four governments have registered their
acceptance of US reassurances that the talks will not undermine
their positions at Contadora, but there are lingering doubts.
These concerns have thus far not appeared to have induced the
Central Americans to compromise for fear of being betrayed.
Nevertheless, we believe that chances for a preemptive bilateral
accomodation with the Sandinistas--especially by San Jose--have
been increased somewhat since the US-Nicaragua talks began.
Nicaragua has consistently maintained that direct
negotiations with the United States are necessary, and it may
play for.time in the regional forum to see what it can obtain in
the bilateral talks. The Sandinistas have already attempted to
exploit the negotiations to induce Honduras to begin bilateral
talks with them. According to Honduran officials, Managua has
attempted to incite fears that agreements of direct concern to
Honduras would be concluded with the US without benefit of
Honduran participation.
EEC Foreign Ministers Meeting. The meeting will concentrate
on outlining future European economic assistance to the region,
which will include Nicaragua. The Europeans are likely to take a
stand which supports the Contadora process, and thus indirectly
endorses the latest Contadora draft. Similarly, the EEC probably
will register approval of the provision in the draft which allows
outside states to signify formally their cooperation and support.
The joint communique Probably will reaffirm in general terms
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the need to establish democratic conditions and strictly observe
human rights. Some of the ministers, however, might use
individual meetings with the Sandinistas to pressure them to open
up their electoral process.
Outlook
Despite the likelihood of continuinq Contadora pressures for
an agreement, the parties remain far apart and are unlikely to
reach a comprehensive regional accord before the end of the
year. The Contadora mediators probably will attempt to maintain
control of the process by introducinq new proposals to bridge the
gap between Nicaragua and the Core Four. Their intercession may
result in proposals to sign a partial agreement in areas where
there is now consensus, and pressures may accelerate to conclude
bilateral border settlements.
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