AFRICA: PROSPECTS FOR THE OAU

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000901240001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 13, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
13 May 1984
AFRICA: Prospects for the OAU
Summary
I?A
The death of President Toure of Guinea and the subsequent
military coup in that country have clouded the already
uncertain outlook for the OAU by reopening the potentially
divisive issues of the timing and venue of the organization's
next summit and the choice of its next chairman. Toure was to
have hosted the annual OAU summit this month and thus to have
become the organization's chairman for the coming year.
We believe an attempt to hold a summit in the fall is
likely, probably at the OAU's permanent headquarters in Addis
Ababa. Wherever the summit is held, OAU members will probably
replace the current chairman, Ethiopian leader Mengistu. If a
moderate, pro-Western African leader is selected, that wou l d
invite Libyan opposition and further divisions within the
organization. If the OAU chooses as chairman a more
independent man with broader acceptability--such as Tanzania's
Nyerere, Zimbabwe's Mugabe, or Zambia's Kaunda--he would try to
lead the organization along a nonaligned course. Any of these
This memorandum was requested by Frederick L. Wettering, Director, African
Affairs, National Security Council. It was prepared by
the Regional Issues Branch, Africa Division, Office of African and
Latin American Analysis. It has been coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Questions and comments are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, Africa Division, ALA,
GALA M 84-10048
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three would give high priority to southern African issues and
would not hesitate to criticize US policies, although we
believe that Kaunda would be more susceptible to US influence
than Nyerere or Mugabe.
US interests in Africa would not be served if the summit
is cancelled this year, which would result in Mengistu staying
on as the OAU chairman. During Mengistu's term, the
organization has made little serious effort to resolve the
Western Sahara and Chad disputes and has ignored Libyan
adventurism. In a worst case scenario, the organization could
split formally into rival moderate and radical groups, leading
to further polarization in Africa and encouraging increased
Libyan and Soviet meddling.
The OAU: Problems and Discord
The death of Guinean President Toure in April and the subsequent
military coup in Guinea have muddled the already uncertain outlook for the
OAU by reopening the potentially divisive issues of who should next lead
the organization and the timing and venue of the next OAU summit. Toure
was to have hosted a summit in Conakry this month and to have become the
We believe Toure's death has left the moderate, pro-Western OAU
states in disarray, giving the more radical states more room for
maneuver.* Toure was a forceful personality and had stature as an elder
statesman in Africa. He led the moderate group that blocked Libyan leader
Qadhafi from becoming OAU chairman two years ago. We believe few pro-
Western African leaders are as willing as Toure was to stand up to Qadhafi
*Although the terms "moderate" and "radical" are commonly used to describe
the split in the OAU, few African countries fall rigidly into one camp or
the other. Most African leaders are pragmatic and decide what position to
take on issues on a case by case basis. Zambian President Kaunda, for
example, has supported the United States on southern African matters but
is allied with Algeria and the "radicals" on the Western Sahara
question.
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The rift between the moderates and the radicals has been widened in
recent years by deep divisions over the Western Sahara dispute and Chad.
Two attempts to achieve a quorum for a summit in Tripoli in 1982 failed
because of Qadhafi's heavy-handed favoritism toward the Polisario Front
and his antipathy for Chadian leader Habre. The Western Sahara
controversy delayed and nearly prevented the summit last year in Addis
Ababa until a compromise enabled a quorum to be reached and Ethiopian
leader Mengistu to become chairman.
We believe the OAU's disarray has been exacerbated by eroding African
confidence in the organization's leadership. Many heads of state have
virtually given up on Mengistu's ability to promote reconciliation among
Chad's rival factions, according to US Embassy reporting. Moreover,
dealing with seemingly intractable pan-African politics is a time-
consuming distraction from the domestic concerns that take priority for
almost all African leaders.
Choosing a Chairman
The OAU's pressing need to agree on a summit site and a chairman is
complicated by the lack of specific rules governing the process. The
choice is normally made by consensus after informal negotiations and
without any voting. The host of a OAU summit usually becomes chairman
until the next annual summit, but there have been a number of exceptions:
-- Kenyan President Moi served a two-year term as chairman
(1981-83) because of the failure to reach a quorum at Tripoli
in 1982.
-- When Liberian President Tolbert was killed in 1980 during a
military coup while he was serving as OAU chairman,
Senegalese President Senghor was chosen to fill out the
remainder of Tolbert's term rather than Tolbert's successor,
Head of State Doe.
-- Several summits have been held at the OAU's permanent
headquarters in Addis Ababa, with an OAU chairman being
chosen from among the organization's members.
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The chairmanship formerly was a much-sought-after plum owing to the
prestige attached to hosting the summit and to speaking for Africa, but in
recent years few African leaders have been eager to assume the role. The
duties of the OAU chairman are now viewed as costly extravagances by
African leaders, almost all of whom are facing serious economic
difficulties. Reporting from US Embassies in Africa indicates that there
is some sentiment for holding all future summits in Addis Ababa to reduce
their cost. In that case, we assume the chairmanship would continue to
rotate among the various member states. 25X1
Controversial Issues
The Western Sahara dispute is the OAU's most contentious problem.
The controversy was aggravated by a decision at a Council of Ministers
meeting in 1982 by then OAU Secretary General Kodjo, a Togolese, to seat
the self-proclaimed government of the Polisario Front, the Saharan
Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR), as the organization's 51st member.
Although a majority of the other 50 African states have granted
recognition to the SDAR, Morocco and its allies were able to prevent
seating of the SDAR at the abortive meeting in Tripoli in 1982 by
mustering enough opposition to block a quorum of the two-thirds of the OAU
membership that is needed to convene a summit. The 1983 meeting in Addis
Ababa proceeded only after the Polisario Front'ssuDDorters backed down
and persuaded the SDAR to withdraw voluntarily.
Reporting from US Embassies in Africa indicates that Morocco's tough
stand against negotiating a solution to the Western Sahara dispute is
costing Rabat support in the OAU and could threaten its ability to
continue blocking the seating of the SDAR. Last year's summit in Addis
Ababa passed a resolution that called for direct negotiations between
Morocco and the Polisario, a ceasefire and referendum under UN and OAU
auspices on self-determination in the disputed territory, and a
peacekeeping force provided by the UN and the OAU. The Algerians, in our
view, might be willing to avoid another crisis over the issue of seating
the SDAR by inducing their Polisario client to stay away from a summit.
Chad is another divisive issue. The OAU has gone through the motions
of trying to promote a settlement since French intervention last summer
led to a military stalemate. An OAU reconciliation conference on Chad in
January in Addis Ababa collapsed over procedural matters because of
Mengistu's bias against Chadian President Habre. We do not expect the
question of Chad to cause a major rift at the next OAU summit, however,
because most members want to avoid splitting the organization over the
The African states are also divided over the question of relations
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with Israel and the Middle East. During the 1970s, when many
impoverished African nations were seeking to curry favor with Arab oil
producers, denunciations of Israel were standard OAU fare. Now, Zaire and
Liberia have restored diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv, and some other black
African states, according to US Embassies in Africa, are disillusioned
over the paucity of Arab economic aid. In our view, many Africans are
coming to regard as a one way street the old arrangement under which they
supported the Arab cause in the Middle East in return for Arab support
against South Africa. The summit meeting in Addis Ababa last year did not
pass a resolution denouncing Israel, and we do not expect Middle Eastern
issues to play a significant role at the next OAU summit.
Even such traditionally unifying issues within the OAU as southern
Africa, however, are becoming divisive. African leaders still unanimously
coffin emn South Africa's racial policies and support the goal of liberating
South Africa and Namibia, but they vary widely in their attitudes toward
the security agreements that Mozambique and Angola have recently
concluded with South Africa,
There are significant differences even among southern Africa's Frontlin
States
Summit Options: Where, When, and Who
OAU members are maneuvering behind the scenes to influence the choice
of the next chairman and the time and place of the next summit. Although
the new leaders in Guinea have expressed a willingness to host the
meeting, their recent statements suggest that they would prefer a change
in venue. In our view, the most likely time for a summit will be sometime
after September; by then, members will have had time to lay out plans and
current Chairman Mengistu will not be distracted by preparations for the
10th anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution on 12 September.
We believe that an attempt to hold a summit in Addis Ababa this fall
is most likely but that an African leader other than Mengistu will
probably be selected as the next chairman. There is no precedent for a
chairman gaining the endorsement of a summit for a second consecutive
term. Moreover, the US Embassy in Addis Ababa believes Mengistu is eager
to unburden himself of the chairmanship. In addition, many African states
are disappointed with Mengistu's performance as chairman--particularly by
his failure last fall to address the UN General Assembly on behalf of
Africa and his more recent decision to visit the Soviet Union instead of
attending Toure's funeral.
Although Libya and some other radical states might try to prolong
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Mengistu's tenure as chairman by delaying a summit for as long as
possible, we doubt that Qadhafi will renew his own bid for the
chairmanship. Qadhafi remains in disfavor among many OAU members because
of his intemperate performances at the abortive meetings in Tripoli in
1982 and his walkout from the summit in Addis Ababa last year. We believe
that Qadhafi realizes it would still be difficult for him to get a quorum
and would want to avoid further humiliation.
The leaders of Gabon and Togo are being promoted by some moderate
West and Central African states as candidates for the OAU chairmanship.
US Embassy reporting indicates tat
Bongo and vor an President oup oue Boigny are urging Togolese President 25X1
Eyadema to declare his candidacy. Gabon might be an attractive
alternative because it is stable and prosperous and could take on the
burden of hosting a summit more easily than most other states in the
region. President Bongo, however, is reluctant to become involved in
disputes between moderate and radical OAU states that might invite Libyan
interference. The US Embassy in Lome believes Eyadema would be willing to
serve as host and chairman but doubts he would lead a campaign to do so;
Togo has the facilities to host a summit. 25X1
Other African leaders are seriously considering the leaders of
Tanzania and Zimbabwe for the OAU chairmanship as compromise choices that 25X1
would be acceptable to both moderates and radicals
yerere, uga e, 25X1
and possibly also Kaunda have the stature to play such a role, even though
serious economic problems would probably prevent them from holding the OAU
summit in their own countries. Nyerere and Kaunda helped mediate between
the radicals and moderates to assure a quorum at the summit in 1983. They
were also considered as possible candidates for the chairmanship then,
according to the US Embassy in Addis Ababa. 25X1
Outlook and Implications for the United States
US interests in Africa would not be served if the summit is cancelled
this year, which would result in Mengistu staying on indefinitely as OAU
chairman. In our view, Mengistu's favoritism toward the Polisario and
anti-Habre Chadians would continue to undermine the ability of the OAU to
contribute to a solution in the Western Sahara and Chad. Moreover, the
OAU under Men istu would continue to turn a blind eye to Libyan
adventurism. 25X1
Despite the OAU's problems, we expect a majority of the
organization's members will try to hold a summit later this year. Most
Africans still view the OAU--for all its faults--as a symbol of the
continent's interests and aspirations. Probably all of its members want
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to see the organization survive as at least a potentially useful forum for
settling disputes and for articulating collective African positions on
issues.
While Eyadema or Bongo as OAU chairman would share US political,
economic, and security concerns for the continent, their strong pro-
Western orientation would invite active Libyan opposition and further
divisions within the OAU. We doubt that much real progress on the Western
Sahara and Chad would be possible under their leadership. According to US
Embassy reporting, both Eyadema and Bongo fear Libyan subversion against
their own countries and might prove more accommodating to Qadhafi than
would serve US interests.
The prospect of Mugabe, Nyerere, or Kaunda as OAU chairman would also
be a mixed blessing for the United States. On the positive side, any of
the three would increase OAU unity and effectiveness simply by being more
acceptable to a broad consensus of OAU members than the others discussed
above. In addition, none of them is beholden to Qadhafi. On the other
hand, none of the three would be hesitant to speak out critically about US
African policies, although we believe Kaunda would be more susceptible to
US influence than Mugabe or Nyerere. As OAU chairman, any of the three
probably would try to steer the organization along a nonaligned course.
Mugabe, Nyerere, or Kaunda probably would also give lower priority to the
Western Sahara and Chad and higher priority to southern African issues.
In a worst case scenario, the OAU could split formally into rival
moderate and radical groups. The resulting polarization in Africa and the
absence of a single forum for dealing with African problems would give
further encouragement to Qadhafi's and Moscow's meddling on the
continent.
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SUBJECT: AFRICA: Prospects for the OAU
Distribution:
Original - Frederick L. Wettering, Director, African Affairs,
National Security Council
1 - Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs, Department of State
1 - Ambassador Frank G. Wisner, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs, Department of State
1 - Ambassador James K. Bishop, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for African Affairs, Department of State
1 - Princeton Lyman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs, Department of State
1 - Robert Cabelly, Special Assistant to the Assistant
Secretary of State for Africa, Department of State'
1 - Peter Lande, Director, Economic Policy Staff,
Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
1 - Pierre Shostal, Director, Office of Central African
Affairs (AF/C), Department of State
1 - Richard W. Bogosian, Director, Office of East African
Affairs, (AF/E), Department of State
1 - Daniel H. Simpson, Director, Office of Southern
African Affairs (AF/S), Department of State
1 - Edward J. Perkins, Director, Office of West African
Affairs (AF/W), Department of State
1 - Randall Lecocq, Ethiopian Desk Officer, Bureau of
African Affairs (AF/E), Department of State
1 - Jeffrey S. Davidow, Director, Inter-African Affairs,
(AF/I), Department of State
1 - John Vincent, Deputy Director, Inter-African Affairs
(AF/I), Department of State
1 - Rear Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, USN, Director,
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM),
Department of State
1 - Gregory J. Newell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of International Organization Affairs (10),
Department of State
1 - Tony Dalsimer, Director-Designate, Office of Analysis
for Africa, INR (INR/AA), Department of State
1 - Leonardo Neher, Director, Office of Analysis for
Africa, INR, (INR/AA), Department of State
1 - Martin Lowenkopf, Deputy Director, Office of Analysis
for Africa, INR (INR/AA), Department of State
1 - Noel Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of'
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Defense, ISA, Department of Defense
1 - Peter Spicer, Defense Intelligence Officer for Africa
(DIO/AF). Defense Intelligence Aaencv
DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Executive Director
1 - SA/DCI/IA
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - DDO/Africa
1 - NIO for Africa
1 - NIC Action Group
1 - PDB Staff
1 - ILS
1 - C/DDI/PES
1 - D/ALA
1 - D/NESA
1 - D/SOVA
1 - D/OCR
1 - D/OGI
1 - ALA/PS
1 - ALA Research Director
4 - OCPAS/IMD/CB
5 - ALA/AF
2 - AF/RI
4 - ALA/RI
ALA/AFI I(13 May 1984)
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