ETHIOPIA-SUDAN: TENSIONS RISE OVER DISSIDENT ACTIVITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000901070001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 5, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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ETHIOPIA-SUDAN: Tensions Rise Over Dissident Activity
Summary
Tension between Sudan and Ethiopia has steadily heightened
in recent months because of the increasingly effective military
operations of dissidents based near their mutual border.
Ethiopian- and Libyan-backed dissident groups have recently
expanded operations by attacking military garrisons and vital
economic projects in southern Sudan. Addis Ababa, on the other
hand, holds Khartoum responsible for the increased military
activity of Sudanese-based Eritrean and Tigrean insurgents
against Ethiopian targets in the border provinces. The
situation has been further enflamed by strident propaganda in
the national media of both countries and the sacking of the
Ethiopian consulate at Kassala in retaliation for an attack on
the Sudanese consulate at Cambela.
Mutual suspicions between Ethiopia and Sudan run deep and,
despite initiatives by outside parties such as Egypt to defuse
Central Intelligence Agency
African Affairs, National Security Council. It was prepared by
This memorandum was requested by Frederick L. Wettering, Director of
Horn of Africa Branch, Office of African and Latin American
Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division
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the situation, we believe both countries will continue their
efforts to destabilize the other. These efforts are
facilitated by the refusal or inability to date of both
Sudanese President Nimeiri and Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu to
deal with the root causes of their problems in the
region--unworkable domestic policies which would generate
widespread dissidence independent of external subversion.
Libya's willingness to fund and arm the Sudanese rebels will
make it easy for Mengistu to keep his hand in the volatile
game, and Khartoum will find it difficult to counter this
activity because of its weak political and military posture.
Both governments will in all likelihood remain careful to avoid
direct military confrontations--although minor border clashes
could occur--because neither has the resources to sustain a
major conflict at this time.
Sudan and The Eritreans
The major Eritrean insurgent group and several minor Eritrean
movements have offices in Khartoum. They openly propagandize and recruit
among the large Eritrean community in both the capital and refugee camps
along the Sudanese side of the border.
Arab supporters for years have shipped weapons and other material into
Port Sudan where it is received by the dissidents and moved across the
Ethiopian border along an intricate logistical pipeline. Although Sudan
itself provides little direct military support to the insurgents in
northern Ethiopia, it has long permitted this dissident use of Sudane
territory both as a base of operations and as a logistical corridor.
We believe Sudanese involvement with the Eritreans and other
Ethiopian dissident groups has been driven by three primary, and at times
overlapping, motivations:
-- Tying down the Ethiopian military in Eritrea, thereby preventing
its use against Sudan.
-- Providing assistance to Eritrean Muslims against a
Christian-dominated Marxist regime.
-- Using support to the Eritreans as a bargaining chip to pressure
Ethiopia into ending its support to Sudanese dissidents.
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In their comments to US officials, Nimeiri and other senior Sudanese
have made plain their belief that the Soviet Union is attempting to use
Ethiopia to overthrow their government and install a Marxist regime.
Thus, they see the insurgencies in Ethiopia, as serving a useful purpose by
tying down substantial numbers of troops that could otherwise apply
serious pressure along the frontier. We believe Khartoum views its role
in providing assistance to the northern Ethiopian dissidents as a key
element in hindering Moscow's plans to dominate the Red Sea area.
Khartoum has been frustrated, on the other hand, in its attempts to
act as a middle-man to pressure the Eritrean factions into unifying.
Historically, the dissidents have refused to live up to proposed merger
agreements and, more importantly, Khartoum has been unable to force its
writ upon the major Eritrean faction, the Marxist-dominated Eritrean
Khartoum has also been ineffective in attempting to use its support
for the Eritreans as a source of leverage over Addis Ababa. Embassy
analysis suggests that this is due, at least in part, to a serious split
within the Sudanese government between the Foreign Ministry, which favors
negotiations and concessions; and the security service, which wants to
adopt a hard-line approach toward Addis Ababa. Embassy reporting
indicates that Nimeiri often wavers in deciding which position to adopt.
Thus, while threatening to "unleash" the Eritreans and other northern
dissidents by supplying increased amounts of arms and funds, the Sudanese
only took this step briefly in 1976, when Ethiopia was much weaker
politically and militarily. Although willing to extend limited
assistance, we believe Nimeiri sees little to be gained in providing
substantial military aid to the EPLF, fearing a more forceful Ethiopian
response and viewing a Marxist-dominated independent Eritrea as little
improvement over his present situation. Khartoum probably is also aware
that stepped-up assistance to other Eritrean groups would be of limited
effectiveness because these factions--the losers in bloody struggles with
the EPLF--have little support remaining within the Drovince and too few
troops to absorb an influx of additional weapons.
1 This movement has long been ignored or opposed by the Arab states
because its members are primarily Christian and strongly committed to
Marxist ideals. As a result, the Arabs have little leverage or influence
on the EPLF, which obtains most of its weapons through the arms market or
captured Ethiopian stocks.
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In addition to keeping fresh his dissident option, Nimeiri has
embarked since 1980 upon a program of seeking both a rapprochement with
the Mengistu government and a settlement between the Eritreans and Addis
Ababa. He apparently believes this approach can lessen Soviet influence
in Ethiopia by eliminating the need for substantial arms deliveries and
the Soviet military advisory role. Nimeiri, however, has had little
success in either venture because of the Ethiopian government's suspicions
of his motives and its refusal to make realistic concessions to the
Eritreans.
On several occasions in recent years, the Nimeiri government has
attempted to restrict the activity of the Eritreans for short periods in
an effort to appease Addis Ababa. Even at these times, however, the
Sudanese military lacked the manpower and other resources to seal the
border and the Eritreans, in particular, easily circumvented these efforts
to interfere with their logistical flow or political operations. In
addition, many of the Arab countries--such as Saudi Arabia--supporting
Eritrean factions provide important assistance to Nimeiri, and he runs the
risk of their displeasure if he clamps down on the insurgents too hard.
The Ethiopian Reaction. Addis Ababa, on numerous occasions, has
protested the use of Sudanese territory for propaganda, recruitment, and
logistical purposes by the dissidents, especially the Eritreans, and has
demanded the expulsion of dissident leaders from Sudan. It has publicly
and through diplomatic contacts portrayed the Nimeiri regime's support for
the Eritrean rebels as a direct Sudanese effort to subvert the Ethiopian
government and its failure to rein in the Eritreans and other northern
dissidents as a reflection of Sudanese duplicity.
We believe the Ethiopian leadership is convinced that its inability
to defeat the Eritreans and to halt the expanding Tigrean insurgency is
the direct result of Sudanese aid to the insurgents. Moreover, the
Ethiopian government almost certainly sees a link between the growth in
the military capabilities of the Eritrean rebels and the expansion of the
US role in Sudan; Addis Ababa views the United States as the main threat
to its Marxist revolution and the driving force behind efforts.to subvert
it. The Mengistu regime, in our view, looks on Sudan and Somalia,
Ethiopia's other major enemy, as surrogates for US policy in the region.
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J L V IN L 1
Ethiopia, Libya, and the Sudanese Insurgents
Ethiopia has cooperated with Libya since the mid-1970s in providing
assistance to Sudanese dissidents who operate out of Ethiopia. The degree
of Addis Ababa's involvement has fluctuated over the years, however
The
Ethiopians primarily provide advisers, logistical support, and training
facilities for the estimated 2,000-2,500 dissidents now in Ethiopia. We
believe Addis Ababa seeks to keep a low profile in this activity because
it is sensitive to its image in Africa.
The signing in 1981 of the Aden Pact between Libya, Ethiopia, and
South Yemen gave Addis Ababa an added incentive for cooperating in efforts
to overthrow the Nimeiri regime.
Qadhafi agreed to provide Ethiopia with over $800
million in badly needed economic assistance--approximately $340 million of
which has already been delivered--in return for expanding its cooperation
against Sudan and Somalia and other pro-Western regimes in the region.
The prospects of this financial assistance, in return for very little from
Addis Ababa, apparently struck a responsive chord in an Ethiopian
leadership faced with continuing economic problems.
We believe Qadhafi has been careful to fulfill his economic pledges
to the Ethiopians, as well as to provide some military aid directly to
Addis Ababa, because of the high priority he assigns to overthrowing
Nimeiri. We further believe that his performance thus far has alleviated
some of the mistrust toward Libya felt by Mengistu and other senior
Ethiopian officials who have seen Qadhafi renege on previous assistance
agreements.
The upsurge of domestic unrest over economic, political, and
religious issues that began in southern Sudan last year created the
opportunity for Tripoli and Addis Ababa to press their effort to overthrow
the Nimeiri regime. Nimeiri's decision in Spring 1983 to dissolve the
regional government in the south and create three separate administrative
regions, the Army mutiny and subsequent harsh crackdown by the central
government that were consequences of Nimeiri's attempt to move southern
troops to the north, and the intensification of southern fears of the Arab
north that occurred as a result of Nimeiri's Islamization campaign have
all served to swell the ranks of Sudanese rebel forces in Ethiopia, which,
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military personnel who defected from the Sudanese Army.
In our opinion, Tripoli has been more than willing to provide the
funding, specialized training in Libya, advisers, and weapons for the
southern Sudanese.
the Ethiopians have recruited personnel for, the dissident forces, set up
several training camps in areas of western Ethiopia, provided advisers,
and given logistical support. Our evidence of Ethiopian troop
deployments, however, does not support Sudanese claims that the Ethiopians
have been directly involved in cross-border operations with the rebels,
nor do we have any indication that the Ethiopians have massed their own
troops along the frontier in an effort to intimidate Khartoum. In fact,
the deteriorating military situation in Eritrea,
Tigray, and Gonder Provinces indicates that attempting to contain the
dissident forces has left the Ethiopians few troops to deploy directly
against Sudan.
both Khartoum
and Addis Ababa have seriously misinterpreted developments along the
frontier. Each side clearly tends to believe the worst about the other's
intentions,
Embassy
reporting indicates that Nimeiri, for example, has persisted in
attributing the recent problems in the south to Libyan and Ethiopian
subversion rather than a reaction by southern Sudanese to his policies.
As a result, Khartoum to date has been reluctant to enter into serious
discussions with the insurgents or to offer concessions that would form
the basis of a political settlement. The Sudanese Army and security
services have also overreacted to Ethiopian military activity along the
frontier, apparently perceiving an invasion threat when almost all unit
deployments and resupply efforts appear to us to have been responses to
the increasing insurgent threat.
The Ethiopians, on the other hand, appear convinced that the Sudanese
military played a role in the Eritrean capture of the town of Tessenei in
January. Mengistu and his senior commanders also appear to believe that
the Sudanese military is planning to conduct cross-border operations
against Sudanese dissident camps in Ethiopia. As a result, according to
has periodically put its
forces along the border on a defensive alert, which Khartoum interprets as
being preparations for offensive operations against Sudan.
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Non-military developments have also worked to keep tensions at a high
level. Both sides have expelled members of the other's embassies,
Ethiopia recalled its Ambassador for a short period of time, and Khartoum
has conducted a heated propaganda campaign against the Ethiopians. The US
Embassy reported an acrimonious meeting between Mengistu and a delegation
from Khartoum late last year, and both governments have condemned the
actions of the other in several diplomatic exchanges.
Each side has appeared eager to portray itself as reasonable and
responsive to third-country overtures toward reducing tensions. For
example, Ethiopia has supported the recent peace initiative spearheaded by
Egyptian Foreign Minister Boutros Ghali and has accepted his proposal to
meet with the Sudanese to discuss the situation. Khartoum has also agreed
to the meeting, reportedly scheduled for Nairobi in mid-March.
In our judgment the Ethiopians will continue to try to capitalize on
signs of unrest in southern Sudan, especially since the cost and risk are
minimal. In addition, we believe that the Mengistu regime has no
intention of making significant concessions to Khartoum despite its
willingness to go along with the Egyptian initiative. In fact, we believe
Mengistu will attempt to use any negotiations to drive a wedge between the
Sudanese and the Eritreans and to force significant concessions out of
Khartoum in return for ending its support to the dissident Sudanese--a
tactic he has used during previous crises with Sudan.
We see little possibility that Ethiopian troops will launch major
attacks along the border or attempt to seize border towns. At present,
the Ethiopians have less than 5,000 troops deployed in the border area.
Because of the deteriorating military situation in the north, the
Ethiopians have only a limited capability to threaten the Sudanese by
moving additional troops to the frontier. Moreover, Addis Ababa's
continuing preparations for yet another northern offensive against the
dissidents in Eritrea and Tigray impose a further drain on military
resources. Inadvertent small-unit clashes could occur, however, and the
Ethiopian Air Force could launch airstrikes against selected border
targets at any time.
There is little likelihood that the lingering mutual mistrust between
Mengistu and Qadhafi will seriously undermine their cooperative effort
against Sudan. In fact, the strains that developed when Mengistu assumed
the Chairmanship of the OAU--a post that Qadhafi desired--appear to have
subsided. the Ethiopian leader
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has frequently consulted with Qadhafi on OAU issues important to the
Libyan leader, such as Chad, in an effort to preserve the relationship.
Sudanese President Nimeiri, on the other hand, finds himself in a
"no-win" situation vis-a-vis Ethiopia. Indeed, in our view, his regime
will continue to have difficulty formulating a cohesive policy to counter
the domestic unrest in the south and the threat posed by Ethiopian support
to Sudanese dissidents. Khartoum is unable to provide the level of
support needed to give the Eritrean and Tigrean insurgents the capability
to seriously challenge Ethiopia's hold over the northern provinces by
capturing and holding major population centers. Nor is it able or willing
to exert the sort of control over the Eritreans--let alone cut off all
assistance programs--to meet the demands put forth by Addis Ababa as
necessary steps for a peaceful resolution of the problem.
Nimeiri cannot rely on the Sudanese military to deter Ethiopia's
meddling in the South. Several understrength battalions--totaling 4,000-
5,500 troops--with little heavy equipment and only limited mobility are
spread thinly along the frontier. While the Sudanese Army and Air Force
could launch small-scale attacks against dissident training camps inside
Ethiopia, we believe Nimeiri and his senior commanders would be reluctant
to take this step out of fear that the Ethiopians would respond on a
larger scale.
Nimeiri will continue to look, therefore, to the United States, Saudi
Arabia, and Egypt for political and military support. His realization
that there are limits to what each nation can or will do, however, may
force him to make some concessions to Sudanese dissidents to firm up his
regime. But he has yet to address the major fears and problems in the
south, the area of the main threat. Until he takes this step, the
Ethiopians and Libyans will have a pool of ready recruits for the
dissident forces to keep the pressure on Khartoum.
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SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA-SUDAN: Tensions Rise Over Dissident Activity
Distribution:
Original -- Frederick L. Wettering, Director, African Affairs, NSC
1 -- Ambassador James K. Bishop, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
-- African Affairs
1 -- Mr. Frank G. Wisner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
-- for African Affairs
1 -- Mr. Robert Cabelly, Bureau of African Affairs
1 -- Mr. Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary for African
-- Affairs
1 -- Mr. Noel C. Koch, Principal, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
-- Defense
1 -- Mr. Leonardo Neher, Director, Office of Analysis for Africa
-- Bureau
1 -- Mr. Richard Bogosian, Director, East African Affairs Bureau
1 -- Mr. Peter Spicer, Defense Intelligence Officer for Africa
1 -- DCI
1 -- DDCI
1 -- Executive Director
1 -- SA/DCI/IA
1 -- DDI
1 -- ADDI
1 -- DDO/Africa
1 -- NIO for Africa
1 -- NIC Action Group
1 -- PDB Staff
1 -- ILS
1 -- C/DDI/PES
1 -- D/NESA
1 -- NESA/AI/E
1 -- D/ALA
2 -- ALA/PS
1 -- ALA Research Director
4 -- OCPAS/IMD/CB
4 -- ALA/AF
11 -- ALA/AF/H
ALA/AF/H: (5 March 1984)
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