SENEGAL: PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000901020001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 3, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000901020001-1
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
3 FeLfruary;1984
Senegal: Prospects for Stability
Summary
Pro-Western Abdou Diouf, elected President of Senegal in
February 1983 after a trio-year interim presidency, faces
popular pressure for improved living conditions and a clean
break with the inefficiency, corruption, and cronyism that
characterized his predecessor's government. In addition,
Senegal, which is strategically and politically important for
France and the United States, is one of many moderate states in
West Africa in financial crisis. The US Embassy points out
that Diouf faces severe constraints in allocating increasingly
scarce resources among competing yoliticat groups that he
cannot afford to alienate.
Diouf realizes that his regime must revitalize the economy
before irreversible decline and political destabilization set
in. The country faces serious economic problems that were
brought about by dependence on one crop (peanuts) and excessive
state involvement in economic life, which Zed to a
This memorandum: was.. prepared, by West Africa.Branch, Africa.
Division, Office'`bf,', rioan and Latf merican Analysis. Questions and
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000901020001-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000901020001-1
proliferation of inefficient state-run enterprises. Recurrent
drought and the global recession of the 1970s resulted in a
convergence of several bad crop years and depressed world
demand and prices for Senegal's peanut exports.,
Senegal's traditionally pro-Western orientation, close
ties to France and effective military apparatus reduce the risk
of serious outbreaks of unrest. Despite an official policy of
nonalignment, Dakar has carefully limited ties to communist and
radical Arab states, while France has become an increasingly
important source of aid and guarantor of the country's
security. The apolitical Senegalese armed forces consider
itself to be the guardian of political order and its self-
restraint and competence make it a key asset to the regime.
Nevertheless, we believe that any signs of serious unrest would
make Senegal an inviting target for outside meddling. Tripoli,
Moscow, and Tehran almost certainly will persist in trying to
increase their influence with domestic religious and political
Politial and Economic Worries
Thus far, Diouf has proved adept at balancing the competing interests
of.Senegal's six major tribes, labor, students, and military factions, and
has gained initial acceptance by powerful Muslim religious brotherhoods to
which 80 percent of the population belong. Most recently, he put his own
stamp on the government by replacing powerful, old-line politicians with
younger technocrats who owe their political loyalty and positions to
him.
Despite Diouf's promising beginning, we believe there are warning
signs that Senegal's political climate could become increasingly tense.
Although the 14 opposition parties --most of which are left-leaning-- are
badly divided among themselves and have yet to show much popular appeal,
several of these parties have received some Soviet and Libyan financial
backing, and, if Di.ouf begins to falter.. they could serve as focal points
for more serious opposition. More troubling, however, is the prospect
that Senegal's continuing economic malaise will begin to undermine Uiouf's
popularity and legitimacy. Dakar had little economic choice last summer
but to implement the IMF's stringent austerity program --which included
sharp price.increases for key food commodities and petroleum products,
reduced subsides. to farmers, and deep cuts in government spending-- in
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000901020001-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000901020001-1
exchange for a one-year standby agreement.
In our view, prolonged austerity could spur unrest among segments of
Senegal's more politically aware urban population. Students, labor, and
Muslim leaders are dissatisfied with the country's economic decline and
Diouf will find it increasingly difficult to blame his predecessor for
painful austerity. Although divisive political wrangling in the face of
economic hardship could provoke grumbling in the officer corps, Senegal's
well disciplined military probably would continue to remain aloof from
politics.
Foreign Policy
We believe Senegalese foreign policy will continue to be driven by
the twin needs of finding massive aid to keep the country econoiai ca l l y
afloat and securing political-military support to counter Soviet and
Libyan intervention in regional affairs. Diouf is under no illusions
concerning Soviet and Libyan intentions in Africa or the region's
vulnerability, and believes that only a strong Western military and
economic commitment can provide adequate protection.
Diouf has continued to limit official ties with the Soviets to
cultural and educational activities and has turned down Cuban requests to
establish an embassy. Dakar receives no military or economic assistance
from Moscow and there are no Communist military or technical advisers in
the country. We believe the size of the Soviet Embassy in Dakar --the
110-man mission serves as Moscow's regional West African headquarters--
keeps the Senegalese Government particularly alert to Soviet activities.
In 1980 Senegal, angered by Libyan efforts to stir unrest among
dissident groups, broke diplomatic ties and has since turned aside
Tripoli's numerous approaches to restore relations. Dakar remains
concerned that a Libyan diplomatic presence would encourage Tripoli to
renew subversion and try to win support for Libyan leader Qadhafi's
radical policies among Senegal's large Muslim population.
Senegal has similar concerns about Iranian intentions, especially
with regard to Senegal's large Lebanese Shiite community.
In keeping with its nonaligned posture and close ties to moderate
Arab states, Senegal grants diplomatic status to the small PLO office in
Dakar. Diouf continues to encourage PLO chairman Arafat --who visited
3
S E C R E T
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000901020001-1
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000901020001-1
Dakar last month-- to pursue peace negotiations with Israel and Arab
moderates.
French Military Presence
Military cooperation between Senegal and France has remained
extensive and virtually unchanged since independence in 1960. Under a
mutual defense agreement Paris is obligated to intervene at Dakar's
request if the country's security is threatened. Some 1,350 French troops
are stationed in Senegal, of which 50 are on the general staff, 450
assigned to the navy, 400 to the air force, and 400 to the army
infantry. Dakar is the main naval logistics and communications base for
the French central and western regions. Yoff airport was used for
refueling by the British during the Falklands crisis arid French Atlantic
maritime air patrols stage from Dakar. Large-scale French military
exercises held in Senegal in December 1982 helped demonstrate the security
role that France is willing and able to fulfill.
Effectiveness of Security Services
Senegal's armed forces are one of the best trained and disciplined
and most apolitical in sub-Saharan Africa. The armed forces number about
14,600 men, of which 10,200 are in the army, 650 in the navy, 550 in the
air force, and 3,200 in the gendarmerie (police services).
The police service includes a paramilitary counter terrorist force of
120 men. The force members are recruited from the elite of the
gendarmerie, and French instructors train them intensively to respond to
the entire range of terrorist acts. The force is armed with classic anti-
terrorist equipment as well as HK-33 assault rifles and Smith and Wesson
revolvers not used in the regular armed forces. The force distinguished
itself in December 1981 during the attempted coup in the Gambia when it
stormed a military camp to free the Gambian president's wife and other
hostages. In December 1982 it participated in effectively controlling a
separatist demonstration in. Senegal's Casamance region.
Potential for Terrorism
Despite Senegal's record of political calm, we believe the potential
for terrorist incidents still exists. The presence of a PLO office and
the ever-present possibility in West Africa of Libyan-backed subversion
could prove disruptive. Although the small but active Iranian Embassy was
ordered closed, --Dakar still maintains dipolmatic relations with Tehran,-
- the Iranians are unlikely to be deterred from trying to stir trouble.
Moreover, Dakar is concerned that the possibility of an Algerian-supported
Polisario state near its border could pose a threat to the country's
security.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000901020001-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000901020001-1
Nevertheless, we believe the Diouf regime responds to potential
security threats with prompt and effective countermeasures. Dakar's
expulsion of Tehran's diplomats following their suspicious activities and
its refusal to permit a formal Libyan or Cuban presence demonstrates
Senegal's caution. Deteriorating economic conditions may spur outbreaks
of public frustration in the near term, but Senegal's military and
security services are relatively well-equipped by African standards to
restore order. Moreover, the Diouf regime can rely on French forces in
Sene
l
ga
to assist the government in the event of serious unrest.
S E C R E T
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000901020001-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000901020001-1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/12 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000901020001-1