POSSIBLE SOVIET MOVES IN START OVER THE COMING MONTHS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000900020001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 8, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Contra' Intdlonce AFncy
Y l#.x.DC20305
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
8 June 1983
Possible Soviet Moves in START
Over the Coming Months F7
Summary
For Moscow, the lack of progress in Round III of the strategic arms
reduction talks (START) probably was not surprising. The Soviets entered the
session knowing that they had fundamental differences with the United States
on the basic approach to strategic arms reductions but nevertheless continued
their efforts to establish SALT II criteria as the framework for
negotiations. They also continued to link the resolution of several specific
issues in START to the evolution of the talks on intermediate-range nuclear
forces (INF). They recognize that the course of the INF negotiations will
ut also the overriding political environment for US-
influence not only STAR"
Soviet arms control. For t
he present, the Soviets appear to believe that they have a stake in
the START process and have avoided any actions that would destroy this
substantial and symbolically important bridge to the United States. They also
appear to believe, however, that if they combine their present negotiating
stance with vigorous public criticism of US proposals, the United States will
modify its START position. Politburo, CPSU, and military officials will have
several opportunities In the rest of 1983 to make major public pronouncements
in this area. 7_1
This paper was preps y o t e Policy Analysis D v sion, 25X1
Office of Soviet Analysis. n s an queries are welcome and may be
directed to Chief, Policy Analysis Division 25X1
SOV M 83-10102
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Unless the United States substantially alters its negotiating posture, we
believe the Soviets will be just as rigid in Round IV (June 1983) and Round V
(October) of START as in previous sessions. They will reiterate the positions
that have the effect of protecting their major strategic weapons programs.
They have also stated that if the United States increases its "forward-based"
INF systems in Europe, they will withdraw ?bpit offer to reduce
intercontinental systems at START.
Late spring 1983 finds the Soviets in a position to undertake various
activities related to their strategic forces--activities that would probably
be designed to pressure the United States to alter its START negotiating
position. None of them would substantially improve the capabilities of Soviet
strategic forces, however; and this is likely to be a major factor in
encouraging caution before departing from the framework of SALT II and their
own draf Treaty as the negotiations continue over the next six to nine
months. sr sQT
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Background
During Round III of the START negotiations (2 February -
31 March 1983), Soviet negotiators continued their vigorous
attack on the US proposal that START negotiations proceed in two
phases, with ballistic missiles being reduced in the first phase
and "slower flying systems" (bombers and cruise missiles)
discussed in the second. They argued that all such weapons were
equally dangerous and could be used as part of a first strike.
Soviet negotiators also criticized those aspects of the US
approach that, they argued, would require a rapid, expensive,
large-scale, and unwarranted restructuring of their strategic
forces. They specifically cited the US proposals for a ceiling
of 400 heavy bombers, stating that they had no intention of
either counting the Backfire as a heavy bomber or building
bombers up to that sublimit. As for loading air-launched cruise
missiles (ALCMs) on bombers, they argued that the US formula
would legitimatize huge deployments and would, therefore, not
meet Soviet concerns, which included banning long-range cruise
missiles (LRCMs).
Moscow's basic point of departure during this round remained
the unratified SALT II agreement. In a draft treaty presented in
March 1983, the Soviets proposed that both sides reduce their
ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers in stages to a level of
1,800. (Such reductions, according to previous Soviet
statements, would be completed by 1990.) Within this aggregate,
they would establish sublimits on MIRV launchers and ICBM MIRV
launchers and limits on the total number of nuclear warhead
bombs carried on all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
The draft treaty does not specifically mention launchers of
the Soviets' SS-18 heavy ICBM. It bans the production of any new
type of heavy ICBM and prohibits the conversion of launchers of
light ICBMs (or of older types of ICBMs deployed prior to 1964)
into launchers of heavy ICBMs and thus carries over the SALT
limit of 308 heavy ICBM launchers into the START agreement. As
part of their reductions scenario, the Soviets might of course
choose to decrease the number of their SS-18s; but their
discussions of this subject during the negotiations have been
purposely vague and noncommittal and have avoided any explicit
offers to reduce their heavy missile force. For Moscow, the
fixed, heavy ICBM launchers remain a significant element of its
strategic force posture, and it has spurned US proposals in this
area as the equivalent of demands for unilateral concessions at
the expense of one of its key systems.
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Their draft treaty also codified the Soviets' previously
expressed proposal for a total ban on LRCMs, although they
probably realize that US agreement to such a ban is unlikely
especially since the SALT II Treaty did not prohibit the
deployment of long-range ALCMs, and the first US bomber squadron
equipped with these systems became operational in mid-December
1982. The proposal probably reflects Moscow's awareness that US
LRCMs, with their relatively small radar cross-section and their
potential for deployment in large numbers. w pose an acute
problem for Soviet defense planners.
The cruise missile provision in the Round III draft treaty
is probably also intended to confirm the linkage between START
and INf that the Soviets had previously set forth. During the
START negotiations, their offer to reduce intercontinental
systems to 1,800 has been explicitly made contingent on no
increase in US "forward-based systems." Thus, the Soviet START
position is inherently linked to the INF talks--specifically, to
NATO's planned deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing II
di
me
um-range ballistic missiles in Western Europe.
Soviet Assessment of US Attitude
For the present, Moscow believes that it has a stake in the
strategic arms negotiation process and has avoided any actions
that would destroy this substantial and symbolically important
bridge to the United States. The Soviets have, however, been
publicly pessimistic for some time about the prospects for arms
control agreements with the current US Administration, and recent
statements by senior 'Soviet officials appear to reflect a
deepening of Soviet suspicions and mistrust of Administration
motives. While there is virtually no information on their
private thinking, we have seen the following significant public
statements:
General Secretary Andropov, in an interview published in
Pravda on 27 March 1983, accused the United States of
treating issues in this area "flippantly."
? Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko, in a press conference
held on 1 April, stated that the United States did not
want an improvement in relations.
Both Andropov and Gromyko have accused the
Administration of making false or misleading statements
about Soviet arms control and defense policies.
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? Both Andropov (on 27 March) and Defense Minister Ustinov
(during a 7 April speech in East Germany) emphasized the
necessity for the Soviet Union to remain vigilant in the
face of external military threats.
While these themes have their antecedents in earlier propaganda,
the current concentrated effort by senior Soviet government
officials to heighten anti-US rhetoric on this subject appears to
reflect a deliberate policy decision by the Andropov leadership
to contrast their own "principled" approach with alleged
irresponsible and erratic US behavior in this area.
Recent unofficial comments by influential Soviets suggest
that Moscow will not undertake any actions in the foreseeable
future that could be interpreted as yielding to or strengthening
the administration's arms control position. The underlying
Soviet calculation appears to be that the combination of Moscow's
present START negotiating stance with vigorous public criticism
of US proposals will lead to a modification of the US START
position. Despite increasing pessimism and suspicion of the
Reagan Administration, Soviet officials may believe that
favorable changes could occur in the months ahead, before this
country becomes absorbed in its presidential election campaign.
They apparently feel that there is still a substantial body of US
opinion outside the Administration that would favor a strategic
arms agreement along the lines of the SALT II Treaty. They may
hope that these forces will grow in influence and ultimately
induce changes in the Administration's approach to START.
Congressional efforts to cut the US defense budget for
fiscal year 1984 and significant legislative support for the
nuclear freeze resolution may be interpreted by Moscow as
reflecting political difficulties for the Administration that
could prompt US compromises at START. The Report of the
President's Commission on Strategic Forces (the Scowcroft
Commission) may also encourage the Soviets to believe that US
policy related to long-term development of strategic forces is
undergoing reexamination within the Administration and that this
reexamination might have a similar effect.
Options for Public Diplomacy
During the rest of 1983, the Soviets will have several
opportunities to continue their vigorous public criticism of the
US arms control negotiating posture. They can create occasions
for public diplomacy whenever they wish, of course, but we
believe that the scheduled Supreme Soviet and Communist Party
plenum sessions, armed forces anniversary days, the fall 1983
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session of the UN General Assembly, and the October Revolution
celebration will offer propitious forums for pronouncements.
Less compelling, but still plausible, opportunities for public
pronouncements could arise during visits by foreign leaders to
the USSR or state visits by Soviet leaders abroad. The Soviets
will also exploit chance events as they occur.
We would expect Moscow to use all of these occasions to
continue its public airing of specific objections to the US START
negotiating position, press for consideration of its draft START
treaty, and publicize similarities between its own position and
the views of official or quasi-official US bodies (such as the
Scowcroft Commission). We also believe that the Soviets will use
one or more of these occasions to announce any possible
withdrawal or revision of its START treaty prompted by the
beginning of US INF deployments (December 1983), and we expect
statements by senior military officials during this year to hint
at any counterdeployments that the Soviets might have in mind.
Table 1 sets forth a schedule of likely opportunities for such
pronouncements.
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Table 1
Propitious Opportunities for Pronouncements on START
[START Session, Round IV, begins in June
1983]
Possible CPSU Central Committee Plenum
(usually held one or two days before
Supreme Soviet session, reportedly to focus
on ideology)
June 16 USSR Supreme Soviet session
June RSFSR Supreme Soviet session (held after
USSR Supreme Soviet)
July 25
Visit to Soviet Union by Chancellor Helmut
Kohl of West Germany at end of month
Navy Day (speech by Sergey Georgiyevich
Gorshkov, Naval Commander in Chief;
possible address by Aleksey Alekseyevich
Yepishev, Chief of Main Political
Directorate, to Army and Navy Main
Political Directorate)
August 15 Air Force Day (speech by Pavel Stephanovich
Kutakhov, Air Forces Chief)
September 12 Tank Troops Day (speech by Yuriy
Mikhaylovich Potapov, Chief of Main Armor
Directorate)
September Annual Session of UN General Assembly
(speech by Deputy Prime Minister Andrey
Gromyko)
[START Session, Round V, begins in October]
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
(CEMA) summit in Moscow (now said to be
scheduled for October; will focus on
economic issues, but could provide forum,
if one is needed, for bloc statements on
START or INF)
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Mid-October October Revolution anniversary slogans
published (usually 14-17 October)
October or November CPSU Central Committee Plenum on economy
(fall plenum is always on economy)
October or November USSR Supreme Soviet session on economy
(date will be announced one month in
advance; usually held in October or
November, but sometimes as early as
September or as late as December)
October or November RSFSR Supreme Soviet session on economy
(held after USSR Supreme Soviet; date
announced one month in advance)
November 6 October Revolution anniversary meeting
(speech by member of Politburo or
Secretariat)
November 7 October Revolution anniversary parade
(speech by Defense Minister Dmitriy
Fedorovich Ustinov)
November 19 Rocket and Artillery Troops Day (speech by
Vladimir Fedorovich Tolubko Chief of
Strategic Rocket Forces)
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Diplomatic Options in Geneva
Because the Soviet draft START treaty tabled in March
codifies Moscow's commitment to the framework of the unratified
SALT II Agreement as the basis for negotiations, the Soviets are
not likely to demonstrate any greater movement in Round IV and
Round V toward the US position than they have in previous
sessions. They will instead reiterate the provisions that have
the effect of protecting the weapons and programs that make the
most important contribution to their major strategic
requirements.
Within this framework, however, the Soviets have various
tactical options for activity that could give the appearance of
change. At Geneva they might:
? Permit deployment of ALCMs (by revising article XI.1
o their treaty) but continue to ban ground-launched
and submerged-launched cruise missiles. This offer
would have the effect of acknowledging the deployment
of US ALCMs on B-52s--but it would probably be made
contingent upon an agreement by the United States to
drop its distinction between "phase one" and "phase
two" reductions so that bomber loadings, as well as
missile reentry vehicles (RVs), would be counted
immediately in aggregates. Such a proposal would
also be consistent with Soviet INF positions.
? Discuss reciprocal de-MIRVing as an option for
reductions. In the context of further developing the
re uctions proposals outlined in articles III, IV,
and V of their treaty, the Soviets may suggest this
concept in order to present an alternative to the
reductions scenario that the United States has
proposed. They might prefer to spread the reduced
number of warheads over a greater number of launchers
than the United States would permit.
Propose that the one new ty eeoof light ICBM permitted
in their article vir should have a single RV. This
would be another attempt: by the Soviets to deal with
US proposals for RV reductions. The Soviet article
at this point does not specify whether this "new
type" of missile will be MIRVed or not. In
conversations with US counterparts in informal and
unofficial forums outside of START, Soviet spokesmen
have mentioned the possibility of developing a "new
type" of ICBM with a single RV. They may believe the
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US side would welcome this proposal because it Is
consistent with the recommendation of the Scowcroft
Commission that the United States develop a new
single-warhead ICBM. The Soviets may also be
attracted to the element of the Scowcroft Commission
recommendation which suggests that the MX--and by
implication the Soviets' SS-X-24 ICBM--might be
considered as an "existing type" of ICBM that would
not be affected by any restrictions on development
and deployment in a prospective arms control
treaty.
Impact
of the Economic Factor
We do not expect economic factors to influence the direction
of the START negotiations in the immediate future, but we know
that the planning cycle for the 12th Five-Year Plan (covering the
period from 1986 to 1990) is under way and that the Soviet
military establishment's assessment of the external threat is an
essential element in this cycle. This military assessment is
being formally developed during 1983, and the Politburo will
consider it in 1984 in allocating resources for the 1986-90
defense plan. u
Although Andropov seemed to give greatest weight to the
Soviet Union's economic problems in his keynote address to the
CPSU Central Committee plenum on 22 November 1982, we still have
too little evidence to determine how he will handle the
allocation of resources to defense. Of primary importance to
Andropov and his colleagues is the requirement to maintain Soviet
military power during the decade.
Near-Term Options for Deployments and "Analogous Responses"
Between June and December 1983 the Soviets will probably
heighten those propaganda efforts that emphasize the threat of
military deployments to counter the impending US programs. Their
options and activities will probably be designed with the
intention of applying pressure on Washington, rather than
increasing their own strategic forces and capabilities. We doubt
that Moscow would undertake any near-term actions inconsistent
with their interpretation of the SALT II Treaty and their own
recently presented START treaty. As noted, we believe that the
Soviets might revise selected portions of their draft. We also
believe, however, that much of the Soviet publicity to be
observed during this period will in fact be disingenuous attempts
to describe as countermeasures (for international ~07
u
mption)
various well-established Soviet weapons programs.
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Among the programs that have been under way for several
years are the following:
? At least one ICBM that may be the counter to the MX. The
Soviets have tested a new ICBM, the SS-X-24, an ave
notified the United States that it would constitute the
one "new type" of ICBM permitted to Moscow by the SALT II
Treaty. We expect flight-testing of this missile to
continue through 1983 and into 1984.
Another ICBM that could be deployed from a mobile
launcher. The Soviets began to test this second ICBM,
but stated that the activity was
connected with the mo ernization of an existing ICBM
(designated by the United States as the SS-13) and not a
"new type" of ICBM as defined in the SALT II Treaty.
Although this system has been tested only from a silo
launcher to date, we believe that it could be tested from
a mobile launcher at any time. Such testing would
probably lend strength to earlier Soviet START statements
that in their view, the development of mobile ICBMs would
contribute to strategic stability.
? An air-launched long-;range cruise missile.
t e Soviets have had a development program to equip heavy
bombers with LRCMs; they probably would consider
deployment of such a system as an "analogous response" to
the recent US deployment of cruise missiles on a B-52
squadron. We have identified a heavy bomber platform--a
variant of the Bear--as well as a cruise missile that we
believe has been tested from it. The entire system could
reach initial operational capability in late 1983 or
early 1984.
? Deployment of a submerged-launched LRCM. The Soviets are
developing the SS- X- 1, with a capa ity against land
targets; it could be deployed some time in 1983. In 1982
they launched a reconfigured ballistic missile submarine
(previously dismantled in accordance with SALT
provisions), which was apparently designed as a test
platform for long-range SLCMs. Testing from its
launchers could begin before the end of the year. (S NF)
Other Options for Strategic Forces
The activities described above could be considered to be in
keeping with both the unratified SALT II Treaty and the US START
position. During 1983, however, the Soviets could undertake a
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number of other options that would put their strategic forces at
variance with both. Although consistent with their own recently
tabled draft START treaty, these options (like those mentioned
above), would probably be aimed more at pressuring the United
States than at substantially improving the capabilities of Soviet
strategic forces:
? Deploy the SS-16 as a mobile ICBM. The draft Soviet
treaty contains no explicit prohibition on either mobile
ICBMs or the SS-16. Statements at recent START sessions
suggested that the Soviets considered mobile ICBMs as a
useful solution to the problem of weapon survivability.
Their comments at the Standing Consultative Committee
(SCC) indicate that research on mobile systems is under
way at Plesetsk. Although the Soviets have stated at the
SCC that they are refraining from development, testing
and deployment of the SS-16, we believe that some may be
available for deployment.
? Increase production of the Backfire bomber or undertake
its aer a refueling for intercontinental missions, or
both. The Soviets assert that the Backfire should not
fall- within the framework of a strategic arms agreement,
and their treaty contains no restrictions on its
production and deployment.
? Deploy new SSBNs without dismantling older launchers as
compensation. The second yphoon SSBN will begin sea
-
trials some time in 1983. The Soviets might choose not
to dismantle a Y-class unit as compensation, a move that
would be easily reversible. The Soviet treaty mandates
phased reductions for launchers, however; so if Moscow
exceeded the Interim Agreement freeze limits, it could
complicate the task of meeting the dismantling schedule
mandated in its own proposed treaty.
Initiate actions to increase the number of MIRV-
accoun a e launchers beyond the MIRV aunc er
sub limit of 820 i n the SALT I reat They cou signal
this intent by reexcavating launch control silos for MIRV
ICBM launchers that were backfilled in 1977 and 1978.
Such activity, if meant to pressure the United States,
would be easily reversible if the Soviets did not also
start converting the missile silos in these groups. But
such action, too, could complicate Moscow's ability to
meet its own proposed dismantling schedule. Increasing
these launchers (and thereby the number of RVs) would be
another sign of Soviet displeasure with the US
negotiating position.
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Table 2
Progress of Selected Soviet Weapons Development
and Deployment Programs
Spring-summer 1983 Continued testing of SS-X-24 ICBM and
PL-5 ICBM
Beginning of sea trials of the second
Typhoon SSBN; compensatory
dismantlement of 10th Y-I unit
Winter 1983-spring 1984 Possible deployment of long-range ALCM
on Bear variant; possible deployment
of long-range GLCM and SLCM
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SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Moves in START Over the Coming Months
DISTRIBUTION:
Mr. Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Ms. Paula J. Dobriansky
Staff Member, NSC
Room 368, EOB
Mr. Sven F. Kraemer
Staff Member, NSC
Room 380, EOB
Mr. Ronald Lehman, II
Staff Member, NSC
Room 380, EOB
Mr. John Lenczowski
Senior Staff Member, NSC
Room 368 EOB
Mr. Jack Matlock
Staff Member, NSC
Room 395 EOB
ADM John M. Poindexter, USN
Military Assistant to the
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger
Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs
Department of State
Rm 7240, State
The Honorable Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
US Ambassador to the UN
US Mission to the UN
Department of State
via Jacqueline Tillman
Room 7511, State
SECRET
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Mr. Stephen W. Bosworth
Director, Policy Planning Staff
Department of State
Room 7311, State
Mr. Philip Kaplan
Chief of Staff of Policy Planning
Department of State
Room 7316, State
Mr. Richard Burt
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State
Room 6226, State
ADM John Howe, USN
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State
Room 7327, State
Mr. George L. Rueckert
Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State
Room 4225, State
Mr. Thomas W. Simons
Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State
Room 4217, State
Mr. Hugh Montgomery
Director/INR
Department of State
Room 6531, State
Mr. Robert Baraz
Director, Office of Analysis for the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, INR/SEE
Department of State
Room 4758, State
Mr. W. D. Howells
Director, Office of Political-Military Analysis
INR/PMA
Department of State
Room 6638, State
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Mr. Robert Dean
Deputy Director, Office of Politico-Military Analysis
Department of State
Room 7317, State
Mr. William Courtney
PM/SNP
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State
Room 7317 State
Ambassador Edward Rowny
US START Negotiator
Arms Control Disarmament Agency
Room 4930 NS Annex
Ambassador Paul Nitze
US INF Negotiator
Arms Control Disarmament Agency
Room 5923 NS Annex
The Honorable Kenneth Adelman
Director
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 5930 NS Annex
Mr. Raymond Firehock
Chief, Intelligence Division
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 6510A, NS Annex
Dr. Manfred Eimer
Assistant Director for Verification
and Intelligence
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 5443, NS Annex
Mr. Louis V. Nosenzo
Assistant Director for Strategic Programs
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 4498, NS Annex
Ambassador Richard Ellis
US SCC Commissioner
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 5534 NS Annex
COL John R. Stanford
Executive Secretary, OSD
Department of Defense
Room 3A948, The Pentagon
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Mr. Fred C. Ikle
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Department of Defense
Room 4-E-830, The Pentagon
General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret)
Deputy Under Secretary for Policy
Department of Defense
Room 2-E-812, The Pentagon
Mr. Andrew W. Marshall
Director of Net Assessment, OSD
Department of Defense
Room 3-A-930, The Pentagon
Mr. Ronald Stivers
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary for Policy
Department of Defense
Room 2-E-812, The Pentagon
The Honorable Richard Perle
Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Policy
Department of Defense
Room 4-E-838, The Pentagon
Mr. Ronald S. Lauder
Attention: BG John R. Lasater
Deputy Assistant Secretary (European
and NATO Policy)
Department of Defense
Room 4-D-882, The Pentagon
LGEN James E. Dalton, USAF
Director, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2-E-936, The Pentagon
LTG Paul F. Gorman, USA
Assistant to the Chairman, JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2-E-872, The Pentagon
BG E. T. Brooks, USAF
Deputy Director for International Negotiations, J-5
Joint Chief of Staff
Room 2-E-1008, The Pentagon
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/13: CIA-RDP85T00287R000900020001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/13: CIA-RDP85T00287R000900020001-2
Mr. James C. McCrery
DIO for Strategic Programs and R&D
Defense Intelligence Agency
Room 2-C-238, The Pentagon
Mr. Wallace C. Magathan
DIO for General Purpose Forces/MBFR
Defense Intelligence Agency
Room 2-C-238, The Pentagon
Ms. Wynf red Joshua
DIO for European and Soviet Political Affairs
Defense Intelligence Agency
Room 2-C-238, The Pentagon
MG William Odom, USA
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
HQDA (DAMI-ZA)
.Department of the Army
Room 2-E-464, The Pentagon
MG John B. Marks, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Air Force
Room 4-A-932, The Pentagon
The Director (6 copies)
T532/CDB
National Security Agency
Fort George G. Meade, Md. 20755
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/13: CIA-RDP85T00287R000900020001-2