BRIEFING NOTES FOR THE DCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000801060001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 12, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Unity Movement
The meeting in mid-February between Moroccan King Hassan and
Algerian President Bendjedid began a movement in North Africa
toward greater Maghreb cooperation. Bendjedid, who has been the
primary initiator of the unity effort, is apparently committed to
the premise that regional stability will serve Algeria's--and its
neighbors--long-term economic interests and is the best insurance
against superpower intervention in the area. The cooperation
scheme is also intended to curtail Libyan trouble-making and
provide a more positive environment for negotiating a political
settlement of the Western Sahara dispute, which is the most
divisive issue in inter-Maghreb relations.
-- A Tunisian-Algerian summit in March improved cooperation
and settled a long-standing border dispute. Algiers sees
better relations as a block to Libya's meddling in Tunisian
affairs.
-- Qadhafi's failure to gain the chairmanship of the OAU and
the uncertainties resulting from his involvement in Chad
have induced him to cooperate in the unity effort. In
recent months Libyan relations with all three neighbors have
markedly improved; moreover, he has publicly declared an end
to Libyan military and political support of Polisario
guerrillas.
-- Maghreb leaders hope that better relations with Libya
will reduce Qadhafi's threat to them. Consequently, they
have been unwilling to take a strong stand against Libya's
troublemaking in Chad. The durability of this quid pro quo
is highly questionable, however, given the fundamental
incompatibilities between Qadhafi and particularly Moroccan
and Tunisian leaders.
Western Sahara
Despite a more regular dialogue between Morocco and Algeria
over the Saharan dispute, a settlement in the near term seems
unlikely. Although acquisition of the Sahara remains a popular
cause among Moroccans, the seemingly "unwinnable" war could
eventually cause domestic trouble for the King.
-- There is growing uneasiness in Morocco regarding the
impact of the war on the economy. Rabat's serious financial
difficulties, caused in part by the war, may increase
discontent with the regime as the impact of austerity
measures are realized.
-- While Algeria, the Polisario Front's chief supporter, is
`NESA M#83-10264
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more amenable to a political settlement, it still insists on
direct Moroccan-Polisario negotiations. King Hassan refuses
to give the guerrillas this kind of recognition and has
generally been unwilling to take any substantial risks in
the OAU-sponsored negotiations. Informal talks between
Algiers and Rabat seem to be temporarily stalemated.
-- Renewed Polisario military activity in recent months is
likely to continue as the Front attempts to force Morocco
into direct negotations.
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Background Paper--Libyan Activities in Africa
Current Libyan activities in Africa have concentrated on two
main targets: Chad and Sudan.
-- Since the Libyans sent regular military units into Chad
last July, they have captured Faya Largeau and occupied the
northern third of the country.
In Sudan, Libya has provided weapons, financing, and
training to several Sudanese dissident factions for years.
-- The Libyans actively recruit Sudanese dissidents,
especially those from western Sudan who have historical and
commercial links to Libya and have long felt neglected by
Khartoum.
Elsewhere in Africa, Qadhafi has provided aid to more
radical regimes.
-- Libya supplied oil at favorable terms and military aid
to the Rawlings regime in Ghana. Libya has currently cut
off oil supplies, however, following Ghana's refusal to
sign a defense pact or allow Libya basing rights.
Several sub-Saharan states are likely targets for future
Libyan subversive efforts.
-- For years, Tripoli has tried to incite disadvantaged
Tuareg nomads in northern Niger to rise against pro-Western
President Kounche.
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SFC.RFT
-- The Libyan people's bureau in Togo has been paying
Togolese students and workers to convert to Islam. Several
Togolese students were sent to Tripoli in August to study
destabilization techniques and Qadhafi's philosophy. In
the past year, Togo has hosted a Libyan-financed Islamic
conference, agreed to allow the Libyans and Saudis to build
an Islamic cultural center, and sent an 85-man delegation
to the Pan-African Youth Conference in Tripoli.
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Syria
Assad's grip on power in Syria remains firm and we believe
he faces no significant domestic political constraints on his
current foreign policy preoccupations.
-- The watershed of opposition activity against the regime
came in February 1982 when the military crushed a Muslim
Brotherhood-led uprising in the provincial city of Hamah,
killing several thousand inhabitants.
Since that event, with the cost of opposition activity
having been raised so high and with further round-ups of
militant opposition leaders, the Syrian population has
been rced into sullen acquienscence to Assad's rule.
We cannot rule out the possibility of a coup or
assassination attempt, but we have detected no signs of a
significant challenge to the regime.
Syria has come back from defeat and isolation following the
fighting in Lebanon in the summer of 1982 to play an increasingly
prominent role in the Arab world.
-- If Syria accepts the reported Saudi and Kuwaiti effort to
mediate between Damascus and Baghdad and reopen the
pipeline, Assad will emerge as a key player in the Gulf
crisis as well.
-- Such a move would hold major benefits for Damascus in that
it probably would bring additional Saudi and Gulf aid,
advance Assad's importance to Moscow, and further Assad's
aspirations to Arab leadership.
In Lebanon, Assad appears willing to tolerate a prolonged de
facto partition of the country. He almost certainly calculates
that time is on his side and that Israeli will ultimately falter.
-- In the meantime, Assad will continue to apply political
and indirect military pressure to seek a government in
Beirut that takes its foreign policy cues from Damascus
and that is unwilling to reach an accomodation with
Israel.
Syrian policy toward the PLO reflects a drive to assert
total control over Palestinian activity in Lebanon and to
maximize the pressure on Arafat to give in to the demands of the
Fatah rebels linked to Damascus.
-- Having cornered the Fatah loyalists in Tripoli, Assad now
effectively imposes a veto on independent Palestinian
activity in Lebanon and gains insurance that Arafat could
not regain a major political role in the country. 25X1
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Damascus almost certainly will keep the pressure on Arafat
to ensure no further PLO flirtation with the peace process
independent of Damascus.
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The national reconciliation talks are likely to evolve into
a lengthy and difficult process. In addition to substantive
questions, procedural and security issues will probably lead to
disagreements that will threaten to derail the conference.
-- The members of the National Salvation Front, led by
Druze leader Walid Junblatt, will press for the abrogation
of the Lebanese/Israel withdrawal agreement and for
significant reforms of the current confessional system.
-- The Gemayel government and Christian politicians will
be prepared to offer only limited concessions to the
Muslims and Druze. Christian extremists, led by Phalange
Party head Pierre Gemayel and Lebanese Forces militia
commanders, favor only cosmetic changes in the 1943
National Pact.
-- All sides will be tempted to resort to military and
terrorist operations to intimidate their opponents and
wrest concessions.
Shia leader Nabih Barri, whose Amal militia controls
Beirut's southern suberbs, may hold the balance of power at the
conference. Although he has allied himself with the National
Salvation Front, he is not a member and did not participate in
force in the recent fighting.
-- Barri and the Shias--who would suffer the most from the
continued de facto partition of Lebanon--favor a central
government that would increase Shia influence over
government policies. They want, however, a diminution of
Phalangist influence, particularly in the military and
security services, and a major economic reconstruction
program.
If the talks break down and factional fighting resumes,
Barri will be under extreme pressure to commit his militia to the
fighting. The Lebanese Army would be hard pressed to fight
effectively on two fronts.
-- If the talks drag on and there is no major escalation
in the fighting, the Gemayel government could, at best,
retain control over the greater Beirut area.
-- The Druze would control their semi-autonomous area,
while Syria and Israel would continue to occupy the north,
east and south.
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-- This de facto partition would meet many of the
essential interests of most internal and external actors
in Lebanon.
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Israel and Africa
Restoration of diplomatic relations with Sub-Saharan African
nations is a key Israeli foreign policy goal. Israel believes
expanded ties with African nations will lessen its diplomatic
isolation, expand existing commercial relations and undercut Arab
influence.
-- Tel Aviv has recently succeeded in restoring relations
with Zaire and Liberia (it already has relations with
South Africa, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland) and has
continuing contact with Ivory Coast, Central African
Republic, Kenya and Guinea.
Israeli success in getting Zaire and Liberia to re-open ties
stems largely from concern in these countries over Libyan
expansionism and frustration at Arab failures to follow through
on aid promises. Israeli promises of military and economic aid
have also played a role.
-- Nonetheless, many other African countries are reluctant to
restore ties with Tel Aviv because of Israel's close
relations with South Africa and continuing concern over
last year's invasion of Lebanon.
-- Despite intense Israeli efforts, there appears to be
little prospect of any other African country restoring
relations with the Jewish state in the near term.
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SUBJECT: Briefing Notes for the DCI
NESA M #83-10264
Orig. - DCI
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - C/PES
1 - D/NESA
2 - NESA/PS
1 - NESA/AI
2 - NESA/AI/I
2 - NESA/AI/L
2 - NESA/AI/M
DDI/NESA/AII I(12 Oct 83)
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