AFGHANISTAN: STATUS OF THE INSURGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000801040001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 11, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP85T00287R000801040001-0
Afghanistan: Status of the Insurgency
Talking Points for the DCI
11 October 1983
Fighting in Afghanistan will continue near current levels
over the next few years, barring a drastic change in Soviet
policy. Increasing insurgent effectiveness and the problems of
the Soviet and Afghan military do not threaten Soviet control but
do raise Soviet costs.
The Afghan insurgents have been seriously threatening urban
security and maintained intense pressure on convoys and military
posts. Since the invasion, Soviet costs have been considerable,
according to our estimates
-- Some 17,000 Soviets have been killed or wounded in
Afghanistan. The Afghan Army has suffered 50,000
casualties and nearly 80,000 men have deserted.
-- The insurgents have destroyed some 370 Soviet and Afghan
aircraft (mostly helicopters) and nearly 150 more have been
lost in accidents.
-- Approximately 10,000 Soviet and Afghan armored vehicles and
trucks have been destroyed or damaged.
-- Direct Soviet costs since the invasion probably total
around $12 billion.
The Soviets are becoming more concerned about their
difficulties in coping with the resistance. Soviet casualties and
air losses are substantially up over the levels of last year.
Improvements in insurgent air defenses are forcing Soviet aircraft
to use evasive tactics that reduce their effectiveness.
We judge that the insurgents will become more politically
sophisticated and militarily effective in the next two to three
years, but they will remain vulnerable.
-- The most serious threat to the resistance is civilian war-
weariness and loss of popular support over the long term.
-- Cooperation among insurgent bands has grown, but because of
deep ideological and religious differences a united
resistance movement in the next few years is unlikely.
-- The Soviets and the Kabul regime are likely to continue
attempts to arrange local truces and encourage defections.
The Soviets probably will continue to practice a strategy of
attrition. To maintain even current levels of security, however,
Moscow may have to consider at least small-scale reinforcements.
NESA M 83-10262
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP85T00287R000801040001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP85T00287R000801040001-0
SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Status of the Insurgency
Distribution:
Orig: - DCI
4 - CPAS
1 - C/PES
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - D/NESA
2 - NESA/PS
1 - NESA/SO
1 - NESA/SO/P
DDI/NESA/SO)
(11 October 83) 25X1
3
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP85T00287R000801040001-0