PAKISTAN: IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISTURBANCES IN SIND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000801000001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 5, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20SOS
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
5 October 1983
Pakistan: Im lications of the Disturbances in Sind
spa-*
President Zia is facing the most significant
challenge to his rule since he took over in 1977. We
believe Zia will be able to retain power unless wide-
spread protests break out in the key province of Punjab
and the Army Loses confidence in him. Despite some
grumbling, we judge that the Army's backing for Zia
remains firm. Zia will have to reassure the Army that
he can return the country to civilian rule without
widespread violence. He probably will have to modify
his plan to hold elections by March 1985 to quiet
opposition demands.
The disturbances in Sind Province, which arise
from deep-seated anger among ethnic Sindhis that their
interests have been neglected., have not spread to other
parts of Pakistan. Recent charges by Islamabad of
foreign instigation probably have increased Punjabi
reluctance to challenge the regime.
Zia still has to move carefully to avoid a major
incident in Sind. He will also have to be cautious not
to allow the opposition a national issue. Ae has
This memorandum was prepared by (South Asia 25X1
Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was prepared partially in response to questions from the
Department of State and DoD/ISA. Information as of 4 October
1983 was used in preparing this paper. Comments and queries are
welcome and should be addressed to Chief, South Asia Division,
NESA M 83-10255 25X1
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demonstrated considerable courage and acumen and pz?o-
bably can successfully manage the present crisis.
Pressure on Zia from within the Army to find a
solution to the Sind problem will grow if the agitation
continues unabated. In our view, the situation there
has gone beyond the point where purely administrative
measures such as removing corrupt bureaucrats will
suffice. We believe that Zia will eventually have to
compromise with moderate opposition leaders and Zet
some of them participate in elections. Failure to
negotiate now, while he retains a position of strength,
probably would require greeter concessions should the
civil disturbances spread.
Prolonged disturbances in Sind would encourage
other ethnic and opposition groups to join in the
agitation and might eventually force the hand of the
senior generals. Should Zia himself become the main
issue, the Army might remove him to make way for
negotiations. Widespread violence in Punjab Province
almost certainly would be sufficient to quickly bring
about the replacement of Zia by another general.
Alienation in Sind
We believe the current agitation is largely an expression of
local Sindhi resentment. Only a few incidents have occurred in
Pakistan's three other provinces. In contrast to Sind, attempts
to disrupt local elections elsewhere received virtually no
support. According to reports from the US Consulate, even in the
Sind provincial capital of Karachi, most protesters have been
Sindhi and Baluch. Other groups that form the majority of the
city's population have indicated some support for President
Zia. Karachi's sizeable leftist trade unions so far have not
joined the protests.
Ethnic Sindhis have lon been alien t d from Zia's martial
law government A traveler in Sind 25X1
recently found deep anger at the Army's overthrow of Prime
Minister Bhutto, a native of the province, in 1977 and his
execution two _years later. Sindhis resent the domination of the
largely Punjabi Army and bureaucracy and the economic inroads
being made in their province by outsiders. Press and Embassy
reports show the worst violence has occurred around strongholds
of the Pakistan People's Party in central Sind and farther north
where newly irrigated land is being iven to Punjabi settlers,
many of them former Army officers. 25X1
Sindhis are no longer a majority in their own province, and
Karachi, their capital and the largest city in Pakistan, has only
a small minority of Sindhis, most of them unskilled laborers,
experts note. Most Sindhis remain bound to the land in a feudal
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system renowned for its violence and repression. For Sindhis,
the Bhutto period opened new opportunities and raised expec-
tations, but Zia has reduced resources for Sind and depended on
non-Sindhis for support there. Punjabis and Pathans largely
control firms supplying labor to the Gulf, effectively keeping
Sindhis from an opportunity that has enriched perhaps a million
Pakistani households.
Various Embassy and press reports suggest the groups in the
forefront of the protests are the most influential in Sindhi
society:
-- Rural religious leaders: heads of heterodox Sufi sects
who feel threatened by the Islamization drive pushed by
the orthodox urban clergy. Enormously influential among
the peasantry and poor, these leaders often communicate
local needs to the bureaucracy and have often represented
their localities in national and provincial assemblies.
-- Landlords: the traditional ruling elite, many of whom are
connected to the People's Partv. They feel threatened by
social change. Barred by the Sind Government on 12 August
from contesting future elections, they are resisting the
loss of local influence and patronage. As the key
political class in the countryside, their support has
always been essential to a smooth-running bureaucracy.
-- Local elected officials: many also landlords, originally
allied with Zia and opposed to the PPP due to old
rivalries, protesting reduced resources earmarked for Sind
since 1979 that are funneled through local councils.
Extreme antiregime local opinion is forcing many of them
to resign or refuse to run in the upcoming local
elections.
-- Sindhi middle class: emergent group of students and
intellectuals who resent the domination of the
professions, private business, and the government services
by Punjabis, Urdu and Gujerati-speaking immigrants, and
Pathans. The most committed separatists are drawn from
this element.
Zia's Options
Despite six weeks of unrest, we believe Zia still hopes to
ride out these disturbances as he has lesser disorders in the
past. So far Zia has been careful to keep the Army as a tool of
last resort in the unrest and has made several minor gestures to
Sindhi opinion during his recent tour of the province. He has
made no public effort to address key Sindhi concerns.
Zia appears determined to carry through with his basic plan
to hold elections, amend the constitution to strengthen
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presidential powers, and lift martial law by March 1985. We
believe he may be ready to modify some of its details to mollify
moderate Sindhi leaders. Zia has left open the timing of
national elections and has not finally barred all opposition
parties from participating. He has said in public he is in touch
with moderate opposition politicians
Zia's top staff 25X1
officer met recently with Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi, a Sindhi and th
most prominent PPP leader currently in the country. 25X1
Jatoi refused Zia's offer to become Prime Minister 1bX~
under the current regime. 25X1
We believe the feeler to Jatoi was an o enin ambit to test
opposition moderates. Jatoi has 25X1
been offered the Prime Ministership by Zia before, only to have
it withdrawn. Jatoi has in the past expressed suspicion about
Zia's motives in making such offers and probably would require
other concessions before he would agree to negotiate. In our
view, it will be difficult for Jatoi or any other opposition
leader to make a deal with Zia as long as the disturbances in Sind
continue because they would fear losing their credibility. 25X1
We believe Zia may adopt administrative measures to deal
with the crisis, including the removal of bureaucrats, such as
the Punjabi Chief Secretary of Sind, who are known to be
corrupt. The government, in our view, also may look for ways to
put pressure on traditional Sindhi leaders by charging them with
avoiding court cases on land reform or bringing up old felony
charges. 25X1
Zia may also replace the Governor of Sind, Lieutenant
General Abbasi, a member of the original senior Army group that
helped Zia overthrow Bhutto. In our view, the removal of Abbasi
now would not by itself be interpreted as a sign of weakness.
Its impact would depend on whom Zia picks to repace him, and Zia
would have difficulty finding a senior officer who is not a
member of one of the communities disliked by ethnic Sindhis. The
choice of a hardline Punjabi or Pathan general would, we believe,
indicate a policy of repression that would only worsen the basic
problem over the mid- to long-term.
The Negotiations Gambit
In our view, the situation in Sind has gone beyond the point
where purely administrative measures will suffice and wi:11
ultimately require negotiations between Zia and moderate
opposition leaders. We believe failure to negotiate now, while
Zia retains a position of strength, probably would mean greater
concessions should the civil disturbances spread.
The moderates in the People's Party, in our view, now that
they have strengthened their support by leading protests and
going to jail, may be prepared to negotiate if the unresr_ dies
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down. They have common interests with the regime in seeing that
more extreme groups--like the land-reform minded Sind Hari
Committee and the Sind Awami Tehrik--do not gain significant
strength.
Although we believe opposition moderates will demand earlier
elections and the restoration of parliamentary government, the
key issue, in our view, will be their right to participate in
elections. We believe Zia must find a way to reassure the
moderates that Sindhi interests will be represented and their
place in the regional political and social order will not be
diminished.
In negotiating with the moderates, we believe Zia will have
to watch his right flank carefully, particularly if it appeared
that some People's Party elements might gain significant
concessions. Zia might then face competing demands from
conservative and Islamic groups that have supported him in the
past and who distrust the PPP.
The leftists groups in the opposition movement, including
the left wing of the PPP, oppose negotiations and want to force 25X1
more radical change. So far, however, the mainline Karachi
leftists have been unable to demonstrate strength by bringing
labor into the movement. Consulate reports show that only the
peasant radicals of interior Sind have shown some strength.
quiet Elsewhere
Although Zia is not a popular leader and lacks a strong base
outside the Army, there are no indications that the public
outside the Sird has decided he must go. We believe that to be
successful, an opposition movement would have to show significant
support in Punjab. With 65 percent of the population and much of
the country's wealth, Punjab is by far the dominant province in
Pakistan. It is also the home of most of the Army and civil
service. If the Army were called out to put down widespread
violence by fellow Punjabis, Zia probably would soon be replaced
Zia apparently has some support in Punjab for his plan for a
phased return to civilian rule. According to the press, bazaar
merchants and the local clerics--important elements in any urban
agitation--have so far refused to support opposition strikes and
demonstrations. We believe labor leaders probably would only
join a movement already well underway, and anti-Zia students have
been unable to organize because schools are closed for
vacation. Punjabis are the most concerned of Pakistan's ethnic
groups that the Indians or Soviets will exploit unrest in the
country
The People's Party retains the loyalty of much of the rural
and urban poor in Punjab,
but we believe only Bhutto's wife and daughter could quickly
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galvanize these groups. Bhutto's widow is undergoing treatment
for a serious illness in Europe, and his daughter has been under
house arrest since 1981. Other PPP groups among lawyers,
professionals, and landlords have attempted to arouse opposition
in the province's cities but so far have failed.
In an apparent effort to keep the unrest from spreading to
Punjab, 7ia has been emphasizing his commitment to Islamization
to keep conservative Islamic parties that have influence in
Karachi and Punjab from joining the protests. In Punjab the
government informally permitted opposition figures to run in
local elections on a case-by-case basis. We believe this
maneuver helped undercut the MRD's efforts to organize an
election boycott and may enable the regime to buy off moderate
PPP landlords in central and western Punjab.
The Religious Groups and pro-Zia Opposition
Zia's position has been strengthened over the years by the
tacit support of several parties, including most of the religious
groups, and he would face serious trouble if they decided to
oppose him. So far only one of these parties--the Jamiat-ul-
Ulema-i-Islam (JUI)--has decided to join the civil disobedience
movement. The JUI is a left of center Islamic party that has
significant support among the Pushtun tribes of Baluchistan and
southern North-West Frontier Province. Part of the alliance that
served under Zia in a previous cabinet, the party split over
leadership issues and the question of joining the opposition
Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. The JUI has now
decided to back the MRD campaign, but we believe the party's
Punjab faction will continue to show little enthusiasm for the
MRD.
A second party--the Muslim League--has not yet decided to
support the agitation, but wants to emphasize its independence
and to maneuver itself into negotiations with the government.
The League, a remnant of the party that founded Pakistan, has
little popular support, but its membership includes some
influential landlords in Sind, Punjab and the NWFP. The Pir of 25X1
Pagaro--the most prominent of Sind's traditional divines and
currently head of the League--in the past has offered his party
Pakistani security officials want to use the 25X1
Pir s militant followers--called Hurs--to protect government
installations in Sind. At the same time, however, Pagaro's
shrine town was the scene of anti-Zia demonstrations in mid-
September and he likely is under strop ressure from hi Sindhi
adherents to support the agitation. 25X1
A third party, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), is
leaning towards active opposition, according to the press. The
JUP--the mainline Sunni party--is not well organized but does
claim the support of thousands of local clerics in Karachi and
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urban Punjab. According to the press, the JiJP head initially_
said he would keep his party out of the campaign for a month to
give Zia a chance to negotiate. According to the press, he
declared his party would join the agitation on 1 October if Zia
did not meet with the opposition and agree to early elections.
However, as October 1 approached, the JUP leader again delayed,
asserting he had received an offer from 7.ia to hold talks.
According to the US Consulate in Karachi, however, the party's
Punjab wing is pressing the party's leader to hold off on direct
elections. A decision by local clerics--who have benefited from
Zia's Islamization policies--to heed the leader's call of open
opposition would spread protests to Punjabi cities. 25X1
The Jama'at-i-Islami (JI), the smallest but best organized
and most fundamentalist party, so far continues its tacit support
for Zia. The JI has strong support among students,
professionals, and business groups in Karachi and Punjab,
Its strong organization and dedicated 25X1
followers made it the core of the movement that toppled Bhutto,
and it would be a formidable opponent if it decided to challenge
Zia in the streets. We believe a decision to do so would
indicate that opinion in key Punjab cities like Lahore had begun
to shift decisively against Zia. The senior generals would
probably view Zia's position as si nificantly eroded if he lost
the Jama'at's support. 25X1
Outlook
6~de do not believe that either the MRD's "fill the jails"
movement or the disturbances in Sind now threatens to topple
President Zia. Public opinion in no other province has risen to
support the Sindhis. Indeed, too many concessions to ethnic
Sindhis could alienate "new Sindhis"--Punjabi and Pathan settlers
in Sind--who have influence in their home provinces.
Most Punjabis presumably have concluded that their coixntry's
interests would be better served by permitting President Zia to
implement his program than by engaging in the kind of
disturbances that would benefit the Indians and Soviets.
Although some urban groups in Punjab--lawyers, professionals and
some students--want a return to the 1973 parliamentary system and
national elections, Zia can claim that his plan offers an
alternative to continued martial law or the chaotic parlimentary
politics of the Bhutto era. Nonetheless, if important interest
groups in Punjab conclude the opposition is gaining momentum
against Zia, they would quickly join against him.
e eginning of cooler weather (October-November) as the
beginning of a new political season, and anti-Zia rou s will
increase their attempts to start trouble.
Punjabis usually regard
25X1
25X1
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Zia still depends on the Army to remain in power.
some senior officers have doubts that
Zia's program to restore civilian government by March 1985, can
succeed, but there is no evidence they are plotting against
him. In our view, the Army, which regards itself as the final
arbiter of Pakistan's destiny, would be extremely reluctant to
remove one of its own from power as a result of pressure from
opposition politicians. However, it would replace Zia if it
believed such a move was in the Army's and the country's broader
We judge that Zia will attempt to ride out the current storm
by dealing firmly with violent protests and putting out feelers
to the moderates. Unrest probably would have to spread beyond
Sind before Zia would consider major modifications in his program
to restore an amended constitution, although he might make a show
of negotiating to reassure the Army. Zia certainly will use both
the Soviet threat from Afghanistan and the historic fear of India
to remind Pakistanis that the country cannot afford domestic
turmoil.
Prolonged disturbances in Sind, in our view, would persuade
many that Zia was losing control, and protests by dissidents
probably would gain momentum even in Punjab. We believe Zia's
policies would then come under increasing criticism from within
the Army. Junior and middle level officers, in our view, would
renew their pressure to get the Army out of politics and back to
the barracks. More senior officers would become critical of
Zia's handling of the crisis and possibly begin maneuvering to
succeed him.
The Army would act against Zia and his senior advisers if it
believed the government had lost control of the situation.
Evidence that public opinion had shifted against Zia or the
spreading of the movement to Punjab would likely bring about the
replacement of Zia by another general. We believe the Army would
act as a unit and that the change would be peaceful. If faced
with spreading disorders and growing doubts in the Army, Zia
might eventually elect to leave voluntarily and turn over power
to another general.
In our view, a successor to Zia would attempt to negotiate a
return to civilian rule on terms the Army could accept. The Army
would attempt to preserve the present US-Pakistan relationship,
but, if the Pakistan People's Party took over, we believe
Pakistan's ties with the United States and its position on
Afghanistan would significantly weaken.
Indicators of Problems for Zia
Indications that Zia is not coping adequately with the
disturbances and that momentum is shifting against him would be:
25X1
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-- Continuing disturbances marked by growing violence and
increased Army involvement in internal security duties.
-- A major incidence of police or Army overreaction that
causes general revulsion throughout the country.
-- The disruption of transportation through Sind that results
in shortages and higher prices of food and fuel in
Karachi.
-- Prolonged antigovernment demonstrations in Sind, including
armed attacks on police and Army units, that require the
redeployment of troops to Sind from opposite India.
-- Widespread student demonstrations that turn from
university to national political issues, move off campus,
and begin to coalesce with opposition demonstrations.
-- Involvement of non-Sindhi elements in Hyderabad and
Karachi, such as bazaar merchants, clerics, and
laborers.
Indications that Zia is in real trouble and could soon be
removed would be:
-- Signs that local clerics in Punjab cities are heeding
calls to confront Zia.
-- A decision by the Jama'at-i-Islami to confront Zia in the
streets of Karachi and Lahore.
-- The outbreak of widespread violent protests in Punjab,
particularly in the cities of Lahore and Rawalpindi.
-- Indications that bazaar merchants, clerics, and laborers
are joining demonstrations by students, lawyers, and
professional women.
-- Signs the military--particularly the Army corps
commanders--is becoming unwilling to suppress
antigovernment demonstrations, particularly in Punjab.
-- Indications that senior Army officers are becoming
dissatisfied with Zia's conduct and are making contacts on
their own with political leaders.
-- Signs of an Indian troop buildup opposite Sind Province
raising concern that India means to take advantage of
Pakistan's troubles if the disturbances in Sind continue.
-- Efforts by senior Pakistani security officers to seek
advice from the United States about what should be done.
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SUBJECT: Pakistan: Implications of the Distrubances in Sind
Internal Distribution:
Orig - C/SO/P
1 - DDI
1 - DDI Registry
1 - VC/NIC
NI NESA
PDB Staff
OCPAS Intelligence Liaison Staff
OCPAS /I I~ID/CB
C/PES
D/GGI
DDO/NE
C/BONA/C~
C/DDO/NE
C/DDO/NE
D/NESA
DD/NESA
NESA/PS
C/NESA/PG
C/NESA/SO
C/NESA/SO/P
C/NESA/SO/S
DDI/NESA/SOS
10
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(26 Sept 83)
25X1
25X1
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SUBJECT: Pakistan: Implications of the Distrubances in Sind
1- Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, Department of State (Howard B.
Schaffer)
1- Senior Director, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
National Security Council (Geoffrey Kemp)
1- Ronald Zwart, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
DoD/ISA.
1- Capt. Robert G. Anderson, Far East/South Asia Division,
Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Chief of Staff
1- Director, PAB, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, Department of State, (Harmon E. Kirby)
1- Mr. Peter Burleigh, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
1- Ns. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Policy Planning Staff, Department
of State
1- Mr. James Rodzinski, Intelligence Coordinator, NSC
1- Situation Room, West ring, White House
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