INDIA-PAKISTAN: CURRENT RELATIONS AND SECURITY CONCERNS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000800770001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 14, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELhIGENCE
14 September 1983
India-Pakistan: Current Relations and Security Concerns
Relations between India and Pakistan have improved somewhat
over the past year, in our view. The two countries are attemp-
ting to settle a variety of nonpolitical issues through their
recently established Joint Commission. Progress on political
talks, !;owever, has stalled over. substanr.ive disagreements on the
r-:at~_~re :.~f_ r,he~ir relationship
-- New De]..hi wants Islamabad to affirm India's view that the
two countries would be limited to the bilateral sett]_ement
of dis~ur_es unless both sides agreed to outside mediation.
-- India requires that both sides abide by a definir_ion of
nonalignment that specifically forbids either sr_ate the
right to grant military bases to a third power or enr_er
.into a foreign alliance.
-- Ln our view, India wants a permanent shelving of the
Kashmir dispute and Pakistani recognition of the current
ceasefire line as an international boundary.
Both India and Pakistan view the other as its primary enemy
and their improved relationship remains tenuous and could easily
be disrupted.
-- .Pakistan believes India has never accented its independent
existence and it wants to make it a caeak buffer state
under. Indian hegemony. Islamabad is particularly
Chief, South Asia Division
of_ September ].2, 1983 was used in pr.eparatin of this paper.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to
25X1
25X1
This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation
for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as 25X1
~~~s~ m 83-iva~.
SECRN T
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concerned that India and the Soviets will- cooperate to
impose their demands on Pakistan.
-- 'India views Pakistan's strong ties with China with alarm
and charges that Pakistan is usi-~g the Afghanistan r_risis
to strengthen itself against India. It opposes US weapons
assistance to Pakistan and wants to maintain the Indian
Ocean area free of superpower rivalry.
Both countries have the bulk of their armed forces deployed
along their common border. India's forces opposite Pakistan are
larger and better equipped than those of Pakistan. Even with
Pakistan's current arms modernization, we estimate that India's
military superiority over Pakistan. will continue to grow through
the 1980s. (See attached graphics)
Pakistan has 1ir.tle strategic depth opposite India. Most of_
its principal cities and major lines of communications are within
100 kilometers of the Indian border. A major breakthrough by
Indian Forces would immediately threaten Pakistan's most
important political, cultural, and economic assets.
Consequently, Pakistan's military strategy emphasizes a forward
defense against India.
-- Pakistan's armed forces have serious command-and-contr.ol.,
training, and logistic deficiencies, according to our
analysis, which limit their effectiveness, even with the
acquisition of new weapons.
-- Pakistan has more strategic depth in the west and has
adopted a strategy of defense-in-depth opposite
Afghanistan. The deployment of_ only four divisions in the
west supports this stategy; Pakistan would have time to 25X1
move reinforcements from east to west before Afghan or
Soviet forces could threaten vital Pakistani assets.
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DIRECTORATE OF INTEL.LIG.Er1CF.
14 September 1983
Afghanistan: Status and Prospects of the Insurgency
Three and a half years after the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan, the resistance has become an effective force
controls much of the country
Barring a drastic change in Soviet policy, we judge the fighting
will continue over the next few years because existing Soviet
forces wilt be unable to destroy the resistance. Despite
improvements in weapons and training, however, we believe the
insurgents will lack the firepower and organization to defeat
The Soviets are becoming more concerned about their
difficulties in coping with the resistance
-- Large-scale Soviet and Afghan operations this spring and
early summer failed to weaken the resistance and the
Afghan Government still controls only about 30 percent of
the country; the same amount it controlled in July 1982.
-- The insurgents have expanded the war with attacks in and
around major cities, especially Kabul. The Soviets are
apprehensive over increasing guerrilla activity in western
Afghanistan and infiltration from Iran.
-- The Soviets have failed so far to rebuild the Afghan Army
into a force capable of effectively fighting the
^ Soviet costs in the war have been considerable, according to
-- We estimate r_hat over 16,000 Soviets have been killed or
wounded in Afghanistan. The Afghan Army has suffered
50,000 casualties and nearly 80,000 men have deserted.
This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation
for. the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as
of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to
/~ L _ _ ~ .. . _ -
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-- The insurgents have shot down or destroyed in attacks on
airfields some 350 Soviet and Afghan aircraft (mostly
helicopters) and nearly 150 more have been lost i.n
accidents.
-- Approximately 10,000 Soviet and Afghan armored vehicles
and trucks have been destroyed or damaged.
-- Direct Soviet costs in Afghanistan probably total around
12 billion dollars since the invasion.
Nevertheless, we judge the Soviets still find the costs
bearable and apparently believe that their relations with many
countries are recovering from the damage done by the .invasion and
that in the long run they will overcome the resistance. We
believe there is no immediate prospect that the Soviets will.
decide to reduce their military effort in Afghanistan.
We judge that the resisrance fighters will become more
politically sophisticated and militarily effective in the next
two years, but they will remain vulnerable.
-- The most serious threat to the resistaFnce is civilian war-
weariness acid the loss of popular support over the long term
that would directly affect the will r_o continue fighting.
-- Cooperation among insurgent bands has grown, but because
of deep ideological, political, and religious differences, 25X1
we do not foresee a united resistance movement emerging in
the next few years.
-- The Soviets and the Kabul regime are likely, in our view,
to continue and probably increase a wide variety of covert
and overt activities--such as arranging truces,
encouraging defections, and subverting groups--to exploit
insurgent weaknesses inside and outside of Afghanistan.
There are some Soviet options--massive troop reinforcement
or a widespread scorched earth policy against civilians--that
might drastically reduce the insurgency in the next two years.
-- Moscow would, however, be reluctant to assume the high
economic, political, and military costs associated with
these options, in our judgment.
The Soviets have started a number of economic, educational,
social, and political programs in Afghanistan that they believe
will eventually turn the county into a viable Soviet-dominated
communist state Because of wide-
spread insurgent activity an. opposition from the Afghan people,
however, r.hese programs have been implemented in only a few
SECRET
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l rnicil Irncllit;cn~c ;\:,rn~~
DIRI:,CTORATr OF Iit!'1'ELLIGENCE
14 Septemt.~er 1.983
Pakistan: Steadfastness on Afghanistan
Pakistani leaders view the Soviet presence in Af hanist
a strategic threat.
~i'hey believe
25X1
the Soviets want to
Gulf and the Indian
gain permanent
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nd
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ac
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ed that Moscow
25X1
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i
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olitical and mil
itary
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ess
ure o
n Pakistan
25X1
once
t
;as consoli
dates its hold o
n Afgt~,
an
ist
an.
they are concerned that 1`,oscow will collaborate
wit? India to neutralise and divide Pakistan--perhaps by a
combination of external military pressure and subversive meddling
We believe Pakistan continues tc engage the Soviets in
periodic talks on Afghanistan for a number of reasons:
The UN-sponsored talks provide Pakistan both witi~ a way to
test Soviet intentions in Afghanistan and maintain
international support for its position on Afghanistan.
Pakistan keeps its channels open to ~7oscow because it
worries that the irlest will in time forget about
Afghanistan or reach an agreement over Pakistan's head as
part of a larger i/ast-West settlement.
The refugee problem inside Pakistan has become a major
concern to Islamabad. Rising local resentments and
concern in the Army that some 3 million Afghan refugees
will become a permanent burden for Pakistan have added a
note of urgency to Pakistan's search for a political
settlement. So far, however, relations between the Afghan
refugees and locals--who belong to the same et;~nic group--
,-. ...,~ h__~ ~----~
`t'his memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation
f_or th,e Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as
of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper.
Comments and queries are welcome and should 'ae addressed to
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ode doubt Islamabad is ready to shift its stand on the issue
in ways that would damage US interests. So far in the .indirect
talks at Geneva, 'Pakistan has remained steadfast in its
insistence that a oolit.ical settlement is contingent
withdrawal of Soviet troops. According to
statements by senior Pakistani officials:
Islamabad supports the Afghan insurgents in order to make
it more, difficult for the Soviets to consolidate their
hold on Afghanistan. An active insurgency is crucial to
Pakistan's diplomatic campaign to keep Afghanistan before
world opinion as an issue that can be settled only by the
withdrawal of_ Soviet troops.
A political settlement acceptable to the Zia regime would
have to permit the voluntary return to Afghanistan of the
Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Islamabad knovas the refugees
will not return home unless the Soviets first withdraw
their troops.
Pakistan has consistently refused to recognize the ;3abrak
regime. Islamabad knows that recognition is its trump
card. It is doubtful that it would play it until a pull-
out of Soviet troops is largely completed and most o,`_ the
refugees have returned home.
Pakistan's current policy on Afghanistan receives strong
support from conservative religious parties at home and
vital friends abroad, such as Saudi Arabia, Chirra, and the
US. Pakistan's strong stand on Afghanistan and its
support for an active insurgency enables it to argue more
effectively with the Saudis, the JS, and China that it
needs and deserves enhanced Diplomatic, economic, ar.~
military support.
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Ccntr~l Intcllit~cnc:c A~cncy
Dl tZL'CTOfZ~~~~; Or' IrVJ.'LLLIGENCE
14 September 1983
Pakistan: [mplications of ~~Ii.l.itary Commitments to Arab States
Pakistan's approxi;nately 18,000 military personnel stationer
in the A~iddle East and North Africa are becoming an important
vehicle for achievement of Islamabad's foreign policy goals.
Pakistan has reaped si~ar.ificant benefits from the program,
according to our analysis:
-- Salary remittances have provided an economic boost.
-- Islamabad has acciuired n?aw sources of arms procurement.
-- Pakistan. has become one of the lar est non-
~C Financial support from 9 Arab recipients
the oil-rich Arab states.
-- Pakistan's ,nil.itary personnel have gained valuable
training on advanced Westarn and Soviet military
euuipment--ir~cluring Soviet air
a wetter underStan~~in of the ca rabilitieCnofathgiven there
Air nonce. g p c _ Indian
Ne `>P1.ievF~ t~~e m111taCLLJ assistance, however, also carries
risks.
-- 'The longer the Pakistani troops stay abroad, the greater
the risk that Pakistan will become embroiled in local or
r?gional conflicts to which it is not a party.
-- Pakistan's i;rternation~l ima ~
that it provires "soldiers for hir~arnished by charges
suci~ as Libya. to radical regimes
(morale within the armed forces
could be damaged by the disparit betwe
domestic salaries and b ,. Y en overseas and
Y dis~,ri;nination against r'akisr
Shia personnel by the rr~r?;,,;,,.,r- __ _-? ~ ani
This memoran~.~um was prepared by the South Asia Division,
Office of [Dear rastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation
for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan.
of September 12, 1983 was use~a Information as
Comments and queries are welcor~ln preparation of this pap`r.
Chisf, South Asi. should be addressed to
~ ~~ivi.sion
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We judge Pakistan will continue and may even expand its
military ties with the Middle East in order to ensure Arab
political support and economic assistance. In our view, as .long
as Pakistani personnel demonstrate competence and Pakistan
maintains a stable and moderate government with Cslamic
credentials, there will be a market Eor its militarv r~ersonnel in
the ~~lide3le East and North Africa. tae believe that concern over
external. and internal threats to stability brought on by the
strife in Lebanon, the continuing Iran/Iraq conflict, and Iran's
Shia religious fanaticism might well prompt the Gulf states to
request even larger foreign military contingents.
Our analysis suggests, however, that several factors could
slow an expansion of military ties or lead to a reduction in
requests for military assistance:
The limited capacity of the recipient countries to abscrb
more military personnel.
Competition from other states to supply military advisers.
The risk that Pakistan could be drawn into regional
conflicts.
-- The limited number of_ skilled technical personnel in
The United States generally benefits from Pakistan's
military assistance program. Cooperation between Islamabad and
the Arab States strengthens tre military establishments of
moderate governments while dampening Pakistan's financial demands
on the United States and minimizi-~g the US visibility in this
sensitive region. Only in life training of Li}~yan pilots avid
small numbers of Palestinian guerrillas co Pakistan's r~.~ilitary
ties run counter to US interests. ;,~~e assess that a setback to
the military assistance program, accompanied by a reduction in
Arab economic assistance to Pakistan, would increase political
and economic strains in Pakistan and increase Islamaba~?'s
requests i:or US economic and military ,aid.
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