THE MAGHREB--PAST, PRESENT AND POTENTIAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000800340001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 21, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
21 July 1983
The Maghreb--Past, Present and Potential
Summary
The moderate, pro-Western regimes in Morocco and
Tunisia appear secure for the near term but face future
challenges--a deteriorating economy and domestic discontent
in Morocco's case, economic difficulties and possible
succession problems in Tunisia's. In Algeria, a more
flexible leadership has adjusted its foreign policy to
include a more open approach to relations with the US, and
has taken the initiative in promoting greater Maghreb
cooperation. Should Algeria's cautious moves toward the US
result in a more pro-Western stance for that country, and
thus the Maghreb as a whole, the US would derive a number of
benefits--a strengthened voice for moderation in OAU and
Arab League councils, a more constructive role with respect
to US Middle East peace plans, more strenuous efforts to
contain Libya, strategic advantages, and increased US sales
to the region.
History
The countries of the Maghreb--Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia--
share common bonds of history, language and religion; but each
has developed different political systems and philosophies. The
region originally belonged to the Berber tribes whose descendants
form the genetic base of the Maghrebi people. The coastal areas
of the region were subsequently dominated by Carthaginian, Roman,
and Arab conquerors.' The Arabs and their religion, Islam, made
the strongest and a lasting impact. Algeria and Tunisia were
provinces of the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire for 300 years from the
early sixteenth century to the early 1800s. Morocco remained
independent during this period.
This memorandum was prepared by the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli
Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was requested by the National Security Council staff. 25X1
Information as of 21 July 1983 was used in its preparation.
Questions and comments are welcome and should be directed to
Chief, Arab-Israeli Division 25X1
NESA M#83-10172
SECRET 25X1
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Algeria was occupied by French troops in 1830, initiating
132 years of colonial rule. Algerian independence was achieved
only after a brutal war that lasted nearly eight years, conducted
under the direction of the National Liberation Front and leading
to the establishment of the Republic of Algeria in 1962.
Algeria's first head of state, Ahmed Ben Bella (currently in
exile), was ousted when his defense minister, Colonel Houari
Boumediene, seized power in a bloodless coup in 1965. After the
death of Boumediene in 1979, Colonel Chadli Bendjedid became
president through an orderly transfer of power. Algeria's
revolution against the French contributed to its policies of
nonalignment, strong ties with the socialist camp, and support
for national liberation movements in the post independence era.
Tunisia was occupied by France in 1881 and remained a French
protectorate for 75 years. The French left a strong imprint of
their culture and technology, and created a gallicized elite to
whom leadership was peacefully passed when the protectorate was
ended in 1956. The dominant factors of Tunisia's modern
political life are the power and personality of President Habib
Bourquiha and the influence of the nestourian Socialist Party.
With independence, Bourquiha used his prestige to
institutionalize presidential dominance and to secure for his
party an unchallenged supremacy over rival groups.
In Morocco, the relatively brief period of the French and
Spanish protectorate (1912-56), during which resistance of
individual tribes to outside intervention was succeeded by a
genuine Moroccan nationalism, may be seen as a short interlude in
the long history of independent Morocco. The institution of the
monarchy was changed only slightly by French domination, and that
change was to increase the popularity of the over 300-year old
Alaouite dynasty--the world's oldest reigning royal house. King
Hassan II's father, Mohammed V, was sent into exile by the French
in 1953 because of his refusal to act as their puppet. By
independence in 1956, the monarchy had become the symbol of
nationalism. King Hassan, who ascended the throne in 1961 after
the death of his father, continues to rule in the traditional and
authoritarian fashion of his predecessors.
Current Trends
In Morocco, the moderate, pro-Western regime of King Hassan
II appears secure for the near term but faces growing domestic
challenges. neterioratinq economic conditions, coupled with
risinq expectations amonq the burgeoning and youthful population,
are sources of popular discontent. Rahat's financial position
has been severely weakened by its heavy dependence on foreign
petroleum, several poor grain harvests, a depressed world market
for phosphates--the country's primary export--and the continuinq
conflict in Western Sahara. The heavy foreign debt--equivalent
to two-thirds of gross domestic product--has significantly
reduced the nation's creditworthiness and foreign exchange
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reserves are able to cover less than a week of imports. Morocco
may not be able to secure all of the required financing needed to
cover its large current account deficit and debt service
obligations, and some form of debt rescheduling may be
necessary. If the economy continues to deteriorate and touqh
austerity measures are implemented, domestic discontent with the
regime is likely to increase.
For several years, Tunisian domestic politics have been
dominated by the question of succession to President Rourguiba.
Tunisian policy has continued along the moderate, pragmatic path
established by Rourguiba while potential successors maneuver for
the day when the aging president passes from the scene. Although
a successor regime would likely retain Tunisia's basically pro-
Western orientation, there are forces in the country--principally
Islamic fundamentalists--that could push for dramatic changes if
their influence increased in the post-Rourguiba era. The
Tunisian economy is stagnating, with the overall growth rate for
1982 only 0.8 percent. Export earnings are down because of the
soft oil market, while imports have risen due to increases in
food, consumer goods, and capital equipment imports.
Unemplovment and underemployment are running at about 20-25
percent. Balance of payment problems and government budget
deficits will probably lead to a slowdown in development
projects; military purchases from the US already have been
affected.
Under Algeria's pragmatic President Chadli Rendjedid, the
Algerian leadership has been trying to introduce some tactical
flexibility into its ideological framework. Algeria has
significantly adjusted its foreign policy to include a more open
and positive approach to relations with the United States.
Rendjedid's purpose is to reap economic benefits, balance
Algeria's dependence on the Soviet Union for arms, and encourage
the United States to take a more evenhanded position on North
African issues. In practical terms, he has muted Algeria's anti-
Western rhetoric, is gradually diversifying arms procurement, and
is taking a more active and cooperative posture in promoting
stability in the Middle East. Although Algeria has byno means
moved completely into the moderate Arab camp or given unqualified
support to US negotiation efforts, the change in its posture is
dramatic as compared with only a few years aqo.
Renjedid's pragmatism is also reflected in a reorientation
of the Algerian economy. Algeria continues to he strongly
committed to socialism but has recently shown a willingness to
decentralize the national industries and to allow qreater private
sector participation. The Algerian leadership has publicly
stated that it is willing to increase US imports, and the number
of contacts between US firms and Alqerian officials has increased
noticeably in the last year.
With respect to the Maghreb as a whole, the major trend
today is toward greater cooperation. The initiative for this
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movement came primarily from Rendjedid, who has taken steps over
the past year to normalize relations with his Maghreb neighbors,
particularly Morocco. Rendjedid's efforts have resulted in a
limited opening of Algeria's border with Morocco, settlement of a
long-standing border dispute with Tunisia, resumption of dialogue
with Libya and increased Mauritanian participation in Maghreb
affairs. Bendjedid has met with Moroccan King Hassan, Tunisian
President Rourguiba, Mauritanian President Haidalla, and Libya's
deputy leader Jallud and with each has made a strong pitch for
greater Maghreb cooperation and political unity. The Tunisians
have been particularly receptive to the "greater Maghreb" idea,
in part because they see the advantages of regional cooperation,
but also because the Libyan threat to Tunisia's stability is a
Rendjedid's initiative has a variety of objectives. He
wants to assert influence with Tunisia in order to forestall a
possible Libyan bid for power there when Rourguiba leaves the
scene. He believes that reasonably close relations with Libya's
Oadhafi will help contain Libyan troublemaking. He sees Maghreb
cooperation as a primary method of precluding chances of
superpower intervention--something to which Algeria remains
deeply committed.
Normalizing Algeria's relations with Morocco is the linchpin
of Rendjedid's plan, but the Western Sahara issue--Algeria's
support for the Polisario Front fighting against Morocco--stands
in the way. So far, neither side appears to be considering major
concessions, although new negotiating formulas for achieving a
settlement are under active consideration. Even if no compromise
emerges, the process of negotiation at least allows the two
countries to go forward with bilateral relations.
Benefits of a Pro-Western Maghreb
The concept of pro-t-7estern Maghreb essentially involves an
even more significant shift in Algeria's orientation, because
Morocco and Tunisia are already strong supporters of US
policies. We see certain limits on Algeria's likely evolution in
this direction. Although Algeria's increasingly moderate and
pragmatic foreign policy has created a confluence of interests
with the US, ideological and regional policy differences will
constrain relations with Washington and limit Algeria's
identification with the t?Testern camp. Nevertheless, we do
believe the Algerian government will continue its cautious
approach toward developing closer ties with the US.
That having been said, a pro-Western Maghreb--in other
words, a Morocco and a Tunisia essentially as they are now, along
with an Algeria that maintains a more neutral stance but is
friendlier to the US--could benefit the US in several ways. A
shared friendship for the US would in itself enhance prospects
for regional cooperation, and this in turn would lend the Maghreb
a strengthened voice for moderation in OAU and Arab League
councils. We could not expect the three states to agree with the
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US in all cases, but they would share a general interest in
shoring up pro-Western regimes and countering destabilizing
influences. They would also be likely to adopt a more active and
cooperative role with respect to US diplomatic approaches to the
Arab-Israeli dilemma.
All three Maqhreb countries share a common interest in
combattinq Libya as a subversive threat to themselves, as well as
in limitinq Libyan influence in both Arab and African circles.
Even given a more pro-Western Algeria, this interest would
probably not take the form of overt hostility towards Libya,
because Alqeria believes--as do the other two, and most Arab
governments--that Oadhafi is less dangerous when bilateral
relations are at least ostensibly friendly. The Maghreb
countries might well step up support for anti-Oadhafi dissidents,
however, whose activities are an irritant, though not a serious
threat, to the Oadhafi regime.
A more pro-Western Maghreh would have significant advantages
in the military sphere as well. It would facilitate the US and
NATO task of keeping the Mediterranean sea lanes open. The
Maghreb role would be restricted to providing US access to
installations--or denying the Soviets access--in a future NATO or
Middle Eastern crisis, however; none of the three states would be
capable of policing the Straits of Gilbralter without significant
ITS involvement. The US could derive a major benefit if Algeria
imposed further restrictions on Soviet port visits. Algeria is
unlikely, however, to allow siqnificantly expanded American
access. Tunisia already denies Soviet nuclear submarines the use
of Tunisian repair facilities, necessitating a lengthy return to
Baltic Sea ports.
Western military ties with Morocco and Tunisia are already
close, with military assistance and arms sales generally
increasing. The US has military agreements with Morocco allowing
access and transit rights for the Rapid Deployment Force, and
both Tunisia and Morocco have particiated in joint amphibious and
desert warfare exercises with the US. The US has sold C-130s to
Alqeria, and an opportunity exists for expanded military sales.
Algeria's opposition to superpower presence in the area, however,
probably would prevent the emergence of any North African defense
arrangement with the US.
Maqhreb support for US military action in the Middle Fast
would be qreatest if an external power were involved, or if the
US were to intervene to protect a conservative Arab state from
radicals. None of the Maghreh states would be inclined to back
UTS resupply of Israel in another Arab-Israeli war.
A pro-Western Maghreb could enhance US economic interests in
the region as well. Better relations would mean that US firms
would be invited to participate on a more timely basis on bids
for transportation, agricultural, construction, military,
hydrocarbon, and petrochemical equipment and technology
contracts. The greatest potential benefits would be in
c G'('D t'm
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Algeria. Respect for US technical expertise on the part of all
the Maghreb countries, coupled with Algeria's interest in
diversifying its sources of supply, could lead to a very
profitable increase in US sales to the region.
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SURJFCT: The Maghreb--Past, Present and Potential
DDI/NESA/AI /M,
National Security Staff
DDI
Exec Director
DCI/SA/IA
NIO/NESA
C/PES
PDB Staff
CPAS/IMD/CB
CPAS/ILS
D/NESA
NESA/PPS
NESA/AI
NESA/AI/M
(21 July 83)
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