AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000800190003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 21, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
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Afghanistan Situation Report
Top Secret
NGA Review Completed
Copy n
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FOOD SHORTAGES IN SOUTHWEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The war has had a devastating effect on the food situation in
southwestern Afghanistan.
INSURGENT RAIDS ACROSS THE SOVIET BORDER . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Afghan insurgent raids across the Soviet border have had a
negligible military impact, although they probably bolster
insurgent morale.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be directed to
21 June 1983
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The war in southwestern Afghanistan has had a devastating
effect on the food situation, reducing farm output and disruptin
internal food rain distribution
high levels of malnutrition among refugees and wounded insurgent
during the first half of 1983. Crop yields have reportedly
dropped sharply because of problems with seed and lack of
sufficient equipment, fertilizer, pesticides, and labor.
Comment: We believe that disruptions in distribution rather
than overall supply shortfalls are the immediate cause of food
shortages and the threat of famine. Even under normal
conditions, most of Afghanistan is somewhat dependent on outside
supplies. The public distribution network and private farmers
normally assured that foodgrains were moved from surplus areas.
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Mass starvation is currently unlikely because private emergency
and seed stocks could be eaten, and the flow of refugees to
neighboring countries could increase.
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Afghan insurgent raids across the Soviet border have had a negligible
military impact and pose no threat to the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan. Although the raids have been sporadic and small scale,
they probably have heightened Moscow's concern about border security and
the stability of its ethnic minority areas close to the border. The
raids may also marginally raise Soviet military costs by tying down
additional forces in border security. From the insurgents' standpoint,
the infrequent forays mainly help to maintain morale and may enable
insurgents to procure limited amounts of supplies. 25X1
Border Situation
Historians generally agree that the Tajik, Uzbek, and Turkmen peoples
who were divided by the delineation of the Soviet-Afghan border in the
19th century have always regarded it as an artificial imposition of
colonial mapmakers. The establishment of the Soviet presence in Central
Asia caused armed resistance--in many ways similar to the present Afghan
resistance movement--that peaked in the early 1920s but was not finally
crushed until the 1930s. That resistance was periodically aided by
peoples of northern Afghanistan, and after that resistance failed, many
Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmens fled across the border to settle out of
reach of Soviet control.
On at least the Afghan side of the border, a folk memory of that
struggle has remained alive, according to Western journalists. That
memory has emphasized hatred of Soviet.-style control and of ethnic
Russian domination. Within the USSR, political and police methods have
kept this hostility under control, but Soviet authorities have always
been apprehensive about it. Such concern may have been a factor in the
Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan.
Soviet Border Security
The USSR's sensitivity about its borders has prompted strict security s
along them, with the Soviet-Afghan border being particularly well
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guarded. KGB Border Guards maintain careful control over the populated
parts of the border region and closely monitor civilians in the area,
The KGB's activities are in accord with a
Soviet law that establishes a "forbidden zone" 30 kilometers deep along
all USSR borders. Imagery indicates that there are about 100 outposts
along the approximately 2,500-kilometer border and an estimated 8,000 to
12,000 guards, who could be augmented as necessary by approximately
8,000 regular army troops in the area. Civilian residents of the zone
are registered; travelers are checked for appropriate entry stamps and
for legitimate reasons for entry; residents are warned to report unusual
activity or the appearance of strangers.
Physical security along the Soviet side of the border--defined by a
river in its more populous parts and running through high mountains and
deserts in other stretches--varies according to the terrain. Imagery
indicates that heavy security--a combination of nearly impenetrable
manmade barriers, alarm devices, and armed guards--protects about 60
percent of the border, the portion that could easily be traversed.
Watchtowers in heavy security areas are usually at one-to-two-kilometer
intervals. Medium security--with fewer outposts and manmade
barriers--exists along about 35 percent of the border, where rugged
terrain, sparse population, and the lack of major transportation
networks make crossings more difficult. In medium-security areas,
watchtowers are usually at 15-to-40-kilometer intervals. The remaining
five percent of the border area has only light security. This area,
mostly along the Pyandzh River (the upper Amu Darya), is devoid of
transportation routes, settlements, or border outposts, and it features
extremely rugged terrain, particularly on the Soviet side. This area
contains no border guard outposts but is probably patrolled periodically
by air and monitored by means of remote surveillance or listening posts.
Insurgent Raids and Forays
& I I inaicaLing
) "undeniably" that such raids have occurred, though they may have been
0 little more than cattle-rustling expeditions. Moreover, Soviet media
have periodically hinted that there is illegal cross-border traffic. E
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forces of the Hizbi Islami insurgent group in Qonduz Province and Jamiat
forces in Takhar Province occasionally mine roads across the river.1
r
Other Support
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Any insurgent contacts across the border probably provide
psychological benefits--a mutual strengthening of morale and exchange of / 25X1
views on resistance to the Soviet and Afghan regimes. The Jamiat-i-
Islami Islami claims to have distributed 3,500 membership cards to Soviet 'moo
Turkmens to boost morale 7
3,400 Jamiat 25X1
membership cards have been distributed to Soviet Tajiks, with the Jamiat
receiving clothes and stolen sheep in return. Also_______________________ 25X1
Afghan and Soviet Tajiks exchange views on means of
opposition, with the Afghan Tajiks trying to discourage their kinsmen in
the Soviet Army from participating in counterinsurgency operations in 25X1
Afghanistan. We believe such requests may have prompted a few
defections and some covert help to the resistance from Tajik troops in
Afghanistan. 25X1
Soviet Countermeasures 25X1
Soviet countermeasures have included enhancing border securit and //
using informants. In one case,
about 200 Soviet troops in Balkh Province, near Termez, strung barbed
wire and laid mines along the Afghan side of the Amu Darya River to
prevent insurgent crossings. At another point in the same region, the ~~
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watchtowers because of the number of raids
Soviet countermeasures on Afghan soil
are hindered by the extensive control exerted by the insurgents.
Soviet and Afghan forces control
only the major transportation routes through Afghanistan's border
districts. Another Soviet countermeasure, the use of informants of
Tajik origin, has prompted insurgents to restrict their relations to
trusted family members living in the USSR
Conclusion
From the Soviet standpoint, the raids may intensify a long-standing,
general concern about the security of the USSR borders. That concern
may harden Moscow's resolve to consolidate its control over Afghanistan.
The primary benefit of the insurgent crossings, however exaggerated
the reports may be, is probably the bolstering of morale, along with
7 increasing costs for the Soviets and the tying down of some forces.
More frequent raids would probably tie up additional Soviet forces and
raise Soviet costs further. But the obstacles--both military and
logistic--to expanding the scope and effectiveness of insurgent raids
will probably remain so considerable as to preclude any notable
political or military insurgent successes.
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Top Secret
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