AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000701040001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 10, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R000701040001-1
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Afghanistan Situation Report
10 May 1983
Top Secret
10 May 1983
COPY 4 8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R000701040001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R000701040001-1
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TOP SECRET
The Afghan regime blames its lack of military presence.
Disruptions caused by the insurgency continue to frustrate the
government's economic planning. F-~
THE WAR IN CENTRAL AFGHANISTAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Central Afghanistan's Shia insurgent groups have not engaged in
major fighting with the area's sparse Soviet forces, but some of
them have been the main recipients of Iranian aid.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near East/South Asia
and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues
raised in the publication should be directe
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Afghanistan
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An Afghan Communist Party Politburo memorandum drafted in late
January cites the "overwhelming lack of a military presence" as
the main reason the regime has been unable to improve its control
in rural areas. The document blames party and state cadres for
allowing insurgents to regain control over some areas after armed
forces have withdrawn. To improve the situation, a new
plan--directed by a committee headed by President Karmal--ordered
security forces to expand regime control and party and secret
police to consolidate it in the countryside. F__1
Comment: Although recognizing the necessity of establishing
military security in an area before political control can be
gained, the memorandum offers no real way to achieve this
security. The largely ineffective and understrength regular
Afghan Army units are needed for offensive combat operations and
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TOP SECRET
cannot be spared to permanently garrison areas. Police, Defense
of the Revolution, and Border Troop units as well as KHAD
officers probably will now be given more responsibility to
maintain control in the countryside. Kabul, however, has done
little so far to improve these poorly armed, manned, trained, and
motivated units. Insurgents will continue to reassert control
and drive out or kill government cadres in many rural areas. F-
Kabul has shelved its multiyear development plan and is
attempting an annual one, but disruptions caused by the
insurgency continue to frustrate the planning process,
The Afghan
Government has slated about 80 percent of the power budget
largely for three major projects in the Kabul area: a gas
turbine from a Swiss company, which is scheduled for installation
north of Kabul; continuing construction of a training facility
for Electricity and Power Ministry employees; and establishment
of a power pole fabrication plant. Other projects are mostly
grid improvements for the cities of Qandahar, Herat, Balkh, and
Mazar-e Sharif.
Comment: Although the Afghan Government has signed
agreements, mostly with the Soviet Union and bloc countries,
which would have provided sufficient capital for the multiyear
plan, two major economic problems have hampered project
implementation. First, foreign funds were misallocated because
of the incompetence of Afghan civil servants. Second, internally
generated revenues were well below expected levels because of the
insurgency. Moreover, the completion of projects for the power
sector in particular will be foiled by increasing insurgent
attacks on power facilities and lines, which are already
resulting in blackouts in Kabul.
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-- Kabul has expelled a US diplomat--Second Secretary Peter
Graham--for the first time; prevented three Indian employees of
the US Embassy from returning to their jobs from India; and
probably arrested three more Afghan employees.
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-- Jamiat Islami chief Rabbani and Hizbi Islami chief Khalis have
announced that they will be moving their headquarters to
Afghanistan within the next two months, but Hizbi chief Gulbuddin
says that he will remain in Pakistan. Rabbani and Khalis may
have made the announcement in anticipation of Pakistani plans to
restrict their activities in Peshawar, and in order to gain
better control of their insurgent groups. F--]
-- A US journalist who recently spent 10 days in Kabul Province
reports that insurgent morale and cooperation are good and that
food supplies are ample. n
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Central Afghanistan has not been a major Soviet priority because of
its geographic isolation and sparse population. Nonetheless, the area
is important because the insurgents there are the main recipients of
Iranian aid. The area also contains a de facto insurgent government--a
confederation led by Ali Behishti.
Background
Central Afghanistan, an area known as the Hazarajat, is the home of
about one million Shia Hazaras and small numbers of other ethnic groups.
The Hazarajat centers on Oruzgan, Ghowr, and Bamian Provinces, and
includes the border areas of eight neighboring provinces. The soil in
the Hazara area is poor, and traditionally food has been imported from
neighboring provinces. The Hazarajat's rugged, mountainous terrain and
primitive dirt roads make access difficult; even before the Communist
coup in 1978, Kabul's presence was minimal.
The Hazaras are the least prestigious ethnic group in Afghanistan
because of their Shia religion and Oriental ancestry. Urban Hazaras,
for example, often hold menial jobs. Traditional discrimination by the
Sunni majority has reinforced the Hazaras' tendency to regard Shiite
Iran favorably. F_~
The Soviet Strategy and Presence
Soviet/Afghan units penetrated the central Hazarajat in force during
1980 but made no serious attempt to establish their authority throughout
the area, presumably believing that the insurgent movements around Kabul
and along Afghanistan's borders were more important. Since then,
Soviet/Afghan forces have largely limited their presence to garrisons in
Bamian in Bamian Province and Chaghcharan in Ghowr Province. In Ghazni
Province, they have concentrated on guarding the key Kabul-Qandahar
road. The ground operations in other adjoining provinces have taken
place largely in non-Hazara areas.
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TOP SECRET
The Main Resistance Movements
The Hazarajat insurgents suffer from rivalries between groups led by
traditional leaders, often from landowning families, and pro-Iranian,
fundamentalist religious leaders, who are closely allied to Iran.
During 1980-81, the traditional leaders held the upper hand, but in
early 1982 the Revolutionary Guards began to channel Iran's modest
military aid exclusively to the fundamentalist groups. The main
traditionalist group is the Shora-i-Itifaq Islami (United Council of the
Islamic Revolution). It is the largest insurgent group, with
approximately 5,000 to 10,000 armed members. Although the Shora is a
federation of more than 30 groups and not a c it
does have a recognized leader, Ali Behishti.
The Shora collects taxes and administers justice, a system of forced
public works projects such as road building, and a military draft.
Young men serve one year, and older men periodically serve during
confrontations with Soviet/DRA forces and Iranian allied groups. Hazara
peasants appear to find the forced labor projects to be the most
burdensome duty, an indication of the low level of actual fighting. F
Behishti's main ally is Syed Mohammad Hasan Jaglan, who is active
just north of Ghazni City and who is referred to as the Shora's "Defense
Minister." Jaglan has several thousand men under arms and his support
of the Shora was crucial during recent armed confrontations with Iranian
allied groups.
Both Behishti and Jaglan have a limited understanding of the
political and military situation in the Hazarajat and the rest of
Afghanistan. The two leaders believe, for example, that the Hazaras are
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the largest ethnic group in the country. They appear not to be overly
concerned about who maintains control of Kabul so long as they enjoy
administrative autonomy in the Hazarajat.
Socioeconomic factors appear to play an important part in the Nasir-
Shora rivalry. Most Nasir leaders are young and do not belong to large
landowning families. In contrast, most Shora leaders are older and
belong to the area's wealthier and more prominent families.
Another important Hazarajat group is Gulbuddin's Hizbi Islami.
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it is the most popular and well- 25X1
organized force in Ghowr Province and, like Nasir, has a large number of
religious leaders. Hizbi Islami insurgents generally try to stay out of
the Nasir-Shora conflict, though some have clashed with Shora members in
Oruzgan Province. Most Hizbi Islami insurgents are poorly armed because
of the distance from Peshawar and their low level of Iranian support.
Those operating around Chaghcharan, for example, the capital of Ghowr
Province, cannot attack the Soviet airfield because of a shortage of
heavy machineguns and
because of a lack of
mining, although even
Conclusions
mortars.
RPG-7s.
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can
most
they confront Soviet tanks
effective tactic is road
mines are in
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The Shia Hazaras' active participation in the resistance clearly
indicates the depth of anti-Soviet/DRA feeling in Afghanistan. Cosmetic
gestures such as the appointment of a Hazara, Soltan Ali Keshtmand, as
Prime Minister have had little impact despite the legacy of Sunni
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discrimination. I (there
is still deep resentment against the Pushtuns, and that there is little
active cooperation between the Hazaras and Pushtuns living on the
borders of the Hazarajat. Although the two groups no longer fight each
other--and the Pushtuns do not interfere with, and may even assist,
Hazara arms caravans--there is no coordination of military operations or
sharing of supplies.
The Hazaras may also have to face the threat of seriously dwindling
food supplies at some point.
the Hazarajat is already producing less food than in the past
because of migration to Kabul, Iran, and Pakistan. Although there are
no signs of malnutrition, food supplies may be marginally
inadequate. Moreover, Soviet authorities have reportedly made large
sums of money available to Afghan nomads to buy grain and transport it
to government-controlled areas outside of the Hazarajat. The Soviets
could, in fact, limit food imports into the area as part of a more
ruthless campaign against the Afghan civilian population.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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