WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTICLE OF 26 APRIL 83 ON AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000701010001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 28, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/NESA
C/PAB/NESA
28 April 1983
SUBJECT: Wall Street Journal article of 26 April 83 on
Afghanistan
1. We agree that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has
grave strategic implications for US interests in South Asia and
the Persian Gulf region because it gives Moscow a base from which
further to threaten Iran and Pakistan. Contrary to the Wall
Street Journal article, however, Shindand Airbase in Afghanistan
does not at present give the Soviets a base to project air power
deep into the Middle East (except eastern Iran). Our analysis
shows that Soviet tactical aircraft--including the SU-24 Fencer
light bomber--cannot reach Persian Gulf targets (or Tehran) from
Shindand flying mission profiles that anticipate air defense
opposition. Even flying optimum mission profiles that assume no
opposition, only the Fencer has the capability to reach those
targets. Soviet bombers--including Backfire--would not need a
base in Afghanistan to threaten the Persian Gulf region. F__]
2. Since the Soviet invasion in December 1979, the Soviets
have constructed new helicopter pads and support facilities and
increased the fuel and munitions storage depots at Shindand to
enhance air capabilities against the insurgents as they have at
all of their other major airbases in Afghanistan. The runway has
not been lengthened.
there are only 10,000 Soviet troops (vice 30,000) and
about 20 helicopters (vice 200) based at Shindand. The Soviets
also have 12 MIG-21 fighters and 12 SU-25 attack aircraft at
3. Attached is a perspective on the potential Soviet air
threat to the Persian Gulf region from Afghanistan. We believe
its conclusions are still valid: airbases in Afghanistan do not
at present enhance Soviet capabilities to attack the Persian
Gulf, but the introduction of newer, longer-range tactical
aircraft in the Soviet Air Force or of an aerial refueling
capability for tactical aircraft by the late 1980s would
significantly increase the threat. F__]
NGA Review Completed
NESA M 83-10100C)(
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SUBJECT: Wall Street Journal article of 26 April 83 on
Afghanistan
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - D/NESA
1 - CPAS/IMD/CB
2 - NESA/PS
1 - C/SO
1 - C/PG
1 - Chrono
DDI/NESA/SO/P (27 April 83) 25X1
2
SECRET
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USSR-AFGHANISTAN: POTENTIAL FOR AIR THREAT TO THE PERSIAN GULF
Soviet military activities in Afghanistan are currently aimed against
the insurgency, but the construction of a new airfield significantly
close to the Persian Gulf in southwestern Afghanistan would indicate an
ominous shift in Moscow's focus. The Persian Gulf is now beyond the
effective range of Soviet tactical aircraft operating from existing
airbases in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, a new airfield in southwestern
Afghanistan would not bring most Sovi ctical aircraft within
operational range of Persian Gulf targets.
Air Coverage From Existing Bases
The only airbases in western and southern Afghanistan capable of
supporting tactical air operations are at Herat. Shindand, and Qandahar.
Soviet fighters and fighter-bombers 25X1
are based at Shindand and Qandahar, but they do not have the range to
attack targets in the Persian Gulf region from there. The other
airfields in western and southern Afghanistan cannot support tactical
air operations because they have neither sufficient runways nor logistic
support facilities.
1 February 1983
NESA M 83-10022CX
SOYA M 83-10022CX
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Air Coverage From A New Airfield
A new airfield in southwestern Afghanistan would increase Soviet
tactical air coverage of southwestern Iran, but we judge it would give
the Soviets few advantages in attacking targets in the Persian Gulf. the
Strait of Hormuz, or the Arabian Peninsula. We believe that Soviet
military planners would anticipate possible opposition to an attack ir.
the Persian Gulf from US carrier-based aircraft in the region or from
Iran and the Gulf Arab states. Soviet fighters and fighter-bombers
flying,great distances at low altitudes to avoid early detection and to
limit the response times of opposing air forces--particularly from L'S
carrier-based aircraft--could not reach Persian Gulf targets even from
southwestern Afghanistan, according to the Intelligence Community's
estimates of Soviet aircraft performance. The SU-24 Fencer light
bomber, a longer-range aircraft, could reach Persian Gulf targets but
would be operating at the extreme limits of its capaoilities when flying
a mission profile which anticipates opposition. Soviet medium bombers.
including Backfire and Badger, would not require airbases in Afghanistan
to be within range of the Persian Gulf, but could be based in the USSR.
The combat radius of any aircraft varies according to the speec,s and
altitudes at which it flies to and from the target, its time in the
target area, and the tactics used in performance of the mission. Combat
missions flown long distances at low altitudes to increase the
probability of success and minimize losses significantly degrade the
maximum range of the aircraft at high altitudes. The combat radius of
an aircraft in any particular mission will most depend on how much of
the mission is flown at low altitudes. Soviet tactical aircraft based
in southwestern Afghanistan, therefore. could fly farther than the low-
altitude coverage depicted on the map depending on Moscow's perception
of the threat from opposing air defenses. Nonetheless, we judge that
Soviet fighters and fighter-bombers cannot reach Persian Gulf targets.
or will be operating at the extreme limits of their maximum combat
radius, even if they fly optimum mission profiles from a base in
southwestern Afghanistan.
Potential for New Airfield Construction
the Soviets are expanding and improving
existing airfieics throughout Afghanistan, but are not building a new
1 February 1983
NESA M 83-10022CX
SOYA M 83-10022CX
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25X1
G~D Xl
Herat
O Shindand Airbase
Potential Soviet Air Coverage From Afghanistan'
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Air coverage Fencer Fighter/fighter-
bomber
Low altitude High altitude --
Pakistan
1 February 1983
NESA M 83-10022CX
SOYA M 83-10022CX
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?
25X1
C' CRE.
airfield in the southwest 25X1
as reported
since in th
e Western helico the invasion pter Parking Soviets press.
maintenance g handstands and have built
facilities, fighter rev additional
capacities and have increased l and s, have
at airfields fuel and improved
construction has throughout munitions storage
Afghanistan. Afghanistan are cletahrely airfi Imprroovveemments continue Of this
eld Improvements that to be made.
intended are .
Insurgents by increae to enhance Soviet ca being made in
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capabilities of
The construction
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ifficulties and confront AI1?han;,r__
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southwestern hinaand, and a major Soviet su or
corner Of Qandahar with the ppl line
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on prim to the
itive, or
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railroads. along major lines of Moreover,
Soviet airbases
Southwestern virtually no ?` conmurication including
Afghanistan to is
would need to to support g tlcai infrastru
build a road building a new store in
heavy vehicles capable of airbase. The
building and equipment supporting sustained Soviets
g materials, in order to transport
the traffic by
runway construction. Particularly the The large concrete necessary
connecting Herat distance from t h slabs used
are " "`IY requires a minimum sustained support forof new airbases
t
25X1
1 February 1983
NESA M 83-10022CX
SOYA ,y 83-10022CX
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The Afghan insurgents would likely be able to harass, but not prevent
the construction and operation of an airfield in southwestern
Afghanistan. The Soviets, however, would need to assign several ground
force battalions in the area to suppress insurgent activity and defend
the airfield. Additional forces would be reeuired to protect the new
road that would need to be built to support airfield construction in
southwestern Afghanistan.
Outlook
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan clearly has serious strategic
implications for the area and gives Moscow a potentiai base from which
to further threaten Iran and Pakistan. The construction of a new
airfield in southwestern Afghanistan would indicate Moscow's intention
to enhance its strategic presence in the Persian Gulf region. The
introduction of new tactical aircraft with greater range at low
altitudes in the late 1980s, or the development of an aerial refueling
capability for Soviet aircraft, would allow the Soviets to more directly
threaten the Persian Gulf region from a base in southwestern Afghanistan
than is currently possible. We judge, however, that the Soviets would
not build a new airfield there until the Afghan insurgency was
effectively controlled--an unlikely development in at least the next few
years unless the Soviets are willing to bear the substantial military.
economic, and political costs of massive reinforcement.
1 February 1983
NESA M 83-10022CX
SOYA M 83-10022CX
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