LEBANON: TALKING POINTS FOR THE NIO - DOMESTIC THREATS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T00287R000700970001-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
10
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 16, 2010
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 22, 1983
Content Type:
REPORT
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CIA-RDP85T00287R000700970001-0.pdf | 501.64 KB |
Body:
I I I GII MIN I 1, .10111 a
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SECRET I `
Talking Points for the NIO on Lebanon
22 April 1983
Domestic Threats
President Amin Gemayel continues to hold on to his fragile
political consensus despite the slow pace of negotiations with
Israel and the growing perception by non-Christian domestic
factions that Lebanese concessions could be substantial.
Gemayel's tenuous support, however, does not insure the end of
violence between confessional groups and political parties.
-- Violence between a variety of pro- and anti-Syrian groups
around Tripoli has subsided in recent weeks, but could
flareup again at any time.
-- The situation between the Phalange-dominated Lebanese
Forces militia and the Druze in the Shuf and Alayh
districts outside Beirut remains tense, with both sides
expressing a desire to resume the fighting once the
Israelis give up control of the area.
-- Attacks against Israeli troops are escalating throughout
areas under their occupation. 25X1
The Lebanese Forces
The Lebanese Forces militia--with about 3,000 regular
fighters--continues to be the dominate force in Lebanese
politics, but its ability to dictate policy to the central
government or seriously threaten Amin Gemayel has diminished.
-- Gemayel has taken advantage of leadership and morale
problems within the Lebanese Forces and the rift with its
Israeli benefactor to maneuver the militia into a series
of compromises with the central government.
-- These compromises, such as the deployment of the Lebanese
Army into the militia stronghold of East Beirut and the
government's takeover of the illegal ports that provided
revenue to keep the militia in business, have bolstered
Gemayel's credibility with non-Christians and at the same
time revealed the vulnerability of the Lebanese Forces.
The Left
Nevertheless, fear of Maronite/Phalange domination of the
Lebanese political system is the main domestic issue fueling the
activities of leftist groups in Lebanon. These groups were
seriously weakened after the Israeli siege of Beirut and the
departure of the PLO.
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SECRET
NESA M#83-10094
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-- While most leftist organizations continue to exist as
political entities, their military capabilities were
either destroyed or so severely limited that most do not
pose a credible threat to the government.
-- The dissolution of the National Movement--the coalition
of leftist Muslim groups--has virtually eliminated
coordination among groups, limited their potential for
action, and left each more vulnerable to right-wing
Christian forces.
Only the Druze-dominated Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)
militia--perhaps 2,000 strong--is capable of confronting the
Lebanese Forces.
-- The Druze and the Lebanese Forces have been engaged in
nearly constant battle since last fall.
I
-- While these clashes have serious implications for further
destabilizing Lebanon, the Druze militia does not
represent a direct threat to the central government, the
multinational peacekeeping force (MNF), or to other US
The Murabitun, a Nasirite group under the leadership of
Ibrahim Qulaylat, has maintained a low profile since the events
of last summer.
the departing PLO turned
over some of their heavy weapons to the Murabitun.
-- Despite this, the organization continues to be weak and
is unlikely to be able to resume military activities for
some time.
The Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) militia
-- Despite its current protection by Syria, the SSNP--like
other leftist groups--appears unwilling to take any
action that would jeopardize its political existence in
the future.
-- The main concern of the SSNP is to protect itself from a
Lebanese Forces vendetta following Syrian withdrawal.
The SSNP was implicated in the assassination of Bashir
Gemaye l .
-- The SSNP militia currently numbers no more than 1,500.
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SECRET
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I I ! L1L. LWI]ILI._ A.11 I' 1111.E 1L1
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SECRET
The Lebanese Communist Party no longer has an organized
militia. The group disbanded following the Israeli occupation,
and militia members reverted to civilian status.
-- The.LCP does have about 100 trained fighters, who are
permitted, as individuals, to take advantage of local
opportunities such as cooperating with the Druze or
participating in anti-Israeli activity.
~ the Communist Action
Organization leader Muhsin Ibrahim said in March 1983 that it is
too early,. to create 'a new leftist organization in Lebanon to
replace the National Movement. He believes the first objective
of leftists is to work against the Israeli occupation and to
thwart US policy in Lebanon.
-- The CAO currently has no active military force or
salaried personnel. Its present strength probably does
not exceed 1,500.
-- The organization's membership is largely Shia youth who
joined for economic gain rather than out of ideological
commitment.
The Shia
Iranian-backed Shia extremists will continue to be the main
security threat to the US and Western European presence in
Lebanon. The decentralization that has resulted from the
plethora of radical Shia splinter groups makes efforts to control
their activities more difficult.
-- Radical Shia believe that attacking the "props" of the
Lebanese government--the MNF and US presence--is a more
effective means of destabilizing the country than moving
against the central government directly.
-- It is not clear whether the Islamic Struggle
Organization, which has claimed responsibility for the
bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut, is an actual group
or a name of convenience used by radicals
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SECRET
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1111 L 11II'InIA'1 __ A Ii I ILLlld LI.
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'There are two major radical groups that cooperate closely
with Iran.
-- The larger group, under the command of Husayn Musawi, is
located in Balabakk and has 300-400 followers. This
faction also cooperates closely with Syria.
-- The less well known group with probably a few score
members is under the leadership of Muhammad Husayn
Fadlallah. This group, located in Beirut's southern
suburbs, may have been responsible for the kidnapping of
American University President David Dodge. There are
some indications that Fadlallah may also have been
involved in the Syrian-sponsored bombing of the Iraqi
Embassy in Beirut in December 1981.
-- Members of Fadlallah's group may have carried out the
bombing of the US Embassy. 25X1
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SECRET
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SUBJECT: Lebanon: Talking Points for the NIO - Domestic Threats
NESA M#83-10094
DISTRIBUTION:
Orig - NIO
4 - CPAS/IMB/CB
1 - C/PES
1 - D/NESA
2 - NESA/PS
1 - NESA/AI
1 - NESA/AI/I
2 - NESA/AI/L
DDI/NESA/AI/L 22Apr83) 25X1
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SECRET
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-Al Amal
Imam Musa Sadr; missing since September
1978 and Nabih Barri; Shia
-Islamic Coalition
Sa'ih Salam and Rashid Karami; Sunni
-Islamic Grouping
Shafiq Wazzan; Sunni
-Democratic Socialist Party
Kamal al-Assad; Shia
'National Movement'
(Primarily Muslim Left)
-Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)
Walid Junblat; Druze
-Independent Nastrite Movement (Murabitun)
Ibrahim Qulaylat; Beirut Sunni
-Communist Action Organization
Muhsin Ibrahim; extreme left Shia
-Communist Party of Lebanon
Nicola Shawi and George Hawi; pro-USSR
Greek Orthodox Christian
-Baath Party-Iraqi Wing
Ahd al-Majid Rafal; Sunni
-Nasirite Corrective Movement
Isam al-Arab; extreme left Sunni
-Syrian Social Nationalist Party (PPS or SSNP)
Inam Raad; left Greek Orthodox Chrisitian
-Popular Nasirite Organization
Mustafa Sa'ad; Sunni
-Baath Party-Syrian Wing
Assam Qansu; Sunni, pro-Syrian
-Arab Socialist Union
Abd al-Rahim Murad; Sunni
National Front
(Pro-Syrian Left)
-Nasirite Organization
(Union of Working Peoples Forces)
Kamal Shatila; Sunni
-Arab Democratic Party
rln^.rih al-Khatih; Tripoli-based Alawites
-Independent Parliamentary Bloc
Sim'an al-Duwayhi and Butrus Harb; Maronite
Pro-Syrian Christians
-Zgharta Front
Sulayman Franjiyah; Conservative
northern Maronite
"Lebanese Front"
(Primarily Christian Right)
-Phalange Party (Kataib)
Pierre Jumayyil and Amin Jumayyil
Maronite and Greek Catholic
-National Liberal Party
Camille Shamun (President of Lebanese Front); Maronite
-Kaslik Front
(Order of Maronite Monks) Bul.us Na'man, Maronite
Clergy, extreme right
-Guardians of the Cedars
Etienne Saqr AKA Abu Arz; extremist Maronite
-Al Tanzim
George Adwan; extremist Maronite
Independent Christian Right
-Maronite League
Shakir Abu Sulayman; Maronite
-National Bloc
Raymond Edde; Maronite, anti-Syrian
-Free Lebanon Movement
Major Sa'ad Haddad, Maronite/Shia, pro-Israeli
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Lebanese Politico-Religious Groups-1981
Estimates a
Thousand
9 Persons
Percent of
Population
Arab Muslims
1,150
44
Sunni
550
Shia
600
Arab Christians
750
28
Maronite
390
Greek Orthodox
240
Greek Catholic (Melkite)
52
Protestant
68
Druze
190
7
Non-Arabs
151
Armenian Orthodox/Catholic
150
Jewish
I
Palestinians (roughly one-third Arab
Christian and two-thirds Arab Muslim)
400
15
Residents in Lebanon
2,641
100
Lebanese expatriates (people holding
Lebanese citizenship or dual citizenship
abroad, mostly in Western Hemi-
sphere)
1,250
a US demographers derive these figures from the Lebanese Govern-
ment's 1969 population estimate based on the 1932 census with
adjustments for births, deaths, and emigration. The individual
politico-religious groups have customarily inflated their population
statistics to such a degree that US officials do not accept even
"official" Lebanese Government figures without reservation. The
Christians frequently report their population figures to include many
of the Lebanese expatriates, many of whom are Christians. in order
to maintain the traditional ratio between Christians and Muslims.
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Confidential
Figure 1
Lebanon: Distribution of Religious Groups
Syria
Maronite
Greek Orthodox
A Greek Catholic
Mixed Maronite and
Greek Catholic
Shia Muslim
Sunni Muslim
Druze
Mixed Druze and
Greek Orthodox
Population shifts caused by the June 1982
Israeli invasion are not depicted.
Boundary representation is
not nscessarily authoritative.
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I I I I! 11 I II'll II?I III II I IIEIL 11 1 I I
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GOLAN
(Israeli
occupied)
/,Approximate area of Z
. `/1,;
Israel
/'
I
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