TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000700930001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 19, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700930001-4
SECRET
The Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement of recent weeks has been
generated more from an increasingly pragmatic Algerian foreign
policy than from a sudden shift in either country's position over
the Western Sahara dispute. Algerian President Bendjedid's
recent meetings with Moroccan King Hassan, Tunisia's Bourguiba,
and Libya's Jallud are aimed at reducing area tensions and thus
allowing Algeria to focus more energy and resources on internal
development and to pursue economic projects with its neighbors.
It is also intended to reduce opportunities for Libyan
troublemaking and superpower involvement in the region.
Both Bendjedid and Hassan would like to put the Saharan
conflict behind them because both probably believe that it
adversely affects regional stability. The cost for both sides
was certainly another factor. Whether the two leaders are
serious ,about resolving the dispute or simply have agreed to set
it aside for the sake of improved economic cooperation, depends
largely on whether both sides are willing to compromise on the
fundamental issue of who is going to control and have sovereignty
over what territorty in the Sahara. So far, we have no evidence
that either side is considering major concessions, although new
negotiating methods and formulas for achieving a settlement are
Algeria is still committed to self determination for the
Polisario for reasons that are more important than just the
support of a revolutionary principle. Algeria, the Polisario's
main backer, is interested in maintaining its control over the
guerrillas and any shift in its support would make it more
difficult to control assistance from Libya or other external
sources like Cuba or the Soviet Union. Moreover, we do not
believe Bendjedid is prepared to see Morocco's size, resources,
and prestige enhanced significantly by the full incorporation of
Any compromise Bendjedid might make with Morocco would
probably be met with little internal disapproval. Most Algerians
see the dispute in Western Sahara as an issue of anti-
colonialization--a point that could be dealt with cosmetically
with relative ease. Bendjedid has the full support of the army,
the real power brokers in Algeria. The FLN is primarily a rubber
stamp organization that has been purged of its radical elements
and have limited input in negotiating a solution anyway.
A settlement of the western Sahara dispute is not yet on the
horizon, in our view, and renewed serious fighting is always a
possibility, but a remote one, at this point. Bendjedid's
initiatives over the past few months suggest that he will not let
the issue stand in the way of pursuing greater Maghreb 25X1
cooperation. He and Hassan seem to have reached a tacit
NESA M#83-10086
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SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700930001-4
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700930001-4
SECRET
understanding that the status quo--minimal squirmishes with both
Morocco and the Polisario controlling territory--is acceptable
and that renewed talks might uncover areas for compromise. If
not, the process of negotiation at least allows the two countries
to go forward with bilateral cooperation.
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SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700930001-4
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700930001-4
SUBJECT: Talking Points for the DCI
NESA M#83-10086
Original - DCI
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB (No further dissem)
1 - C/PES
1 - D/NESA
2 - NESA/PS
?rl 1 - NESA/AI
DDI/NESA/AI/M
(19 Apr 83) 25X1
- NESA/AI/M
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700930001-4