AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000700890001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 22, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Afghanistan Situation Report
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IN BRIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
PERSPECTIVE
THE USSR IN AFGHANISTAN: DIM PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE . . . . . . 5
A summary of the US Embassy, Moscow, assessment of the Soviets'
Afghan policy. F
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near East/South Asia
and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues
raised in the publication should be directed
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the Afghan artillery regiment that
withdrew from Rokheh two weeks ago is now at Anawa. The Soviet
units formerly at Rokheh have not so far been observed elsewhere
in the Panjsher Valley.
-- Abdul Wali, who has close ties to King Zahir Shah, has implied
that the King would consider returning to Afghanistan as the head
of a genuinely popular government after only a partial Soviet
troop withdrawal, according to the Italian Foreign Ministry. The
Italians have no evidence that the Soviets have contacted the
King. Wali also plans to solicit Saudi funds and to sound out
Pakistani authorities on a united resistance movement headed by
the King.
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-- French medical aid groups said that there are now 20 French
doctors working in Afghanistan and the number may increase,
according to press reports. Meanwhile, the US Embassy in Kabul
reports that the recently sentenced French doctor Phillippe
Augoyard may be released quickly if the French Communist Party
provides publicity favorable to the DRA regime. F--]
-- An insurgent leader has told French officials that the flight
of Afghan civilians from Vardak Province west of Kabul has
included the departure of nearly all educated people, leaving a
void that the resistance cannot fill and serving Soviet strategy
well. He indicated that educated Afghans should return and work
in whatever way they can to assist the civilian population in the
liberated areas.
-- Australia's decision to resume cultural, scientific, and other
exchanges with the USSR was reported with unusual promptness by
Pravda. The decision probably will be seen by Moscow as another
sign that hostile foreign reactions to the invasion are
dissipating and that international attitudes toward the continued
occupation of Afghanistan are not a significant factor in Soviet
policy decisions. F--]
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on this issue that have been offered by the US Embassy, Moscow.
When UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar comes to Moscow on 28
March, we suspect that he will find the Soviets no more forthcoming on
Afghanistan than they were last September. Andropov's accession has not
changed Moscow's basic view of the costs and benefits of its presence in
Afghanistan, and we thus view skeptically hints since November of new
flexibility on the terms of a political settlement. Instead, we see
signs of preparations for a long stay in Afghanistan. Moscow will
probably continue UN efforts to find a solution to the Afghan problem
but will make no meaningful concessions. Should the UN cease its
efforts, the Soviets will seek to place the blame on the US.
Withdrawal: Costs and Benefits
Based on our contacts here and the intelligence available to us, we
judge that Soviet perceptions of the problem reflect the following
considerations:
-- The military and economic burden of the war is manageable
indefinitely at present levels. There is no significant domestic
opposition to the war.
-- Afghanistan's strategic importance has increased since 1979
because US capabilities in the region have grown and the Soviet
relationship with Tehran has continued to deteriorate.
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-- The foreign policy costs of the invasion are now seen as
declining. Afghanistan has not prevented a limited rapprochement
with China, seriously disrupted economic and political relations
with Europe, or been the decisive factor in Soviet loss of
leverage in the Islamic world.
-- There is little to gain in US-Soviet relations by a withdrawal
of troops from Afghanistan, and improved relations with China and
Europe will be a function primarily of other issues.
-- Most important, a withdrawal from Afghanistan would risk a
sharp increase in internal disorder on Soviet borders or
establishment of an overtly hostile regime in Kabul. Either
result would be seen as a major foreign policy defeat, which the
Andropov regime--less well established than Brezhnev's--would be
unlikely to accept. F_~
In light of these considerations, we have been skeptical of hints
since Brezhnev's death of new Soviet interest in finding a way out of
Afghanistan. We may, in fact, be seeing signs that the Soviets are
moving in the opposite direction:
-- Recent Soviet media treatment of Afghanistan has shown more
frequent coverage of that nation, with much less effort to
minimize the difficulties facing the DRA. In fact, the
importance of Soviet moral and material support for the ultimate
success of the Revolution is being stressed heavily, and the
Soviet combat role has recently been far more candidly depicted.
Although these developments may represent Andropov's preference
for greater openness, they seem to us more of an effort to
prepare the populace for a prolonged effort in Afghanistan.
-- Afghan Defense Minister Qader's February visit to Moscow
looked like the first step in a renewed effort to reinvigorate
the Afghan armed forces. And Moscow's ambiguous press treatment
of Babrak Karmal in recent months, coupled with recurrent rumors
of efforts to find a more viable successor, seems to reflect a
continuing Soviet effort to broaden the DRA's legitimacy and
domestic support. To succeed, such efforts would require the
long-term presence of Soviet forces.
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Some Conclusions
We surmise the following about the current Soviet attitude toward
Afghanistan and Moscow's likely strategy for the months ahead:
-- The Soviets have probably concluded that it will take them far
longer than they originally anticipated to ensure the
survivability of a socialist-oriented client state.
-- The Soviets probably believe that they can attain their
objectives if they are willing to persist.
-- Militarily, Moscow is probably going to continue a policy of
maintaining control of Afghanistan's main cities and
transportation routes, and of breaking up insurgent
concentrations that threaten these goals.
-- Politically, they will continue efforts to broaden the DRA's
domestic base and its international legitimacy.
-- Introduction of a significant number of additional forces is
unlikely. F__1
The UN Role
The Soviets will find it useful, as they have since December 1979, to
appear to be engaged in efforts to achieve a settlement that would
"permit" them to withdraw from Afghanistan. For now, Cordovez' mission
fits this need well, and we expect Moscow to continue to support his
efforts, perhaps even more openly than it has thus far. We seriously
doubt, however, that they will be drawn into any commitments that would
meet the demands of the guerrilla resistance or the UNGA mandate, and
thereby begin a process leading toward political settlement and
withdrawal. Should Cordovez weary) of his efforts, the Soviets will seek
to blame the US for his failure.
Implications for US Policy
In addition to continuing support for the Pakistanis and the
insurgents, the most important task for the US in the months ahead will
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be to ensure that we are not perceived as an obstacle to a settlement
--either by Cordovez or others. Close coordination with the UN and the
major interested parties will be our best insurance against this. It
will also be tactically useful to be seen as engaged in a continuing
dialogue with Moscow on Afghanistan, though we should have no illusions
that anything concrete will result from such a dialogue in the near
future. We should be able to show that we are doing everything possible
both to induce the Soviets to negotiate seriously and to dispel any
notions that we do not, in fact, want them out of Afghanistan. In
addition, should Moscow at some point conclude that its interests would
best be served by a face-saving withdrawal, having an existing open
channel will make it easier for them to signal this. As should be clear
from the above, however, we do not think that point is near.
(CIA/SOYA Comment: While in general agreement with Embassy Moscow's
assessment, we believe it fails to indicate the new flexibility that the
Andropov regime has tried to bring to the Afghanistan problem. For
instance, the involvement of Soviet military officers in cease-fire
negotiations with Afghan guerrillas for the first time was an important
initiative of the new regime. Also, under Soviet stimulus, the Afghan
Government appeared more flexible in dealing with UN negotiator Cordovez
in order to keep his talks going, although without conceding any
significant points. The Soviet search for new ways to pursue the war
while holding off foreign political pressure probably will lead to
further changes in Moscow's tactics, although the ultimate og al of
maintaining control of Afghanistan is unlikely to change.)
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Top Secret
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