AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000700730001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Afghanistan Situation Report
NESA M 83-1003/CX
SOYA M 83-10038CX
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COPY i 1 Q tS
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Tf1P RFCRF.T
The plan, developed by Afghan exiles in Europe, may be a good indication
of the kind of settlement most Afghans would accept.
Soviet/DRA forces appear to be maintaining
somewhat
better
control
of
Qandahar than in previous years.)
IN BRIEF
2
PERSPECTIVE
INFECTIOUS DISEASE--THE OTHER SOVIET ENEMY IN AFGHANISTAN
4
Infectious disease has been a major cause of noncombat Soviet casualties
in Afghanistan and probably seriously reduces the effectiveness of Soviet
military efforts. Although some measures to reduce the incidence of
illness have been taken, infectious disease probably will continue to be
a problem for the Soviets in 1983.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near East/South Asia and the
Office of Soviet Analysis.
1 March 1983
NESA M 83-10051CX
SOVA M 83-10038CX
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TOP SECRET
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- International boundary
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Names end 6oundery representation
are not neceaearily authorimtive.
1 March 1983
NESA M 83-10051CX
SOVA M 83-10038CX
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The Afghan exile organization in Europe headed by former Prime
Minister Yusuf plans to send a letter to resistance leaders urging the
formation of a Council of National Guidance with authority to speak for
all resistance groups. Included in the letter is a peace plan that calls
for the following:
-- The unconditional, total, and immediate withdrawal of Soviet
forces under UN supervision.
1 March 1983
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1 SOVA M 83-10038CX
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-- The establishment of the Council of National Guidance as a
provisional government.
-- The convening of a Loya Jirga--a body even the Communists
recognize as the ultimate political authority in Afghanistan--to
approve a new constitution.
Comment: The plan is designed primarily to provide a common position
for the various resistance groups, with its usefulness in any
negotiations with Moscow, at most, a secondary consideration. Because
the former government officials who drew it up are realistic and well
informed, we believe the plan is an accurate reflection of what the
resistance--and most other Afghans--would accept. We doubt that Moscow
would give much consideration to a peace settlement that, in effect,
simply turns over Afghanistan to the resistance.
CONDITIONS IN QANDAHAR CITY
Three Qandahar businessmen report that Soviet troops and civilian
advisers still rarely venture into Qandahar city and that DRA personnel
still restrict their movements largely to the city's center and the
network of military posts surrounding the city. But most of the fighting
now takes place just outside the city, and one businessman notes that it
has been more than a year since he has seen an insurgent carrying a
weapon during the day inside the city. ~~
Comment: Continued Soviet/DRA control of key points in Qandahar a
year after their last major clearing operation indicates a decline in
insurgent effectiveness. In 1980 and 1981, it usually took about six
months for the insurgents to regain virtual control of the city after a
major clearing operation. ~~
1 March 1983
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-- The US Consul in Peshawar reports at least two insurgent commanders
were assassinated recently near the city...Resistance sources claim 36
insurgents belonging to moderate groups were killed in one month...Hizbi
Islami was blamed for the attacks, but the killin s could also be a KHAD
effort to provoke fighting among the guerrillas.
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The high incidence of infectious disease among Soviet troops in Afghanistan
almost certainly has reduced their combat effectiveness during the last three
years. The problems stem primarily from poor logistic support and a lack of
preventive medicine in Soviet units. Soviet medical authorities have made some
improvements in treatment and facilities that have reduced the number of
illnesses in 1982. We believe, however, that medical, bureaucratic, and
logistic shortcomings will continue to make infectious disease a major cause of
Soviet casualties in Afghanistan and hamper their military efforts in 1983.
1 March 1983
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4 SOVA M 83-10038CX
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A Failure of Logistics and the Soviet Medical Bureaucracy
The Soviets' ability to deal with infectious diseases in Afghanistan has been
hampered by severe logistic shortfalls, principally in providing subsistence
supplies, uncontaminated food, and potable water to their troops.
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We believe that the failure of Soviet military medical authorities both to
anticipate logistic and medical problems, based on sound existing area
knowledge, and to respond effectively to them once they had arisen was and is a
major factor contributing to Soviet health problems in Afghanistan. Soviet
military medical authorities are well aware of sanitary-epidemiological problems
in Afghanistan and the measures to be taken against them. Nevertheless, few if
any of these measures are believed to have been taken to protect the invasion
force, and later efforts have been slowly and apparently indifferently
1 March 1983
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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