LIBYAN ACTIVITY WORLDWIDE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000700240001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 6, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/02 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000700240001-0
DATE
TRANSMITTAL SLIP 27 Jan 83
TO:
CPAS/IMD/CB (No further di sem
ROQAA?N.
/hU~
BUILDING Has
REMARKS:
NESA M#83-10021
FROM:
NE SA/A I /M
ROOM 5 NO.
BUILDING
a s
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/02 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000700240001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/02 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000700240001-0
6 January 1983
LIBYAN ACTIVITY WORLDWIDE
Beginning about 1975, Libyan leader Qadhafi adopted a concerted policy of
subversive activity, coup-plotting, and support for "national liberation movements"
in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, as well as support for some
terrorist groups in'Western Europe.
Qadhafi has been unscrupulous in promoting these aims, and a catalogue of
offenses can be documented without difficulty: two unsuccessful coups against
Sudan and ongoing attempts to unseat Nimeiri; three plots against Tunisia, the
most recent being the Qafsah raid in January 1980; a coup attempt against Niger
in 1976; intervention in Uganda in 1979 in an attempt to shore up Idi Amin's
dictatorship; intervention in Chad in 1980.
In Africa, Qadhafi's behavior has been more circumspect than usual for the
past year, out of reluctance to jeopardize his scheduled accession to the chairman-
ship of the OAU. Now that the chairmanship has almost certainly fallen through,
there could be an upsurge of Libyan-sponsored subversive activity. Qadhafi never
did stop working against certain key targets: Sudan--currently Qadhafi's highest
priority target--where he is working with the Ethiopians to arm and train Sudanese
dissidents for infiltration across the border; Somalia--Libya and Ethiopia are
training and equipping an anti-Siad Somali insurgent group operating out of the
Ogaden region of Ethiopia; and Niger, where Libya is supporting Nigerien dissidents
based in Benin, training dissidents inside Libya, and encouraging rebellion by
Tuareg nomads. Qadhafi is also stepping up Libyan involvement in Chad, where he
is attempting to undermine the Habre regime by increasing support to Chadian
dissidents.
In the Middle East, Qadhafi's reliance on terrorism and subversion and the
insults he has heaped on Arab leaders in recent speeches have seriously isolated
Qadhafi from his Arab colleagues. He supplies money, arms and training to a
variety of Palestinian groups, and gives the Polisario Front fighting in Western
Sahara significant amounts of military equipment. He continues to train a large
number of Tunisians in paramilitary and sabotage techniques at camps inside
Libya, with a view to using them to destabilize the Bourguiba government. He
has been providing financial and military support for factions of the South Yemeni-
backed National Democratic Front for several years.
Libya's relations with West European governments reached a low point in
1980, when Libyan hit squads murdered ten Libyan dissidents in Rome, London,
Bonn, Athens, Milan, and Manchester, England. Qadhafi finally abandoned that
policy, and West European governments responded by seeking to maintain or
improve their ties with Libya, arguing that isolation would drive Libya more
firmly into the Soviet camp. He does not appear to be currently involved in
European terrorist activity. Last October, however, he publicly warned Libyan
dissidents in exile to "repent" and return home or face a renewal of the murder
campaign.
Libyan involvement in East Asia is largely limited to support for dissident
Muslim groups. Last fall Qadhafi signed a friendship and cooperation treaty
with North Korea, which has long provided training to limited numbers of Libyans
in guerrilla warfare and agent operations.
In Latin America, Libyan efforts are small-scale and largely motivated by
Qadhafi's desire to strike at the US by undercutting its interests in its historical
sphere of influence. Libya has been involved in training and supplying Salvadoran
insurgents since the spring of 1980. It has been attempting to make inroads
among radicals in the English-speaking Caribbean since late 1979, funding various
projects and cultivating leftist politicians.
NESA M#83-10021
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/02 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000700240001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/02 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000700240001-0
SECRET
SUBJECT: Libyan Activity Worldwide
NESA M#83-10021
DISTRIBUTION:
Orig - NIO/NESA (for NSC Staff)
1 - CPAS/IMD/CB (No Further Dissem)
1 - C/PES
1 - D/NESA
2 - NESA/PS
1 - NESA/AI
2 - NESA/
DDI/NESA/AI/M I(26Jan83)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/02 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000700240001-0