AFGHANISTAN: POTENTIAL FOR SOVIET AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000700090002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 5, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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January 5, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Near East
South Asia
SUBJECT: Afghanistan:
Construction
Attached is our response to the DCI's inquiry on the above
subject. The response was prepared by
branch and coordinated with SOYA.
Attachment: a/s
Chief, Pakistan/Afghanistan/Bangladesh Branch,
NESA, DDI
ntial for Soviet Airfield
of my
NGA Review Completed
TOP SECRET
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Afghanistan: Potential for Soviet Airfield
Orig
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1
1
1
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4
Addressee
D/NESA
C/SOVA/TF/A
C/SOYA/CS/E
C/NESA/PG
C/NESA/SO
C/DDO/NEC
OCPAS/IMD/CB
DDI/NESA/SO/P7
(4 Jan 82)
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TOP SECRET
Afghanistan: Potential for Soviet Airfield Construction
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan clearly has grave
strategic implications for the area and gives Moscow a potential
base from which to further threaten Iran and Pakistan.
Nonetheless, Soviet military activities in Afghanistan are
currently aimed against the insurgency. In particular, the
apparent intent of Soviet airfield improvements there, as
is to increase the number of
helicopters in Afghanistan and to expand the maintenance
capabilities of Soviet air units engaged in operations against
the insurgents. A key indicator of a shift in Soviet focus would
be if Moscow began constructing an airfield in southwestern
Afghanistan significantly closer to the Persian Gulf than
existing bases. F-1
A new Soviet airfield in southwestern Afghanistan would
increase Soviet tactical air coverage of southeastern Iran, but
we judge that it would give the Soviets few advantages in
attacking targets in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, or
on the Arabian Peninsula. Of Soviet tactical aircraft, only the
SU-24 Fencer tactical bomber would be within effective
operational range of the Strait of Hormuz from an airfield built
in southwestern Afghanistan. Assuming realistic combat mission
profiles that anticipate possible US or Persian Gulf opposition,
MIG-27 and SU-17 fighter-bombers would be unable to reach targets
in the Persian Gulf from a new airfield and MIG-23 fighters would
be operating at the limits of their effective range. Soviet
medium bombers--including Backfire and Badger--would not require
airbases in Afghanistan to be within range of the Persian Gulf,
but could be based in the USSR.
Building a major airbase in southwestern Afghanistan would
be costly, time-consuming, and confront nearly insurmountable
logistical difficulties. Imagery indicates that the construction
of new airbases in the USSR that are capable of sustaining
tactical air operations requires a minimum of three years.
Moreover, Soviet airbases are typically located along major lines
of communication, usually including rail lines. There is
virtually no logistical infrastructure in southwestern
Afghanistan to support building a new airbase. The Soviets would
need to build a road capable of supporting sustained traffic by
heavy vehicles and equipment in order to transport the necessary
building materials, particularly the large concrete slabs used
for constructing runways. The distance from the existing main
road connecting the cities of Qandahar and Farah with the USSR to
the southwestern corner of Afghanistan is over 100 miles.
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25X1
25X1
25X1
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_ Temporary
combat operations from an improvised airfield in southwestern
Afghanistan would also require logistics support probably beyond
the capabilities of the existing primitive road network in the
area.
The Afghan insurgents would likely be able to harass but not
prevent the construction and operation of an airfield in
southwestern Afghanistan. The Soviets would need to assign at
least a ground force regiment to the area to suppress insurgent
activity.
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4 0
Effective Combat Radii of Selected Soviet Tactical Aircraft
NIIG-23 fighter 800 km., optimum mission profile
400 km., probable mission profile
SU-17 fighter-bomber 600 kn., optimum mission profile
300 km., probable mission profile
SU-24 tactical bomber 700-800 km., probable mission profile
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`yA \ ~! ~~? 600 KM.?_~~i
Guff
Red
Sea
RIYADH
U.A.E.
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