AFGHANISTAN: POTENTIAL FOR SOVIET AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85T00287R000700090002-6
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
6
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 10, 2010
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 5, 1983
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP85T00287R000700090002-6.pdf178.1 KB
Body: 
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700090002-6 January 5, 1983 MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Near East South Asia SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Construction Attached is our response to the DCI's inquiry on the above subject. The response was prepared by branch and coordinated with SOYA. Attachment: a/s Chief, Pakistan/Afghanistan/Bangladesh Branch, NESA, DDI ntial for Soviet Airfield of my NGA Review Completed TOP SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700090002-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700090002-6 Afghanistan: Potential for Soviet Airfield Orig 1 1 1 1 1 4 Addressee D/NESA C/SOVA/TF/A C/SOYA/CS/E C/NESA/PG C/NESA/SO C/DDO/NEC OCPAS/IMD/CB DDI/NESA/SO/P7 (4 Jan 82) Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700090002-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700090002-6 TOP SECRET Afghanistan: Potential for Soviet Airfield Construction The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan clearly has grave strategic implications for the area and gives Moscow a potential base from which to further threaten Iran and Pakistan. Nonetheless, Soviet military activities in Afghanistan are currently aimed against the insurgency. In particular, the apparent intent of Soviet airfield improvements there, as is to increase the number of helicopters in Afghanistan and to expand the maintenance capabilities of Soviet air units engaged in operations against the insurgents. A key indicator of a shift in Soviet focus would be if Moscow began constructing an airfield in southwestern Afghanistan significantly closer to the Persian Gulf than existing bases. F-1 A new Soviet airfield in southwestern Afghanistan would increase Soviet tactical air coverage of southeastern Iran, but we judge that it would give the Soviets few advantages in attacking targets in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, or on the Arabian Peninsula. Of Soviet tactical aircraft, only the SU-24 Fencer tactical bomber would be within effective operational range of the Strait of Hormuz from an airfield built in southwestern Afghanistan. Assuming realistic combat mission profiles that anticipate possible US or Persian Gulf opposition, MIG-27 and SU-17 fighter-bombers would be unable to reach targets in the Persian Gulf from a new airfield and MIG-23 fighters would be operating at the limits of their effective range. Soviet medium bombers--including Backfire and Badger--would not require airbases in Afghanistan to be within range of the Persian Gulf, but could be based in the USSR. Building a major airbase in southwestern Afghanistan would be costly, time-consuming, and confront nearly insurmountable logistical difficulties. Imagery indicates that the construction of new airbases in the USSR that are capable of sustaining tactical air operations requires a minimum of three years. Moreover, Soviet airbases are typically located along major lines of communication, usually including rail lines. There is virtually no logistical infrastructure in southwestern Afghanistan to support building a new airbase. The Soviets would need to build a road capable of supporting sustained traffic by heavy vehicles and equipment in order to transport the necessary building materials, particularly the large concrete slabs used for constructing runways. The distance from the existing main road connecting the cities of Qandahar and Farah with the USSR to the southwestern corner of Afghanistan is over 100 miles. TOP SECRET 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700090002-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700090002-6 _ Temporary combat operations from an improvised airfield in southwestern Afghanistan would also require logistics support probably beyond the capabilities of the existing primitive road network in the area. The Afghan insurgents would likely be able to harass but not prevent the construction and operation of an airfield in southwestern Afghanistan. The Soviets would need to assign at least a ground force regiment to the area to suppress insurgent activity. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700090002-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700090002-6 4 0 Effective Combat Radii of Selected Soviet Tactical Aircraft NIIG-23 fighter 800 km., optimum mission profile 400 km., probable mission profile SU-17 fighter-bomber 600 kn., optimum mission profile 300 km., probable mission profile SU-24 tactical bomber 700-800 km., probable mission profile Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700090002-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700090002-6 `yA \ ~! ~~? 600 KM.?_~~i Guff Red Sea RIYADH U.A.E. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700090002-6 /J ?DOHA Qatar ABU DNAB