IMPLICATIONS OF ARGENTINA'S URANIUM ENRICHMENT CAPABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000601320001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 5, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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5 DEC 1983
Director of Global Issues
SUBJECT: Implications of Argentina's Uranium Enrichment
Capability
1. The attached memorandum examines the implications of
Argentina's surprise announcement that it has successfully
operated a facility to enrich uranium.. Buenos Aires claims that
this development--the latest in a series of Argentine efforts to
circumvent comprehensive nuclear saf eguards--will help the
country achieve greater independence in the area of nuclear
energy. However, the existence of an unsafeguarded enrichment
facility will deepen suspicions about potential military applica-
tions of Argentina's nuclear program and impact negatively on
Buenos Aires's relations with major nuclear supplier states. 25X1
This memorandum was prepared by
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International Security Issues llivisio n, U ice of
3. Comments and queries regarding this subject are welcome
and may be addressed to the Chief, Weapons Proliferation Branch,
UGI,
Attachment:
The Implications of Argentina's Uranium Enrichment
Capability GI r1 83-10"174, December 1983
~~ M S~3-~oa~~
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C.20S05
DIRECTORATE OF I[VTELLIGENCE
2 December 1983
Implications of Argentina's Uranium Enrichment Capability
Summa ry
Argentina's sudden mid-November public announcement of a
breakthrough in uranium enrichment technology has increased spee-
uZation about the potential military applications of Argentina's
nuclear research efforts. The new regime--which was apparently
surprised by the announcement--probably will not open the
enrichment facility to international safeguards inspections. An
unsafeguara'ed enrichment facility would make it more difficult to
monitor possible Argentine weapons-related activities and would
damage Argentine relations with major nuclear suppliers. Fur-
thermore, some military officials in Brazil and Chile already
have suggested that their governments intensify nuclear research
outside safeguards for national security reasons.
The Announcemen t
The head of Argentina's Atomic Energy Commission, Retired
Admiral Carlos Castro Madero, announced on 18 November that his
country has successfully operated a pilot-scale gaseous diffusion
This memorandum was prepared by
International Security Issues Division, Office of Global Issues.
This analysis is based on information as of 2 December 1y 83.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to Chief,
Weapons Proliferation Branch, OGI,
VI M 83-10274
Dec embe r 19 8 3
CUNI'I DENT IAL 25X1
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facility. According to Castro Nladero, the present facility is
the "first module" of a larger uranium enrichment plant that when
complete will be capable of enriching about 50U kilograms of
uranium a year to the 2U percent level. 't'his larger plant is
reportedly in the "advanced stages" of construction and is
scheduled to be completed by the end of 1985. Both facilities
are located near Bariloche, about 1,000 miles southwest of Buenos
Aires. The Argentines showed the pilot-scale enrichment facility
to IAEA Director General Hans Blix on 24 November. 25X1
Castro Madero publicly justified the decision to launch
research in uranium enrichment technology as a legitimate
reaction to the Carter administration's decision in 1978 to
terminate the supply of US-origin enriched uranium for use in
Argentina's five small light-water research reactors.
Argentina's refusal to accept safeguards administered by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on all Argentine
nuclear activities was the principal reason why Washington chose
to terminate nuclear relations with Buenos Aires.
The Argentines claim that the uranium enrichment development
program will provide a reliable source of enriched uranium for
their small research reactors. Furthermore, they maintain it
will enable Buenos Aires to be a reliable supplier of enriched
uranium to its own nuclear customers in Latin America, particu-
larly Peru which has purchased a small research reactor from
Argentina. In his announcement, Castro Madero also emphasized
that Argentina plans to utilize some low-enriched uraniurn
(probably at the one percent level) in the country's two opera-
tional natural uranium reactors, a move that would increase fuel
efficiency.
Argentina's Intentions
Castro Madero's sudden announcement of this. sensitive and
difficult achievement was made without any previous indication
that Buenos Aires was seriously considering construction of a
gaseous diffusion facility. However, Buenos Aires has for many
years made clear its intention to obtain a complete nuclear fuel
cycle outside IAEA safeguards. This new development is in
keeping with this objective even though, thus far, Argentina's
nuclear energy program has been largely centered on the heavy-
water nuclear fuel cycle which uses natural uranium rather than
enriched uranium.
The announcement, which apparently took the newly elected
civilian regime by surprise, was made by the Argentine Foreign
Ministry with the approval of the outgoing military government.
6ae believe that the timing of Castro Madero's announcement was
influenced by the desire of senior Argentine nuclear officials to
influence the new .government on the importance of nuclear
research and the need to maintain a well-funded nuclear energy
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program. The President-elect, Raul Alfonsin, who will take
office on 10 December, had campaigned in opposition to nuclear
weapons research and his advisors have stated that nuclear energy
in the future will be given a lower priority.
6?Je cannot independently confirm Argentina's capability to
enrich uranium, but their claim to have enriched some uranium
through the gaseous diffusion process probably is accurate. A
visit by IAEA Director General Hans Blix on 24 November confirmed
the existence of a pilot-scale enrichment facility, and it would
have served little purpose for Castro Madero to prematurely
unveil Argentina's enrichment capability. However, the projected
completion of the larger facility in 1985 may be overly optimistic
because of financial and possible technical constraints.
The Argentine achievement underscores Buenos Aires's
determination to master both routes--uranium enrichment and
plutonium separation--to fissile material production. Most other
countries that have posed a proliferation threat have pursued
only one route to fissile material acquisition. Generally the
plutonium route is chosen because it technically is easier and
less costly to accomplish. India and Israel are the best
examples of countries that have used the plutonium route to
complete the nuclear fuel cycle for possible military use.
Pakistan, which has a strong desire to acquire a nuclear
capability, is the only other deve"loping country known to have
made a serious effort to build both, uranium enrichment and
plutonium reprocessing facilities.
The Argentine and Pakistani cases are also similar in that
both countries managed to keep secret their efforts to acquire
enrichment technology for an extended period of time. In
Pakistan's case, centrifuge enrichment technology was obtained
illegally from 4destern Europe's uranium enrichment consortium,
URENCU, in the mid-1970s. We do not know how Argentina developed
or acquired gaseous diffusion technology. The Argentines claim
that this has been an exclusively national achievement, although
public remarks by Castro Madero indicate that Argentina imported
at least some comUOnents and equipment for the enrichment
facility.
Proliferation Impact
The Argentine breakthrough in this sensitive area of nuclear
science makes the proliferation threat substantially more serious
than before. Technically, the obstacles to the production of
weapons-grade fissile material (i.e. uranium enriched to the 80-
90 percent level) are substantially overcome if a country can
enrich uranium to the 2U percent level. Further enrichment to a
weapons-grade level then becomes a political decision rather than
a technical problem.
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The Brazilian Government was given advance notification and
subsequently issued public congratulations to the Argentines for
their achieveme nt, but we expect the Argentine announcement will
heighten concern among Brazilian officials and those from other
neighboring Latin American countries--particularly Chile. Some
Brazilian and Chilean officials have expressed publicly in the
past the belief that the Argentine nuclear energy program might
eventually move toward weapons-related research. Those
individuals in the military and nuclear establishments in Brazil
and Chile most suspicious of Argentine intentions have advanced
stronger arguments to support their own interest in conducting
nuclear research outside IAEA safeguards, according to US Embassy
reporting. Like Argentina, neither country has signed the,
Nuclea r Non-Proliferation .Treaty (NPT) and, as a result, has
reserved the legal basis for justifying indigenous nuclear
activities free of international inspection.
Uther states of proliferation concern such as-Pakistan and
South Africa will probably draw considerable encouragement from
Argentina's ability to develop the most sensitive nuclear
technology with minimal or no outside assistance. Some, like
Libya, may even hope that Argentina will share the secrets of its
enrichment technology. Others such as Taiwan and South Korea
might assert that they should not be restricted by the United
States from advanced nuclear research in view of the Argentine
Prospects
The new civilian Argentine Government under Raul Alfonsin
will find it difficult to balance its conflicting domestic and
foreign policy interests resulting from Castro Madero's
unexpected revelation. The Argentine press has praised the
achievement of the country's scientific elite, but the Alfonsin
government, in view of its stated opposition to nuclear weapons
research, will probably be both unwilling and unable to ignore
negative foreign reactions.
We expect the new civilian Argentine Government to attemp t
to gain greater control over the direction of the nuclear program
and perhaps put it on a tighter budget. However, according to
several press reports, the Alfonsin government does not intend to
open the new enrichment facility to IAEA safeguards inspection.
Acceptance of international inspections at indigenous nuclear
facilities would signify a radical departure from all previous
Argentine policy statements on this issue. Thus far, Buenos
Aires's position has been that IAEA safeguards are only accept-
able in cases where there has been an actual transfer of nuclear
materials, equipment, o r technology to Argentina.
Argentine nuclear officials will probably try to counter
foreign criticism by emphasizing that IAEA safeguards for uranium
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enrichment facilities are still in the developmental stage.
Furthermore, even if such safeguards were available today, the
Argentines probably would reject them on the grounds that
inspections would compromise a major commercial secret--a
position which has often been advanced by West European countries
and Japan to protect their own versions of uranium enrichment
technology. As long as the new enrichment facility remains
outside safeguards, the ability of the IAEA to provide any timely
warning of weapons-related activities which may take place in
Argentina is seriously jeopardized.
Argentina's relations with nuclear supplier states will be
severely complicated though Castro Madero presumably took this
into account when he decided to reveal Argentina's unsafeguarded
enrichment facility. The Argentine Government may find it
difficult, if not impossible, to have any future nuclear
cooperation with Canada and the United States since each
requires, as a matter of policy or law, that their?customers
accept comprehensive safeguards.
Buenos Aires may believe that PJest Germany--which is
constructing Argentina's third nuclear power reacto r, Atuch a II--
will likely prove to be more flexible than Canada or the United
States concerning future nuclear cooperation. Bonn rationalized
its decision in 1980 to proceed with the Atucha II project, in
the face of US criticism, on the grounds that Argentina had?all
of its operational nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.
Although this situation is no longer the case, Bonn still has a
fallback position. In terms of its legal commitments under the
NPT and its membership in suppliers organizations such as the
London Suppliers Group, West Germany is only obligated to insist
on IAEA safeguards for what it sells to another country. The
Argentines probably are counting on this fact to preserve their
access to West German nuclear technology.
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Addressee List for Typescript: Implications of Argentina's
Uranium Enrichment Capability
The Honorable Langhorne A. Motley
Assistan t Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs
Department of State
The Honorable Richard T. Kennedy
Ambassador at Large (S/NP)
Room 7 531
Department of State
The Honorable James C. Malone
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Uceans
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (UES)
Room 7831
Department of State
James Devine
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy
and Energy Technology Affairs (UES/N)
Room 7 831
Department of Sate
Donald Fortier
Senior Director for Political-Military Affairs
and Special Assistant to the President
National Security Council
Room 392
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20506
Lucian Pugliaresi
Policy Planning Staff
Room 7312
Department of State
Frederick F. McGoldrick
Director, Uffice of Nuclear
,Proliferation and ~;xport Policy
Room 7828
Department of State
Ala n Ses sours
Director, Uffice of Nuclear Technology
and Safeguards (UES/NTS),
Room 7 828
Department of State
Thomas Gabbert
Agency Director for Science and Technology (IO/SCT)
Room 5336
Department of State
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Addressee List for Typescript: Implications of Argentina's
Uranium Enrichment Capability
Carlton Thorne
Chief, International Nuclear Affairs Division
Arms Control Disarmament Agency
Room 4678
Department of State
Joerg Menzel
Chief, Nuclear Safeguards and Technology
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 4947
Department of State
W. Dean Howells, Jr.
Director, Office of Politico-Military Analysis (INR/PNIA)
Room 6638
Department of State
George Bradley
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
for International Affairs (IA-2)
Mail Stop 7C016
Forrestal Building
Department of Energy
Harold Jaffe
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
for International Energy Cooperation
and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy
Mail Stop 7C034
Forrestal Building
Department of Energy
Sheila Buckley
Director of Multilateral Negotiations
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Department of Defense
Room 4C76l Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20301
James R. Shea
Director, Office of International Programs
E/41/S 414 A
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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