COMMUNIST AID TO SELECTED CLIENT STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000600920001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 12, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert Friel
EUR/RTE/EWEA
25X1 Department of State
Chief, ommuni.st Activities Branch
Attached is the final version of the paper provided to NATO
in September, 1983. If you have any questions, please contact
Attachment:
Communist Aid to Selected Client States,
GI M 83-10232, December 1983, (S)
Unclassified When Separated
From Attachment.
~ 1 M 3-- /OcQ3
25X1
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LUKE 1'
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
8 December 1983
Communist Aid to Selected Client Stafes
Summary
The USSR and its Eastern European allies promised nearly $1
billion in new military and economic assistance to selected
Soviet client states (Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique,
and South Yemen) in 1982, bringing total commitments to the five
countries to more than $14 billion. Almost all of this
assistance has been provided since the mid-1970s. Since 1979,
client states (especially Afghanistan and Ethiopia) have
accounted for an increa roportion of Soviet allocations to
Third World countries. 25X1
Identified military agreements plunged dramatically in 1982
to about 15 percent of the 1981 level, and we1Z below the $1.4
billion annual average of the previous five years. A precipitous
drop in identified new Soviet contracts with Ethiopia and
Afghanistan, which together have received two-thirds of the
25X1
Communist Activities Branch, OGI,
This memorandum was prepared) (International
Security Issues Division, Office of Global Issues. This analysis
is based on information available as of September 1983. Comments
and queries are, welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
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USSR's military pledges to the client states under consideration,
was responsible for the drop*. In contrast, Soviet economic
commitments to client states rose to a record $650 million,
propelled by a $400 million agreement with Angola to build a dam
and powerplant, and by oil assistance to Ethiopia.
The Military Program Still the Most Important Policy Instrument
In spite of the drop in new military agreements, Moscow's
military program in client states remained its most important
instrument to maintain its presence and to further its
influence. The USSR and East European countries are the primary
military suppliers for all five of the client states. Even
though this group accounts for only a little more than 10 percent
Table 1
USSR and Eastern Europe: Military
Agreements with and Deliveries
to Client States
Million US $
Agreements
Deliveries
Eastern
Eastern
USSR
Europe
USSR
Europe
Totala
9,085
565
5,675
470
1955-74
680
35
600
35
1975
305
10
95
??
1976
790
25
150
1977
1,305
165
600
130
1978
1,330
125
1,,460
120
1979
1,785
70
760
70
1980
520
100
875
50
1981
2,085
5
575
35
1982
280
35
555
35
aBecause of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.
Numbers are rounded to nearest five.
*This level could be much higher. We have been unable to assign
a value to possible new contracts with Angola and Mozambique.
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of the USSR's total sales, Ethiopian agreements account for more
than two-thirds of the Moscow's sales to all of Africa. Ethiopia
is Moscow's seventh largest military recipient, Afghanistan is
eighth.
With military assistance the USSR has helped modernize
military establishments in Afghanistan and Ethiopia, and has
converted rebel armies into conventional fighting forces in
Angola, Mozambique, and South Yemen. In turn, the USSR has
created a dependence within client states for spares and follow-
on support and has strengthened the Soviet position in their
In 1982, Moscow's Marxist allies were excepted from a
general downtrend in deliveries to non-Arab clients. Angola and
Mozambique experienced sharp increases in Soviet arms transfers
in 1982, as Moscow bolstered the defenses of its African allies
against increasing threats from South Africa. Angola received
its first guided missile patrol boats and T-62 medium tanks as
well as MIG-21. jet fighters. Moscow also introduced several
types of equipment into Mozambique to improve the army's
power structures.
USSR and Eastern Europe: Military Agreements
Concluded and Equipment Delivered,
1955-82
Million US $
Agreements
Concluded
Equipment
Delivered
Eastern
Eastern
USSR Europe
USSR
Europe
Totals
9,085 565
5,675
470
Afghanistanb
2,885 90
1,270
40
Angola
780 220
775
205
Ethiopia
3,940 110
2,250
110
Mozambique
320 125
290
95
South Yemen
1,155 25
1,090
25
'Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.
Numbers are rounded to nearest five.
bExcluding Soviet equipment transfer used exclusively by
Soviet troops.
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capabilities, including APCs, tanks, and bridging equipment.
Other notable deliveries included:
o SU-22 fighter bombers and MI-8 helicopters to
Afghanistan,
o Costal patrol craft, tanks, APCs, and other ground
guided missile patrol boat to South Yemen.
weapons to Ethiopia, and
o SU-22 fighter bombers, MI-8 helicopters, and
Military Services
The USSR has backed up its weapons sales to client states
with the most active technical services program in the Third
World. About three-fourths of the Warsaw Pact and Cuban military
Table 3
Communist Military Technicians
in Client States, 1982a
USSR
Eastern
Europe
Cubab
6,700
1,200
34,800
Afghanistan
2,000
NA
c
Angola
1,200
500
25,000
Ethiopia
1,700
600
9,000
Mozambique
800
..
800
South Yemen
1,000
100
aMinimum estimates of the number of persons present for a
period of one month or more. Numbers are, rounded to the
nearest five.
bincluding combat units in Angola and Ethiopia.
CHighest estimate is 30,000.
dHighest estimate is 11,000.
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USSR and Eastern Europe: Training of Client
States Military Personnel in Communist
Countries, 1956-82a
1956-82
1982
USSR
Eastern
Europe
USSR
Eastern
Europe
Total
8,570
1,340
400
10
Afghanistan
5,075
655
150
Angola
300
5
3.25
NA
Ethiopia
1,600
520
25
Mozambique
400
130
?.
??
South Yemen
1,195
30
100
10
aData refer to the minimum number of persons departing for
training. Numbers are rounded to nearest five.
25X1
personnel in non-Communist LDCs are employed in these
countries. The ratio for Cubans is more than 90 percent, as
Havana has dispatched a full range of military personnel
(including the only combat units in the Third World) to Angola
and Ethiopia to keep their revolutionary regimes afloat. During
1982, Havana increased its presence in Angola to up to 30,000
troops to support Luanda against more aggressive forays over the
border by South Africans. Moscow also accepted about 400
milit r trainees from client states for advanced training in the
USSR. 25X1
Economic Aid: Beginning to Make Impact
Until recently, the USSR's economic program in.client states
has been a secondary effort, and aid levels have disappointed
Marxist leaders eager for large amounts of Soviet financing for
economic development. In 1982, the USSR provided $650 million in
new credits and grants to hard-pressed client states--about
three-fourths of its new pledges for the year. Notable among the
new agreements were:
o A $400 million credit to Angola for a hydropower project,
extended under a 1982 framework agreement that could
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eventually provide $2 billion in financing. This deal
calls for Brazil to undertake the infrastructure for the
project.
o Some $170 million in credits and grants to Ethiopia for
oil purchases--the first such allocation to a non-CEMA
country.
USSR and Eastern Europe: Economic Credits
and Grants to Client States, 1982a
Million US $
USSR
Eastern
Europe
Total
650
Afghanistan
75
??
Angola
400
??
Ethiopia
170
??
Mozambique.
5
10
South Yemen
??
??
aNumbers are rounded to nearest five.
The new credits bring Soviet aid to client states in the past
five years to more than $2 billion, about $500 million to
Afghanistan for commodities and consumer goods. The aid has
included a high proport grants, a feature not usually found
in the Soviet program. 25X1
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USSR and Eastern Europe: Economic Credits
and Grants to Client States, Extended
and Drawn, 1954-82
Million US $
Extended
Drawn
Eastern
Eastern
USSR
Europe
USSR
Europe
Tot
ls
3,660
980
2,270
315
a
Afghanistan
2,195
210
1,625
75
Angola
440
100
30
20
Ethiopia
645
390
430
70
Mozambique
180
155
40
80
South Yemen
205
125
140
65
aBecause of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.
Numbers are rounded to nearest five. 25X1
Disbursement rates under agreements with client states have
been unusually high for the Soviet program because Moscow has
provided unprecedented levels of commodity support to Afghanistan
to help stabilize the regime. Ethiopia also has required oil
subsidies and petroleum shipments under credit because of foreign
exchange shortages. This has meant that disbursements to client
states have averaged about $400 million annually in the 1980s, or
more than two-fifths of Soviet aid deliveries to all non-
Communist LDCs. Support to these countries propelled Soviet aid
flows over the billion dollar mark for the first time in 1982.
It is likely that this Soviet support is even more extensive than
we know. For example, we do not include possible budgetary
support to South Yemen, whose annual trade deficit with Moscow
has been in the $100 million range for the past three years.
Moscow may b ing (or possibly even excusing) annual trade
settlements.- ______
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USSR and Eastern Europe: Economic Agreements
With and Disbursements to Client States
Million US $
Agreements
Disbursements
Eastern
Eastern
USSR
Europe USSR
Europe
Totals
3 , 660
980 2 ,
270
1954-74
1,030
115
680
45
1975
440
30
25
15
1976
90
45
55
30
1977
40
50
80
25
1978
95
400
90
20
1979
530
75
135
25
1980
650
175
395
20
1981
135
80
330
50
1982
650
10
480
85
aNumbers are rounded to nearest five.
25X1
The USSR's aid to its LDC clients has been noteworthy for
its easy terms. About $500 million to Afghanistan and Ethiopia
over the past five years have been grants. Credits have been
repayable over a minimum of 12 years at a maximum 2.5 percent
interest rate. In addition, the Kremlin has.shown itself
unusually flexible in rescheduling payments on the large military
and economic debts run up by this group of countries.
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and South Yemen have received
reschedulings that run through at leas 985 on an estimated $3-4
billion in economic and military debt. 25X1
Economic Technicians
There were more than 22,000 Soviet, East European, and Cuban
economic personnel in client states in 1982, a little over 15
percent of the Communist technical contingent in the Third
World. Angola hosted the largest contingent of Cuban economic
personnel abroad--about 2,000 construction workers and 4,000
teachers and doctors working in all sectors of the economy.
Communist advisors permeated all levels of the bureaucracies in
the Marxist states, providing policy planning, administrative and
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managerial services in the industrial, political, financial, and
educational sectors and directing the economy on a day-to-day
basis for some. Communist personnel also provided the bulk of
the foreign educational and medical services available in most
client states. Again, the USSR has shown flexibility in allowing
its poorer clients to defer technical services payments under
existing lines of credit. Only Angola and Mozambique are known
to pay hard currency--generally requisite for an LDC
desiring Communist technicians. 25X1
Communist Economic Technicans
in Client States, 1982"
Number of Persons
USSR
Eastern
Europe
Cuba
9,000
5,000
8,300
Afghanistan
3,500
300
100
Angola
1,500
2,050
6,000
Ethiopia
1,000
600
1,000
Mozambique
1,000
1,300
1,000
South Yemen
2,000
750
200
"Minimum estimates of number present for a period
of one month or more. Numbers are rounded to
nearest five.
students in Soviet establishments.
Client states also sent a disproportionately large share of
the foreign academic students enrolled in Soviet and East
European universities under agreements to revamp and upgrade
their educational system along Marxist lines. Students from
Moscow's five clients accounted for more than one-fourth of the
83,000 students in Communist universities from 100 countries at
the end of 1982. Afghanistan had the largest student contingent
in the USSR under a 1980 agreement to train upwards of 15,000
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Academic Students From Client States Trained
in USSR and Eastern Europe, 1956-82a
1956-82
Being Trained
as of Dec 1982
USSR Europ
e
USSR
Europe
Total
17,620 11,51
5
13,555
7,945
Afghanistan
9,015 4,12
0
7,535
2,675
Angola
1,260 1,07
0
985
790
Ethiopia
5,005 2,32
0
3,680
1,905
Mozambique
625 2,97
5
395
2,200
South Yemen
1,715 1,03
0
960
375
aNumbers are rounded to nearest five. Most of the
estimates are based on scholarship awards.
Country Surveys
Afghanistan
the Soviet military
campaign against the Afghan insurgents has slowed, if not forced
some cutback's in, Moscow's military and economic development
programs in Afghanistan. Security breakdowns in the countryside
have affected progress on development projects, while military
operations have been hampered by conscription and leadership
problems. Even so, aid flows have ned substantial because
of food and commodity assistance. 25X1
lar e25x1nbers for instruction and indoctrination in the USSR.
Military Force Improvements
Despite some slippage, the USSR is continuing its effort to
expand and upgrade the Afghan def-ense establishment. Inflows of
weapons and material for Afghan forces remained heavy in 1982,
while Afghan military personnel continued to leave the country in
The Soviets are upgrading the Afghan arms inventory with new
and sometimes better equipment. For example, old T-34 tanks are
being replaced with T-55 and newer model amored personnel
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f~~bicians, for which the USSR usually demands cash payments.
Along with the infusion of new and better hardware, the USSR
has invested heavily in improving Afghanistan's logistic base.
While much of the new construction--airfields, training
facilities, and depots--is being financed with credits under
economic agreements, it is dedicated to the support of the Soviet
expeditionary force. Other Soviet building projects earmarked
for the Afghans have been identified and include several NCO and
officer training schools, new barracks, a mi vehicle repair
shop, and a large medical treatment center. 25X1
Economic Aid Turns to Basic Needs
Since the Marxist takeover, Afghanistan has become one of
the USSR's largest economic aid recipients (after India) in the
non-Communist world. The USSR provided $75 million in new
assistance to Afghanistan in 1982, most of it grant aid to
finance the delivery of commodities. More than $500 million in
aid deliveries to the Marxist government has been in the form of
grants, generally to cover the delivery of food and other basic
commodities. Disbursements were stepped up after the December
1.979 Soviet invasion, and have averaged $200-300 million per
year. In addition to its sizable commodity support, the USSR has
permitted Afghanistan to defer payments on the services of Soviet
for battle losses.
carriers. The Air Force has received the most attention and
improvement thus far; in 1982, the USSR reportedly transferred
SU-22 fighter-bombers and MI-8 helicopters to the Afghan
government. On a few of th25xi aircraft represented replacement
In contrast, the war has greatly impeded Soviet efforts to
move forward with such other major development projects as the
Ainak copper complex, the Hajigak iron ore scheme, natural gas
exploration in the north, and extension of the Soviet power grid
into Afghanistan. Rebels blew up the gas pipeline close to the
border at Jeraqduq in 1982, interrupting gas supplies to the
USSR. The only major development contract concluded between
Moscow and Kabul in 1982 was for a $200 million project to link
Afghanistan to the USSR's power grid, to be financed under old
agreements. The Soviet program in 1982 was supported by 3,500
technicians in Afghanistan, and a burgeoning training effort that
saw 7,500 Af hans in Soviet civilian educational institutions at
year end. 25X1
well ahead of schedule.
Deliveries to projects have continued at about $75 million
annually as the Soviets expedite work on transport and military-
related projects under credit agreements with Afghanistan that
ultimately will facilitate logistics for Soviet troops. For
example, in April Soviet personnel completed a bridge across the
Amu Darya, a river which forms part of the USSR-Afghan border, 25X1
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U 1L 'i .L 1
Until the invasion, Moscow's economic program in Afghanistan
was self-sustaining. Commercial deliveries and aid flows were
nearly balanced by Afghan exports of 3 billion cubic meters of
natural gas annually'through a pipeline built by the Soviets in
the mid-1960s. Since the invasion the Soviets have had to
provide an average of 150 -21 lion in commodities annually that
will not be repaid. of
Afghanistan has become almost completely dependent on the
Soviets for economic aid as well as military equipment. Moscow
has been forced to supply food to Afghan cities because the war
has disrupted traditional distribution patterns, but it has been
unable to replace the $100 million plus in annual Western aid
flows to Kabul that dried up when it crossed the Afghan border in
December 1979. Almost all of Afghanistan's foreign trade is now
carried out-with the USSR, and Moscow is having difficulty in
meeting im ort demands from Afghanistan's consumer goods-oriented
society. 25X1
sides are also discussing the construction of an oil refinery.
On the economic side, Angola finally received a significant
Soviet commitment to economic development in January under a 10-
year agreement that eventually could provide up to $2 billion in
credits. The USSR already has signed a contract to provide $400
million in equipment credits for the Kapanda hydroelectric dam
and powerplant that will be Angola's largest construction
project. In an unusual move, the USSR joined with Brazil (which
will perform civil construction) to execute this project. It is
part of a comprehensive Soviet-formulated development plan under
which Moscow will also construct a 990,000 acre irrigation
system, bridges, and other projects in Malanje province. The two
equipment deliveries for the year.
Angola
Military setbacks and heavy casualties stemming from more
aggressive actions by UNITA guerrillas and South African
government troops precipitated sharp increases in Soviet and
Cuban'support to Angola last year. Putting aside an earlier
reluctance to deepen its military assistance, Moscow boosted arms
shipments to Angola to record levels and introduced more advanced
weapons to shore up Luanda's air and coastal defenses.
Some $180 million in Soviet military equipment deliveries
was identified in 1982, twice the level of past years. The
higher value is linked largely to the arrival of more advanced,
more costly weapons, including Angola's first OSA missile patrol
boat, late-model medium tanks, BMP armored reconnaissance
vehicles, and MIG-21 fighters and various early warning ra-dar
stations. Additional T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, 25X1
artillery and military transport vehicles rounded out Soviet
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The large new Soviet agreement has not appreciably reduced
the growing tension in relations over the Soviet and East
European failure to help reverse the decline in Angola's
economy. More than 9,500 Communist economic technicians were
present in Angola in 1982, but industrial production lagged far
behind prewar levels, and only the Western assisted oil industry
operated at a profit. Food and consumer goods shortages became
more pronounced during the year. Once an agricultural exporter,
the country now imports 90 percent of its food. Angola's poverty
has been camouflaged by sharp increases in petroleum prices--oil
nrine droDs have virtually bankrupted the government.
contributes 80 percent of Angola's export earnings--butt -recent
military supplies and technical services. Angolans became more
restive over what they saw as Communist monopolizing of the few
food and consumer items that were imported, while Angolan
cials watched the growing Soviet debt burden with dismay.
25X1
has been costing it-$2 billion a year in hard currency for
Ethiopia
Concessions made on both sides of the bargaining table
during Chairman Mengistu's October visit to Moscow in 1982 appear
to have strengthened the bonds linking the USSR and Ethiopia. In
return for signing an agreement to move forward with the
establishment of a Communist party in Ethiopia, the USSR agreed
(a) to review rescheduling of the country's large military
indebtedness (estimated at $2-3 billion), (b) additional economic
assistance, and (c) additional arms deliveries. 25X1
Soviet arms deliveries to Ethiopia in 1982 fell to $110
million (a six-year low), but the volume remained substantial by
any measure. Equipment arrivals consisted mostly of land
armaments--tanks, APCs, artillery and heavy transport vehicles.
Three Soviet-made coast patrol craft rounded out the year's 25X1
deliveries to Ethiopia.
As a result of lengthy economic negotiations, Moscow made
substantial new credits available to Ethiopia for oil--its first
such concession to a non-Communist LDC, and promised additional
development aid. The USSR agreed to provide 500,000 tons of
crude oil in 1983 (all of Ethiopia's requirements) on credit at
prices 10 percent below the world market. The USSR also appeared
to be moving forward on Chairman Mengistu's repeated requests for
development aid. Moscow began preliminary work on the $250
million Gambella irigation project for which the USSR reportedly
will provide large new credits. The USSR also continued work on:
o acement plant,
o a farm machinery assembly complex,
o a caustic soda plant
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While publicly reaffirming his political commitment to
Moscow, Mengistu continues to rely on the West for economic
assistance. Ethiopia is trying to arrange a Western donors'
conference in 1983 in the hopes of increasing aid for Ethiopian
development projects. Mengistu hopes to obtain substantial
increases in aid to food production, the centerpiece of his
ambitious five-year plan. Funding has been reduced by several
years of low coffee prices and decreasing production. In spite
of the deteriorating economy, Mengistu probably will not make the
political concessions necessary to attract significant increases
in Western funds above the cur 50 million Ethiopia receives
annually from Western donors. 25X1
o grain and fodder warehouses,
o oil, gas, and mineral prospecting.
Mozambique
The. USSR and its East European allies deepened their
economic involvement in Mozambique during the year with over 500
new technicians and $15 million in new aid. The USSR, the
largest donor with $140 million in outstanding development
credits, pursued several initiatives:
o Participation in a railroad from the Moatize coal fields
to the port of Beira using Brazilian firms as civil works
contractors,
J U[Jy V U LGU L1L Y1 1lIJ U I r, G11 LJ.
Mozambique's policy of expanding ties with Western powers
did not affect its relations with Communist countries in 1982.
As the security situation worsened, some Mozambican officials
questioned the wisdom of relying on Comnunist countries for
military equipment and services, but these reservations have not
yet become urgent enough to damage ties forged during Freliino's
long liberation struggle and reinforced with nearly half a
billion dollars in Communist military equipment and supplies.
Deliveries of Soviet military equipment in 1982 included light
cross-country armor and vehicles and bridging equipment tailored
to help the Mozambican armed forces cope with the South African
o The supply of $150 million of equipment for the second
stage of the Cabora Bassa hydropower projects,
o Accelerated work on mining and agricultural projects, an
aluminum smelting plant at Caia, and intensified coal
exploration.
The USSR also donated $4.6 million in food and see ins to
Mozambique and signed a two-year trade agreement.
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East Germany was the only other Communist donor that
provided new aid--$10 million in commodities as a grant. For the
most part, East European countries concentrated on implementing
projects agreed to earlier. East Germany (a) discussed a 120,000
hectare grain-growing project, (b) accepted several thousand new
students under a program developed in 1981 to train Mozambicans
at home and in Germany, (c) sent more agricultural advisors and
equipment, and (d) donated educational materiels. Romania
prepared to being work on a $16 million steel plant for which it
is providing some financing. Some 1,300 East European economic
personnel were stationed in Mozambique during 1982, commanding
hard currency payments estimated at $25 million annually for 25X1
their home governments.
Mozambique's Cuban connection has evolved into a relation-
ship that is characterized by good rapport from the leadership
level down. About 1,000 Cubans worked in Mozambique on
agricultural, medical, and educational projects; governed by a 25X1
series of agreements signed in the mid-1970s.
Even with Communist assistance, Mozambique has made scant
headway in filling the void left by the departure of nearly
200,000 Protuguese who were in the country before independence.
Production of key export crops--cashews, sugar, and cotton--is at
about half of pre-independence levels, manufacturing output is at
about half of capacity, and the prospects for economic recovery
soon are poor. Increasing rebel activity dampens prospects for
an increase in foreign investment and major development projects
are falling by the wayside. 25X1
South Yemen
The USSR values South Yemen both for its strategic location
and its Marxist politics, and maintains its position in Aden
because it is the major provider of arms and military technical
assistance. In 1982, the USSR provided Aden with an advanced
variant of the SU-22 fighter/bomber that will upgrade pilot
training and ground attack-capabilities, MI-8 helicopters, an
OSA-II guided missile patrol boat (plus STYX missiles), a torpedo
retriever, and armored personnel carriers. Nevertheless, Soviet
arms deliveries dropped by more than half from the 1981 level to
$55 million, as shipments unde 850 million in agreements signedxl
in the late 1970s wound down.
Despite his concern over the mounting military debt to the
USSR, President Al-Hasani shows no signs of turning elsewhere for
military assistance. We have received reports that both the
economic and military debt (estimated at $1-1.5 billion) have
been deferred for five years. 25X1
Economic realities, however, threaten to damage South
Yemen's relations with the USSR and its East European allies over
the long term. Dismayed by the lack of economic progress made
since the revolution, President al-Hasani has begun actively to
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seek trade and investment in the West and Saudi Arabia.
Communist-sponsored projects have suffered in comparison to the
limited Western effort in South Yemen. For example, in 1982 an
Italian firm discovered oil in Aden's territorial waters; long-
term Soviet and Romanian land-based efforts have turned up
nothing. Nor has the USSR made much progress on long-awaited
the cost of the powerplant has increased threefold since i-
was originally promised. The Soviets also are encountering
increasing hostility from the local populace because of arrogant
behavior and plundering of South Yemeni markets of consumer
durables and food to send back to the USSR. In spite of the
increasing impatience of South Yemen leaders, in 1982 the USSR
managed to sign agreements to improve Aden port and construct a
satellite receiving station as part- of the Intersputnik
network. Work continued on a fishin port, irrigation projects,
a hospital, and the powerplant. 25X1
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SUBJECT: Communist Aid to Selected States
OGI/IS/CA:C.
Distribution:
Orig -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
8 -
Addressee
CPAS/ILS
NIO/USSR
D/GI, DD/GI
C/ISID
C/IS/CA
OGI/PG
(12 December 1983)
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